Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

In a story from today’s Daily Environment Report, Cynthia Giles, the new Assistant Administrator for Enforcement at EPA, stated that she was looking increase the number of criminal investigators at EPA, noting that

Criminal enforcement is a very important part of our arsenal in achieving compliance and has a powerful deterrent effect. It's important to us that we're out there and that we pursue the criminal cases.

There’s no doubt that, in a simplistic way, she is correct. Generally speaking, as the plausible threat of enforcement increases, the amount of noncompliance will be expected to decrease. However, for criminal enforcement to be a truly useful enforcement tool, EPA has to communicate clearly and unambiguously what conduct constitutes a criminal violation of environmental laws and what does not. Where language is ambiguous and interpretations shift, criminal enforcement only works as the roughest kind of hammer. It may decrease noncompliance, but it will also decrease productive, compliant, economic activity, because the risk posed by uncertainty will not be worth the reward.

Anecdotal evidence is always dangerous, but from where I sit, the risk that EPA will fail to wield its bludgeon with due care is substantial.

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In another sign that the NSR program is alive and well under the Obama administration, the United States (together with the State of Illinois, filed suit Thursday against Midwest Generation, alleging violations of NSR requirements at six coal-fired power plants. Although the action is not too surprising, given that the Bush EPA had issued a notice of violation to Midwest Generation in 2007, it remains noteworthy. Each new prosecution serves to remind generators that failure to comply with NSR rules can lead to significant costs.

Of course, that in terrorem effect on other generators is precisely what the administration and environmental groups want. Unfortunately, for those of us who believe that the NSR program is an incredibly wasteful way to reduce air pollution, such litigation only detracts from efforts to make air pollution control regulations more cost-effective.

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Justice Potter Stewart famously said, with respect to obscenity, that “I know it when I see it.” I fear that the test for what constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA is no clearer than Justice Stewart’s subjective test regarding obscenity.

This week, in a decision that is good news for RCRA defendants, Judge Illlston, of the Northern District of California, ruled, in West Coast Home Builders v. Aventis Cropscience USA,  that risks posed by potential future vapor intrusion into buildings from a groundwater plume could not be “imminent and substantial” where no development has yet occurred on the property that is the subject of the litigation. The court was interpreting the Supreme Court’s statement in Meghrig v. KFC Western, to the effect that RCRA “implies that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later.”

Although Judge Illston’s interpretation of Meghrig seems right, other RCRA cases have been allowed to proceed, even though the relationship between the contamination and the exposure have often been equally attenuated. It seems that the court liked the simplicity of a black-letter rule that risks associated with conditions not yet in place can never be imminent.  I am not confident this case will provide much clarity, but even if it only establishes a bright line rule in one narrow corner of the "imminent and substantial endangerment" landscape, that's better than the prior morass.

A developer might reasonably respond to this decision by arguing that such a ruling means that the development will never happen, because no one will finance such a project without knowing that the potential vapor intrusion risk will be addressed. (And a court might respond by saying that that is a problem for Congress to solve, not the courts.)

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According to an article by BNA published this morning, EPA may soon act to apply the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) provisions of the Clean Air Act to facilities that emit more than 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide annually.  Presumably, EPA's action is either an effort to exert leverage on Congress to pass pending climate change legislation or to ensure that GHG are regulated in the event that legislation doesn't pass -- or both.  

Under the Clean Air Act, PSD applies to major new sources, which are defined by their emissions level -- for pollutants in identified industrial sources categories, the threshold is 100 tons per year, while for others it is 250 tons per year.  Assuming that EPA moves forward with its its proposed endangerment finding, the default assumption (and the doomsday scenario presented by the Chamber of Commerce) would be that all GHG sources greater than 250 tons or 100 tons, depending on the source, would be subject to PSD regulations.

As an example, per the General Reporting Protocol's conversion factors, burning only 265.3 tons of coal or 1,173 barrels of fuel oil would produce 250 tons of CO₂.  However, the 25,000 ton threshold is the same used by the EPA in the endangerment finding and its proposed mandatory reporting regulations, so seems likely to be applied here as well.

