Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

In a prior rant, I raised the concern that EPA would oppose the use of new cleanup technologies based on nanotechnologies on the basis of the precautionary principle. I may not have been exactly on the mark, but I was pretty close. On Thursday, the NRDC announced that it has filed suit challenging EPA’s decision to issue a conditional registration of a nanosilver-based antimicrobial agent. The NRDC asserts that EPA’s use of the conditional registration process is “illegal,” apparently because EPA does not have sufficient information to justify a conclusion that use of the nanosilver products do not cause “unreasonable adverse effects to human health and the environment.” According to the NRDC, EPA’s decision is

just the most recent example in a long line of decisions that treats [sic] humans and our environmental as guinea pigs for these untested pesticides.

As noted in my prior post, there is a difference between regulating in spite of uncertainty – which can frequently be justified – and regulating because of uncertainty, which is deeply troubling. Nanomaterials hold great promise in a wide number of fields, including many uses – such as antimicrobials – focused on protecting public health and the environment. 

What is the basis for keeping these materials off the market just because we haven’t proved that they don’t pose a risk?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As readers of this blog know, the impact of EPA air rules, including in particular the Utility MACT rule, on the reliability of the nation’s electric grid has been the subject of much speculation. Last week, the Congressional Research Service weighed in, with the exciting headline: EPA’s Utility MACT: Will the Lights Go Out?” Of course, notwithstanding the sexy title, the CRS conclusion can be summarized pretty simply: the MACT rule will not cause the lights to go out. Money quote:

although the rule may lead to the retirement or derating of some facilities, almost all of the capacity reductions will occur in areas that have substantial reserve margins. Two areas that may have difficulty meeting reserve margins, Texas and New England, will experience few plant retirements and deratings, according to industry data. Furthermore, to address the reliability concerns expressed by industry, the final rule includes provisions aimed at providing additional time for compliance if it is needed to install pollution controls or add new capacity to ensure reliability in specific areas. As a result, it is unlikely that electric reliability will be harmed by the rule.

Absent some surprises, I’m done with the subject. Let me know if the lights go out.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court today affirmed the decision by the Department of Public Utilities to approve the power purchase agreement, or PPA, between Cape Wind and National Grid. (Full disclosure: Foley Hoag represented the Department of Energy Resources in support of the contract before the DPU.) The decision doesn’t mean that Cape Wind will now get built. Given the (one hopes) temporary problems with the federal loan guarantee program and Cape Wind’s failure thus far to sell the rest of the power from the project, the SJC decision is more of a necessary than sufficient condition to construction.

On the merits, the decision is pretty much a standard nuts-and-bolts review concerning whether there was substantial evidence to support DPU’s decision. The SJC made frequent reference to the deference given both to DPU’s application of its expertise and to its interpretation of statutes it is charged with implementing. 

Going forward, the most significant aspect of the decision is probably the SJC’s finding that, in the absence of a statutory definition of the term “cost-effective,” the DPU was within its authority in in considering

All costs and benefits associated with [the PPA], including the non-price benefits that are difficult to quantify, and including costs and benefits of complying with existing and reasonably anticipated future federal and state environmental requirements.

Similarly, the SJC agreed with the DPU that analysis regarding whether the contract is in the public interest need not be limited to whether lower-priced alternatives exist. The SJC found that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the DPU’s conclusion that Cape Wind would provide “significant and special advantages by virtue of its location near an area that uses high levels of electricity and the advanced state of the permitting process for the facility.” 

In short, the decision not only affirms the DPU’s decision here, but makes clear that, so long as an appropriate record is compiled, DPU is going to have significant discretion with respect to similar projects going forward.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last week, I noted that the D.C. Court of Appeals had found that the National Association of Home Builders did not have standing to challenge a determination by EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River are traditional navigable waters. On Friday, in National Association of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the NAHB lost yet another standing battle.

This time, the NAHB was challenging the Corps’ nationwide permit, NWP-46, allowing discharges of dredge and fill material into certain upland ditches. The District Court had found that the NAHB did have standing, but ruled against NAHB on the merits. The Court of Appeals didn’t even let them get that far, once more barring the courthouse doors.

Aside from the NAHB’s bad luck in losing in the court of appeals twice in one week, what’s news here? 

The news is that, once again, the Court has provided useful guidance regarding what regulated entities – or their trade groups – must allege to establish standing in these types of cases. The NAHB had asserted that NWP-46 imposes costs on its members because it is ambiguous and leaves members uncertain when they are in fact subject to CWA jurisdiction for filling ditches. Unfortunately for the NAHB, the Court concluded that the Corps has been asserting jurisdiction over upland ditches for years. Moreover, the Court pointed to an acknowledgement by the NAHB VP for Legal Affairs that the Corps had “consistently suggested that at least some upland ditches were subject to CWA jurisdiction.”

In short, the Court concluded that the NAHB’s injury was not traceable to the permit, but was instead traceable to the Corps’ underlying assertion of jurisdiction, which was not asserted for the first time in NWP-46. Indeed, as the Court noted, because the Corps had previously asserted jurisdiction over upland ditches, NWP-46 benefited NAHB members, by providing them a way to comply with the CWA that is less costly than the individual permit process.

As the two NAHB decisions make clear, a trade group asserting standing on behalf of its members – or those members suing on their own behalf – must address the traceability and redressability prongs of the standing requirement with particularity, and must establish both that the specific regulatory action being challenged is the direct cause of their injury and that vacating the agency action will redress that injury.

I’m sure that the third time will be a charm for the NAHB. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Developers have cheered in recent years as the Supreme Court has tightened its standing rules. In a decision issued on Friday in National Association of Home Builders v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may have hoist the developers on their own petard. 

After EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers issued a determination that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River constitute “traditional navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act, the National Association of Home Builders sued. The complaint appears to have attached declarations referring to individuals who own property along tributaries of the two reaches, and who asserted that they are have applied for permits under the CWA. None of this was enough for the Court, which made four important points:

·         The NAHB itself did not have organizational standing. The Court made clear that an organization does not have standing unless it has credibly asserted that the challenged action “’perceptibly impaired’ a non-abstract interest.”

·         NAHB’s effort to assert representational standing for its members generally failed, because it contained no assertions linking this site-specific TNW determination to any broader impacts that would affect developers away from the Santa Cruz River.

·         NAHB’s effort to assert standing on behalf of owners in the vicinity of the Santa Cruz River failed because none of the declarations filed with the complaint alleged any harm specifically tied to the issuance of the TNW determination.

·         NAHB did not have “procedural standing” to challenge the agencies’ failure to provide notice and an opportunity to comment before issuing the TNW determination. Quoting from the Supreme Court decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Appeals Court stated that “deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation – a procedural right in vacuo – is insufficient to create Article III standing.” As the Court further noted, allegations of procedural violations may be relevant in assessing the redressability issue, but they cannot loosen the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that they have suffered a substantive injury traceable to the procedural violation.

The NABH decision appears plainly correct in light of Supreme Court standing jurisprudence. Moreover, it does not substantially narrow access to the courts. In fact, I think it provides a useful roadmap regarding the types of declarations that will be required to establish standing for developers. What it does make clear is that the courts are not simply discouraging environmental plaintiffs in their standing jurisprudence. Instead, the courts are discouraging each side equally – or at least requiring the same demonstrations from developers as well as environmentalists.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Earlier this week, Greenwire noted a Los Angeles Times story reporting that businesses are using the California Environmental Quality Act – California’s version of NEPA – as a tool of economic competition, trying to kill or delay projects for economic reasons. Much like Claude Rains, I am shocked, shocked, to find that there is strategic litigation going on here. In the past two years, I have defended multiple court cases and administrative hearings brought by a 10-citizens group against one particular client. Many of those claims have been premised on our state MEPA statute. Who are the members of the citizens’ group? A competitor of our client, and a variety of employees of the competitor and relatives of the competitor’s principal.

As suggested by the headline, none of this is really news to practitioners, who have to live with this stuff all the time. What really caught my eye in the Times story was this quote from a defender of the status quo:

Environmental advocates say the focus on why groups use CEQA is misplaced. "You shouldn't really be looking at motivations of petitioners," said Doug Carstens, an environmental lawyer in Santa Monica who often files CEQA complaints. "Even if it's a solely economically motivated actor, if they're promoting transparency, good government, why not?"

Why not? Why not? Because transaction costs matter. Because they are a dead weight on the economy. Because they distract agency personnel from focusing on more important and pressing environmental issues. Because they really can kill valuable developments. Perhaps Mr. Carstens is an outlier, but I fear that he in fact remains all too typical in an environmental movement that remains, at its core, very skeptical of, if not downright opposed to, economic development.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

It is, as the lawyers say, black letter law that the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, is a procedural statute, which provides no substantive protection to the environment. It merely requires the appropriate level of assessment of the potential environmental consequences of federal action. Whether the action should be taken is outside NEPA’s purview.

Rarely, however, has this critical limitation on NEPA’s scope been stated so plainly as in yesterday’s decision in Save Strawberry Canyon v. U.S. Department of Energy, in which Judge Alsop of the Northern District of California rejected a NEPA-based challenge to a DOE-funded laboratory at the University of California. As Judge Alsop wrote:

We must always remember that NEPA is a procedural – not a substantive – statute. Once the agency takes a hard look at the environmental consequences of the proposed action, the agency is free to destroy the environment. (My emphasis.) NEPA does not require, in making the substantive decision, that any extra weight be given to environmental preservation, sad as that sometimes is.

As an empirical matter, I’m skeptical that judges’ views on the merits of projects don’t infect their thinking regarding whether NEPA procedural requirements have been met, but the decision is nonetheless a salutary reminder of both NEPA’s purpose and its limits.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As part of its efforts to control the impact of mountaintop removal mining, EPA has implemented a number of changes – both procedural and substantive – into how § 404 permit applications for such activities will be reviewed. None of these changes have gone through notice and comment rulemaking. As we previously noted, Judge Reggie Walton already expressed skepticism about EPA’s mountaintop removal guidance. Last week, in the latest decision in National Mining Association v. Jackson, Judge Walton shot down EPA’s “Enhanced Coordination Process”, or ECP, for reviews of section 404 permit applications.

Although EPA described the modifications as the types of procedural changes that are within agencies’ inherent authority, Judge Walton was having none of it. He concluded that EPA’s authority under the CWA is subject to certain unambiguous limitations. 

The statutory language explicitly establishes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, as the permitting authority, which strike the Court as an express limitation. … The statute is therefore not ambiguous…. Thus, if a responsibility involving the permitting process has not been delegated to the EPA by Congress, that function is vested in the Corps as the permitting authority.

Under the Multi—Criteria Resource Assessment, or MCIR [don’t ask me why it’s “MCIR” and not “MCRA”], EPA, not the Corps, initially applies § 404(b) guidelines, and EPA directs the Corps how to process mountaintop removal § 404 permit applications.  To Judge Walton, these changes exceed EPA’s statutory authority under the CWA.

Judge Walton also concluded that the ECP, including the MCIR violated EPA’s obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to comment on the change in rules that the ECP represents. For those of you who are not APA geeks, the APA exempts from the obligation to provide notice and comment “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” While the ECP sounds procedural – after all, the word “process” is in the label – Judge Walton concluded that the rules were substantive and required notice and comment under the APA. To Judge Walton,

The fact that the creation of the MCIR Assessment removed the task of applying the 404(b)(1) guidelines to pending permits from the Corps and bestowed it upon the EPA signifies a substantive, rather than a procedural, change to the permitting framework. … [I]t is apparent that the MCIR Assessment and the EC Process “effectively amend” the Section 404 permitting process by conferring additional reviewing authority on the EPA – authority that the statute reserves for the Corps. American Mining therefore compels a finding that the MCIR Assessment and the EC Process are legislative rules. 

