Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

Last week, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response announced release of its Community Engagement Implementation Plan. Who could be against community engagement? It’s as American as apple pie. It’s environmental justice. It’s community input into decisions that affect the community. It’s transparency and open decision-making.

Call me a curmudgeon, but I’m against it. Study after study shows that, in terms of the actual risks posed by Superfund sites, we devote too many of our environmental protection dollars to Superfund sites, when we should be focusing on air and water. Why do we keep doing this? Because the community demands it. As Peter Sandman has noted, perceptions of risk are driven only partly by the actual hazard posed. To a significant degree, those perceptions are more driven by outrage over the situation. In some circumstances, what Sandman calls outrage management makes sense, but I’m skeptical that EPA’s community engagement initiative is really about outrage management.

In any case, here’s the public policy question of the day. Does it really make sense to spend scarce environmental protection resources, not to reduce risk, but to reduce outrage?

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By now we are all familiar with the criteria for robust carbon offsets:real, additional, verifiable, enforceable, permanent.  But what exactly do those criteria mean?  And how should a cap-and-trade program be designed to ensure that they are met?  

Earlier this month the three regional U.S. greenhouse gas programs released a white paper which sets out their answers. In Ensuring Offset Quality: Design and Implementation Criteria for a High-Quality Offset Program, representatives of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Climate Initiative, and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord provided their consensus view on key offset policy design and implementation components.  They concluded that offsets provide an important compliance flexibility that reduces the cost of cap-and-trade programs, allows for more varied emissions reduction opportunities, and ultimately enables the pursuit of more aggressive emissions reduction targets. This all comes with a stern warning: if offset projects do not achieve the five tenets listed above, the one-to-one relationship between substituting emissions reductions outside the cap for those under the cap is destroyed, and environmental benefits of the cap-and-trade program are undermined. The paper emphasizes additionality as the most important criterion ¾ offset programs must guarantee that the project “would not have happened anyway in the absence of the economic incentive created by the compliance obligation created by the cap-and-trade program.

The paper favors an approach where the validity of offsets is determined through standardized requirements rather than project-by-project determinations of which offsets can be used for compliance. Both the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism and the European Union’s original offset program relied on a project-by-project system, while the climate change bill recently released by Senators Kerry and Lieberman and the ACES bill passed by the House last year are more reliant on standardized requirements.

The principles advanced in the white paper are useful, but they are still theoretical.The challenge remains to develop standardized guidelines that will address tricky issues such as guaranteeing the permanence of an afforestation offset, where there is always the chance of a forest fire, or ensuring the additionality of a landfill methane capture project, when regulations or the market may have demanded it anyway. Perhaps that is why we have the states as laboratories ¾ including the very states that drafted this paper ¾ as we wait for federal climate legislation to become a reality. The consensus announced in the white paper could certainly form the basis for a federal offsets scheme, but the regional programs don’t seem to be holding their breath.

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In 1972, Christopher Stone published his seminal book “Should Trees Have Standing?” That same year, Justice Douglas posed essentially the same question in his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, in which he argued that inanimate objects should have standing “to sue for their own preservation.”

I hadn’t thought of this for some time, but was reminded of the issue by an article in GreenWire this week, reporting on a study which has concluded that kudzu, an invasive species which is, one might say rhetorically, taking over the southeastern United States, increases NO_x levels and thus leads to the formation of ground-level ozone. Indeed, the study concluded that if kudzu does in fact take over – to the point where it covers all non-urban, non-agricultural soil – the number of areas exceeding the ozone NAAQS would increase by more than one-third.

Now, what’s the point of this other than the opportunity for a snappy headline? Perhaps nothing. I love a snappy headline. On the other hand, the report does serve as a useful reminder that environmental science and policy are really complicated. I do not use this complexity to suggest that the government should not act in the face of uncertainty, but I do believe that it can serve as a useful reminder of the limits of our knowledge and the appropriateness of a prudent caution before we assume we know all the answers. 

At a practical level, can EPA set up an offset program that would allow new sources of NO_x to move forward if they remove a certain number of acres of kudzu? After all, no one likes kudzu, anyway.

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It now appears that Senator Murkowski’s resolution disapproving EPA’s endangerment finding will come to a vote in the Senate sometime in June. The complexity of the political dynamic is highlighted by the speculation regarding what such a vote will mean.  On the one hand, there are those who argue that a significant number of votes for the resolution will mean that climate change legislation is dead. On the other hand, Senator Graham has now predicted that the resolution will pass precisely because most Senators do want to pass a climate bill.

