Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

The decision yesterday in United States v. Minnkota Power Cooperative serves as a useful reminder regarding how important the burden of proof is in review of agency decisions. The case started in 2006, as part of DOJ’s NSR enforcement initiative, when the United States and North Dakota brought suit against Minnkota’s Milton R. Young Station. The parties settled and a consent decree was entered. Apparently, the parties knew at the time of the settlement that there would be a dispute regarding what would constitute BACT for NO_x control and they thus agreed to defer the issue; the consent decree simply provided that the North Dakota Department of Health would determine BACT.

It took the DOH four years to do so, but, in November 2010, the DOH concluded that selective non-catalytic reduction, or SNCR, constitutes BACT for the MRY facility, which has unusual technology involving cyclone-fired boilers combusting North Dakota lignite, rather than bituminous or sub-bituminous coal. EPA wanted SCR identified as BACT and pursued dispute resolution under the consent decree to get it. 

Unfortunately for EPA, the decree provided that the determination by North Dakota would be binding unless EPA “demonstrates that it is not supported by the state administrative record and not reasonable in light of applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.” As the court noted, the consent decree language was not unique; it “mirrors the standard of review” for challenges to state BACT determinations even outside the consent decree context.

The crux of the case was whether cyclone fired boilers combusting North Dakota lignite were sufficiently like other coal-fired boilers that determinations for such boilers that SCRs constitute BACT should essentially be binding here. The North Dakota DOH compiled an extensive record demonstrating that such other coal-fired facilities are not sufficiently like the MRY facility, and the court deferred to DOH’s judgment, based on the record.

Perhaps the most telling evidence was that DOJ engaged an expert consultant, which issued an request for proposals to install SCR at the MRY facility. DOJ in fact obtained two proposals with performance guarantees. The availability of such guarantees is extremely probative of whether a technology constitutes BACT. However, DOJ’s consultant failed to provide in its RFP sufficient detail regarding the specific characteristics of the MRY facility – and when the companies responding to the RFP learned the details, they withdrew the guarantees, almost certainly leaving EPA and DOJ in a worse position than if they had never gone through the RFP process. One might also infer that the court thought that DOJ was trying to pull a fast one, which certainly did not help.

Yesterday’s Cape Wind decision, together with this case, even though involving totally different statutory and regulatory regimes, provide a useful joint reminder of the importance of building the record in administrative cases.

As to this case, would the outcome have been different if EPA had made the BACT decision? Would a decision to impose SCR as BACT have been upheld if the burden were on the person challenging that decision? We’ll never know, but I could see it happening. Burdens do matter.

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The PCB contamination in the Lower Fox River in Wisconsin continues to spawn novel Superfund decisions.  The latest is US v. NCR, in which Judge Greisbach of the Eastern District of Wisconsin reversed his initial ruling, made less than six months ago, that the United States could not establish successor liability under CERCLA against  Appleton Papers, which had bought assets from the alleged  polluting party – NCR Corp – and assumed NCR’s liabilities.  As Judge Greisbach explained in his earlier ruling, there can be no successor liability where the  seller of assets remains a viable CERCLA defendant, since the purpose of successor liability is to prevent “paper transactions” that deny the public access to a solvent party to respond to claims.  Whatever contract rights NCR might have against Appleton, the court initally held that they did not extend to the United States.

While the earlier decision seemed eminently reasonable, it posed a practical problem for the parties, since the PCB remedial work was essentially in the control of Appleton, which the Court ruled was not liable.  That practical problem then unleashed a flurry of creative advocacy by the United States – specifically an argument that the Court could issue orders requiring Appleton as a non-liable party to take steps to facilitate the remedial work.  The Court ultimately declined that invitation to be creative.  However, illustrating once again that hard cases make bad law, the Court did accept the government’s alternative invitation to reverse its earlier holding on successor liability.  To justify this reversal, the court could point to no supporting case law or policies in the doctrine of successor liability; the best the court could come up with was the weak argument that none of the successor liability cases expressly held that it was necessary that the seller of assets be insolvent or dissolved, even though all those cases involved circumstances in which the seller was in fact insolvent or no longer in existence.  To compound the confusion, the court went on to note that, in a private arbitration between Appleton and NCR to resolve their contract dispute, Appleton would be assigned 60% of all liability for the site.  According to the court, the fact that the arbitration assigned a majority of the liability to Appleton somehow justified allowing the government to pursue joint and several CERCLA liability against Appleton. 

Environmental law often pushes courts to put practicality ahead of sound legal principle, which begs the question whether the short-term result justifies the jurisprudential confusion.

