Court Orders EPA to Ban Chlorpyrifos: No Escaping Jurisdiction After 10 Years of Delay

Last week, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered EPA to revoke all tolerances for chlorpyrifos within 60 days.  It’s another fairly devastating indictment of the Trump administration.

First of all, the merits were pretty clear.  Clear enough that the administration did not attempt to defend the case on the merits!  The statutory language requires EPA to ban pesticides from use on food products unless:

There is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide.

After many years of delay in responding to a petition to ban chlorpyrifos (the Bush and Obama administrations were not exactly covered in glory in this case, either), the Obama administration did propose to ban chlorpyrifos.  However, before the proposal was finalized, the Trump administration changed course and denied the petition.  Why?  Because:

The science addressing neurodevelopmental effects remains unresolved.

How the administration thought that it could justify denying the petition on the basis of scientific uncertainty, when the statute requires a ban unless the science shows with “certainty” that the product will not cause is just one of those sweet mysteries of how a bureaucracy responds to a force of nature such as Trump or Pruitt.  One might have thought that at least one lawyer at EPA would have pointed out that the rationale for denying the petition was actually an admission that EPA had an obligation to grant the petition!

The outcome turned on whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case.  EPA argued that there was an administrative process for appealing the denial of the petition, that petitioners had failed to exhaust that administrative remedy, and thus that the Court was deprived of jurisdiction.

Distinguishing between jurisdictional rules and claim-processing rules, the Court concluded – rightly, I think – that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.  The Court’s frustration with years of EPA delay certainly played a role in its conclusion:

Over the past decade and more, the EPA has stalled on banning chlorpyrifos, first by largely ignoring a petition properly filed pursuant to law seeking such a ban, then by temporizing in response to repeated orders by this Court to respond to the petition, and, finally, in its latest tactic, by denying outright our jurisdiction to review the ultimate denial of the petition, even while offering no defense on the merits. If Congress’s statutory mandates are to mean anything, the time has come to put a stop to this patent evasion.

Justice delayed is justice denied.

Winston Churchill and Fuel Economy Standards

So the Trump administration has formally proposed to roll back CAFE standards for model years beginning in 2021.  And California has announced its intention to start separately enforcing its own standards if the federal standards are weakened.  Trying to sort it all out, I was somehow reminded of the famous Winston Churchill statement:

Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…

No one who’s thought seriously about the environmental impacts of emissions from cars can really argue that CAFE standards are a good way to go about it.  They are just a way to tax emissions by subterfuge.  In one of the few statements in the proposed rulemaking with which I agree, NHTSA and EPA state that:

There remains no single technology that the majority of vehicles made by the majority of manufacturers can implement at low cost without affecting other vehicle attributes that consumers value more than fuel economy and CO2 emissions.

Well, sure – but consumers don’t face the actual costs imposed by their driving, because the externalities resulting from motor vehicle fuel consumption aren’t factored into the price.  Of course consumers don’t value reductions in emissions.  If emissions were factored into the price of gasoline, consumers would by definition “value” emissions, because they’d be paying for them.

In the power plant context, I’ve long been a supporter of some kind of grand bargain that would trade elimination of New Source Review for either a cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax.  Why not an even grander bargain.  Let’s call it the grandest bargain – an economy-wide carbon tax at really meaningful levels in return for elimination of both NSR and CAFE standards.

I admit that some details would have to be worked out, but I’m just an ideas man.  I’ll leave implementation to Congress.  After all, isn’t the U.S. Senate the world’s greatest deliberative body?

Dog Bites Man: Scott Pruitt Edition

According to Greenwire (subscription required), EPA has acknowledged that it possesses no records providing a factual basis for claims made by Scott Pruitt that GHG emissions are not a primary contributor to global warming.

As we noted in June, EPA opposed a FOIA request seeking documents supporting Pruitt’s statements, and the Court ordered EPA to provide responsive documents.  Except that, apparently, there aren’t any.

Gosh, I’m surprised.  I guess EPA was just waiting for the Red Team – or perhaps it would have been the Blue Team – to complete its work compiling the evidence against anthropogenic climate change.

