Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

When President Obama issued Executive Order 13,563, on Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, it was not obvious whether the Order was simply an attempt to protect the President’s right flank or whether the agencies would respond substantively. Yesterday, EPA released its Preliminary Plan for Periodic Retrospective Reviews of Existing Regulations. Initial review of the Plan suggests that EPA has taken the task seriously and has made some constructive suggestions. To me, however, they missed the elephant in the room and therefore cannot be given better than a B grade at this point.

There is a lot of good stuff in the plan, which is certainly too long to summarize here. The highlights from where I sit include the following:

• Increased use of electronic reporting. This falls in the category of “now why didn’t I think of that?” Telling point? EPA has put use of e-manifests under RCRA in the long-term action, rather than early action, category, while acknowledging that this was proposed in 2004. How hard is some of this stuff?

• Improved transparency, i.e., increased public disclosure of compliance and other regulatory information. Cynical translation? If we can provide more information to the public, citizen suits will be easier and we can do less government enforcement. Still, hard to argue with.

• Coordination of emission reduction regulations across multiple pollutants. Interestingly, EPA has put this in the early action category. Although EPA identified the pulp and paper industry specifically, this has to be thought of mainly as a longer-term project. Well worth it, however long it takes.

• Encouraging innovative technology. Who could be against it? This is probably the most important issue, precisely because it is here that the Plan is the weakest. I think that EPA has largely missed the point, because it has not correctly defined the problem. The single action EPA could take that would have the most impact on encouraging innovative technology would be to get out of the command and control business once and for all. The highest priority of this regulatory review should be for EPA to identify areas where it can move from command and control regulation to performance-based standards. A fruitful initial target? CERCLA and the NCP. EPA does not have to privatize Superfund cleanups as several states have done; that would require legislation. Even without privatization, it could simply set standards for what constitutes a significant risk and require PRPs to eliminate such risks. I promise, innovation will follow. Not only that, but EPA could eliminate a significant percentage of its existing CERCLA staff, or redirect that staff to more productive uses. 

EPA is taking comment on the proposed plan, at least through June 27, 2011. Get your comments in here. I am the eternal optimist, though the 7-year delay in implementing an e-manifest program should probably give me some pause as to how quickly EPA can really reform.

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The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) took a bit of a blow today when Governor Christie of New Jersey, the second-largest of the 10-state group, announced that the state was leaving the organization.  This comes only a few weeks after the narrow defeat of bills to repeal RGGI in New Hampshire, Delaware and Maine.  However, RGGI announced on its website that the participating states would proceed with their 12th quarterly auction as scheduled on June 8th. 

Despite Governor Christie’s announcement, official withdrawal from RGGI requires legislative action, namely repeal of the provisions of New Jersey’s Global Warming Solutions Fund Statute that established the cap-and-trade program within the state.  Currently pending before the New Jersey legislature is a bill that would repeal these sections and transfer any remaining money from allowances into the state's general fund.

So what happens now?  Will the nine remaining states reduce their own RGGI allowance budgets in order to recognize the NJ allowances already sold?  Or will they proceed as if New Jersey was never part of the program in the first place, and invalidate the allowances? 

In the press release responding to the announcement, the organization said only that “the participating states will evaluate how New Jersey’s proposed withdrawal might affect New Jersey allowances currently in circulation.”   It will be interesting to see if the New Jersey-based power plants which have been buying allowances along the way at quarterly auctions, in preparation for the end of the 3-year compliance period this December, will demand a refund from the state for their potentially worthless allowances. In addition to the loss of significant RGGI-allowance revenue going forward, this could create a problem for this already cash-strapped state.   

In the last two years, New Jersey took in over $113 million from the sale of allowances in the nine auctions in which it participated. This money was divided up in a number of ways – including the Governor’s recent withdrawal of $65.2 million to balance the current state budget.  New Jersey has also already awarded $29.6 million in allowance proceeds to 12 large scale energy efficiency and renewable energy projects through its Clean Energy Solutions Capital Investment Loan/Grant Program. According to New Jersey's statements through the RGGI website, these programs would create enough renewable energy to meet the demands of more than 19,600 New Jersey households each year, and would avoid 1.7 million tons of CO₂ over the lifetime of the projects.  

