Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

In the category of dog bites man, EPA today announced it was granting the State of California a waiver that will allow California to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. The granting of the waiver was expected after Obama’s election and became pretty much inevitable after the administration announced in February that it was reconsidering the waiver request.

Substantively, it is not clear that the waiver matters that much, given the announcement on May 19 of the “grand bargain” among California, the federal government, and automakers to improve fuel economy nationwide. The real significance of today’s notice is that it is further evidence of a coordinated national strategy by the administration to address climate change. Although the administration has not yet finalized its endangerment finding with respect to GHGs, EPA’s notice today stated in part that California had a need to regulate GHG due to “compelling and extraordinary conditions”  resulting from the cumulative impacts of GHG on California and the US as a whole. Sounds like endangerment to me.

In other words, in light of the close vote in the House on the Waxman-Markey bill, interest groups on both sides of the bill should keep in mind their BATNA – one acronym that has stuck with me in 25 years since the Kennedy School – their best alternative to a negotiated agreement.  If there isn’t a bill, is there any doubt at this point that EPA will regulate GHGs on the basis of existing authority? Furthermore, is there any doubt that such regulations would be uglier, messier, more complicated, and less efficient than whatever might come out of Congress?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

While some of my colleagues are laboring in the climate change vineyards (and we should have posts soon summarizing the House bill), I thought I would note another interesting enforcement decision issued this week.  United States v. Oliver is, in some respects, a run of the mill decision.  A mom-and-pop medical waste incinerator (the adjective is the court’s not mine; it does give one pause) failed for several years to comply with EPA regulations governing such facilities.  EPA sought and obtained a permanent injunction ceasing facility operations until the defendants can demonstrate to the satisfaction of EPA and the court that it can comply with the applicable regulations.

The interesting part of the decision relates to the Court’s imposition of a penalty.  EPA took the position that the Court should presume that the maximum penalty should be imposed, citing Pound v. Airosol and United States v. B & W Inv. Properties. Doing so in this case would have generated a penalty of $220,080,000 before any mitigation were considered. That EPA itself only sought a penalty of $445,000 demonstrates the absurdity of even starting with the maximum penalty. The court, noting that the defendant had two employees and was poorly capitalized, stated that the size of the business argued for a penalty “far smaller” than what the government sought.

The court also considered, as a separate factor, the impact of the penalty on business operations. While previously noting that the defendants showed no real likelihood of being able to come into compliance, the court nonetheless noted that imposition of a large penalty would pretty much make it impossible for the defendants to operate in compliance with applicable regulations, and therefore concluded “that the penalty should be dramatically lower than the amount sought by the United States.”  The court imposed a $75,000 penalty.

I’m not sure I’d read too much into this decision, but it does give defendants a basis for arguing that courts should not start with the maximum statutory amount in determining an appropriate penalty.  It also puts the defendant’s ability to pay front and center in the penalty calculus.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In an interesting case, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit this week vacated most of a preliminary injunction issued by a federal judge in Puerto Rico, because, the Court concluded, the lower court had wrongly, and without doing so explicitly, converted a PI hearing into a hearing on the merits.

In Sanchez v. Esso, a gasoline station operator brought RCRA citizen suit claims against Esso, which supplied gasoline to the station, and which actually was the owner of the USTs in which the gasoline was stored. Plaintiffs requested a PI requiring Esso both to assess and to remediate the contamination resulting from leaks in the tanks. After the District Court issued the PI, Esso sought interlocutory relief.  The Court of Appeals vacated most of the injunction.

As the Court of Appeals noted:

[w]hen a trial court ‘disposes of a case on the merits after a preliminary-injunction hearing … it is likely that one or more of the parties will not present their entire case….  Therefore, it is ordinarily improper to decide a case solely on such a basis. 

Reviewing the District Court proceedings, the Court of Appeals pointed to District Court’s statement that the Esso “appear[ed] to be in continuous violation” of the applicable regulations.  Moreover, following issuance of the injunction, Esso had asked the District Court to require the plaintiffs to post a bond.  The District Court denied the request on the ground that:

"'the grant of the preliminary injunction carried[d] no risk of monetary loss" for Esso in the face of the "documented" contamination resulting from Esso’s "violation of regulatory safeguards."