Massachusetts Passes “Minibus” Clean Energy Bill

On July 31, the Massachusetts Legislature passed H.4857, An Act to Advance Clean Energy.” The bill, released late on July 30, was the result of a compromise between the Senate’s broad, omnibus bill passed in early June and the House’s more modest proposals, passed piecemeal in mid-July. Among other things, the bill:

  • increases opportunities for energy efficiency by expanding the definition of qualifying programs;
  • increases the Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPS”) from 1% to 2% annually from 2020 through 2029, bringing the overall RPS to 35% by 2030;
  • establishes a Clean Peak Standard (“CPS”);
  • sets a storage target goal of 1,000 megawatt hours (“MWh”) by 2025;
  • creates a path for the solicitation of an additional 1,600 megawatts (MW) of off-shore wind;
  • clarifies what information distribution companies must provide to solar net metering customers prior to imposing demand charges;
  • allows distribution companies to consider and solicit for non-wire alternatives for the resiliency of their distribution systems; and
  • requires the Department of Energy Resources (DOER) to study the feasibility of mobile battery storage systems.

While the bill touches upon many issues of interest for stakeholders in the energy arena, the most significant aspects of this bill are the provisions that establish a CPS, create the energy storage target program, and create a path for additional procurements under Section 83C that would double the currently authorized amount of off-shore wind procurements from 1,600 MW to 3,200 MW.

In adopting the CPS, the legislation requires that every retail electric supplier shall provide a “minimum percentage of kilowatt-hours sales to end use customers from clean peak resources.” The concept is similar to the framework currently used for RPS purposes, but in addition to the “clean” requirement, the resource must also be delivered during a defined peak period.  The legislation defines a clean peak resource as “a qualified RPS resource, a qualified energy storage system or a demand response resource that generates, dispatches or discharges energy to the electric distribution system during seasonal peak periods, or alternatively, reduces load on said system.” Details related to the implementation of the CPS program are not well developed in the legislation itself; instead, the Legislature granted broad authority to DOER to promulgate rules to implement the program, including but not limited to the methodology for determining clean peak values, the process by which distribution companies procure clean peak certificates, and alternative compliance mechanisms for retail suppliers. Given the broad discretion afforded DOER in the development of these program rules, and the relatively short time-frame in which to accomplish the task, the stakeholder process around CPS will likely be robust.

In addition to the storage opportunities created by the CPS, the bill also establishes an energy storage target of 1,000 MWh by December 31, 2025. The bill again grants DOER discretion to implement a range of policies to achieve the 1,000 MWh target and to “encourage the cost-effective deployment of energy storage systems.” It also requires distribution companies to report annually, beginning in February 2019, on energy storage installations in their service territories. It is evident from the bill that the Legislature sees storage as a major player on the road to a renewable future, and this program affords storage another opportunity to fulfill that role.

With respect to the authorization to solicit an additional procurement of off-shore wind, the bill directs the DOER to investigate “the necessity, benefits, and costs” of requiring the electric distribution companies to procure an aggregate of 1,600 MW of offshore wind, “in addition to the solicitations and procurements required by section 83C…and may require said additional solicitations…by December 31, 2035.” This section of the legislation also allows DOER to impose additional requirements for these procurements, and expressly mandates that any selection of off-shore wind energy transmission “shall be the most cost-effective mechanism for procuring reliable, low-cost off-shore wind energy transmission service for ratepayers in the commonwealth.” With the regulatory proceedings related to the first 1,600 MW tranche of off-shore wind just getting underway at the Department of Public Utilities, stakeholders will likely be watching and waiting for a sign from DOER of its intent to seek additional procurements under this newly enacted law.

Overall, the bill developed by the House and Senate conferees and ultimately passed by the bodies, is far more modest than that proposed by the Senate in S.2545; the final legislation drops provisions in the Senate version that would have:  eliminated the caps on net metering; established interim CO2 emission targets; potentially expanded the Section 83D procurements; and established market-based mechanisms for CO2 reduction across all sectors, including transportation. Even in its pared down version, the legislation ultimately adopted by the bodies still cements the Commonwealth’s reputation as a leader in energy efficiency and renewable resource development. There can be no doubt, however, that the cumulative effect of increases to the RPS, the creation of the CPS and the potential for doubling the off-shore wind procurements will affect the competitive wholesale electricity markets. The next few years will be interesting as the Commonwealth continues to implement its clean energy policies and the regional electric grid transitions toward a renewable future.