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In an interesting decision issued late last week in Industrial Communications and Electronics v. Town of Alton, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that private citizens who had intervened to defend a local zoning limit on cell tower height could continue to do so, notwithstanding that the cell tower provider and the municipal defendant were prepared to settle the case. 

Industrial Communications sought to build a 120’ cell tower in Alton, New Hampshire. The Local zoning by-law would have limited the tower to 71’. The Town’s Zoning Board denied a variance. Industrial Communications did not appeal the denial. Instead, it sued in federal court, seeking to take advantage of the preemption provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Nearby residents, the Slades, intervened as defendants in the federal action.  

After initially defending the case, the Town negotiated a settlement with Industrial Communications that would allow a 100’ tower. The District Court concluded that, where the original defendant was no longer defending the case, the Slades had no rights themselves to continue to defend the denial of the variance. 

The Court of Appeals noted that the Slades could not compel the Town to continue to defend the denial of the zoning variance. “A government entity is free as a defendant to decline to defend or settle on the best terms it can get.” However, the Court noted, intervenors can usually continue to litigate, as long as they have Article III standing. The Slades alleged that a taller tower would impair their views and cause both economic and aesthetic harm. 

Thus, the court had to balance the rights of parties to settle a case with the rights of the intervenors to continue to litigate. To the Court, the determining factor was that the Slades

have a legal interest under state law in the protection that the zoning laws afford to their property; specifically, they could sue in state court to overturn the variance if it were granted unlawfully…. What is at issue here is not merely a private settlement … but, by virtue of the court’s adoption and entry of a consent decree, a legally operative judgment that overrides state law and the Slades’ rights under state law that would prevail unless overridden by the decree. Given that Article III requisites are established, the Slades are entitled to resist the entry of a decree that terminates their protectable rights unless a violation of the Act is proven.

While Industrial Communications alleged that the denial of the variance violated the Telecommunications Act, the District Court never made a finding to that effect – once it approved the settlement, the court thought that no such findings were necessary. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case, giving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove a violation and the Slades an opportunity to deny it.

Although the provisions of the Telecommunications Act may be unusual, cases of federal preemption of state and local environmental laws are not. Industrial Communications makes clear that, even where a state or municipality does not want to defend the local law or regulation, individual citizens who can establish standing may have a right to do so themselves.

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While not ones to unnecessarily toot our own horns, the First Circuit’s decision in United States et al. v. Coalition for Buzzards Bay et al. is worth a read. We (specifically, Buzzards Bay Guardian Jonathan Ettinger, Amy Boyd, and I) have been representing the recently-renamed Buzzards Bay Coalition in this case for a number of years and yesterday’s decision represents both a victory for the Coalition and an important First Circuit precedent with respect to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 

In yesterday’s decision the First Circuit held that the Coast Guard failed to comply with NEPA when it promulgated a rule (the “2007 Rule”) which purported to expressly preempt certain provisions of the Massachusetts Oil Spill Prevention Act (MOSPA).

By way of background, the MOSPA was enacted in response to a spill of approximately 98,000 gallons of oil into Buzzards Bay in April 2003. The federal government filed suit against the Commonwealth, asserting that the MOSPA was preempted by federal law. (The Coalition intervened as a defendant to support the Commonwealth in defending the MOSPA). Following a district court decision and an appeal to, and remand by, the First Circuit, and while the case was pending once again before the district court, the Coast Guard promulgated the 2007 Rule. 

The Coalition and others believe that the 2007 Rule provides less protection against oil spills than does the MOSPA – for example, the 2007 Rule requires tug escorts only for certain single-hulled vessels transporting oil through the Bay while the MOSPA requires such escorts for single- and double-hulled vessels. But in the course of the rulemaking the Coast Guard relied on a Categorical Exclusion (CE) to obviate the need for the preparation of an EA or EIS, and did not consider the impact of this lessened environmental protection.  The Commonwealth and The Coalition argued that in relying on a CE and failing to perform a NEPA analysis, the Coast Guard violated NEPA. The District Court found that the Coast Guard’s reliance on a CE was erroneous, but held that such error was harmless. 

The First Circuit agreed that the Coast Guard’s reliance on a CE was erroneous because the promulgation of the 2007 Rule was “likely to be highly controversial . . . in terms of public opinion”, and thus triggered an “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the use of a CE. The First Circuit then disagreed with the lower court’s finding that such error was harmless. 