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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court today affirmed the decision by the Department of Public Utilities to approve the power purchase agreement, or PPA, between Cape Wind and National Grid. (Full disclosure: Foley Hoag represented the Department of Energy Resources in support of the contract before the DPU.) The decision doesn’t mean that Cape Wind will now get built. Given the (one hopes) temporary problems with the federal loan guarantee program and Cape Wind’s failure thus far to sell the rest of the power from the project, the SJC decision is more of a necessary than sufficient condition to construction.

On the merits, the decision is pretty much a standard nuts-and-bolts review concerning whether there was substantial evidence to support DPU’s decision. The SJC made frequent reference to the deference given both to DPU’s application of its expertise and to its interpretation of statutes it is charged with implementing. 

Going forward, the most significant aspect of the decision is probably the SJC’s finding that, in the absence of a statutory definition of the term “cost-effective,” the DPU was within its authority in in considering

All costs and benefits associated with [the PPA], including the non-price benefits that are difficult to quantify, and including costs and benefits of complying with existing and reasonably anticipated future federal and state environmental requirements.

Similarly, the SJC agreed with the DPU that analysis regarding whether the contract is in the public interest need not be limited to whether lower-priced alternatives exist. The SJC found that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the DPU’s conclusion that Cape Wind would provide “significant and special advantages by virtue of its location near an area that uses high levels of electricity and the advanced state of the permitting process for the facility.” 

In short, the decision not only affirms the DPU’s decision here, but makes clear that, so long as an appropriate record is compiled, DPU is going to have significant discretion with respect to similar projects going forward.

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Last week, MassDEP finally issued its long-awaited vapor intrusion guidance. Including appendices, it is 148 pages. There is a separate 52-page response to comments on the draft guidance. MassDEP has certainly learned that guidance must at least be described as guidance. The disclaimer runs a full page, and includes the following text:

MassDEP generally does not intend the guidance to be overly prescriptive. Use of such words as “shall,” “must,” or “require,” however, indicates that the text is referring to a specific regulatory and/or statutory requirement, rather than a suggested approach and/or optional measure. Use of the words “should” or “recommend” indicates aspects of a method or approach that are considered appropriate and protective, based on MassDEP’s experience and/or sound technical practices, but do not correspond to a specific regulatory and/or statutory requirement.

The guidance is not a regulation, rule or requirement, and should not be construed as mandatory. Accordingly, this document does not create any substantive or procedural rights, and is not enforceable by any party in any administrative proceeding with the Commonwealth.

My take? 

I was tempted to say “trust, but verify.” However, to be honest, I think I have to say instead, “I’ll believe it when I see it.”

For example, one of the most contentious issues has been how to address potential future vapor intrusion issues when there is currently no building on the site and there are no current plans for a specific building. MassDEP has created a three-tiered approach. Owners of property in Category A, with concentrations below GW-2 standards (GW-2 standards, for readers who are not MCP aficionados, are specifically designed to protect against indoor air exposures), need take no additional precautions prior to building. Owners of Category B sites, with concentrations greater than GW-2 standards, but less than 10 times the GW-2 standards, “should” include the installation of a vapor barrier and an active sub-slab depressurization, or SSD, system. Sites with concentrations greater than 10 times the GW-2 standard will be in Category C.  Buildings on these sites “would be constructed with a vapor barrier and active SSD system” and the site “should” be sampled over a two-year period. 

Don't you just love the artful use of the passive voice here?  Who the heck is actually building the buildings?  Perhaps the the vapor barrier and SSD will build themselves.

Is this a rule or guidance? Time will tell. My prediction? The first time MassDEP varies from its “shoulds” and “woulds” will be one more time than I expect will ever happen. The street-level bureaucracy at MassDEP is still the law west of the Pecos – or at least east of the New York border – and I do not foresee much flexibility. I would be pleased to be wrong.

(And good luck and best wishes to former Foley lawyer Ben Ericson, now Assistant Commissioner for Waste Site Cleanup, as he tries to implement this guidance -- as guidance.)

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On Wednesday, EPA promulgated the final Utility MACT rule. I doubt that anyone reading this blog isn’t already aware of the big news.

As seems frequently to be the case with EPA rules, this one, weighing in at 2.4MB and 1,117 pages, cannot easily be summarized here. In fact, the rule is so complicated – and controversial – that EPA had to generate four separate fact sheets to summarize the rule and its impacts: (1) Costs and Benefits (or, as EPA carefully puts it, “Benefits and Costs”); (2) Summary of the Rule; (3) Clean Air and Reliable Electricity (I wonder why EPA thought this one necessary?); and (4) Adjustments from Proposal to Final.