The District Court also made statements to the effect that the only issue going forward was the “extent” of Esso’s liability.

The Court of Appeals concluded that it was “inescapable” that the District Court pre-judged Esso’s ultimate liability.  Aside from the District Court’s conclusory statements about liability, the District Court also failed to address the traditional factors required for issuance of a PI.  This was “a clear error of law.”

It is unclear what impact this case will have. However, RCRA, like most environmental statutes, has an element of strict liability.  The strict liability nature of these statutes often makes it too easy for courts – and perhaps regulators at times? – simply to assume that a defendant is liable, without worrying about the sometimes messy process of discovery and the taking of evidence.  Sanchez v. Esso thus serves as a welcome reminder that even in a world of strict liability, a defendant remains entitled to his day in court.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

For those of you who cannot get enough of Superfund, I spoke at a Boston Bar Association panel on this subject yesterday about the implications of the Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern decision. Thanks to EPA Region I and Joanna Jerison, head of the Region I Superfund Legal Office, for being willing to speak on so obviously sore a subject. And thanks to Craig Campbell for participating on the panel as well.

As you can see from her presentation and mine, it appears that EPA and the private bar do not yet have a common understanding of the implications of the case. Isn’t that a surprise?

I still think, as I said at the meeting, that never has the Supreme Court done so much by doing so little. With respect to the divisibility issue, which is of the greatest long-run significance, the Court explicitly did not change the law at all. And yet …. We all know that they did. Now, instead of divisibility being an insuperable hurdle, it should become something like routine.

Or so I hope.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

At the fourth auction of CO₂ allowances under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) on June 17, participation was certified as robust by market monitor Potomac Economics, but auction prices decreased. Last week’s clearing price for 2009 vintage CO₂ allowances was $3.23 per allowance, only slightly above the clearing price of $3.07 at RGGI's initial auction in September 2008, and below March’s clearing price of $3.51.  The 2.1 million 2012 vintage allowances offered for sale in last week’s action sold for $2.06, almost one-third below the $3.05 price that they earned at the March auction, which was the first at which these later vintage allowances were offered for sale.  

RGGI, Inc. has released the range of bid prices from the fourth auction, allowing some insight into how CO₂ is valued by the players in these auctions.  Bid prices for the 2009 vintage allowances ranged from $1.86 (the minimum clearing price) to $12.00, up $2 from the maximum bid in the March auction, while bids for the 2012 vintage allowances ranged from $1.86 to $3.84, down from March’s high bid price of $4.40. Participation in the 2009 vintage offering remained high at 54 entities, while participation in the 2012 vintage auction was down from March’s 20 entities to only 13.

Interestingly, the share of non-compliance entities (persons not regulated under RGGI) who participated in the 2012 vintage auction rose this time, with only 62% of the bids submitted in that auction coming from compliance entities (power plants regulated under RGGI).  Even so, regulated generators and their affiliates continued the trend from previous auctions of winning the vast majority of the allowances – 85% of 2009 allowances and 81% of 2012.

The difference in the clearing price for the 2009 vintage and the 2012 vintage is not surprising. RGGI allowances may be banked without limitation and used in future years, making the 2009 allowances more valuable than later vintages.  What is notable is the drop in both participation in the 2012 vintage allowance and the clearing price (nearly 33% less than it was only 3 months ago). It seems that many market participants are uncertain about the value of the 2012 allowances, given the possibility that RGGI may be replaced by a national cap-and-trade program whose provisions are not yet known. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In 1992, in South Carolina Coastal Council v. Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a state statute or regulation that denies a property owner all economic use of her property requires payment of just compensation under the Takings Clause. The Court distinguished statutes and regulations from restrictions inherent in background principles of the common law of nuisance – the latter types of restrictions do not require just compensation.

The Supreme Court announced earlier this week that in the fall 2009 term it will hear another, similar, property rights case. The Court will hear an appeal of a decision by the Florida Supreme Court holding that a beach erosion control statute did not unconstitutionally deprive landowners of their property rights without just compensation. 