Score One For Rational Regulation: The 2nd Circuit Rejects Environmental and Industry Challenges to EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structure Rule

On Monday, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all challenges to EPA’s cooling water intake structure rule.  Notwithstanding the Court’s rejection of the industry challenges, it’s a big win for industry.  As I noted when the rule was promulgated, industry dodged a major bullet when EPA decided not to require closed-cycle cooling at existing facilities.

The decision is really all about Chevron deference and is another bit of evidence in support of my ongoing effort to demonstrate that conservatives might want to be careful what they wish for when they discuss overruling Chevron.

The most significant element of the decision was the holding that EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis in the rule was consistent with the CWA.  While at some level this was merely an extension of the Supreme Court’s holding in Entergy v. Riverkeeper, it’s nonetheless an important decision in its support for EPA’s approach to cost-benefit analysis in the rule.

Overall, I think the case represents a rare breath of good news on the environmental front.  EPA’s rule was, on balance, a model of good rulemaking.  EPA spent a lot of time taking comment from and listening to the regulated community.  It ultimately issued a rule that imposed stringent standards on the facilities that – literally – use 99.8% of all water withdrawn for industrial purposes in the United States, while giving those facilities substantial flexibility in how to meet the standards.  The Court applied Chevron deference to EPA’s statutory interpretation and traditional APA deference to EPA’s conclusions from the record, and affirmed EPA across the board.

Might I suggest that this is how rulemaking and judicial review are supposed to work?

The D.C. Circuit Holds that Hydroelectric Facilities May Not Ignore Historic Impacts In Relicensing

Earlier this month, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision that is a must-read for anyone who will be needing at some point to relicense an existing hydroelectric facility.  The short version is the status quo may no longer be good enough and dam operators may have to improve on existing conditions in order to succeed in relicensing.  At a minimum, facility operators will have to take the cumulative impacts of dam operation into account in performing environmental assessments under NEPA required for relicensing.

The case involves a series of dams on the Coosa River operated by the Alabama Power Company.  The licenses were due to expire in 2007.  Alabama Power timely applied to renew the licenses.  FERC duly issued an environmental assessment and issued a FONSI, a Finding of No Significant Impact.  Later, in 2012, the Fish & Wildlife Service, issued a biological opinion that relicensing would not “jeopardize” any threated or listed species.  In 2013, FERC issued a new license.  In response to a request from Alabama Power, FERC granted a request by Alabama Power to loosen a critical condition in the license concerning the maintenance of dissolved oxygen levels.  The litigation followed.

It’s a long and complicated opinion.  Here are the highlights.

First, with respect to the biological opinion, FWS “acknowledged the precarious state of certain species in the area.”  Nonetheless, FWS “failed to incorporate the environmental baseline into its jeopardy analysis.”  The Court concluded that this was a no-no:

Even where baseline conditions already jeopardize a species, an agency may not take action that deepens the jeopardy by causing additional harm.

It did not help that the Biological Opinion predicted 100% mortality for certain listed species.  Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court held that BiOp failed to “explain how a one hundred percent incidental take for multiple species is not likely to result in jeopardy.”

FERC’s NEPA environmental assessment did not fare any better; the Court concluded that it was “rife with flaws.”  In its analysis of fish passage issues, the Court could not resist this pithy summary:

The Commission’s acceptance, hook, line, and sinker, of Alabama Power’s outdated estimates, without any interrogation or verification of those numbers is, in a word, fishy. And it is certainly unreasoned.

The most important aspect of the Court’s decision probably concerns its discussion of cumulative impacts, because it is the one that may be more broadly applicable to other relicensing proceedings.  The Court made clear that cumulative impacts include “all past impacts of the dams’ construction and operation, including the enduring or ongoing effects of past actions.”  Because the analysis of the Coosa River dams failed to do so, the Court concluded that it violated NEPA.

These cases are fact-intensive and what the Court found here may not be applicable in other situations.  I don’t see the Supreme Court thinking that it needs to hear this case.  Thus, whatever one might think of it on the merits, it’s going to be an important case in this area for some time.

Two Strikes Against Climate Plaintiffs; the New York Case Is Dismissed.