Another day, another defeat for EPA. The APA lives.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

EPA may have had problems in court in recent years defending its regulations, but it has generally fared much better in its enforcement cases. Earlier this week, however, EPA suffered what will be, if it is affirmed, a devastating defeat in its PSD/NSR enforcement initiative. In United States v. EME Homer City Generation, Judge Terrence McVerry concluded that the government could get no relief against either the former owners of the facility or the current owners or operator. No penalties. No injunctive relief. No relief under state law. Nothing. Nada.

The facts here were typical of NSR enforcement cases. The facility, in Homer City, Pennsylvania, had implemented a number of projects from 1991 through 1996 which, EPA alleged, required PSD permits. No permits were sought. The owners at the time of the changes sold the plant in 1999. It was sold again in 2001 and is currently operated by one entity and owned by a group of LLCs. 

The court’s analysis was thorough, yet straightforward. According to the court, PSD requirements are one-time, pre-construction requirements. With respect to civil penalties, the United States acknowledged that the five-year statute of limitations precluded claims against the former owners. The court gave the claim against the current owners and operator short shrift. The court concluded that

The alleged PSD violations constitute singular, separate failures by the Former Owners to obtain pre-construction permits, rather than ongoing failures to comply with whatever hyupothetical conditions might have been imposed during the PSD permittingprocess. Thus, the United States was required to file suit to recover civil penalties for an alleged PSD program violation within five years of the construction project.

The big news from the decision is the court’s refusal to grant injunctive relief. While Judge McVerry described the statute as complex and ambiguous, he did not find the decision before him difficult. With respect to the current owners/operator, injunctive relief could not be imposed on them, because no remedy can be imposed without a liability finding. Because the failure to obtain PSD permits was solely attributable to the former owners, the current owners/operator are not liable for the violation. No liability; no injunction. 

The court found the question somewhat more difficult with respect to former owners. They would be liable for the original violation, if proved, and the five-year statute of limitations does not apply to injunctive relief. The court punted on whether it had authority to issue an injunction against former owners, resting its decision instead on the court’s broad discretion to grant or deny equitable relief. Describing injunctive relief as “a rare and extraordinary remedy,” the court concluded that it would be inappropriate to grant relief against former owners where, since they no longer own the facility, injunctive relief against the former owners is not necessary to prevent future violations by the former owners. 

Finally, the court concluded that the current owners/operator did not violate their Title V permit, because the permit does not include any requirement to meet BACT. The court flat-out rejected the idea that the Title V permit could somehow be found to “incorporate” BACT requirements that should have been included in the Title V permit because they should have been included in PSD permits, because the former owners should have applied for them. 

In short, the government was too late to bring claims against the former owners, and could not establish liability against the current owners. Thus, it could get no relief against anyone.

It is difficult to square this opinion with the general rule interpreting police power statutes broadly to effectuate their purposes, because this decision means that there will be some circumstances in which there is a violation with no remedy, even where the impacts of that violation are still being felt, or seen, or inhaled, today. However, the decision is careful and thoughtful and I wouldn’t automatically assume that it will be reversed on appeal. Not a good day for EPA.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As some of our clients know all too well, I am spending much time these days defending citizen suits. As federal and state agency budgets get slashed, we’re only going to see more such suits, unless a Tea Party-controlled Congress amends the relevant statutes to cut back on citizen suit provisions. 

In a move that will facilitate citizen enforcement, EPA announced last week that it has yet again upgraded its Enforcement and Compliance History Online, or ECHO, data base. As Cynthia Giles, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Enforcement said:

EPA is committed to providing the public with easy to use tools that display facility compliance information and the actions EPA and the states are taking to address pollution problems in communities across the nation. EPA is proud to announce our latest effort under the President’s White House Regulatory Compliance Transparency Initiative and we will continue to take steps to make meaningful enforcement and compliance data available as part of an open, transparent government.

In other words, if we don’t have the resources to sue the polluters, we’ll at least try to make sure that NGOs do. 

It’s difficult to be against increased transparency – and I’m not. I will note, though, that ECHO is not perfect. I frequently see mistakes when I review information about our clients. I certainly would advise clients to review ECHO periodically to ensure that they know what information EPA is providing to the public about their compliance status.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Following EPA’s decision last week to scrap its reconsideration of the 2008 ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard, the parties to the litigation challenging the 2008 standard are back in court. This week, EPA submitted a brief to the Court of Appeals, which was pretty much a six-page version of Roseanne Roseannadanna’s “Never mind.” After telling the Court for years that it should defer to EPA’s reconsideration process – a decision on which was always just around the corner, until EPA decided it wasn’t – EPA has now told the Court that it is time to brief the merits of the challenges to the 2008 standard of 0.075 ppm.

As I noted last week, EPA has already made the argument that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction in this case. If that argument fails, I cannot wait to see what argument EPA will make on the merits. The Clean Air Science Advisory Committee said that 0.075 ppm was not sufficiently stringent, the Court of Appeals has said that EPA cannot willy-nilly ignore CASAC, and EPA itself pretty much said in 2010 that the standard cannot be any higher than 0.070 ppm. I don’t envy the DOJ lawyers who will be writing that brief.

The problem for the environmental group challengers is whether there is any practical remedy at this point. The Court cannot promulgate its own NAAQS. All it can really do is impose a schedule on EPA to correct the 2008 standard. It doesn’t take much analysis to conclude that there is likely no reasonable deadline the Court could impose that would result in a new ozone standard any earlier than the 2013 date towards which EPA is already pointing. I foresee some awkward moments for the DOJ lawyers and some very firm finger-wagging by the Court, to the effect of “We really, really expect you to issue a new standard in 2013.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

This week, EPA filed a brief with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that, notwithstanding its fourth delay in issuing a decision on its reconsideration of the NAAQS for ozone, the court cannot and should not order EPA to issue a decision. Industry shouldn’t get too excited, however. In the same brief, EPA telegraphed pretty clearly, consistent with its 2010 proposed rule, that it remains on track to significantly decrease the ozone standard from the 0.075 ppm standard promulgated by the Bush administration in 2008.

As most readers know, the Bush standard was higher than that suggested by EPA’s own Clean Air Science Advisory Committee, or CASAC. In a parallel case, the D.C. Circuit found EPA’s fine particulate standard arbitrary and capricious, largely because it had ignored CASAC’s recommendations. Given the decision in the fine particulate case, and, presumably, the Obama administration’s own views on the appropriate standard, it is not surprising that EPA embarked on a reconsideration effort, rather than trying to defend the Bush standard.

In January 2010, EPA proposed that the standard should be in a range from 0.060 ppm to 0.070 ppm. However, notwithstanding CASAC’s views, the new standard remains hugely controversial and EPA has had difficulty in finalizing the rule. EPA missed an August 2010 deadline to publish a final rule, and then an October 2010 target, and then a December 31, 2010 target, and then a July 29, 2011 target. When EPA, after missing the most recent target, would not even give a date, but instead only informed the court and the parties that a final rule would be issued "shortly", the environmental petitioners, including the American Lung Association, asked the court to order EPA to issue the final rule.

EPA’s opposition is straightforward. First, it argues that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over citizen claims that EPA is late in issuing such rules. Second, EPA claims that it has been “diligent” in its reconsideration effort and that the final rule will indeed be issued “shortly.” 

It’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that EPA was, to put it mildly, overoptimistic in its reports to the court regarding how long the reconsideration process would take. They should have known better. That being said, I wouldn’t be surprised if the Court continues to give EPA at least some more time to reach a decision. After all, the court cannot issue a standard itself. What would surprise me would be if EPA does not manage to issue the new standard sometime in the next six months or so. They’ve been boxed in by CASAC and any standard above 0.070 ppm would probably be found to be arbitrary and capricious. 

The ever-reliable internet attributes the “wheels of justice” quote to Sun Tzu. No matter how slowly it grinds, EPA is going to have to issue a rule at some point. It would be best to get it out as far in advance of the election as possible. Moving from Sun Tzu to Shakespeare, “if it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well It were done quickly.” 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Late last week, Greenwire reported that EPA is delaying its proposed construction general permit, or CGP, for stormwater. The delay is certainly a victory for the real estate industry, which has been fighting hard to delay the rule and, in particular, its numeric turbidity limit. The industry had complained about the data on which the standard was based, calculation errors by EPA, and what it views as a 10-fold underestimate of the compliance costs.

EPA denies that the delay was a political decision by the White House or OMB and stated that it needs to gather more information about existing stormwater treatment technologies before issuing the rule. 

We’ll see whether EPA gets any credit from the business community for the delay. They certainly won’t get any from environmental groups. It’s important to remember that the rule is actually the result of litigation brought by the NRDC, so EPA cannot continue to delay indefinitely or it will just find itself back in court. As is often the case, EPA is going to have a difficult time avoiding being caught between a rock and a hard place at some point on this rule.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Yesterday, the SJC issued its eagerly awaited decision in Ten Persons of the Commonwealth v. Fellsway Development. I think that the SJC probably got it right. It says something about MEPA jurisprudence, however, that the decision is good for neither citizen plaintiffs nor for developers. I’d suggest that the legislature go back to the drawing board, but it won’t happen and, if it did, I wouldn’t trust the legislature to get it right.

Fellsway Development involves an proposed development within the Middlesex Fells Reservation. After running into certain obstacles, the developers reconfigured their project to avoid the need for any permits and thus any MEPA review. To do so, they eliminated any roadway changes that would have required approval from the Department of Conservation and Recreation. DCR initially concluded that it still had to perform some roadway changes itself in order to mitigate adverse traffic impacts. EEA, in turn, concluded that such changes by DCR would constitute financial assistance to the project, which would bring it back into the MEPA universe.

Fellsway Development had a creative solution to that determination. It entered into an MOU with DCR pursuant to which DCR would do the work, so the project would not require a permit, but Fellsway Development would pay for the work, so that it would not be receiving any financial assistance. EEA blessed the deal with an advisory opinion concluding that MEPA review would not be required.

The unhappy citizen protectors of the Reservation were not so pleased. They sued, arguing that the advisory opinion was wrong, and that the MOU constituted both a form of permit and that it constituted improper “segregation” of the project, because, whatever Fellsway Development said, the roadway improvements were really a necessary part of the project.

Following its decision in Cummings v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, the SJC concluded that the EEA Secretary is not subject to suit under Chapter 214, § 7A, because he cannot cause “damage to the environment” by making a flawed ruling under MEPA. This decision is almost certainly right under Cummings, but that doesn’t mean that it’s not nuts. In traditional administrative law terms, this case – and all MEPA cases – are about whether the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. How is it that our case law has thus determined that the Secretary is not a proper party to the case?

The SJC also handed one victory to developers, by making clear that Chapter 231A, the declaratory judgment statute, does not provide standing to citizen plaintiffs. The court reiterated that:

We discern nothing in MEPA’s language, purpose, or administrative scheme, however, to suggest a legislative intent to confer standing on residents who bring suit alleging a generalized harm to nearby property.