The Court distinguished the case from prior cases finding harmless error, stating that

 the sockdolager is that the Coast Guard did not perform and environmental analysis at all. Indeed, it made no site-specific appraisal of the potential environmental effects of its proposed action. For ought that appears, it took no “hard look” at the situation. It gave the matter the barest of glances and . . . made no ‘reasoned finding.’ . . . the absence of any [substantial] analysis is antithetic to a finding of harmlessness.

Thus, the Court made clear that the harmless error rule is only applicable where there is evidence that some substantial environmental analysis has been undertaken by an agency. In this case the administrative record did not show that “the Coast Guard ever analyzed, or even adequately studied, the environmental impact of its proposed action.”

The Court also rejected the Coast Guard’s argument that failure of the Coalition and Commonwealth to object to its reliance on a CE during the notice-and-comment period resulted in a waiver of such objections, stating that

. . . nothing in Public Citizen shifts the burden of ensuring NEPA compliance from the agency that is proposing an action to those who wish to challenge that action. Indeed, the Public Citizen Court stressed that ‘the agency bears the primary responsibility to ensure that it complies with NEPA.’

In reaching its decision, the Court did not address the issue of preemption.  As a result of the decision, the First Circuit vacated a previously issued injunction of the MOSPA, and the 2007 Rule will now be remanded to the Coast Guard for proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

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Late last week, the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources (DOER) filed with the Joint Committee on Telecommunications, Utilities, and Energy of the state legislature proposed final amendments to the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) regulations governing the eligibility of woody biomass facilities and fuels to qualify to earn renewable energy credits (RECs).  DOER originally issued a draft of these regulations in September 2010, and made revisions after receiving written comments and holding 2 public hearings.  In addition to the revised regulations, DOER issued a regulatory package containing two sets of guidance in the forms of Excel spreadsheets, the Guideline for the Calculation of Overall Efficiency and Lifecycle GHG Analysis and the Guideline for the Determination of Forest Derived Eligible Biomass Woody Fuel. The Joint Committee has 30 days to review the rules and submit its comments to DOER for additional review. DOER hopes to promulgate the final rules early this summer.

At a time when the EPA appears to be favoring biomass a fuel (with actions like exempting it from the tailoring rule for 3 years), Massachusetts is making it very difficult to qualify “electricity only” biomass as renewable and eligible for RECs, as the rules strongly favor combined heat and power uses.   While the proposed changes to the regulation do not ban the development of biomass facilities in Massachusetts, they do set a very high bar to qualify for renewable energy credits under the RPS – so high that many believe that large scale biomass units may not be viable absent significant technological advances. Under the regulation, the term Eligible Biomass Fuel will include things like woody pellets, agricultural waste and by-products, food or vegetative material, algae and biogases, but officially excludes Construction and Demolition Waste.

Eligible Biomass Woody Fuel, the largest subset of eligible fuels, is now limited to forest-derived residues from timber operations, limited thinnings and invasive growth; forest salvage from storms or pest infestations; non-forest derived residues from lumber mills and woodworking shops, trees removed in converting forests to agricultural, residential or commercial uses (so long as all other permits have been obtained), yard wastes, and maintenance of parks and rights of way. The final category of Eligible Biomass Woody Fuel is “dedicated energy crops” which includes wood (but not cellulosic fuel) that has been purposefully grown to produce fuel, but contains a remarkably broad restriction that the trees may not have been grown in a place that “sequestered significant amounts of carbon” such as a forest, or on land that has the potential to support crops grown for human consumption as food. 

Biomass units are required to provide to DOER in their applications a lifecycle analysis of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and demonstrate emission reductions of at least 50% over 20 years compared to a new, combined-cycle natural gas generator using the most efficient commercially available technology. DOER will provide a standard analytical methodology in another set of guidance to accompany the Statement of Qualification Application. Under both the proposed regulations and Guidance #1 on GHG lifecycle analysis, facilities must account for direct emissions from production of the fuel stock and delivery to the biomass facility, as well as indirect emissions from land use changes, and temporal changes in forest carbon sequestration and emissions resulting from biomass harvests, regrowth, and avoided decomposition.