On Thursday, Judge John Keenan dismissed New York City’s climate damages law suit against five oil majors.  The basis for the decision was the same as in last month’s decision dismissing similar claims in California:

  • Because climate change is an interstate and international problem, such claims cannot be resolved under state law; if such claims are valid, they must be brought under federal common law.
  • The City’s claims interfere with the separation of powers and the conduct of foreign policy, because the claims relate to international emissions of greenhouse gases.

That’s pretty much it.  Two more points.  First, as in California, the City argued that its claims were not displaced by the CAA, because they related to the oil companies’ production and marketing of fossil fuels, not the emissions that resulted from their combustion.  The Court wasn’t buying it:

Regardless of the manner in which the City frames its claims in its opposition brief, the amended complaint makes clear that the City is seeking damages for global-warming related injuries resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, and not only the production of Defendants’ fossil fuels.

Second, the City argued that, if federal claims are displaced, then it should be able to bring state law claims.  However, as the Court noted:

The City has not sued under New York law for claims related to the production of fossil fuels in New York.  The City brings claims for damages caused by global greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the combustion of Defendants’ fossil fuels, which are produced and used “worldwide.”

Case dismissed.  I expect plaintiffs to keep trying, certainly as long as the administration blocks federal regulatory action.  Still, it’s hard to see the path forward for these cases at this point.  Only two strikes, but the plaintiffs seem to be out for now.

Brick/Clay MACT: Environmentalists in a TKO Over Industry

Earlier this month, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on challenges to EPA’s National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the brick and clay industries.  The Court granted the environmentalists’ petitions almost in their entirety and denied the industry petitions in their entirety.

The decision is not really surprising, because EPA had failed to justify a number of the decisions that it made.  Nonetheless, I don’t see the decision as a total loss for the regulated community.  Why not?  Chevron, that’s why!  The Court affirmed several of EPA’s interpretations of the statutory requirements that were favorable to the regulated community.  For example, the Court deferred to EPA’s interpretations of the statutory terms in section 112(d)(4) of the statute, providing that EPA may implement a health threshold-based emissions limit for “pollutants for which a health threshold has been established.”  The environmental plaintiffs still prevailed on their challenge, but only because, even under EPA’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, the record did not support EPA’s determination.

Even more significantly for future EPA decision-making, the Court affirmed EPA’s deference in determining how to include an “ample margin of safety” in setting health thresholds.  This is a critical issue in the Clean Air Act.  The question before the Court was whether EPA may comply with the requirement to provide an “ample margin of safety by including conservative assumptions in setting the threshold or whether, even after setting a conservative threshold, EPA must include “ample margin of safety” beyond the calculated threshold.  The Court agreed with EPA that it is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory requirement to make conservative assumptions in setting the threshold and that it did not need to provide an extra margin of safety beyond the calculated threshold.  (Once more, EPA lost on the merits, but only because the record indicated that EPA did not provide any margin of safety.)

I think that this is potentially a really important issue.  Those of us who represent regulated industries have complained for years about EPA’s tendency to pile conservative assumption on top of conservative assumption, leading to standards that seem to bear no real connection to any reasonable calculation of the risks actually posed by a compound or a situation.  The decision here seems to strike the perfect balance, requiring the agencies to comply with the statutory requirement to include an ample margin of safety, but not requiring the agencies to make every possible conservative assumption.

An ample margin of safety does not necessitate a risk-free world under the most conservative assumptions possible.

I just hope that this administration does not forget that it really does face statutory requirements to provide an ample margin of safety, even if it has some flexibility in how that margin is determined.

WOTUS: Legal Issue or Scientific Issue?

Last week, EPA and the Army Corps issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in support of their efforts to get rid of the Obama WOTUS rule.  It’s a shrewd but cynical document.  It’s shrewd, because it fairly effectively shifts the focus from the scientific question to the legal question.  Instead of asking what waters must be regulated to ensure that waters of the United States are protected, it asks what are the jurisdictional limits in the Clean Water Act.

It’s cynical, because, by failing to take on the science behind the 2015 rule, which seemed fairly persuasive to me, EPA and the Corps avoid the hard regulations necessary to protect our waters while clothing themselves in feel-good words about the integrity of the statute and the important role given to states under the Clean Water Act.