Unfortunately, this was largely a pyrrhic victory for the developers, because the SJC concluded that the citizens had stated a claim under Chapter 214 7A, adequately alleging that DCR and Fellsway Development had violated MEPA by improperly segmenting the project. In a backhanded compliment, the SJC stated that “we do not suggest that the Secretary’s opinion [that no MEPA review was required] is unpersuasive.” Instead, the Court just fell back on the generous pleading requirements of Rule 12. While giving a nod to recent decisions imposing more rigorous pleading requirements – “We look beyond the conclusory allegations of the complaint” – the SJC nonetheless concluded that “plaintiffs have pleaded facts sufficient to support a claim that the DCR and the developers delayed specific roadway alterations, which might otherwise require a permit, in order to ‘phase or segment a Project to evade, defer or curtail MEPA review.’”

What’s the bottom line? 

1.                   The Secretary still will not be a party to cases asserting his/her MEPA decisions were wrong.

2.                   Developers remain at risk of having projects delayed because courts bend over backwards to give those challenging MEPA or permitting decisions their day in court.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Environmental liability has always been a dish best served in as many slices as possible.  Hence, CERCLA jurisprudence in its first two decades was characterized by a judicial willingness to entertain ever more creative theories to extend environmental liability to new classes of parties, such as a developer who unknowingly moved contaminated soil (Tanglewood East) to a toll manufacturer who merely directed the production of a useful product with knowledge that there would be hazardous waste by-products (Aceto).  More recently, however, courts have shown far less appetite for expanding the traditional boundaries of environmental liability beyond owners, operators, arrangers and transporters.  Typical of this new trend is Hinds Investment, L.P. v. McLaughlin, decided yesterday.  In two short decisions, the Ninth Circuit held that the manufacturer of a dry cleaning machine could not be held liable under either CERCLA or RCRA merely for selling a machine that by design would generate waste PCE.

Similar to the rationale in Aceto, the plaintiff in Hinds Investments claimed that the manufacturer of  the dry cleaning equipment used at its shopping centers could be liable on the theory that those dry cleaning machines had been designed with the knowledge that they would generate waste PCE.  According to that plaintiff, the manufacturer of the machine was an “arranger” within the meaning of CERCLA and “contributed” to the past handling and disposal of a hazardous waste within the meaning of RCRA’s citizen suit provision.  On a motion to dismiss, the trial court rejected these claims.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed in its published decision, finding that the machine manufacturer did not have an active enough role in contributing to the use or disposal of the waste PCE to support a RCRA claim.  In an unpublished decision, the court ruled that no CERCLA claim would lie given that the machine manufacturer had not sold its equipment for the purpose of disposing waste PCE.  In the end, Hinds Investment illustrates just how dramatically the judicial climate has changed after Burlington Northern and Best Foods with courts being far less receptive today to the notion of expanding environmental liability to new classes of PRPs.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last week, in Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, Judge Henry Kennedy reminded us that, in thinking about whether the existing Clean Air Act requires EPA to address climate change, the actual words of the statute matter. The scope of the climate problem does not obviate the need to parse individual provisions of the CAA and Massachusetts v. EPA did not resolve all issues. 

CBD petitioned EPA to regulate GHG emissions from nonroad engines and vehicles, under § 213 of the CAA, and from aircraft engines, under § 231 of the CAA. EPA did issue advanced notices of proposed rulemakings in response to the petitions, but CBD sued, arguing that EPA has not gone far enough. 

The court rejected CBD’s claims regarding nonroad engines, because § 213 provides only that

If the Administrator determines that any emissions not referred to in [a prior paragraph] from new nonroad engines or vehicles significantly contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, the Administrator may promulgate (and from time to time revise) such regulations as the Administrator deems appropriate . . . .

To the court, the “if” and “may” language, combined with the overall structure of § 213, mandates a conclusion that EPA does not have an obligation to make an endangerment finding with regard to nonroad engines. Even so, as the court noted, EPA does have an obligation to respond fully to CBD’s petition, and EPA’s ultimate action on the petition will itself be subject to judicial review.

With respect to the petition under § 231 regarding airplane engines, the different language of that section compelled a different conclusion.  

The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue proposed emission standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.

Again looking at the specific language of the statute, including the use of the mandatory “shall,” the court concluded that EPA cannot refuse to make endangerment findings.

The simple lesson from the case? The specific language of the statute matters. The bigger lesson? Unless Congress acts, the courts are going to be requiring EPA to take action with respect to GHG emissions under existing CAA authority. 

We’re thus left in the same bind we’ve been in since Waxman-Markey collapsed. EPA does not have the authority that it and the environmental community want and it cannot regulate GHG efficiently. At the same time, EPA does have authority that conservatives wish it did not have. True climate skeptics may never be convinced, but it still seems that a deal should be possible among environmentalists and conservatives who acknowledge the reality of climate change.

Hope springs eternal.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Yesterday, the Supreme Court announced its decision in American Electric Power v. Connecticut, holding that EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law nuisance claims. I have always thought that the displacement argument was correct, so the decision is not really a surprise (and the 8-0 decision and crisp opinion only confirm that view). The decision is nonetheless important and, notwithstanding a few limitations, rather sweeping.

The Court’s analysis was straightforward. The creation of federal common law by courts is “unusual” and

[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law,” the “need for such an unusual exercise of law-making by federal courts disappears.”

Next, displacement of federal common law is not the same as preemption of state law, because there are no federalism issues. Thus, the test for displacement is “simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue.” Therefore, what EPA does in response to the congressional mandate is irrelevant to displacement. It is the CAA that matters. As the court noted, if EPA does not set emission limits, the CAA allows the plaintiffs to petition EPA to do so and EPA’s response to that petition is subject to judicial review. In short,

the relevant question for purposes of displacement is “whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.”

The Court also provided a forceful argument for judicial restraint in these kinds of cases:

            It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions. The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order.

The decision did not address whether these or other plaintiffs could bring actions under state nuisance law, but I would not put a lot of money on those cases succeeding. The decision also does not address cases such as Kivilina v. ExxonMobil, in which the plaintiffs do not seek regulation, but only damages. However, I’m skeptical about the survival of those cases as well.

The real question following yesterday’s decision is whether Republicans in Congress will read it carefully. Will they continue to press to eliminate EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases? Doing so would revive public nuisance suits, unless the legislation also barred federal courts from hearing such cases.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

This week, in Webster v. USDA, Judge John Bailey of the Northern District of West Virginia rejected a challenge to the Environmental Impact Statement filed for a USDA flood control project. The decision is not particularly startling and does not break new ground, but it does serve as a reminder just how limited judicial review under NEPA is supposed to be – and just how often that limitation is honored only in the breach, by judges who don’t like particular projects or don’t want to be known as the judge who approved a particular project if something later goes wrong.

As Judge Bailey pointed out:

NEPA does not … impose any substantive environmental obligations upon agencies; it “merely prohibits uninformed – rather than unwise – agency action.”

Just to be clear, Judge Bailey was not off on a frolic and detour here; the quoted language is from the Supreme Court decision in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council. Moreover, in determining whether the agency committed a reversible “clear error of judgment,” the court

must take a holistic view of the agency’s assessment; “[c]ourts may not ‘flyspeck’ an agency’s environmental analysis, looking for any deficiency, no matter how minor.”

How many federal judges have the restraint to reject a challenge to an EIS, where he/she finds the EIS thorough, but is convinced that the project is “unwise”? And how many practitioners have the experience of judges “flyspecking” a holistically sound EIS, looking for some kind of reversible error, because they had some underlying concern about the substance of the project?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The uncertain and often lengthy time to get permitting decisions is always near the top of the list of industry complaints. Section 165 of the Clean Air Act provides some relief by requiring certain permit decisions to be made within one year. Last week, in Avenal Power Center v. EPA, District Judge Richard Leon, in what may comfortably be described as a strongly-worded opinion, held that EPA may not circumvent the one-year limit on permit decisions by carving out from the one-year period the time spent by the Environmental Appeals Board reviewing EPA’s permit decision. 

In March 2008, Avenal Power filed an application for a PSD permit necessary to construct a new gas-fired power plant in the San Joaquin Valley in California. When EPA had not issued a decision within two years, Avenal sued. In February 2011, Gina McCarthy, head of EPA’s air office, announced that EPA would issue a permit decision by May 27, 2011. However, Judge Leon found EPA’s commitment to be “disingenuous,” because EPA's permit decision would be subject to EAB review, and EPA acknowledged that EAB review could take 6-18 months.

Judge Leon’s analysis was, in keeping with the statutory language, quite simple. Section 165 requires permit decisions within one year. EPA’s decision to provide appeals of permits to the EAB is a creature of regulation, not statute. The notion that EPA’s regulatory process could trump the statutory requirements is, to Judge Leon, “absurd.”

It is axiomatic that an act of Congress that is patently clear and unambiguous - such as this requirement in the CAA - cannot be overridden by a regulatory process created for the convenience of an Administrator, no matter how much notice and comment preceded its creation. "The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."

EPA apparently tried to persuade the court that section 165 is sufficiently ambiguous to give EPA discretion regarding whether it must squeeze the EAB process into the one-year time frame. Judge Leon’s response to what he called EPA’s “self-serving misinterpretation of Congress’s mandate”?

"Horsefeathers!"

One parochial note for my Massachusetts readers: Massachusetts DEP has recently announced that its permits – although labeled as “Final” – are not final until DEP's own internal adjudicatory hearing process has been completed. Massachusetts law has nothing comparable to Section 165 of the CAA, so MassDEP’s interpretation adds the insult of delay inherent in adjudicatory proceedings to the injury caused by the length of the normal permit process..

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In an interesting decision issued late last week in Industrial Communications and Electronics v. Town of Alton, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that private citizens who had intervened to defend a local zoning limit on cell tower height could continue to do so, notwithstanding that the cell tower provider and the municipal defendant were prepared to settle the case. 

Industrial Communications sought to build a 120’ cell tower in Alton, New Hampshire. The Local zoning by-law would have limited the tower to 71’. The Town’s Zoning Board denied a variance. Industrial Communications did not appeal the denial. Instead, it sued in federal court, seeking to take advantage of the preemption provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Nearby residents, the Slades, intervened as defendants in the federal action.  

After initially defending the case, the Town negotiated a settlement with Industrial Communications that would allow a 100’ tower. The District Court concluded that, where the original defendant was no longer defending the case, the Slades had no rights themselves to continue to defend the denial of the variance. 

The Court of Appeals noted that the Slades could not compel the Town to continue to defend the denial of the zoning variance. “A government entity is free as a defendant to decline to defend or settle on the best terms it can get.” However, the Court noted, intervenors can usually continue to litigate, as long as they have Article III standing. The Slades alleged that a taller tower would impair their views and cause both economic and aesthetic harm. 

Thus, the court had to balance the rights of parties to settle a case with the rights of the intervenors to continue to litigate. To the Court, the determining factor was that the Slades

have a legal interest under state law in the protection that the zoning laws afford to their property; specifically, they could sue in state court to overturn the variance if it were granted unlawfully…. What is at issue here is not merely a private settlement … but, by virtue of the court’s adoption and entry of a consent decree, a legally operative judgment that overrides state law and the Slades’ rights under state law that would prevail unless overridden by the decree. Given that Article III requisites are established, the Slades are entitled to resist the entry of a decree that terminates their protectable rights unless a violation of the Act is proven.

While Industrial Communications alleged that the denial of the variance violated the Telecommunications Act, the District Court never made a finding to that effect – once it approved the settlement, the court thought that no such findings were necessary. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case, giving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove a violation and the Slades an opportunity to deny it.