One new provision added since the September draft requires that the amount of forest-derived biomass material eligible to be removed be limited based on soil types and as set forth in Guidance #2 on Forest-Derived Fuel.  The regulation and guidance set a cap by percentage of weight of the total amount of material harvested from the site, ranging from zero (for very poor quality soils) to 40% (for highly productive soils) – the rest of the biomass harvested must be left in the forest for soil nutrient retention. To effectuate this requirement, foresters will have to develop a soil map for each harvest area and determine the maximum eligible biomass tonnage that can be removed. The September draft had set this cap at 15% across the board.

Both the September draft and this week’s proposed final rules require that biomass units meet a minimum overall efficiency rate of 40%, determined based on the biomass input heat content of the fuel, and accounting for GHG emissions associated with fuel refining and processing.  If operating at that level of efficiency, the unit will receive one-half REC for each MWh of generation. Units operating at an overall efficiency of 60% and above would receive a whole REC credit for each MWh they generate, and units between 40 and 60% would receive a proportional fraction of a REC.

Under the revised regulations, electricity generated by a unit that is used on-site (“behind-the-meter”) is included in the calculations of the unit’s overall efficiency. “Merchantable bio-products” (chemicals like additives and lubricants) created from the woody fuels at an on-site bio-refinery will also be netted out in calculating overall efficiency.  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, productive use of the large quantities of heat generated by the biomass facilities, so long as it falls within the defined term “useful thermal energy” under the regulation, will also be included in the overall efficiency calculation.  However, the revised regulation clarifies that any thermal energy used to dry or refine green woody biomass for use as a fuel will not count towards overall efficiency.  

Biomass generating units that have already secured their Statement of Qualifications will also have to demonstrate compliance with the new regulation. They must prove use of Eligible Biomass Woody Fuel by 2013, and comply with all provisions, including the requirement for overall efficiency, by 2015.

 

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Anyone who does development knows the subtle and not-so-subtle quid pro quos that are sometimes exacted by local planning boards. In Massachusetts, a decision issued on Tuesday by the Appeals Court has emphasized that there are limits to what planning boards may require in return for approval of subdivision plans. 

In Collings v. Planning Board of Stow, the developer was seeking to build a subdivision that included a 1,300 foot street ending in a cul-de-sac (known, with more directness, simply as dead-ends when I grew up in New Jersey). The Stow by-law limits cul-de-sacs to 500 feet, but provides that waivers can be granted. The Planning Board granted the requested waiver, but made it subject to a requirement that the developer devote at least 10% of the subdivision land to open space. Moreover, the Board required that the land be offered to the Town’s Conservation Commission or a land trust.

As plaintiffs noted, Massachusetts law prohibits, as a condition of approval of a subdivision, a requirement to dedicate land to the public use “without just compensation.” The Board ignored this provision. The Land Court actually did address it, but found that a quid pro quo is acceptable. In other words, dedication of land without just compensation is ok, so long as there is consideration, i.e., the developer got a waiver he was not otherwise entitled to obtain.

Not so, said the Appeals Court. To the appeals court, waivers may only be conditioned on requirements that go to the purpose behind the underlying requirement. The purpose of the limitation on cul-de-sacs is to address public safety concerns, particularly related to access for fire fighting vehicles. Thus, the Board requirement to install sprinklers in all of the subdivision houses was reasonable. The open space requirement, on the other hand, was “inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the subdivision control law.” 

The Court acknowledged the bargaining that takes place between developers and towns.

While it may be true that the subdivision control process … doubtless often involves negotiation between the developer and the town, the power of a planning board is limited to the authority “clearly and specifically given by the statute.”

The bottom line?

That waivers from some of the subdivision rules and regulations are required does not authorize a planning board to exact conditions expressly prohibited by § 81Q, and unrelated to the regulation sought to be waived….

Finally, the court emphasized that towns may not use these types of requirements to circumvent the eminent domain process, which is the constitutionally required means of taking private property:

We cannot resist the conclusion that, however worthy the objectives, the conditions imposed attempt to achieve a result which properly should be the subject of eminent domain.”

Will Collings prevent municipalities from overreaching in the future? Unlikely. Most developers know that they need to get along with planning boards. Nonetheless, it’s nice to know that there are some limits.

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E&E Daily reported today that Senate Republicans are preparing legislation to combine EPA and the Department of Energy. The list of Senators identified as supporting the proposal is a virtual who’s who of conservatives, including Jim DeMint, a favorite of the Tea Party. Accordingly to Richard Burr (R. N.C.), the measure would reduce waste by eliminating duplicative programs in EPA and DOE.