We live in a complex world, so there is not much use in complaining about how overwhelming this rule is, and about the problems inherent in a system in which rules with costs of approximately $10B annually and benefits ranging from $37B to $90B annually are this complicated and are probably truly understood by a very small number of people. As I tell my Libertarian friends, even Jefferson wouldn’t be a Jeffersonian today. Nonetheless, it is troubling.

The issues worth noting in a blog post are probably the changes from the proposal. Significant changes include:

·         Use of filterable PM for the particulate emissions limit, rather than total PM (which would include condensables).

·         Use of work practice standards, rather than emission limits, during start-up and shut-down. This is an important change, which will make life much easier for regulated units.

·         Greater flexibility in facility-wide averaging.

Reliability has obviously been the big issue for EPA. Units will generally have three years to comply. Permitting authorities may grant a 4^th year, if necessary, and EPA has said that they expect the extra year to be “broadly available.” EPA has also provided a mechanism for “units that are shown to be critical for reliability to obtain” a 5^th year to comply – though EPA has said that it does not expect many units to require or qualify for the 5^th year.

My predictions on the rule’s fate and impact?

·         I’ll be stunned if the rule does not survive judicial review. Of course, in an 1,117 page rule, there may be some obscure provision that is struck down, but the basic provisions will be upheld.

·         The sky will not fall. Significant numbers of jobs will not be lost, and the increase in electricity prices will be smaller than predicted. Since I whack EPA often enough, I’ll defend it here – to a limited extent. I don’t think that there has been a single big rule ever promulgated by EPA where the implementation costs haven’t been less than expected. That’s been true for one simple reason. When industry has clear rules to follow (even if they are not the cost-effective rules I would prefer), industrial innovation works to bring down compliance costs in ways that were not imagined, either by EPA or industry, when the rule was promulgated.

·         Of course, if there is a Republican President and a Republican Congress, all bets are off. Of course, when Mitt Romney was Governor of Massachusetts, he supported regulations by MassDEP that were essentially a state version of the Utility MACT rule, notwithstanding his criticism today of EPA for wanting to promulgate job-killing regulations. Of course, Mitt Romney has been known to change his mind. Of course,… oh, never mind. 

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In New York State Superfund Coalition, Inc., v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, the highest court in New York recently put its own gloss on the long-standing environmental issue of "How Clean is Clean". There, the court held that, even though liability for cleanup under New York’s state Superfund statute is triggered when there is a “significant threat” to the environment, the state has authority to promulgate regulations requiring cleanup beyond what would be necessary to eliminate that significant threat.  Specifically, the Court affirmed regulations that require cleanup to "pre-disposal conditions, to the extent feasible". 

The court reached this result by a definitional sleight-of-hand. The court noted that the statute seeks "a complete cleanup of the site through the elimination of the significant threat to the environment posed by the disposal of hazardous wastes at the site." The court then goes on to claim that the statutory standard of a "complete cleanup" to eliminate threats is the same as the regulatory standard of returning the site to “pre-disposal conditions, to the extent feasible”. 

Although the Court of Appeals gets the last word on this issue, its reasoning seems disingenuous.  The statutory standard defines cleanups to be the elimination of significant threats, meaning that a liable party could potentially leave some contamination at a site as long as that contamination did not pose a threat. The regulatory standard, in stark contrast, contemplates the removal of all contamination, whether causing a threat or not, constrained only by whether such removal was “feasible”.  Although the Court of Appeals professes to find no difference in the verbal formulations of these two standards, parties having to undertake cleanups in New York may find the difference to be many millions of dollars.  One can argue whether it is a wise decision to expend societal resources to restore disposal sites back to the condition of the Garden of Eden.  However, it's harder to argue that that decision should be made by courts and regulatory agencies instead of by the legislature.

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Last week, I noted that the D.C. Court of Appeals had found that the National Association of Home Builders did not have standing to challenge a determination by EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River are traditional navigable waters. On Friday, in National Association of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the NAHB lost yet another standing battle.

This time, the NAHB was challenging the Corps’ nationwide permit, NWP-46, allowing discharges of dredge and fill material into certain upland ditches. The District Court had found that the NAHB did have standing, but ruled against NAHB on the merits. The Court of Appeals didn’t even let them get that far, once more barring the courthouse doors.

Aside from the NAHB’s bad luck in losing in the court of appeals twice in one week, what’s news here? 

The news is that, once again, the Court has provided useful guidance regarding what regulated entities – or their trade groups – must allege to establish standing in these types of cases. The NAHB had asserted that NWP-46 imposes costs on its members because it is ambiguous and leaves members uncertain when they are in fact subject to CWA jurisdiction for filling ditches. Unfortunately for the NAHB, the Court concluded that the Corps has been asserting jurisdiction over upland ditches for years. Moreover, the Court pointed to an acknowledgement by the NAHB VP for Legal Affairs that the Corps had “consistently suggested that at least some upland ditches were subject to CWA jurisdiction.”