Although the provisions of the Telecommunications Act may be unusual, cases of federal preemption of state and local environmental laws are not. Industrial Communications makes clear that, even where a state or municipality does not want to defend the local law or regulation, individual citizens who can establish standing may have a right to do so themselves.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Sometimes I’m so timely I can’t stand it. This morning, I posted about the difficulty in challenging regulations under Massachusetts law. Later this morning, the SJC agreed. In Entergy v. DEP, the SJC upheld DEP’s authority to regulate cooling water intake structures under the state CWA. Funny how the SJC cited to the same language here as did Judge Sweeney in the Pepin case.

We will apply all rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the administration action and not declare it void unless its provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the legislative mandate.

Entergy argued that the statute and DEP’s regulations under it have always focused on discharges of pollutants, rather than intake of water. This was not persuasive to the SJC. The Court stated that

[T]he permitting regime for discharges does not foreclose the department from developing compatible methods of regulating water intakes…. Specific statutory authority to act in a particular respect does not bar consistent action under general statutory authority.

The Court’s bottom line? 

We will not substitute our judgment as to the need for a regulation, or the propriety of the means chosen to implement the statutory goals, for that of the agency, so long as the regulation is rationally related to those goals. [T]he purpose of conferring broad power on an expert agency is to permit discretion in determining the best approaches to a complex issue.”

I think that the SJC probably got this case right based on its own precedents. However, the Court’s last statement is almost breathtaking in its scope. Has there ever been a clearer or broader defense of the modern administrative state? With a statement like that, could one imagine the SJC ever concluding that the legislature delegated too much authority to the regulatory agencies? And yet, as conservatives sometimes note, it is the legislators, and not the agency personnel, who are elected and who are supposed to make the big picture decisions.

Jefferson would be turning over in his grave.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Anyone who has ever tried to challenge a regulation in Massachusetts knows that it is an uphill battle. Just how tilted the playing field is was reinforced late last month in the decision in Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife, rejecting a challenge to DFW’s “priority habitat” regulations. The case involves the Eastern Box Turtle, perhaps the most common of state-listed species.

As our Massachusetts readers know, MESA is similar to, but has some significant differences from, the federal ESA. Fundamentally, MESA prohibits taking “endangered” or “threatened” species or species “of special concern.” The statute provides for a rather cumbersome process by which DFW may designate “significant habitat" in order to protect listed species. Whether it is because the process is too cumbersome, or whether it is because the statute provides that property owners may petition for compensation resulting from a taking of their property following designation of significant habitat, DFW simply doesn’t utilize the process.

Instead, DFW has created regulations concerning “priority habitat,” a term not found in the statute. The priority habitat regulations provide somewhat more flexibility and, importantly, do not have a procedure for compensating landowners for regulatory takings. After part of his property was designated as priority habitat, Pepin sued DFW, claiming that the priority habitat regulations were beyond DFW’s authority under MESA. 

Judge Sweeney of the Land Court was having none of it. First, she noted that MESA gives DFW residual authority to promulgate “any regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter.” Moreover, the statute does not preclude DFW from establishing a second category of protected habitat.  With that as background, Justice Sweeney rehearsed the litany of cases with which Massachusetts lawyers are all too familiar. 

The party challenging the validity of an agency’s regulations bears a formidable burden. This Court gives substantial deference to the agency’s expertise and statutory interpretation, applies all presumptions in favor of the validity of administration action, and declares a regulation void only if its provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the legislative mandate. 

Given this case law, it is not surprising that Judge Sweeney concluded that MESA does not unambiguously prohibit the priority habitat regulations and that the regulations are consistent with legislative intent. 

Of course, the priority habitat regulations do effectively make a nullity of the MESA provisions regarding significant habitat, but what’s a little nullity among friends. Heads the agency wins; tails the regulated industry loses. What’s new?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Earlier this week, EPA announced its long-awaited revised proposal for a cooling water intake structure rule for existing facilities. Praise is much less interesting than criticism, and thus less conducive to entertaining blog posts, but I’m afraid EPA has left me no choice. Within the confines of what the Clean Water Act requires, EPA seems to have gotten this one pretty much right.

EPA has a useful summary of the rule here. I could certainly quarrel with aspects of the rule, but the basic structure makes sense. It applies to facilities that take at least 25% of their water from an adjacent waterbody and use more than 2MGD/day. Limits are imposed on total fish impingement, though facilities can meet an alternative standard by limiting approach velocity to 0.5 feet per second. EPA has gotten out of the command and control business, at least for existing units. Facilities that withdraw at least 125 MGD would have to perform studies leading to site-specific standards to address entrainment concerns.  Finally, new units that increase generating capacity would be have to used close-cycle cooling (or something equivalent).

One measure of EPA’s success here may be that environmental NGOs are already criticizing the proposal because, instead of setting immovable national standards, the rule would give too much discretion to state permitting authorities. 

It really is worth noting that the 316(b) proposal is only one of several in which EPA has listened to the concerns of industry and revised rules or proposed rules in response to those concerns. First, EPA revised its proposed Tailoring Rule to raise the jurisdictional thresholds to exclude additional smaller sources. Then, it revised the boiler rule in response to concerns that its original proposal really wasn’t feasible. Now, it has avoided a one size fits all rule for CWIS, allowing site-specific factors to come into play. 

Just so I don’t lose all my credibility with my clients, I must note that there remain areas in which EPA seems completely tone-deaf regarding reasonable regulatory reforms. The last bastion of soviet-style command and control known as the Superfund program certainly springs to mind. However, while I doubt EPA will get much credit for it, it is only fair to acknowledge that there does seem to be at least something of a pattern unfolding here. Whether this is really a change in EPA’s DNA or whether it is simply a response to current political realities, only time will tell. Whatever the cause, it’s certainly welcome.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In an interesting decision issued earlier this month, Judge Lewis Babcock of the District of Colorado ruled, in County of La Plata v. Brown Group Retail, that detection of contamination at levels exceeding state cleanup standards does not, by itself constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA. I think that Judge Babcock is correct, but I can’t help but feel that the decision might be different in the blue state of Massachusetts. I was particularly taken by Judge Babcock’s description of the nature and purpose of state regulatory standards:

Regulatory screening levels, action levels, and standards do not identify real or actual risks to human health. Rather, these regulations are designed to protect the public health by identifying the level of chemical exposure at which there is no threat of harm with a large margin of error. Exceedance of regulatory screening levels, action levels, or standards therefore does not demonstrate a real or actual risk to human health.

Tell it to MassDEP.

I think it’s wonderful that a federal judge has said that “regulatory … standards do not identify real or actual risks to human health.” He’s right, of course, and we often forget that when conservative assumption is piled on top of conservative assumption in the establishment of a standard, the standard may end up having only the most tenuous connection to any actual concern about human health.

I wish I could make equally kind statements about Judge Babcock’s handling of the CERCLA claims in the same case. Like many judges implementing the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, Judge Babcock shrugged off the defendant’s divisibility arguments, notwithstanding that the arguments the defendant made were well within the ambit of the types of considerations the Supreme Court said were relevant in Burlington Northern. I feel we are destined to continue the cycle of lower court decisions which simple-mindedly whack the defendant, followed every few years by a Supreme Court decision that says fairly simply: No, that’s not the way it’s supposed to be.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

If anyone had any doubts about the significance of the conventional pollutant regulations that EPA would be rolling out, even in the absence of a full cap-and-trade program for GHG, Wednesday’s release of EPA’s revised power plant MACT proposal should go a long way towards eliminating those doubts. As most readers know, the rule replaces the Bush-era MACT rule that would have created a trading program.

The rule poses a problem for critics of EPA. While arguments can be made about the feasibility of some of the standards and the cost to comply, they cannot credibly allege that it is a back-door effort to regulate coal out of existence. The rule is required by statute and the courts already rejected EPA’s attempt to implement a trading program for mercury.

Apparently, EPA acknowledges that this rule will result in the shut-down of approximately 10 GW of coal-fired capacity, though EPA is taking the position that most of that capacity would shut down for other reasons.

As to substance, the rule is too long – the currently available version weighs in at 946 pages – to describe here. EPA has a reasonably helpful summary, though it doesn’t describe the actual standards. Suffice it to say that, given the absence of a trading program, and the imposition of very low emission standards for mercury and PM (or non-mercury metals), control technology will be necessary to comply with the standards. I don’t think that there’s any such thing as low mercury or low PM coal. The days of uncontrolled coal units are coming to an end.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last month, in discussing the Administration’s brief in the American Electric Power case, I praised the nuanced and persuasive approach that the Administration took in seeking reversal of the 2^nd Circuit opinion allowing the states' public nuisance climate litigation to go forward. The states seeking to prosecute the law suit have now filed their brief and it turns out that they also do nuance. I still think that the Supreme Court will reverse, however.

I’m not going to get into the standing issue. I don't believe that the states should have standing, but it’s not obvious, given the result in Massachusetts v. EPA, that the Supreme Court will agree.

I find the displacement issue more interesting. The 2^nd Circuit held that the Clean Air Act had not displaced federal common law, because EPA wasn’t actually regulating GHG. Of course, EPA has reversed course and, at least until the GOP in the House has its way, it does now regulate GHG under the CAA. As a result, as the Administration put it in its brief:

Although EPA has not yet done precisely what plaintiffs demand here…, that is not the relevant test. … The question is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.

The plaintiff states disagree. In what is probably a shrewd concession, the states acknowledge that, were EPA to issue new source performance standards for GHG, such standards would displace federal common law, because, while they would not directly subject existing facilities to controls, they would lead to follow-on regulation by EPA requiring states to impose GHG standards on existing plants. Until existing plants are regulated, according to the states, common law has not been displaced. Thus, the states argue, the Supreme Court should either affirm the 2^nd Circuit or simply dismiss the appeal – the states further acknowledge that, on remand, the District Court could reasonably stay the nuisance case to see if EPA in fact issues NSPS for GHG.

Shrewd and nuanced, but I’m still not buying it. I think that once EPA’s GHG regulatory program came into effect, federal common law was displaced. Of course, I don’t get a vote, so we’ll have to wait for the Supreme Court to decide the case.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

While EPA remains under attack by the GOP-majority House, that doesn’t mean that coal is off the hook. To the contrary, coal remains under attack itself. A number of recent stories demonstrate the multi-pronged effort by those who want to reduce or eliminate use of coal. For example, the Environmental Integrity Project and two Texas-based NGOs just filed suit against the Lower Colorado River Authority's Fayette Power Project, alleging violations of NSR/PSD requirements and exceedances of particulate limits in the plant’s permit. There is no doubt that there is a concerted effort by NGOs to make life difficult for coal. Thus, even if Congress succeeds in muzzling EPA to some extent, citizen suits will only proliferate, unless Congress also amends the CAA and other environmental statutes to eliminate citizen suit provisions.

Next up? A report that TransAlta Corp. has reached an agreement with the State of Washington to shut down Washington’s last coal-fired power plant. The agreement gives TransAlta until 2020 and 2025, respectively, to shut the two boilers at the plant. The story serves as a reminder that, even aside from NGOs, some states are looking to phase out coal-fired generation.

Let’s not forget that coal mining is under attack as well. Here too, notwithstanding Congressional efforts to protect coal mining, NGOs remain active. Daily Environment just reported that a federal judge issued a temporary restraining order against Highland Mining Co., ordering it to stop work on its 635-acre Reylas Surface Mine in Logan County, West Virginia. The suit alleges violations of NEPA and § 404 of the CWA.