As a logical matter, Senator Graham is right. Being against EPA regulation of GHG under existing authority doesn’t necessarily mean that one is opposed to climate change legislation. Indeed, my guess at this point is that at least a plurality and probably a majority of the regulated community supports climate change legislation, but thinks that regulation of stationary sources under existing authority would be a bad idea. 

In terms of practical politics, however, it seems likely that there may be very little correlation between Senators’ views on climate change legislation and their vote on the Murkowski resolution. Some senators may vote for it because on the merits they think that GHG should be regulated pursuant to specific legislation enacted by Congress. However, many will just be taking a stand against any government regulation of climate change. On the other side, there may be many Senators who would prefer that climate change be addressed through legislation, but since legislation is not guaranteed, want to be certain that some kind of regulatory program is in place. 

Of course, it’s also important to remember that the Murkowski resolution would not just preclude regulation of stationary sources. Because it would disapprove the endangerment finding, it would also jeopardize the carefully negotiated agreement on mobile sources. They aren’t very many people who want to reopen that agreement, I assume.

The world’s greatest deliberative body? We’ll see about that.

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When the Burlington Northern decision was first announced, I concluded that “never has the Supreme Court done so much by doing so little.” On May 5, Judge John Mendez, of he Eastern District of California, proved me at least half right. In United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, joint and several liability was imposed on the defendants in 2002. The 2002 decision stated that “given the nature of pollution at the site, it would be difficult to identify distinct harms.” The court did not analyze whether there was a reasonable basis for apportionment of liability. 

Following the Burlington Northern decision, the defendants moved for reconsideration, arguing that Burlington Northern constituted an intervening change in the law. Defendants argued that “the Supreme Court clearly meant to send a signal to other courts that they must begin evaluating apportionment in a different way.” I think that the defendants in Iron Mountain were right.  Unfortunately, that’s not the standard for a motion for reconsideration.   If Iron Mountain were being decided for the first time today, the defendants might get a better result, but that doesn't mean that they win their motion for reconsideration.

What the Supreme Court really said in Burlington Northern isn’t that the law was wrong; it is that District Courts weren’t applying the law correctly. District court judges had their collective judicial thumbs firmly on the side of the government. The Supreme Court simply told the lower courts to take those thumbs off the scales. I hope that this decision will not encourage lower courts to keep the thumbs on the scales.

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First Kerry-Lieberman, then the Tailoring Rule – a busy week for climate change. Senator Kerry certainly did not miss the coincidence. He called the release of the Tailoring Rule the “last call” for federal legislation. I’ve noted before the leverage that EPA regulation would provide, but this is the most explicit I’ve seen one of the sponsors on the issue.

As to the substance, there are not really any surprises at this point. EPA is certainly working to soften the blow of GHG regulation under the PSD program. Here are the basics (summarized here):

January 2, 2011 – Facilities obtaining PSD permits for pollutants other than GHGs after that date will need to meet BACT for GHG (whatever that may be) if their GHG emissions will increase by at least 75,000 tpy.

July 1, 2011 – New facilities with emissions of at least 100,000 tpy of GHG will need to obtain a PSD permit and meet BACT (whatever that may be) for GHG, even if they do not need a PSD permit for other pollutants. Modified facilities with increases of at least 75,000 tpy will have to obtain a PSD permit and meet BACT (whatever that may be) for GHG, even if they do not need a PSD permit for other pollutants.

July 1, 2012 – EPA will conclude a further rulemaking to address smaller sources. EPA has already committed to not regulate sources with GHG emissions below 50,000 tpy and further stated that permits would not be required for smaller sources before April 30, 2016.

As I’ve subtly hinted above, we still don’t know what EPA thinks BACT for GHG may be. EPA has at least suggested that, with respect to coal plants, BACT may be Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle, or IGCC, and with respect to IGCC plants, BACT may be natural gas. If so, we’re not going to see many traditional coal plants permitted after this rule takes effect.

What about opposition to the rule? It’s near certain that someone will challenge it. While environmental groups support it and have suggested that opponents may not have standing, I’m skeptical. I think it likely that someone with standing will challenge it. I also think that there is a reasonable chance that the rule is overturned, because it’s not obvious to me that the courts will buy the “administrative necessity” argument. The more fundamental point is that I’m not sure it matters. If the Tailoring Rule is struck down, a court is still unlikely to vacate the rule. Instead, the court is likely to keep the Tailoring Rule in place, while giving EPA time to figure out how to comply with conflicting mandates in a way that doesn’t bring the world as we know it to an end.