In short, the Court concluded that the NAHB’s injury was not traceable to the permit, but was instead traceable to the Corps’ underlying assertion of jurisdiction, which was not asserted for the first time in NWP-46. Indeed, as the Court noted, because the Corps had previously asserted jurisdiction over upland ditches, NWP-46 benefited NAHB members, by providing them a way to comply with the CWA that is less costly than the individual permit process.

As the two NAHB decisions make clear, a trade group asserting standing on behalf of its members – or those members suing on their own behalf – must address the traceability and redressability prongs of the standing requirement with particularity, and must establish both that the specific regulatory action being challenged is the direct cause of their injury and that vacating the agency action will redress that injury.

I’m sure that the third time will be a charm for the NAHB. 

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Those following stormwater issues know that EPA is overdue to promulgate a proposed rule for stormwater controls at post-construction sites. The rule has been extremely controversial, with groups such as the Associated General Contractors arguing that EPA has no authority to promulgate post-construction rules. EPA was originally scheduled to issue the proposed rule by September 30. When EPA couldn’t meet that deadline, it negotiated an extension until December 2 (while stating that the deadline for the final rule, November 19, 2012, would still be met). Well, it’s December 15, and no proposal has been issued.

E&E Daily has now reported that, in recent Congressional testimony, EPA Acting Assistant Administrator for Water Nancy Stoner (a law school classmate, I might add) has acknowledged the obvious and admitted that EPA is “behind schedule.” Stoner did not provide a new target for when the rule would be proposed. If I were a betting person, I’d be skeptical that there are any circumstances under which EPA could actually meet the November 19, 2012 deadline for promulgation of a final rule. 

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Market-watchers thinking that having friends in Congress means that coal can flourish despite EPA regulation on many fronts may have a different view to ponder. Goldman Sachs predicted last week that generators will continue to switch from coal to natural gas and downgraded the prospects of the coal industry from “attractive” to “neutral.” Specifically, Goldman predicted that 51 GW of coal electric generating capacity are on their way out and that EPA Cross State Air Pollution Rule, or CSAPR, and utility MACT rule would together eliminate 160 million tons of coal production through 2018. Political winds may shift direction periodically, but cold-blooded economic analysis says that the outlook for coal is not great in the long run.

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Developers have cheered in recent years as the Supreme Court has tightened its standing rules. In a decision issued on Friday in National Association of Home Builders v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may have hoist the developers on their own petard. 

After EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers issued a determination that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River constitute “traditional navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act, the National Association of Home Builders sued. The complaint appears to have attached declarations referring to individuals who own property along tributaries of the two reaches, and who asserted that they are have applied for permits under the CWA. None of this was enough for the Court, which made four important points:

·         The NAHB itself did not have organizational standing. The Court made clear that an organization does not have standing unless it has credibly asserted that the challenged action “’perceptibly impaired’ a non-abstract interest.”

·         NAHB’s effort to assert representational standing for its members generally failed, because it contained no assertions linking this site-specific TNW determination to any broader impacts that would affect developers away from the Santa Cruz River.

·         NAHB’s effort to assert standing on behalf of owners in the vicinity of the Santa Cruz River failed because none of the declarations filed with the complaint alleged any harm specifically tied to the issuance of the TNW determination.

·         NAHB did not have “procedural standing” to challenge the agencies’ failure to provide notice and an opportunity to comment before issuing the TNW determination. Quoting from the Supreme Court decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Appeals Court stated that “deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation – a procedural right in vacuo – is insufficient to create Article III standing.” As the Court further noted, allegations of procedural violations may be relevant in assessing the redressability issue, but they cannot loosen the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that they have suffered a substantive injury traceable to the procedural violation.

The NABH decision appears plainly correct in light of Supreme Court standing jurisprudence. Moreover, it does not substantially narrow access to the courts. In fact, I think it provides a useful roadmap regarding the types of declarations that will be required to establish standing for developers. What it does make clear is that the courts are not simply discouraging environmental plaintiffs in their standing jurisprudence. Instead, the courts are discouraging each side equally – or at least requiring the same demonstrations from developers as well as environmentalists.

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On Friday, EPA proposed certain revisions to its rule on air emissions from boilers and commercial and industrial solid waste incinerators (CISWI). As with other major rules under development in the past few years, EPA has taken fairly substantial steps to limit the reach of the rule to those boilers and CISWI that are of greatest concern. Without engaging in formal cost-effectiveness analysis, EPA has sought to make the rule as cost-effective as possible.