Finally, we have the economic side of the issue. One factor coal has always had on its side – until recently – was its cost advantage over natural gas. With that cost difference eroded, simple economics may do what years of environmental enforcement couldn’t. Thus we have John Rowe of Excelon, which, of course, has almost no coal assets, asserting that EPA regulation will not kill coal, but only drive out old, inefficient plants. Heck, we even have the Wall Street Journal asking whether coal is “The Energy of the Past.”

Time will tell, but it is at least plain that the current GOP ascendancy has not solved all of coal’s problems.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As readers of this blog know, the question of guidance v. regulation is one near and dear to my heart. I generally disfavor guidance, because I think it offers none of the protections of the regulatory process and almost none of the flexibility that guidance is supposed to provide. Two issues are of particular concern. First, guidance is not supposed to announce new rules – only clarifying interpretation of existing rules. However, we all know what a slippery slope that can be. Second, notwithstanding the purported flexibility of guidance, how often do regulators on the street – those actually using the guidance, rather than those writing it – treat guidance exactly like regulations and expect the regulated community to follow it to the letter?

The problem was brought to the forefront again recently by the decision in National Mining Association v. Jackson, in which Judge Reggie Walton in the District Court for the District of Columbia stated that EPA’s mountaintop mining guidance likely exceeded EPA’s authority. Although Judge Walton denied plaintiffs’ request for an injunction because they had not demonstrated irreparable harm, he made clear that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits. Addressing the core issues I noted above, he stated that the EPA mountaintop mining guidance

Qualified as final agency action because, despite the representation that it is an interim document, it is nonetheless being applied in a binding manner and has been implemented in its current version even though the EPA continues to receive comments about it. Therefore,… it appears that the EPA is treating the Guidance as binding.

Judge Walton went on to conclude that the various documents at issue constitute “legislative rules because they seemingly have altered the permitting procedures under the Clean Water Act by changing the codified administrative review process.” He also found that the documents exceeded EPA’s authority, because they ignored “EPA’s limited role in the issuance of Section 404 permits.”

Relatively hard on the heels of the National Mining Association decision, Daily Environment Report this week covered efforts by industry groups to prevent EPA from issuing guidance interpreting the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision regarding the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.” I’m sorry, but does anyone think that such “guidance” would not be treated in practice as having the finality of regulation? If, under such guidance, certain types of situations are considered to be “waters of the United States,” does anyone doubt that such situations will be subject to CWA permitting requirements 100% of the time? 

Agencies officials generally make two arguments in favor of guidance. One is simply to ask for recognition of the practical reality that getting formal notice and comment rulemaking accomplished is very difficult and often impractical in the modern world. The second is that guidance provides flexibility. However, if the regulators want the rest of us to recognize the practical realities involved in promulgating regulations, then they must recognize the practical reality that guidance almost always immediately ossifies and that those implementing it treat it as gospel. There is often little in it for the regulated community.

Until Rand Paul succeeds in dismantling the modern administrative state, the debate will continue.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I don’t normally blog about cases in which I’m involved, but since this one made the front page of the Boston Globe, I suppose it’s sufficiently newsworthy. Yesterday, EPA announced that a settlement had been reached among EPA, MassDEP, our client GenOn Kendall, and the Charles River Watershed Association and the Conservation Law Foundation concerning the NPDES permit for Kendall Station. As a result of the settlement, when all the equipment needed to implement it has been installed, both the water intake and discharge and the thermal load will be reduced by over 95%.

How will this be accomplished? Installation of certain new equipment at Kendall Station and a new steam pipe across the Charles River will allow facility to sell more steam to Boston and avoid putting excess heat into the River. As a result, not only will the impacts on the River be reduced, there will be collateral air emissions benefits, as Kendall’s clean gas displaces fuel oil as a source of steam in Boston.

Credit in the first instance has to go to our client, GenOn, for thinking creatively about how to respond to the problem posed by the very restrictive conditions imposed in its 2006 NPDES renewal. GenOn firmly believed that it had strong technical arguments with which to dispute the permit terms. Rather than focusing on those arguments, however, GenOn instead worked to figure out a solution that will allow the plant to remain economic, while addressing the concerns of the regulators.

Credit also goes to EPA Region I and MassDEP, both of which responded enthusiastically and constructively to GenOn’s proposal. Notwithstanding the win-win nature of the solution, the negotiations were complicated and the permit is extremely complex. However, the agencies kept their eyes on the prize.

Finally, credit also goes to the Charles River Watershed Association and the Conservation Law Foundation. Both of them had appealed the original permit, arguing that it was not sufficiently stringent (well, they are environmental NGOs). They could have tried to play bad cop to the agencies’ good cop. After all, it may take until 2016 until all the new equipment is in place and operational. CRWA and CLF could have used this delay to extort more from GenOn. In fact, while GenOn was pleased to contribute $250,000 to a fish restocking effort in the Charles River that CRWA will help implement, CLF and CRWA cooperated fully in the final settlement.

One aspect of the settlement is particularly worth noting. As discussed, the settlement works because Kendall Station is in an urban location and has a market for additional steam. Many commentators have discussed the important role of combined heat and power in helping achieve the nation’s environmental goals. Not everything is going to be solar and wind. Clean gas facilities that can sell steam will be a major contributor over the coming decades. Often, environmental justice concerns are raised with respect to urban power plants. There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch. If we want CHP, then we have to put the power where there’s a market for the steam.

However, that full rant can wait for another day. Right now, as Peter Shelley of CLF said in the Globe, “this solution is the type of thing that makes you feel good.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

This week, the United States filed its brief in American Electric Power v. Connecticut. The brief is a nicely nuanced and persuasive argument for dismissal of plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims against five large power generators. The brief is nuanced in that it acknowledges that plaintiffs have Article III standing – allowing the Court to avoid reaching a constitutional standing issue – and provides a vehicle for the Court to avoid reaching the political question doctrine issue.

Instead, the brief makes two fairly simply points – and makes them convincingly. First, the brief argues that plaintiffs’ lack “prudential standing,” because their complaint raises “generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” As the brief notes:

Global climate change will potentially affect the property interests of most landowners. And the effects of climate change will not be limited to landowners; they will also be felt by individuals, corporations, and governmental entities throughout the Nation and around the world. … The problem is not simply that many plaintiffs could bring such claims and that many defendants could be sued. It is also that essentially any potential plaintiff could claim to have been injured by any (or all) of the potential defendants.

A court – when no statute or regulation is in place to provide guidance – is simply not well-suited to balance the various interests of, and the burdens reasonably and fairly to be borne by, the many entities, groups, and sectors of the economy that, although not parties to the litigation, are affected by a phenomenon that spans the globe.

The brief is even more convincing in demonstrating that the common law claims have been displaced by the regulatory actions that EPA has taken under the Clean Air Act since Massachusetts v. EPA.   Specifically, it doesn’t matter that EPA’s regulation doesn’t do what the plaintiffs are seeking in the litigation:

Although EPA has not yet done precisely what plaintiffs demand here…, that is not the relevant test. … The question is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.

Moreover, and this is the crux of the displacement argument, the brief notes that:

Plaintiffs’ attempt to secure court-ordered emissions reductions from emitters of their choosing on their own schedule would be plainly inconsistent with EPA’s systematic, phased approach.

Interestingly, the brief makes the point that:

Displacement also occurs when an agency, whose comprehensive statutory authority to regulate the subject matter has been triggered, decides to postpone or even forgo the imposition of regulatory standards, where the decision is made through the exercise of that authority on the basis of a weighing of relevant considerations under the statutory scheme. [My emphasis.]

This is one issue that could come back to haunt both the government and global warming skeptics in Congress. As you will probably infer from my description of the brief, I expect the United States to win this case. However, while the prudential standing issue is persuasive, I think that the displacement is much the stronger argument – but only because EPA has in fact done something about GHG. What’s notable about the language in the brief is that, even if EPA were to make a formal decision to postpone GHG regulation under the CAA, such an decision would justify continued displacement of public nuisance claims, under the theory of the government’s brief. On the other hand, if Congress were to amend the CAA to preclude EPA regulations – and unless the legislation specifically precluded nuisance claims as well – such action would then revive the potential for nuisance claims, which is probably the last outcome that power generators would want to see.

As I have said before on this issue, be careful what you wish for.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Today, EPA announced settlements of litigation with states and environmental groups which will require EPA to promulgate New Source Performance Standards for greenhouse gas emissions from electric generating units and refineries. EPA will thus give those of us who practice in this area an opportunity to decide which program we find more cumbersome and ill-suited to regulate GHGs, the PSD/NSR program or the NSPS program.

As with the PSD/NSR regulations, I remain sympathetic to EPA in that, once you take Massachusetts v. EPA as a given, and if you accept the logic of the Endangerment Finding, then it is difficult to see how EPA can avoid these regulations. Moreover, EPA has described its expected set of performance standards as “modest” – though modesty, of course, is in the eyes of the beholder. 

Nonetheless, it’s not surprising that opponents of GHG regulation see this as another stick in the eye. Here is what Senator Murkowski’s spokesman, Robert Dillon, had to say:

The administration used the threat of EPA regulations as a cudgel to force Congress to pass cap and trade. It was a strategy that failed.  You've opened Pandora's box now. You've let the agency loose with these new regulations when they're interpreting the law.

Of course, it’s EPA’s job to interpret the law. That doesn’t make me happy about it.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As a follow-up to last week’s post, if you want a handy-dandy rundown of what U.S. carbon policy looks like in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation, take a look at the presentation I gave last week to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, which summarizes federal, regional, and state regulatory efforts – many of which are not explicitly directed at CO₂ – that are likely to have significant impacts on U.S. CO₂ emissions. Thanks to Amy Boyd, who did the lion’s share of the work on this one.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

An adjudicatory hearing decision issued by MassDEP in September just came to my attention. The decision in the case, In the Matter of Town of Plymouth, is worth reading for those of you interested in the emerging issues related to concerns over nutrients and how nutrient discharges will be regulated in groundwater or surface water discharge permits.

What caught me eye about the decision, however, wasn’t its substance, but was instead its procedural history. The Town of Plymouth first obtained a permit for the groundwater discharge from its municipal wastewater treatment plant in 2000. The Eel River Watershed Association appealed that permit. (For my out-of-state readers, such permits are appealed administratively in Massachusetts.) Dispositive motions were filed in 2003 – but were never acted on. 

Although the Recommended Final Decision by the hearing officer (which was adopted by the MassDEP Commissioner) doesn’t provide the entire history, one assumes that Plymouth timely filed a renewal application before the permit’s 2005 expiration date. It took MassDEP until 2008 to issue a permit renewal – at which time the dispositive motions in the appeal of the 2000 permit were still pending. 

Not surprisingly, the Town of Plymouth and MassDEP filed motions to dismiss the appeal of the 2000 permit as moot, once the new permit was in effect. Equally unsurprisingly, those motions were granted. To give MassDEP its due, it has worked hard in recent years to shorten the time needed to resolve adjudicatory appeals. It is noteworthy that MassDEP issued the decision dismissing the appeal of the 2008 permit within two years. Nonetheless, it is sort of chilling that the resolution of a permit appeal can extend beyond the life of the permit being challenged.

Justice delayed is…, oh, never mind.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Almost all – 46 – states have delegated programs under the Clean Water Act. One criterion that EPA must determine has been satisfied before approving delegation is that the state has the ability to "abate violations of the permit … including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement."

EPA’s regulations provide that this criterion will be met if :

State law allows an opportunity for judicial review that is the same as that available to obtain judicial review in federal court of a federally-issued NPDES permit. A State will not meet this standard if it narrowly restricts the class of persons who may challenge the approval or denial of permits….