At bottom, the problem isn’t the Tailoring Rule. The problem is that Massachusetts v. EPA makes regulation of GHG under the existing Clean Air Act inevitable absent congressional action. In other words, John Kerry is right; the Tailoring Rule is last call for the climate bill. I happen to agree with opponents that regulation of GHG under existing authority will be a nightmare. Even exempting small sources, PSD is just a terrible way to go – one of the last vestiges of command and control regulation and a nearly incomprehensible one, at that.

However, given Massachusetts v. EPA, Congress really only has two ways to fix the problem. The first would be to pass climate legislation. The second would be to pass legislation to preclude EPA regulation of GHG under existing authority. Right now, neither alternative seems likely, but once EPA rules are in effect, they’ll both be more tempting. We’ll see which we Congress moves.

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So, Kerry Lieberman (Graham?), also known as the American Power Act, is here. What does it mean?

My immediate reaction is that, in a big picture sense, they got it just about right. The fundamental issue, which was previously acknowledged by Senator Graham (can we start calling him “he who must not be named?”), is that we’re not going to solve the energy independence or climate change problems unless we put a price on carbon. This bill does that.

Frankly, the rest of the issues really only matter either to particularly constituencies or, as a related concern, to particular members of Congress. What are some of these other issues and how would they be handled in this bill? We’ll be getting a more detailed client alert out shortly, and if you can't wait, you can review the short summary or the section by section analysis, but here’s the very quick version.

Basic cap-and-trade provisions –

Goal is to reduce CO₂e by 4.75 percent of 2005 levels by 2013 and 83% by 2050, with interim targets in 2020 and 2030

EPA administrator will set allowance numbers to reach those targets

Only facilities emitting >25,000 tpy CO₂e will be subject to the program

Generating facilities are subject to the program in 2013; manufacturing facilities will not be subject until 2016.

Initial price floor of $12/ton and price ceiling of $25/ton

Limits on who can participate in the carbon market to avoid market manipulation

Allowances used primarily to cushion consumers from energy price increases, but also to support various industries

Includes a “WTO-consistent border adjustment mechanism.” In the absence of a global agreement, tariffs will be imposed on countries without similar GHG controls

Nuclear power – lots of help for the nuclear industry

Off-shore drilling – Provides substantial revenue sharing to certain coastal states, but allows states to prohibit leasing within 75 miles of their coastline

Coal – significant support for carbon capture and sequestration

Renewable energy – Does not include a national renewable energy standard, or RES, though does provide for federal assistance to encourage development of renewable energy technology

Preemption – preempts state cap-and-trade programs, but not other state regulation of GHG. Precludes EPA regulation:

No listing of GHG as criteria pollutants based on climate change impacts

No listing as hazardous air pollutants based on climate change impacts

Limitation – but not complete preemption – of GHG regulation under existing NSR authority

Don’t yell at me if this list does not include your favorite provision. This is a blog, not a treatise. As to the big political picture, I still think that, if Senator Graham can be brought back on board, there is a reasonable chance that this bill passes. If not, then I’m pretty skeptical. 

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EPA is proceeding with its plan to establish a new program to regulate stormwater discharges from new development and redevelopment, with a target date for a final rule by November 2012. The next step: the reissuance of draft mandatory questionnaires that, once finalized, will be sent to various stakeholders, including approximately 738,000 owners and developers of residential, industrial and commercial sites. According to EPA, the “target population for the Owner/Developer Questionnaires is all development establishments in the United States,” as defined by 8 NAICS codes (see Part A.4 of EPA’s Supporting Statement for further information on whether your business would be covered).

The questionnaires request detailed information about real estate improvements during the last five years as well as the financial characteristics of development companies and their projects. There are two versions of the Owner/Developer questionnaire, but only the longer version -- which will be sent to “selected recipients” -- seems to address the types of stormwater controls actually used, or the cost of those controls, in any detail. Thus, while the longer questionnaire will present an additional burden for its recipients, it will also allow developers to report key information for the regulated community, including the cost-effectiveness and context of stormwater controls (e.g. soil types, urban vs. rural settings). 

Among other stakeholder groups, EPA will also send questionnaires to owners and operators of municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) and to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authorities. That means that one party that apparently won’t have to fill out a questionnaire is the Massachusetts DEP, which, along with 4 other states and the District of Columbia, does not have NPDES permitting authority. Particularly in light of MA DEP’s own recent stormwater proposal, EPA might consider asking all state environmental authorities about the scope of their current and planned regulatory efforts with respect to stormwater, so as to better coordinate state and federal programs. 