The facts in Stop the Beach Replenishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection are somewhat obscure and relate specifically to the consequences of beach replenishment in Florida. However, it again does raise the question of how the Supreme Court treats statutes. Prior to the 1960s, governments pretty much regulated nuisances pursuant to common law police power. Apparently, exercise of such power has the constitutional blessing of the Supreme Court.

On the other hand – to note the obvious – since the 1960s, across the gamut of environmental police power issues, use of statute and regulation has overtaken reliance on the common law. For some reason, however, constitutional jurisprudence has not caught up with reality on the ground. The whole idea of the common law is that it is flexible and changes over time. Is there any doubt that, had there not been an explosion of environmental statutes and regulations, there would have been an explosion in the development of the common law of nuisance? It seems near certain that courts would have identified numerous additional uses of property over the past 40 years that would now be considered nuisances.

Why should the same regulatory outcome require compensation if taken pursuant to statute or regulations, but not if it occurs as a result of judge-made common law?   

(In the interests of full disclosure, the broad question of how courts treat statutes, as opposed to the otherwise developing common law, was raised by my then-Professor Guido Calabresi in his 1982 book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes.  Judge Calabresi, your student has not forgotten.)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Thinking about how to take advantage of funding for energy efficiency retrofits from the federal stimulus package, state-level programs like Massachusetts’ Green Communities Act, or even utility-funded programs?  You should also think about whether your actions will create another income stream – offsets under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) – and whether taking funds will prohibit the creation of offsets when the project is finished.

RGGI, Inc. this week released model applications for offset projects which could create interesting incentives if implemented by each of the RGGI states. Unlike some of the offset provisions proposed under ACES, all of the RGGI offset categories are outside of the electric generation sector that RGGI regulates. The 5 categories of emission reductions that are eligible for offsets in RGGI include landfill methane capture and destruction; reductions in sulfur hexafluoride in the electricity transmission and distribution sector; sequestration of carbon due to afforestation; avoided methane emissions from agricultural manure management, and, most interestingly, reductions or avoidance in CO₂ emissions from natural gas, oil or propane in residential or commercial facilities due to energy efficiency in the building sector. 

RGGI has a notoriously strict stance on additionality which certainly shows in the application for energy efficiency offsets. To qualify, the applicant must certify that the project did not receive any funding or incentives from any state run programs or programs funded with RGGI auction proceeds. Given that a large portion of the money from RGGI auctions is being directed by the states toward energy efficiency improvements, being able to provide this certification may be difficult. The application also notes that any renewable portfolio standard (RPS) attributes generated by the offset project must be transferred to the state regulatory agency, rather than sold separately. 

Energy efficiency projects that can qualify for offsets are not necessarily complex. The types of energy efficiency projects that can qualify for offsets include:

• Improvements in the energy efficiency of combustion equipment that provides space heating and hot water, including a reduction in fossil fuel consumption through the use of solar and geothermal energy
• Improvements in the efficiency of heating distribution systems, including proper sizing
• Installation or improvement of energy management systems
• Improvement in the efficiency of hot water distribution systems, including reduction in demand for hot water
• Measures that improve the thermal performance of the building and reduce the building envelope air leakage
• Measures that improve the passive solar performance of buildings or utilize active heating systems using renewable energy
• Fuel switching to a less carbon-intensive fuel in combustion systems, including the use of liquid or gaseous eligible biomass (but not conversions to electricity).
  

On the other hand, the projects must achieve very high efficiency gains to qualify. Whole-building energy projects must be 30% above ASHRAE 90.1-2004 standards, and retrofit projects that commenced after January 1, 2009 must show that the energy conservation method they employ has a market penetration rate of less than 5%, although the market or class of buildings can be defined by the applicant. In addition, the baseline from which reductions in CO₂ are measured is based on a combination of the current building code and the actual equipment to be replaced, so not all of the gains from retrofits can be certified as offsets. 