With respect to citizen suits, this language seems fairly clear. As long as the state does not impose heightened standing requirements, the same opportunity for judicial review exists.

When EPA approved delegation of the NPDES program to Alaska, notwithstanding that Alaska has a version of the so-called “English Rule,” which requires that losing parties pay fees to the winners, various citizen groups challenged the delegation, on the ground that the Alaska fee shifting provision means that, as a practical matter, Alaska restricts access to the courts in ways not permitted under the CWA. Last week, in Akiak Native Community v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the delegation. 

I actually wish that the Court had gone further than it did. As noted above, I think that, in the absence of different standing requirements, there is a comparable “opportunity” for judicial review. Instead, the Court’s decision was more limited, holding only that, as a result of certain limits on Alaska’s application of the fee-shifting rule, the plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish that EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Indeed, the Court noted that EPA could potentially reverse the delegation if it later finds in practice that Alaska courts are applying the fee-shifting provisions in ways that discourage citizen plaintiffs.

I just want to know – what’s so bad about fee-shifting?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Stop the presses: According to the Daily Environment Report, EPA’s director of the Office of Federal Activities, Susan Bromm, has acknowledged that concerns about climate change and environmental justice are “contributing to the size, cost, and time-consuming nature of environmental impact statements….” Nonetheless, Ms. Bromm apparently asserted that these "analyses do not have to be overwhelming,” and she blamed, at least in part, agencies which “overreact to the fear of litigation.”

Not surprisingly, a speaker on the same panel from DOT felt otherwise. According to Helen Serassio, an attorney at DOT:

We’ve gotten to the point where they’re kind of out of control.

Ya’ think?

The notion that agencies are overdoing environmental reviews under NEPA because they are unreasonably concerned with potential litigation would strike many as absurd. It’s so easy for a judge, who doesn’t want to be the one who approved a nuclear plant that later has some kind of disaster, to say that the EIS wasn’t sufficiently thorough. For any worst case analysis, there’s always something worse, and for any nervous judge, it’s just too easy to ask for that additional analysis.

What’s lost from the discussion is any perspective, any sense that compliance with NEPA costs money and that delay of important projects imposes its own set of costs. I’m a supporter of NEPA. The requirement to assess environmental consequences of federal decisions certainly improves those decisions. However, those reviews do come with costs attached and, from where I sit, the judicial thumb is firmly on the side of more review at this point, without regard to any kind of cost-benefit analysis. As Ms. Serassio said:

We’ve gotten to the point where they’re kind of out of control.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

When clients are threatened with citizen suits – and particularly when the threatened litigation involves a matter where EPA or a state regulatory agency is heavily involved, the clients always want to know why they can’t somehow get rid of the citizen suit, given that EPA is on the case. The answer is that they can – but only in limited circumstances.

The recent decision in Little Hocking Water Association v. DuPont confirmed this answer in the context of RCRA. The Little Hocking Water Association provides public water to certain communities in Ohio, directly across the Ohio River from a DuPont plant which uses , also known as PFOA or C8 – also known as the contaminant du jour. According to the complaint, the Little Hocking wells have among the highest concentrations of C8 of water supply wells anywhere and its customers have among the highest C8 blood levels anywhere. Little Hocking Water Association thus sued DuPont under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, claiming that DuPont’s release of C8 had created an “imminent and substantial endangerment."

Section 7002 of RCRA contains provisions precluding such citizen suits if either EPA or a state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting” an action under RCRA to abate the endangerment. In the DuPont case, releases of C8 from the DuPont facility had been the subject of at least two administrative orders on consent entered into by DuPont and EPA. However, consent orders aren’t the same as “an action” under § 7002 or § 7003 of RCRA – and they thus do not preclude a citizen suit.

DuPont tried the next best argument – that EPA had primary jurisdiction over the regulation of C8 – and that the existence of EPA’s regulatory authority and the issuance of the consent orders meant that the courts should defer to EPA. DuPont’s argument was that a court could not fashion a remedy in the case without essentially establishing a new cleanup standard for C8 and that doing so is the job of EPA, not the courts.

The Court gave the primary jurisdiction argument short shrift. As the Court noted, using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in citizen suits would dramatically reduce the scope of such suits. Since Congress provided a citizen suit mechanism – and provided very specific, discrete, circumstances in which citizen suits are precluded – it doesn’t make sense to use primary jurisdiction to establish another defense, particularly where the defense would almost eliminate the remedy. 

The bottom line? If you don’t want to face a citizen suit (and you’re not in compliance), get yourself sued by EPA or your state regulatory agency. The mere existence of EPA or state regulation, even if requirements are embodied in a consent order, is not enough.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On a day when ClimateWire reported that thousands of walruses are stuck on land because their usual summer home – sea ice – has disappeared, I’m beginning to wonder whether EPA’s stationary source GHG rules are similarly at risk. It may not be difficult for EPA to brush off a fairly over the top letter from Texas which basically asked EPA “What part of ‘hell no” don’t you understand?”

However, today Greenwire reports that Governor Freudenthal of Wyoming – a Democrat – is asking EPA to defer enforcement of GHG stationary source regulation. So is Ben Grumbles, head of the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality. Grumbles may be a Republican, but he was head of the water office under the Bush EPA, so he has to have some idea of the legal pressure for EPA to regulate GHGs following Massachusetts v. EPA. 

In addition to these latest requests from the states, ClimateWire had a separate story today which noted that Senate efforts to bar EPA from regulating GHG may still be alive and that Democrat Senators Nelson and Dorgan may support attaching the legislation to the EPA appropriations bill. Readers of this blog know that I am a fan of Senator Graham’s willingness to consider climate legislation, but EPA has to be worried if it is counting on Senator Graham’s prediction that the amendment will fail.

I have long said that EPA’s regulations are here to stay, because they are not only defensible, they are - in some form, at least - pretty much mandated by Massachusetts v. EPA. However, where the prevailing metaphor for the November elections is that of a GOP tsunami, one has to wonder whether there is a realistic possibility that, one way or another, EPA regulation of GHG under existing authority could be subject to significant delay.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Sometimes, the headline writes the story. EPA’s TMDL program under the Clean Water Act has been the subject of so much litigation since its inception that EPA has a web page devoted to the status of litigation on the establishment of TMDLs.

Bringing things close to home, the Conservation Law Foundation and the Coalition for Buzzards Bay filed suit late last month, challenging implementation by MassDEP and EPA of the TMDL program for certain embayments on Cape Cod and Nantucket. (Full disclosure time – this firm represents the CBB on unrelated matters.)

The law suit claims that MassDEP erred in determining the waste load allocation, or WLA, in establishing the TMDLs for the embayments, because it failed to identify septic systems, stormwater systems, and wastewater treatment systems as point sources. (Since we also represent wastewater treatment system operators – though none that are the subject of these TMDLs – I think that, like Joe Friday, this is going to be a “Just the facts, ma’am,” post.)

With respect to stormwater systems, MassDEP determined that systems located less than 200 feet from the embayments were point sources, but that those farther away were not. The basis for this determination, according to the complaint, was that the more proximate systems in fact discharge to surface waters, whereas the more distant ones discharge to groundwater, so that there is no point source discharge to surface water. 

The complaint does not identify the basis for MassDEP’s conclusion that septic systems are not point sources, but presumably it is also based on a conclusion that the systems discharge to groundwater and thus are not point sources of surface water pollution.  

Without commenting on the merits – just the facts, ma’am – I will note that a determination that septic systems and stormwater drainage systems that discharge initially to groundwater are point sources under the CWA would have dramatic consequences for the regulation of nutrient pollution under the CWA. In situations where there are industrial sources of these pollutants, those industrial sources might be quite pleased to have someone else bear share of the burden of reductions necessary to meet the TMDL. Given the brouhaha over how state agencies would cope with permitting hundreds or thousands of new stationary sources under EPA’s Clean Air Act PSD program for GHGs, however, I cannot imagine that MassDEP – or other state environmental agencies – would eagerly assume the responsibility for permitting septic systems.

Why do I foresee more litigation in the TMDL program’s future?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I have previously expressed my distaste for public nuisance litigation to require reductions in GHG emissions. It cannot be more than a tactic in a war to the plaintiffs, because the chaos resulting from regulation of a global problem through a series of individual law suits has to be obvious to everyone. Now, apparently, that chaos is also obvious to the Obama administration, because it has filed a brief with the Supreme Court, asking the Court to accept a certiorari petition filed by the defendants in American Electric Power v. Connecticut, the 2^nd Circuit case in which the Court of Appeals held that the nuisance claims could proceed. 

The United States cited two reasons why the government should take the case and vacate the appellate decision. First, the brief states that the petitioners failed to demonstrate “prudential standing.” In other words, while they may have Article III standing, federal courts should “refrain from adjudicating ‘generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches.’” As the brief notes:

The problem is not simply that many plaintiffs could bring such claims and that many defendants could be sued. Rather, it is that essentially any potential plaintiff could claim to have been injured by any (or all) of the potential defendants. The medium that transmits injury to potential plaintiffs is literally the Earth’s entire atmosphere – making it impossible to consider the sort of focused and more geographically limited effects characteristic of traditional nuisance suits….

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the administration has argued that EPA’s recent regulatory efforts with respect to GHG, including the mobile source rule and the PSD / Title V rules for stationary sources – which occurred after the 2^nd Circuit decision – have “displaced” federal nuisance law. Since the Second Circuit specifically addressed the displacement argument and found for the plaintiffs in part precisely because EPA had not yet regulated GHG, EPA’s intervening regulatory actions certainly would seem to provide a basis for remanding the 2^nd Circuit decision. I think that’s an easy call for the Supreme Court to make.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were dismayed by the filing of the brief.  According to GreenWire, Matt Pawa, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, said that:

We feel stabbed in the back. This was really a dastardly move by an administration that said it was a friend of the environment. With friends like this, who needs enemies?"

My take is a little different. Why don’t the plaintiffs’ attorneys thank the administration for promulgating the various GHG regulations, admit that the nuisance cases were a tactic to move Congress and the administration, claim a partial victory, because they at least got EPA moving, fold up their tents, and go home.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Those who operate industrial facilities or do development in Massachusetts often know far more than they would like about Chapter 214, § 7A, the environmental citizens’ suit provision of the Massachusetts General Laws. Chapter 214, § 7A, eliminates plaintiffs’ usual obligation to demonstrate standing and simply gives 10 citizens the right to sue to prevent or eliminate “damage to the environment.” The damage does have to constitute a violation of a statute, regulation, ordinance, or by-law, the major purpose of which is to prevent damage to the environment.

Chapter 214, § 7A, does not contain any statute of limitations. Does this mean that ten persons can sue any time, even if the conduct complained of is allowed under a permit and the permit was issued long ago, as long as the plaintiff alleges that the permit should not have been issued and the conduct in fact violates a statute or regulation? Thankfully, Judge Locke of the Superior Court recently answered that question, posed in EarthSource v. Burt, with an emphatic “No.”

Full disclosure time – this firm (including yours truly) represents Covanta, the private defendant, in EarthSource v. Burt.

Earthsource v. Burt deals with efforts by Covanta, which operates four municipal waste combustors in Massachusetts, to initiate a process at its SEMASS combustor in which it would take what are known as fats, oils, and grease (or FOGs) from restaurants, separate the FOGs from the associated wastewater, recycle the wastewater, and combust the FOGs at the SEMASS facility. EarthSource is a competitor of Covanta in the FOGs processing business. It and some citizens (many, if not all, of them affiliated with EarthSource or related entities) brought suit against MassDEP and Covanta, not just to stop the FOG project at SEMASS, but alleging wholesale violations by Covanta at all of its Massachusetts facilities. Routinely, the complaint alleged that DEP misinterpreted its own regulations, should not have issued the permits, and that the permits were void “ab initio.” 