As we previously noted, the EPA's official current position on this point is still the memorandum issued December 18th by former EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson, which said that since CO₂ is not a regulated pollutant under the Clean Air Act, PSD does not apply.  However, current EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson issued a letter on February 17 stating that the agency will reconsider this position. 

As noted in the BNA article, there is reason to question EPA's authority to exempt small GHG sources from PSD requirements once GHG are found to be pollutants which endanger public health and the environment.  Moreover, EPA's record in defending creative interpretations of the Clean Air Act -- even where they are generally supported, such as in the CAIR regulations -- has not been sterling.  

The entire debate is likely to get messier before it is resolved. 

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Although not breaking any new ground, a decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court last week provides a helpful summary of the discretion typically given to MassDEP in making permitting decisions. In Healer v. Department of Environmental Protection, abutters to a proposed wastewater treatment facility in Falmouth sued MassDEP, claiming that the groundwater discharge from the leach field associated with the facility would damage drinking water supplies and nearby wetlands. The Court affirmed the MassDEP Commissioner’s rejection of the abutters’ challenge.

As the Court noted

the “applicable standard of review is “highly deferential to the agency” and requires the reviewing court to accord “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it…. We give deference to the decision of an agency interpreting its own regulations … [and] do not intrude lightly within the agency’s area of expertise, as long as the regulations are interpreted with reference to their purpose and to the purpose and design of the controlling statute.”

As if that were not enough of a nod towards agency deference, the Court also noted, in the context of the plaintiffs’’ challenge to the monitoring requirements imposed in the permit, that

The Legislature “has chosen to put into the hands of an expert administrative agency the decision making regarding complex issues of environmental … science…, and has allowed the agency considerable discretion in determining monitoring of applicable parameters in order to carry out its duty….

Finally, the Court made at least one statement about the plaintiffs’ affirmative case that is sure to be cited by MassDEP and permittees in future citizen suits. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that toxic household chemicals might cause environmental damage, the Court stated that the “regulations do not require the department to establish permit conditions based on the plaintiffs’ speculative concerns.”

So, what’s the upshot of Healer? It certainly confirms that, as a general matter, courts are not going to reverse agency decisions unless they seem really off-the-wall.  On the other hand, it remains true that MassDEP does not always win and my own jaded view is that courts remain willing to reverse MassDEP, even when deference would require that the court affirm the agency, if the agency decision somehow rubs the court the wrong way.

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As we have reported, EPA and MADEP have both been taking steps over the past year to broaden the scope of their stormwater programs beyond existing regulation under the rules concerning stormwater discharges associated with industrial or construction activity. EPA has proposed using residual designation authority in Maine and Massachusetts and the MADEP proposed sweeping rules governing existing private facilities.

In the regulated community, there has been substantial concern that these efforts have focused too narrowly on private properties, with the MADEP proposed rules, for example, potentially requiring costly retrofits on many properties without consideration of whether there might be more cost-effective ways to control stormwater pollution, such as through increased focus on MS4s.

Based on this week’s news, EPA may have heard these complaints.

On Wednesday, EPA Region I announced enforcement actions against municipalities for violations of MS4 requirements. EPA proposed to fine nine communities in Massachusetts and New Hampshire; EPA also issued orders requiring that the municipalities take certain actions to come into compliance with the MS4 requirements.  Given the current economic climate and the erosion in municipal budgets, the willingness to impose penalties demonstrates EPA’s seriousness in enforcing the MS4 requirements.

So why does the private sector need to remain worried? One word in the first sentence of EPA’s press release says it all: “integrated.”  Wednesday’s enforcement announcement was part of “a new integrated effort” to enforce stormwater requirements.  While this notice was focused on illegal connections to storm sewers, is there any doubt that this is also part of a broader “integrated” effort to attack stormwater pollution more generally?  Now, when EPA and MADEP come calling on the private sector, the agencies can respond to complaints about unequal focus by noting that they have already made municipalities take their medicine; now it’s time for the private sector to do so as well.