Why is this even a story? Perhaps because Democratic Governor Deval Patrick did the same thing in Massachusetts in 2007, forming what has been considered a very successful Executive Office of Energy and Environment. Perhaps because newly elected Democratic Governor Dannell Malloy recently did the same thing, creating the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection in Connecticut (and naming my friend and law school classmate Dan Esty to be first Commissioner of the combined agency).

So, is this a progressive idea to ensure that energy development, which is a very big part of our economy, is considered together with environmental protection, or is this a regressive idea, intended to eliminate spending? 

Perhaps, just perhaps, it’s simply a good idea.

Politics would determine whether the combined agency leadership would pursue an aggressive environmental protection and clean energy agenda or whether it would instead avoid new regulatory programs in order to facilitate an aggressive program of developing traditional energy resources. Either way, it makes sense to house these two functions under one roof.

For those of us who follow politics as the blood sport it’s become, it will be interesting to see if this idea gets any traction and, if so, where Congressional Democrats line up. Are they going to try to tar this as a simple-minded conservative idea? If so, will the President’s friend Governor Patrick be caught in a Mitt Romney-like dance, trying to argue that it was a good idea for Massachusetts but would not be a good idea nationally? 

Serious kudos to the first liberal Democrat who unambiguously supports this proposal.

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It’s long been a tenet of Superfund that one effective strategy for managing an expensive site is to bring in a lot of additional parties to share the costs.  For some years now, that has been the strategy of the two largest PRPs alleged to have contaminated the lower Fox River in Wisconsin with massive amounts of PCBs.  Cleanup costs for that site are estimated to cost $1.5 billion.  So far, at least, that strategy of bringing in more parties has failed in ever more dramatic fashion.  

First, a federal court in Wisconsin dismissed a contribution action brought by the largest PRPs against twenty additional parties even though those parties had unquestionably disposed of paper wastes containing PCBs into the river.  More recently, the government entered into a de minimis settlement with twelve of those parties, contending that a $2 million contribution from those parties represented their fair share of the $1.5 billion cleanup.  A fairness challenge by the largest PRPs was rejected by the district court and was affirmed yesterday by the Seventh Circuit. United States v. George A. Whiting Paper Co. In a breezy decision, the Seventh Circuit held that CERCLA settlements require broad deference to EPA and should be approved as long as the factual record contains any support for the government’s estimate as to the share to be paid by the settling parties.

Everyone knows that Superfund is unfair and that the government can impose a disproportionate share of the cleanup costs on parties which don’t settle. Anyone who wondered how far the government could go in imposing that disproportionate share will find an answer in the Seventh Circuit’s decision.  

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As I have previously mentioned, EPA is considering including criteria related to vapor intrusion (VI) in the hazard ranking system scoring used to determine which sites should be added to the National Priorities List. As I noted when this first became news, it’s pretty much an obvious step for EPA to take. These are precisely the types of sites on which EPA should be focusing. At a certain level, I’d be happy – relatively – if EPA limited CERCLA to sites imposing threats to public water supplies and sites posing VI problems, and jettisoned everything else. 

The National Association of Manufacturers and the Aerospace Industries Association have now sent EPA a letter opposing inclusion of VI as a criterion for HRS scoring. The basis for their opposition is curious. It’s not that VI sites aren’t a problem. It’s that VI sites are a problem – but that CERCLA is not the right vehicle to address VI, because CERCLA cleanups take too long. 

NAM and AIA are right, of course. CERCLA decisions take forever. While NAM and AIA don’t point out the irony, it’s got to be uncomfortable for EPA that the principal federal program to clean up contaminated properties is not well-suited to address what is arguably the most significant health risk from the existence of contaminated properties.

Why should this be so? Could it be because CERCLA is the last bastion of almost totally pure command and control regulation? Might CERCLA remedy decisions take less time if EPA did not have to select remedies, but instead only identified appropriate cleanup standards and let PRPs select the remedy? Might cleanups get implemented faster if the PRPs’ obligation was simply to meet cleanup standards and provide sufficient information to EPA or 3^rd party auditors to demonstrate that the cleanup standards have in fact been met? 

Oh, and, by the way, in these troubled budget times, might EPA be able to oversee the CERCLA program with about ¼ of its current staff if it set cleanup standards and got out of the way, rather than micromanaging every element of every cleanup?

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