If your summer home improvement efforts this year include upgrading to a state-of-the-art boiler, you didn’t take RGGI funds from the state to do so, and you are persistent enough to endure certification and verification of the reductions, you could qualify for up to 10 years of offset credits to sell to electric generators in the 10-state region. It is certainly something to think about.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

For those who missed it, just a quick note that EPA has once more extended the date by which subject facilities need to prepare or amend SPCC plans to comply with the latest revisions to the applicable regulations. The original compliance date was February 3, 2009; this marks the third time EPA has extended the date.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As we previously noted, last fall Massachusetts proposed sweeping new regulations designed to reduce phosphorus discharges in stormwater. In response to a very large number of comments, MassDEP is taking a second look at the regulations, though the bookies in Las Vegas are laying odds against there being any significant changes made when the regulations reappear.

Now Maryland is also getting into the act, although it is taking a slightly different approach. Under a statute enacted in 2007, developers in Maryland must incorporate the concept of “environmental site design” into their plans. ESD means

using small-scale stormwater management practices, nonstructural techniques, and better site planning to mimic natural hydrologic runoff characteristics and minimize the impact of land development on water resources.

The Maryland statute will be enforced by counties and municipalities. Therefore, the Maryland Department of the Environment has released a Model Stormwater Management Ordinance for use by local governments in implementing the statute.

As one of the contentious issues in the Massachusetts debate has been when redevelopment would subject a property to the requirements of the regulations, it is notable that the Maryland ordinance defines redevelopment as

any construction, alteration, or improvement performed on sites where existing land use is commercial, industrial, institutional, or multifamily residential and existing site impervious area exceeds 40 percent. [Emphasis added.]

To that, I can only say, uh-oh.

One final note on stormwater – Oregon just enacted legislation limiting the phosphorus content of certain soaps.  This is not significant in its own right. However, in Massachusetts, many of the comments from developers and industrial interests noted that the types of stormwater controls proposed by MassDEP may not be the most cost-effective way to reduce nutrient loading to water bodies, and specifically suggested that programs targeted at consumers using products containing nutrients might be a better way to attack the problem in the first instance.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

According to a quote from House Energy and Commerce Chairman Henry Waxman in an E&E article this morning, the Waxman-Markey bill could reach a floor vote inside of 3 weeks.  Speaker Pelosi had set a deadline of next Friday, June 19, for the 8 House Committees still evaluating HR 2454 to conclude their review, but has not indicated when Democrats will bring the legislation to the House floor.  Waxman said yesterday that he wants debate to begin on June 22 and the bill to go to a vote before the July Fourth recess -- "I think the speaker and the majority leader and the administration agree with that timing, and we're going to do all we can to stick to it because after we come back from the July Fourth recess, it is health care for the rest of the month."

The tension in scheduling the Administration's dual priorities of energy and health care seems to be an issue.  Ways & Means Chairman Charles Rangel reported that in the Democratic committee members' meeting with the President this week , the President did not give lawmakers a specific deadline for sending him a climate bill -- a marked contrast with the firm deadline for health care legislation.  Rangel told reporters that in order to concentrate on both climate and health care, the Ways & Means Committee might skip markup of the climate bill and instead work out their concerns with Chairman Waxman before a floor vote or during floor vote, via amendments.

What the bill will look like when when it reaches the floor is still under discussion.  One committee expected to offer substantial amendments on hot-button issues like biofuels and offsets is the House Agriculture Committee.   While the offsets debate may be even more heated than that for the allocation of credits, biofuels may be the first amendment offered.  As Climate Wire reported Wednesday, House Agriculture Committee members are considering a legislative fix for EPA's proposed regulation of biofuels.  At EPA's public hearing on the recent proposal, which involves the requirement of a 100-year long lifecycle analysis for biofuels international impact, testimony from both biofuel advocates and environmentalists urged changes.  Particularly since the lifecycle emissions of petroleum production are not evaluated in the same way, calculation of biofuels' carbon footprints will have a huge impact on whether the Congressional mandate to ramp up biofuel use to 36 billion gallons a year by 2022 can be met. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I know it’s hard to believe, but some of you may not have realized that today is World Oceans Day. In connection with World Oceans Day, Senator Jay Rockefeller has written a letter to the White House in support of the concept of “ocean zoning.” Senator Rockefeller will also be holding hearings on the issue tomorrow. Among those testifying will be Deerin Babb-Brott, who is the Assistant Secretary in the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs and is in charge of Massachusetts’ first in the nation ocean zoning effort.