Spoonful of sugar, anyone?

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In an important decision yesterday, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the operator facility participating in the renewable portfolio standard program did not have standing to challenge a state decision authorizing other facilities to participate in the RPS program. The decision may have broad implications regarding when businesses may challenge the issuance of permits or other approvals to competitors in Massachusetts.

In Indeck Maine Energy v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, the plaintiffs operated biomass facilities which were authorized to sell renewable energy credits. When the Department of Energy Resources authorized two other biomass facilities to sell RPS credits, plaintiffs sued.

As the SJC noted up front, to establish standing, a plaintiff must “allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred.” At least in Massachusetts, an injury from business competition does not confer standing. However, prior cases held that this rule “does not apply … to competitors in a regulated industry.” The question is thus: What does it mean to be in a regulated industry?

After analyzing the purpose of the RPS statute and its prior cases on this issue, the court came to a relatively simple conclusion:

The question of standing in the context of competitive injury turns not simply on whether an industry is regulated, but rather on how that industry is regulative. The common threat present in the cases in which standing has been found is regulatory schemes that contemplated some form of protection of the competitive interests of the respective plaintiffs.

Accordingly, if an industry is regulated in such a way that it can be said that the protection of competitors is within the regulatory scheme’s area of concern, such a competitor alleging harm deriving from business competition would have standing to sue.

Applying the rule here, the SJC concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing, because the Legislature “did not seek to protect and thereby confer standing to sue on existing competitors, thereby creating a barrier to market entry.” In other words, a business does not have standing to challenge an approval issued to a competitor unless the very purpose of the regulatory scheme was to protect the competitive position of the plaintiff.

This decision has potentially significant impacts on other permitting regimes, such as those implemented by MassDEP.  Following Indeck, a business harmed by the issuance of an environmental permit issued to a competitor will not have standing to challenge the permit, because it is not the purpose of any of the environmental permitting regimes to create barriers to market entry.

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Construction and development companies praying for an economic recovery next year have something else to worry about: pending new EPA regulations regarding stormwater discharges from construction activities – and claims from environmental groups that EPA’s proposal isn’t stringent enough.

EPA issued a proposal on November 28, 2008. That proposal is complex, but the aspect of it that has received the most attention is the requirement that certain construction sites greater than 30 acres meet numerical turbidity limits (specifically, 13 nephelometric turbidity units (NTUs), which I had to include in this post just because it sounds so cool). Developers have opposed the numeric limits; the National Association of Home Builders estimates that the cost to comply would be $15,000 to $45,000 per acre.

On the other hand, the NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have threatened to sue EPA if EPA does not revise the propose rule to include post-construction controls as part of the rule. EPA has stated that it is not planning to do so. It’s not obvious that NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have the better of this specific debate, but the argument regarding post-construction controls is similar to the ongoing discussion in Massachusetts and elsewhere regarding the need for ongoing stormwater controls at properties other than industrial facilities that are already regulated.

The issue is not going to go away.  EPA is under a deadline to issue the rule by December 1, 2009.

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EPA announced today that it had reached yet another six-figure penalty settlement in an anti-idling case.  This time, the penalty was $650,000. This is one of the larger penalties EPA has obtained in this area.  There appear to be several reasons for the magnitude of the penalty.  First, the defendant, Paul Revere Transportation, LLC, was apparently a recidivist.  It has been the subject of an anti-idling enforcement action in 2003.  Second, Paul Revere refused to settle, making EPA go to trial to prove liability.  Finally, at the trial, EPA established a substantial number of idling violations.  Facing a separate trial regarding the penalty, Paul Revere quickly negotiated a settlement on the penalty amount.

EPA Region I has now targeted bus companies, transit companies, rental car companies, and waste haulers. Truly, any company which operates a large fleet of vehicles is at risk for an anti-idling enforcement action if it does not have a written company idling policy.  Moreover, a paper policy is not enough; companies must take care to ensure a top-down emphasis on compliance with its anti-idling policy.  Letting drivers start trucks before going inside to drink their coffee will not pass muster.

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