Covanta and DEP both moved to dismiss those counts that involved claims related to permits issued outside the appeal period provided in either the applicable substantive statute or in the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 30A, § 14. EarthSource argued that the APA does not limit the time in which suits can be brought under Chapter 214, § 7A. Judge Locke concluded otherwise, noting that:

a contrary rule would be disruptive to the permitting agencies and that G.L. c. 214, § 7A should not become a means to disturb otherwise settled permits whenever a group of plaintiffs chooses to file suit sometime in the future.

Truer words were never spoken. Going forward, the rule for persons who don’t like permits is going to be “speak now or forever hold your peace.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On August 12, in Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Sierra Club’s suit related to the Big Stone Generating Station, a coal fired power plant in South Dakota. In doing so, it disagreed with EPA and sided with what appears to be the majority on a question that has produced differing responses amongst the courts - whether the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program prohibits only the construction or modification of a facility without a PSD permit, or whether it imposes ongoing operational requirements. Finding that PSD requirements are conditions of construction or modification, and not conditions of operation, the court held that violations related to the defendants’ failure to obtain PSD permits occurred at the time the modifications were made, and that the claims were thus barred by the statute of limitations.

The Sierra Club challenged three modifications undertaken at the Station: a 1995 change in fuel source from lignite coal to sub-bituminous coal; a 1998 boiler modification; and, 2001 changes which allowed the Station to supply steam to a nearby ethanol plant. In June 2008, the Sierra Club filed a citizen suit alleging, among other things, that the defendants violated and continued to violate the Clean Air Act in that they had failed to obtain PSD permits prior to the modifications and, as a result, were operating without appropriate permits and without abiding by best available control technology (“BACT”) limits that would have been imposed had PSD permits been obtained.

The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the case, basing its decision largely on the language of the PSD statute, which prohibit a facility from being “constructed” without meeting PSD requirements, and the citizen suit provision, which authorizes suit “against any person who proposes to construct or constructs,” as well as the related regulations.  Finding the language unambiguous, the court refused to defer to the contrary interpretation of EPA, which participated as an amicus party. The court rejected the argument that the CAA and PSD regulations should be interpreted as establishing operational duties based on the program’s purpose and the fact that PSD permits impose requirements on the operation of facilities, finding that such requirements are not enforceable independent of the permitting process. In addition to finding the Sierra Club’s civil penalty claims barred, the court held that its claims for equitable relief seeking to bring the Station into compliance with the Act were also barred. 

Under the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, while a facility must obtain a PSD permit prior to construction or modification, and, having done so, must operate in accordance with the permit, if the operator fails to apply for such a permit, claims relating to its failure to obtain or operate pursuant to an appropriate PSD permit are barred unless brought within five years of the construction or modification. Given the potential difficulties involved in detecting PSD violations, the decision places a burden on plaintiffs seeking enforcement of PSD requirements to identify and file claims related to such violations as early as possible. Given that this issue has come up a number of times and there is some disagreement amongst the courts as to the right answer, it is possible that the Sierra Club will seek further review of this issue.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

My apologies if this post is a mash note to Judge Wilkinson. Sometimes a decision is written with such clarity and simplicity that you have to sit up and take notice. Such is the case with yesterday’s decision in North Carolina v. TVA, reversing the District Court decision imposing an injunction against four TVA plants that would have required installation of additional controls for NO_x and SO₂ , notwithstanding the absence of any allegation that the plants were violating their permits under the Clean Air Act. My apologies also to my friends in the environmental community and the Massachusetts AG’s office, who supported the District Court decision, but I have a hard time seeing this decision as anything other than the death knell for this kind of public nuisance litigation.

My only complaint with the opinion is that second paragraph of the decision is such a cogent summary that it’s not obvious to me that the decision needed to go on for another 30 pages. That paragraph states:

This ruling was flawed for several reasons. If allowed to stand, the injunction would encourage courts to use vague public nuisance standards to scuttle the nation’s carefully created system for accommodating the need for energy production and the need for clean air. The result would be a balkanization of clean air regulations and a confused patchwork of standards, to the detriment of industry and the environment alike. Moreover, the injunction improperly applied home state law extraterritorially, in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court’s decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Finally, even if it could be assumed that the North Carolina district court did apply Alabama and Tennessee law, it is difficult to understand how an activity expressly permitted and extensively regulated by both federal and state government could somehow constitute a public nuisance. For these reasons, the judgment must be reversed.

While I will thus leave the bulk of the opinion to readers particularly interested in the subject, one other paragraph stands out for me. After discussing the contours of public nuisance litigation, Judge Wilkinson noted that:

while public nuisance law doubtless encompasses environmental concerns, it does so at such a level of generality as to provide almost no standard of application. If we are to regulate smokestack emissions by the same principles we use to regulate prostitution, obstacles in highways, and bullfights, see Keeton, supra, at 643-45, we will be hard pressed to derive any manageable criteria. As Justice Blackmun commented, "one searches in vain . . . for anything resembling a principle in the common law of nuisance."

There’s no question in my mind that this decision is the end of public nuisance litigation as a viable cause of action for traditional pollutants, where those pollutants are comprehensively regulated under a federal statute. Moreover, it certainly provides a roadmap for dismissal of public nuisance claims concerning GHG emissions. As I noted last year in discussion Connecticut v. AEP, even though the 2^nd Circuit allowed GHG nuisance claims to proceed, part of its argument was that there is no comprehensive federal regulatory scheme with respect to GHG. Its argument clearly suggested that, once such regulations are in place, public nuisance defendants might have better luck. The promulgation of the Tailoring Rule now means that public nuisance defendants can point to North Carolina v. EPA and say that the federal rules have displaced the common law of nuisance. I think that they will probably win that argument. They certainly should.

Thank you Judge Wilkinson.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

It has long been understood that Massachusetts that the Commonwealth cannot meet its renewable energy goals with solar power alone. Solar is great, but really ratcheting up the percentage of energy supplied by renewable sources is going to take a big commitment to wind. In fact, Governor Patrick announced a goal of 2,000 MW of wind on- and off-shore in Massachusetts by 2020. There are currently 17 MW of wind power in Massachusetts.

Everyone knows the permitting travails – now, hopefully, over – that Cape Wind has faced. It is less known that on-shore wind has not been any easier to develop in Massachusetts. Yesterday, in Ten Local Citizen Group v. New England Wind, the Supreme Judicial Court released a major on-shore wind project from permitting appeal purgatory. The New England Wind project (perhaps still better known as Hoosac Wind) in Florida and Monroe, Massachusetts, was proposed in 2003. Not uncommonly for projects of this sort, the appeal that delayed project implementation had nothing to do with the merits of on-shore wind. It was an appeal over wetlands approvals needed for a gravel access road. By the time MassDEP issued a Superseding Order of Conditions, the opponents requested an adjudicatory hearing, the hearing was held, the ALJ issued a 78-page recommended decision rejecting the permit, the Commissioner issued a 31-page final decision affirming the permit and rejecting the ALJ’s recommended decision, the Superior Court affirmed the Commissioner, and the SJC affirmed the Superior Court, it was July 6, 2010.

I don’t know about you, but I’m out of breath just typing this history. There has to be a better way. It’s certainly safe to say that if wind projects – wherever located – take 7 or 8 years to permit, it’s going to be 2120, not 2020, before we have 2,000 MW of wind in Massachusetts. As some readers will be aware, the Administration has been supporting legislation to facilitate siting of wind power facilities in Massachusetts, but it hasn’t been enacted yet and the forces that make it difficult to obtain final permits in Massachusetts go far beyond the issues that would be addressed by the wind siting legislation. 

For the lawyers among my readers, the decision breaks little ground. Yes, the Commissioner of DEP has considerable discretion in interpreting her own regulations. No, the ALJs who hear adjudicatory appeals and make recommended decisions are not entitled to any deference. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms, the big NEPA case before the Court this term. The District Court had struck down the decision by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to completely deregulate roundup ready alfalfa (RRA). That decision was not actually under appeal. The appeal concerned only the scope of the injunction issued by the District Court, which precluded APHIS from issuing any kind of deregulation decision without completing an Environmental Impact Report (EIS) and similarly issued a nationwide injunction against planting of RRA alfalfa prior to completion of an EIS. The District Court decision had been upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court reversed, and vacated the injunction. I’ve got to say, Supreme Court decisions in environmental cases have often puzzled me in recent years, but it is difficult to read this one and not feel its inevitability and obviousness. This case really shouldn’t be news. The Court decided in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council (the Navy sonar training case) that the standard for injunctions in NEPA cases is not any different from that in any other case. In other words, injunctions are not automatic – or even presumed – in NEPA cases. Instead, the party seeking the injunction must satisfy the traditional four-factor test in order to obtain relief.

In Monsanto, the Court simply put the final nail in the coffin of the idea NEPA is somehow different. Citing to cases suggesting that the standard may be more lenient under NEPA, the Court yesterday said that:

The statements quoted above appear to presume that an injunction is the proper remedy for a NEPA violation except in unusual circumstances. No such thumb on the scales is warranted. … It is not enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not issue; rather, a court must determine that an injunction should issue under the traditional four-factor test….

Here, the Court concluded that an injunction prohibiting even partial deregulation of RRA was overbroad. Moreover, because no one challenged the District Court decision striking down APHIS’s original deregulation decision, those opposing use of RRA will have another opportunity to go to court and seek an injunction in the future, should APHIS again try to deregulate RRA without having first complied with NEPA.

The lesson? If you want an injunction for a NEPA violation, you better be able to demonstrate that the balance of equities and the public interest are on your side.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last Friday, the Court of Appeals for the 5^th Circuit issued an order – boggling the minds of lawyers and non-lawyers alike – dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal in Comer v. Murphy Oil, one of the climate change nuisance cases. As the order and dissents make clear, it’s quite a set of circumstances. The District Court dismissed the case. A panel of the 5^th Circuit reversed. A request to rehear the case en banc was made. Seven out of 16 judges recused themselves. Of the nine remaining judges, six voted to rehear the case en banc. 

Three months later, one of the nine judges who voted on the en banc petition recused herself, leaving only eight – or half – of the judges. After requesting and receiving letter briefs from the parties, five of the remaining eight judges concluded that the last recusal deprived the Court of Appeals of a quorum, which means that the Court cannot hear or decide the appeal. Since the Court had already determined that, pursuant to its rules, the original panel decision was vacated when the decision to hear the case en banc was made, there is now no Court of Appeals decision; nor will there ever be one. The District Court decision dismissing the case, which had been reversed by the panel, is now in effect again, and the plaintiffs’ only remedy is a Supreme Court appeal.

As readers of this blog know, I’m not a believer in climate change nuisance litigation. As a formal matter, I think plaintiffs probably lack standing in these cases. As a practical matter, nuisance litigation is not the right way to regulate GHG emissions. However, I have to admit that I find the order breathtaking. The plaintiffs have a formal statutory right of appeal. As Judge Dennis pointed out in a scathing dissent,

federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred…. Just as courts have an “absolute duty … to hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction, [] litigants have a corresponding due process right to have their cases decided when they are properly before the federal courts.”

I’ll spare you the details, but Judge Dennis provided several different practical solutions that the Court could have utilized to hear the case.