The Massachusetts effort is based on the Oceans Act of 2008, which called for development of a comprehensive ocean management plan. In other words, ocean zoning. Since enactment of the Act, EOEEA has been working on developing the required plan, with assistance from the Ocean Advisory Commission, which was created by the Act to help guide EOEEA’s development of the plan. The plan has yet to issue and, based on recent documents from EOEEA, it may be some time before the final plan sees the light of day.

Notwithstanding the complexities of the issue – or perhaps because of them – Senator Rockefeller apparently believes that federal ocean zoning would be appropriate. He may be right. Issues such as renewable energy and deepwater aquaculture may be of local concern, but do we really want a patchwork of local laws and regulations dictating policy on issues of broad national concern?  If we go that route, it won’t be very long before there is a yet more complicated set of exemptions and preemptions.

I’m sure that Deerin will not be advocating federal preemption of local ocean zoning efforts, but there is a part of me that hopes that Deerin’s testimony is so effective that he talks himself out of a job.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Congressional testimony last month, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson apparently told Congress that amendments to the CAA may be necessary in order to ensure that any revised CAIR rule issued by EPA would be safe from legal challenge.  The testimony is not really a surprise. Anyone reading the decision striking down the original CAIR rule would understand that the Court had concluded that the cap-and-trade program promulgated under CAIR was not authorized by the CAA.

Like the situation posed by EPA’s obligation to address climate change endangerment following the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the threat of further litigation and court mandates may be the best hope of getting something done.  EPA is expected to issue a new rule in 2010 and if the agency does not have legislative authority for a cap-and-trade program, then we’re going to see a command-and-control rule. The unattractiveness of that possibility may be what’s necessary to get the legislation sought by EPA.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last week, Judge Larry McKinney issued an order requiring to shut down three coal-fired generating units at its Wabash Station facility by no later than September 30, 2009. The decision actually struck me as a thoughtful analysis of injunctive relief issues in a situation where a violation of NSR regulations had already been proven. Although the decision has gotten most press for the order shutting down the units, it covers a number of issues important to injunctive relief situations, and there are some nuggets which are potentially useful to generators; it is not a one-sided decision. Here are some highlights:

The shut-down order – although significant, is not as earth-shattering as it seems. Cinergy gave the judge little choice by testifying that it would not be economic to install pollution controls on the units, given their age and size. The fight was thus about when, not whether, the units would be shut down. The judge was clearly annoyed that, following the liability finding, Cinergy had seemingly taken no action to plan for a shut-down. The judge, in response to reliability concerns, did allow the units to operate through the summer of 2009.

Irreparable harm discussion – a few noteworthy aspects here

The court relied on modeling which demonstrated that Wabash emissions contributed to PM_2.5 levels downwind

The court noted that contributions of “just a few tenths of a ug“ can be significant when an area is on the border between compliance and noncompliance.

Like the court in the TVA injunctive relief case we posted about earlier this year, the court specifically noted that adverse health affects can occur at levels below the NAAQS

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that acid deposition and mercury emissions from Wabash had caused irreparable harm, concluding “that Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient nexus between the relevant excess emissions and the negative … effects. 

In a win for generators, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ position that BACT for NO_x emissions in 1989 was SCR technology. This is an important issue, because EPA and the states will sometimes try to take the position that unproven technologies are nonetheless BACT. The decision squarely rejects that argument.

Surrender of SO₂ allowances. The court required Cinergy to surrender SO₂ allowances equal to the excess emissions from the May 2008 jury verdict to the time the units are shut-down. However, it is important to note that the Plaintiffs had requested that the court order Cinergy to install BACT on larger units at the Station that had not violated NSR rules. The court rejected that argument, noting that the Plaintiffs’ proposal “does not bear an equitable relationship to the degree and kind of harm it is intended to remedy …. Imposition of such a remedy is punitive in nature.”

In sum, although the decision is important, it is not surprising in context. Indeed, the finding on BACT, which was favorable to Cinergy, may have the most precedential significance.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link