Part of the beauty of the SNPR is the way it carefully navigates between whether the broader jurisdictional interpretation taken by the 2015 rule is prohibited under the Clean Water Act or simply not required under the Clean Water Act.

The agencies are also concerned that the 2015 Rule lacks sufficient statutory basis. The agencies are proposing to conclude in the alternative that, at a minimum, the interpretation of the statute adopted in the 2015 Rule is not compelled, and a different policy balance can be appropriate.

I’m not sure I agree with the administration’s interpretation of the scope of the CWA, but it’s not crazy.  If I had to bet, I’d assume that it would survive judicial review.

The problem is that this simplistic legal approach ignores the science and ignores the missions of both EPA and the Corps.  If the 2015 rule is more protective of the nation’s waters, and if there are questions about the scope of jurisdiction under the CWA, then shouldn’t the administration be asking Congress to clarify EPA’s and the Corps’ authority so that they can regulate in a manner consistent with what good science says is necessary to protect the waters of the United States?

I’m not holding my breath.

Challenging EPA NPDES Permitting Decisions Is Really An Uphill Battle.

The decision last week in City of Taunton v. EPA did not break any new ground, but it is certainly a reminder of just how much of an uphill battle it is to challenge an NPDES permit.

The City of Taunton challenged EPA’s decision to include a numeric limit for nitrogen in Taunton’s renewed permit.  The Court rejected all of Taunton’s challenges in a tone that, while not explicitly disdainful, certainly gives one the impression that it wished that the City had not wasted so much of the Court’s precious time.

Here are just some of the reasons why such challenges are so difficult:

  • Deference is given both to EPA’s permitting decision and to the EAB’s affirmance of that decision.
  • The “scientific and technical nature of the EPA’s decisionmaking” increases the level of deference.
  • The courts (for now!) grant Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute and Auer deference to its interpretation of its regulations.
  • EPA has authority to regulate discharges that merely have a “reasonable potential” to cause – or contribute to – an exceedance of a water quality standard.  EPA’s interpretation of this phrase – which of course is given Auer deference – is that is means “some degree of certainty greater than a mere possibility.”  Can you say “precautionary principle”?!
  • “EPA is required to exercise its judgment even in the face of some scientific uncertainty.”
  • Thus, EPA need not prove causation, both because it may regulate under uncertainty and because it may regulate where a discharge merely “contributes” to a water quality exceedance.
  • EPA need not – and in fact may not – delay permit issuance in order to get better data and eliminate uncertainty.

I used to say that the arbitrary and capricious standard means that the agency wins even if it’s wrong, so long as it’s not crazy wrong.  Now, I’m not even sure that the standard is that stringent.

WOTUS, SCHMOTUS. Can the Corps Reach a Reasoned Jurisdictional Determination In Less Than 12 Years?

The debate over the definition of “Waters of the United States” goes on and on.  I tend to think that Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test was a reasonable approach to making sense of a vague statute.  I also think that the Obama administration definitional rule was supported by good science.

What we sometimes lose track of in the ongoing debate is that the definition – whatever we choose – matters, that ordinary citizens’ use of their property is affected by how the Corps applies the rule, and that the current system fails to provide anything near the level of reasonable certainty that we’re entitled to expect.

Exhibit A?  Orchard Hill Building Company v. US Army Corps of Engineers, in which the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals just vacated a District Court judgment and ordered the Corps to revisit its determination that the plaintiff’s wetlands constitute Waters of the United States.  Orchard Hill originally asked for a jurisdictional determination in 2006.  It’s now 2018.  The case still isn’t over, because the Corps has yet another shot at determining whether the wetlands at issue are in fact jurisdictional.

Would it be rhetorical excess to argue that delays such as this help explain why President Trump is in fact President Trump?  May I at least suggest that such delays undermine respect for the regulatory system?

One final note, just to confirm that I haven’t gone over to the dark side.  One of the arguments that the Obama administration made in support of the WOTUS rule was precisely that it would provide a lot more certainty and thus eliminate many such delays.  I happen to think that they were right – though it’s also true that some of the presumptions in the Obama WOTUS rule were challenged from the left as not being sufficiently protective.