As with most of EPA’s big rules, it is too complex to be summarized in a blog post. EPA’s summary fact sheet is here. Very briefly, the rule exempts 86% of industrial boilers and subjects most other boilers to work practice standards rather than emission limits. For those boilers subject to the emission limits, the new rules relaxed limits for CO, PM, and most metals, but increased the stringency for mercury and acid gases.

EPA also made one important change sought by the biomass industry. The rule will allow biomass to be combusted in boilers and CISWI, by defining it as “non-hazardous secondary material,” which can now “be considered a legitimate, non-waste fuel.”

As I have noted with other EPA rules, I expect that this rule will survive judicial challenge. Although no cost-effectiveness analysis was provided, EPA estimates that the benefits of the rules exceed the costs by a factor of more than 10. More to the point, as with other rules, much of what EPA has done is dictated by the CAA.

The real question is whether anyone will appreciate EPA’s efforts to – if I may use the term – tailor the rule as finely as possible. As Greenwire noted, there remain efforts in Congress to pass legislation both delaying and softening the rules. My sense is that we should at least give EPA credit for drafting better rules, because the agency is certainly not getting any political credit. The environmentalists criticize EPA for not having enough gumption, while EPA’s critics still call EPA “the scariest agency in federal government.” 

On this score, I’ll just note one final perspective. In today’s New York Times, David Brooks described Obama – or least Cass Sunstein, director the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs – as a “wonky liberal.” What was the context for this comment? A discussion of the administration’s handling of costly environmental regulations. Brooks conceded that “most people in government are trying to find a balance between difficult trade-offs.” The problem for the administration is that neither the right nor the left today wants balance.

I enjoy criticizing EPA, but I would want to be trying to juggle the issues that EPA is currently statutorily mandated to address.

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Chapter 91 is in many ways my favorite Massachusetts environmental statute. After all, very few statutory regimes allow one to discuss the Colonial Ordinances of 1641-47, and where the waters ebbeth and floweth. The gist is that these waters, and the land under them, belong to the Commonwealth, in trust for its citizens. Of course, the modern details get more complicated, but that’s still the essence.

As Boston Harbor in particular has gotten cleaned up, and efforts to revive the waterfront have really picked up steam (thank you, Liberty Wharf!), an issue that has reared its ugly head is the requirement for projects subject to Chapter 91 to provide “Facilities of Public Accommodation.” This requirement is understandable at a certain level and can be a useful tool to ensure the ongoing revival of the waterfront as public space. However, what happens when a developer is required to devote the first floor of a project to an FPA, but there’s no public to accommodate? There are some waterfront locations where FPAs don’t really make sense. Indeed, the proof is often in the pudding; developers sometimes just cannot find tenants for FPA space.

That problem was the subject of the recent adjudicatory hearing decision in In re Matter of Navy Yard Four Associates, Ltd. The underlying facts and legal issues are somewhat complex and not really relevant here. What is relevant is that the licensee, known as “Navy Yard,” has a Chapter 91 license that, consistent with the regulations, requires that the first floor of the project be devoted to an FPA. Navy Yard sought to amend the license to get out from under the FPA requirement. The Recommended Final Decision came down against Navy Yard.

Commissioner Kimmell adopted the Recommended Final Decision, but, in what is most interesting in the Decision – and the reason for this post – he did not stop there. As the Commissioner noted:

            It is apparent that the legal wrangling in this case stems from the Navy Yard Four’s alleged difficulty in securing a tenant for a ground floor FPA.

            The paramount purpose of chapter 91 is to activate, preserve and protect public use and enjoyment of tidelands. While the FPA requirements have been highly successful in fulfilling this purpose and enriching our civic culture, it may be that in some instances FPA rules do not work as intended and interior spaces remain vacant. In my view, idle and vacant waterfront space does not promote the public use and enjoyment of tidelands, and represents a lost opportunit for the public.

            It is therefore incumbent upon the Department … to determine whether this problem exists, is widespread, and is attributable to FPA rules. If so, the Department should explore refinements to FPAs and consider alternative means of promoting the public use and enjoyment of the waterfront to address instances in which existing FPA rules do not secure these benefits.

To which, I can only add, it’s about time. Empty FPA space indeed benefits no one. 

I do not know what, if anything MassDEP will do with respect to FPAs. There are those who think that a legislative solution is necessary. I suspect that DEP disagrees. Either way, the Commissioner’s recognition of the issue and public statement about it in the Navy Yard Four decision is a positive first step.

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