We’re pleased that EPA is making an effort to base its regulatory proposal on good information. Nevertheless, developers should watch the rulemaking process carefully between now and 2012. The 30 day public comment period on the draft questionnaires ends June 9, 2010.

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Environmentalists have been pushing for years to overturn the Bevill Amendment and get coal combustion residuals (CCR) regulated as a hazardous waste. The failure of an impoundment at the TVA facility in Kingston, Tennessee, in 2008 almost guaranteed that EPA would do something to regulate CCR. Like Hamlet, however, EPA seems to be having trouble making up its mind. Earlier this week, EPA announced two different potential regulatory approaches, one regulating CCR as a hazardous waste under RCRA Subtitle C and one regulating CCR as non-hazardous waste under Subtitle D of RCRA.

Entities with coal generating assets have two problems, broadly speaking, with regulating CCR as a hazardous waste. The first is just the sheer magnitude of the costs required to address existing surface impoundments and find alternatives to impoundments going forward. I realize that there are significant scientific questions regarding whether migration of contamination from existing impoundments in fact poses any significant risk. However, this question was answered at a political level once the Kingston impoundment failed. It’s difficult to see any regulatory regime going forward that doesn’t strictly regulate impoundments.

The second significant issue is beneficial reuse. A very substantial amount of CCR is safely and economically reused. Strict regulation of CCR as a hazardous waste would, to put it mildly, put a crimp in the CCR recycling market. EPA, at least based on its public pronouncements to date, appears to get it, though time will tell whether the program the agency ultimately implements will nonetheless create needless obstacles to recycling CCR.

Thus, if I had to guess – and to paraphrase the Bard – recycling of CCR is to be, disposal of CCR in surface impoundments is not to be.

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Yesterday, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs released its Revised MEPA Greenhouse Gas Emissions Policy and Protocol. For those who cannot get enough of this stuff, they also released a summary of revisions to the policy and a response to comments. On the whole, EEA took an appropriately moderate, incremental approach to revising the GHG policy. Indeed, it’s telling that the very first “change” identified by EEA in its summary is not a change at all – it’s EEA’s decision to retain the current case-by-case approach to determining appropriate performance standards and mitigation requirements. EEA decided not to establish numerical GHG emissions limits or emissions reductions targets.

Some of the other noteworthy aspects of the revised policy include:

Establishment of the state building code in effect at the time the ENF is filed to determine the project baseline

Elimination of the requirement to include a formal analysis of a separate “better” alternative. Although EEA said it was in some circumstances unrealistic to propose something “better” than the preferred alternative, to me it was simply that the MEPA process for the analysis of mitigation is the appropriate avenue for determining GHG improvements. That mitigation process was already in place, is always what MEPA has been about, and works well. Thus, the separate alternative was inappropriate.

No requirement to analyze life-cycle emissions. EEA was pushed to require full life-cycle analysis, including such components as emissions associated with construction, waste generation, water use, and wastewater generation. However, EEA concluded that such analyses would not be cost-effective: “the effort and cost associated with making these calculations may outweigh their usefulness….”

Retention of the self-certification process for verifying mitigation efforts. The policy does require that agencies include the self-certification requirement in Section 61 findings for permits.

An updated list of mitigation measures.

As EEA noted, the MEPA program has never been about standards; it is about project-specific analysis of impacts and potential mitigation measures to address those impacts. Particularly inthe GHG arena, where both technology and science are changing so rapidly, it makes even more sense to maintain the case-by-case approach, rather than adopt overly prescriptive standards. The devil is in the details regarding how MEPA implements the policy, but given the legislative mandate in the Global Warming Solutions Act, the policy continues to provide an appropriate framework for integrating GHG analysis into MEPA.

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Last year, I noted that EPA had made its ECHO data base more user-friendly, creating a web-based map of enforcement actions. Last week, EPA took the effort a step further, at least with respect to Clean Water Act enforcement action. EPA’s Clean Water Act Annual Noncompliance Report, or ANCR, is available on the web in an interactive format that allows interested citizens to see where the noncompliance and enforcement action is taking place. 

As some of my clients are unfortunately aware, I’ve been seeing a lot of enforcement action recently, at both the federal and state level. It’s not clear long the agencies can maintain a vigorous enforcement posture in the face of repeated budget cuts. I still think that efforts such as providing interactive access to EPA’s ANCR is going to facilitate citizen suits, ensuring the private enforcement is available even if the agencies ease up.

Whether that's a good result is of course a separate question.

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