Sometimes I think that the perfect is the enemy of the good.  Sometimes I think that our entire political system is the enemy of the good.  And I’m an optimist!

Thanks For Proving Me Right, Rhode Island!

Late last month, when I reported on the dismissal of the California climate change public nuisance litigation, I stated boldly that we should not expect advocates to stop trying.  I did not really think I was going out on a limb with that prediction, but I also did not know that I’d be proved correct so quickly.  Less than a week later, on July 2, the State of Rhode Island brought its own public nuisance claim.

Time will tell whether Rhode Island fares any better than California.

One final note.  I just loved this response from Lindsey de la Torre, executive director of the National Association of Manufacturers “Manufacturers’ Accountability Project.” 

It’s time for politicians and trial lawyers to put an end to this frivolous litigation.

The response itself is pretty much what one would expect, but who knew that the NAM had created something called the “Manufacturers’ Accountability Project.”  Somewhere, George Orwell is smiling grimly.

The Dutch Government Also Doesn’t Like Citizen Climate Litigation

As a follow-up to my June 27 post about the dismissal of public nuisance claims brought by the City of Oakland and the State of California against five oil majors concerning their contribution to climate change, I note that ClimateWire (subscription required) is reporting that the Dutch government is appealing a court order that would require it to cut carbon emissions by 25 percent by 2030.  

The Dutch case is more similar to the Oregon children’s suit than Oakland litigation, because the Oregon case, like the Dutch case, is against the government, seeking further regulation, rather than against private parties, seeking damages.  All of these cases, though, present some of the same concerns regarding whether courts are the right place to make climate policy, as noted by the Dutch government spokesman, quoted in ClimateWire:

We also believe that renewable energy should be increased and CO2 emissions should be reduced, so this is really about something else: It’s about how the judge has intervened in something that’s [called] democracy, and actually democracy has been sidelined.

It would be nice if democracy could show a greater capacity for addressing climate change, but I still agree that sidelining democracy is rarely a good thing.  Of course, there are good scientific reasons why democracies don’t do so well at dealing with climate change.  Appeals to the courts may be unavoidable.

Still No Judicial Remedy For Climate Change — Don’t Expect Advocates To Stop Trying

On Monday, Judge William Alsup dismissed the public nuisance case brought by the City of Oakland and the State of California against five major oil companies.  The suit sought payment of damages into a fund to be used for necessary adaptation expenditures to deal with sea level rise.  

Why did he dismiss the case?  Simple.  The courts are not the right forum in which to address the problems of climate change.  The more complicated answer?  Because AEP v. Connecticut held that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law claims for greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and because claims with respect to sales by the defendants outside of the United States could not be addressed by a U.S. court without violating the presumption against giving extraterritorial effect to U.S. laws.

Here, plaintiffs seek to impose liability on five companies for their production and sale of fossil fuels worldwide. These claims — through which plaintiffs request billions of dollars to abate the localized effects of an inherently global phenomenon — undoubtedly implicate the interests of countless governments, both foreign and domestic. The challenged conduct is, as far as the complaints allege, lawful in every nation. And, as the United States aptly notes, many foreign governments actively support the very activities targeted by plaintiffs’ claims. Nevertheless, plaintiffs would have a single judge or jury in California impose an abatement fund as a result of such overseas behavior. Because this relief would effectively allow plaintiffs to govern conduct and control energy policy on foreign soil, we must exercise great caution.

This order fully accepts the vast scientific consensus that the combustion of fossil fuels has materially increased atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, which in turn has increased the median temperature of the planet and accelerated sea level rise. But questions of how to appropriately balance these worldwide negatives against the worldwide positives of the energy itself, and of how to allocate the pluses and minuses among the nations of the world, demand the expertise of our environmental agencies, our diplomats, our Executive, and at least the Senate.  Nuisance suits in various United States judicial districts regarding conduct worldwide are far less likely to solve the problem and, indeed, could interfere with reaching a worldwide consensus.

I couldn’t have said it better myself.  I’ve always thought that these types of suits are not the way to address climate change.  I’ve recently acknowledged that, if the current administration continues to rely on fake news to formulate its position on climate change, courts at some point might conclude that the exigencies of the situation require them to act.  For now, we haven’t reached that point, and I hope we never do.