My initial reaction is that this will slow Supreme Court review of this issue. The 5^th Circuit was likely to affirm the District Court decision, which would have created a split with the Second Circuit. The order issued last week means that there is no circuit split at this point. While the plaintiffs can appeal the order to the Supreme Court. even if the Supreme Court were to reverse the order, it would only be to order the 5^th Circuit to hear the appeal on the merits. If the 5^th Circuit is to hear the case, it’s years away at this point. 

Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, anyone?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

First Kerry-Lieberman, then the Tailoring Rule – a busy week for climate change. Senator Kerry certainly did not miss the coincidence. He called the release of the Tailoring Rule the “last call” for federal legislation. I’ve noted before the leverage that EPA regulation would provide, but this is the most explicit I’ve seen one of the sponsors on the issue.

As to the substance, there are not really any surprises at this point. EPA is certainly working to soften the blow of GHG regulation under the PSD program. Here are the basics (summarized here):

January 2, 2011 – Facilities obtaining PSD permits for pollutants other than GHGs after that date will need to meet BACT for GHG (whatever that may be) if their GHG emissions will increase by at least 75,000 tpy.

July 1, 2011 – New facilities with emissions of at least 100,000 tpy of GHG will need to obtain a PSD permit and meet BACT (whatever that may be) for GHG, even if they do not need a PSD permit for other pollutants. Modified facilities with increases of at least 75,000 tpy will have to obtain a PSD permit and meet BACT (whatever that may be) for GHG, even if they do not need a PSD permit for other pollutants.

July 1, 2012 – EPA will conclude a further rulemaking to address smaller sources. EPA has already committed to not regulate sources with GHG emissions below 50,000 tpy and further stated that permits would not be required for smaller sources before April 30, 2016.

As I’ve subtly hinted above, we still don’t know what EPA thinks BACT for GHG may be. EPA has at least suggested that, with respect to coal plants, BACT may be Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle, or IGCC, and with respect to IGCC plants, BACT may be natural gas. If so, we’re not going to see many traditional coal plants permitted after this rule takes effect.

What about opposition to the rule? It’s near certain that someone will challenge it. While environmental groups support it and have suggested that opponents may not have standing, I’m skeptical. I think it likely that someone with standing will challenge it. I also think that there is a reasonable chance that the rule is overturned, because it’s not obvious to me that the courts will buy the “administrative necessity” argument. The more fundamental point is that I’m not sure it matters. If the Tailoring Rule is struck down, a court is still unlikely to vacate the rule. Instead, the court is likely to keep the Tailoring Rule in place, while giving EPA time to figure out how to comply with conflicting mandates in a way that doesn’t bring the world as we know it to an end.

At bottom, the problem isn’t the Tailoring Rule. The problem is that Massachusetts v. EPA makes regulation of GHG under the existing Clean Air Act inevitable absent congressional action. In other words, John Kerry is right; the Tailoring Rule is last call for the climate bill. I happen to agree with opponents that regulation of GHG under existing authority will be a nightmare. Even exempting small sources, PSD is just a terrible way to go – one of the last vestiges of command and control regulation and a nearly incomprehensible one, at that.

However, given Massachusetts v. EPA, Congress really only has two ways to fix the problem. The first would be to pass climate legislation. The second would be to pass legislation to preclude EPA regulation of GHG under existing authority. Right now, neither alternative seems likely, but once EPA rules are in effect, they’ll both be more tempting. We’ll see which we Congress moves.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last year, I noted that EPA had made its ECHO data base more user-friendly, creating a web-based map of enforcement actions. Last week, EPA took the effort a step further, at least with respect to Clean Water Act enforcement action. EPA’s Clean Water Act Annual Noncompliance Report, or ANCR, is available on the web in an interactive format that allows interested citizens to see where the noncompliance and enforcement action is taking place. 

As some of my clients are unfortunately aware, I’ve been seeing a lot of enforcement action recently, at both the federal and state level. It’s not clear long the agencies can maintain a vigorous enforcement posture in the face of repeated budget cuts. I still think that efforts such as providing interactive access to EPA’s ANCR is going to facilitate citizen suits, ensuring the private enforcement is available even if the agencies ease up.

Whether that's a good result is of course a separate question.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last week, Judge Thomas Varlan handed the power plant sector a major win in the NSR enforcement arena, ruling that economizer and superheater replacement projects in 1988 at the TVA Bull Run plant were routine maintenance not subject to NSR/PSD regulations. Judge Varlan ruled for the TVA notwithstanding that: 

The projects cost millions of dollars (but less than $10M each)

They extended the life of the plant by 20 years

The costs were identified as capital, not maintenance, expenses

The projects were more extensive than other economizer/superheater projects that had previously been implemented at the Bull Run facility

Why did the Court rule for the TVA?

Although expensive, the projects’ costs were consistent with a wide range of maintenance projects conducted at Bull Run during the time frame

These projects were routine in the industry, even if not commonly performed more than once at individual facilities

Life extension, while a result of the projects, was not their primary purpose

If this decision is upheld on appeal, it will significantly weaken EPA and citizen NSR/PSD enforcement efforts in the power plant sector – at least in the Sixth Circuit, where there are a lot of coal-fired power plants.

Whether the decision is right or wrong – and neither reversal nor affirmance by the Sixth Circuit would surprise me – I’d like to take this opportunity to get on my soapbox about the NSR program as a whole. Why are we fighting about whether projects implemented 22 years ago were routine maintenance? Wouldn’t it make more sense to rely on trading programs that are proven to work cost-effectively to reduce emissions than to try to figure out whether replacement of a superheater provides sufficient leverage to require a power plant to install a scrubber or SCR?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last week, Judge John Darrah handed the government a defeat in a PSD/NSR enforcement action, when he ruled that the requirement to obtain permits under the PSD program prior to making major modifications was solely a pre-construction obligation and did not constitute a continuing violation. 

United States v. Midwest Generation was one of the recent wave of government PSD/NSR actions, filed last summer. The problem with the government’s case was that Midwest Generation had purchased the six facilities at issue in the case from Commonwealth Edison in 1999 and all of the alleged changes but one were made prior to the purchase.

Although the court thoroughly reviewed the case law – and found it generally supportive of its conclusion – its major focus was on a plain reading of the statutory language (and we know how much this Supreme Court likes plain readings). The relevant statute provision provides that:

No major emitting facility … may be constructed in any area to which this part applies unless … a Permit has been issued…. 

To Judge Darrah,

the plain meaning of the statute’s introductory language … thus prohibits the construction of a “major emitting facility’ unless [the statutory requirements] are met…. On its face, nothing in § 7475 prohibits the subsequent operation of such a facility without a permit. (Emphasis in original.)

There are other counts in the government’s complaint, including claims of operating permit violations. However, the decision on the NSR/PSD claims is quite significant. The case does not simply dismiss, as some other decisions have done, penalty claims. This is not a statute of limitations decision (though the Judge did also follow most other cases in dismissing, on statute of limitations grounds, the penalty claims with respect to the one alleged modification that occurred after Midwest Generation bought the facilities). As Judge Darrah made clear, the government is not entitled to “any relief on those claims – injunctive or otherwise.” (Emphasis in original.)

Score one of generators – particularly merchant generators who bought facilities after modifications had already been made.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I’ve been waiting to write this headline ever since the SJC took this case. Today, the SJC issued its long-awaited decision in Moot v. Department of Environmental Protection. For those of you who pay attention to where the waters ebbeth and floweth – or at least where they ebbed and flowed in 1641 – you know that this is the second time that Moot has been before the SJC.

After the SJC struck down MassDEP regulations which provided that landlocked tidelands did not need a license under Chapter 91, as the Commonwealth’s waterways statute is now known, the Legislature took a shot at fixing what would have been a major problem by passing new legislation specifically excluding landlocked tidelands from the need to obtain a license. 

Moot challenged the legislation, arguing that it completely relinquished all of the Commonwealth’s rights in private tidelands, without making the findings necessary to justify such a relinquishment. The SJC did not agree. The Court concluded that the Commonwealth has preserved its rights in landlocked tidelands, and noted that projects subject to MEPA must address project impacts on the Commonwealth’s tideland rights. In essence, the Court concluded that the oversight provided by MEPA was sufficient to demonstrate that the Commonwealth could and would still enforce its rights in landlocked tidelands. Since those rights are still protected, the Court concluded, the Legislature had authority to exclude landlocked tidelands from the need to obtain a license under Chapter 91. 

This is clearly the right result. The only question in my mind is the gymnastics that the Court had to go through to get there. The Court may have concluded that the Commonwealth has not relinquished all of its rights in landlocked tidelands, but does anyone think that the MEPA process will ever result in developers being required to make changes to their projects to protect those rights? I sure hope not. Certainly, the first developer forced to do anything different as a result of that process is not going to be a happy camper. It would have been cleaner for the SJC to acknowledge that the Legislature was effectively relinquishing the public’s rights in landlocked tidelands and to affirm that act. Nonetheless, this decision pretty much did what was needed and a large number of landowners – not just the developers defending this case – are breathing a lot easier this afternoon.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Massachusetts has an “anti-SLAPP” statute (as do 26 other states at this point, apparently). The law protects “petitioning”, by precluding litigation targeting petitioning, providing an early motion to dismiss, and awarding attorneys’ fees to defendants where a court finds that the defendants were indeed engaged in petitioning activity.

Yesterday, the Massachusetts Appeals Court struck a blow for reason when it determined, in Brice Estates v. Smith, that a trespass is not protected petitioning activity. Those of you outside Massachusetts may be wondering why we needed a court case to tell us this. Those of you inside Massachusetts, particularly in the development community, know where this is headed.

Brice Estates involved a real estate developer, looking to build a large residential subdivision. Low and behold an abutter observed a four-toed salamander – a species protected under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act. Of course, the developer shouldn’t have been surprised, because developers of projects with significant opposition often learn of mysterious discoveries of endangered species at the project location.

The only aspect of this case that was different was that a specifically identified person was known to have gone onto the developer’s property – thus providing the basis for a trespass claim. The Court of Appeals made clear that, while notifying the authorities of the presence of the salamander was protected petitioning activity, the trespass itself was not. Moreover, the court also made clear that, even if the reason why the owner filed suit was the protected petitioning activity, the owner may still bring the action with respect to the non-protected activity.

Time will tell whether the lesson to NIMBY types is “no shenanigans” or “don’t get caught.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

To date, the only circuit courts that have reviewed public nuisance claims related to climate change, the Second Circuit, in American Electric Power, and the Fifth Circuit, in Comer v. Murphy Oil, have ruled that such suits can proceed. However, last week the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided to hear Comer v. Murphy Oil en banc, which certainly has to give the plaintiffs pause. While I am not fully versed in this issue, a quick glance at the web indicates that statistical analysis confirms one’s naïve assumption, i.e., that a full appellate court often decides to hear a case en banc because a majority thinks that the panel got it wrong.

As I noted when the original decision was issued, even under liberal standing rules, which suggest that the plaintiffs’ harm can be “traced” to the defendant as long as the defendant’s conduct “contributed” to the harm, it’s going to be very difficult for plaintiffs, particularly under the Supreme Court’s new pleading rules, to argue that, for example, Murphy Oil “contributed” to the harm caused by Katrina. If the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affirms the District Court dismissal in Murphy v. Comer, we could be headed back to the Supreme Court on climate change, since that would set up a conflict between the Second and Fifth Circuits.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Yesterday, EPA Administrator Jackson issued a letter to Senator Jay Rockefeller responding to certain questions regarding EPA regulation of GHGs under existing Clean Air Act authority, including promulgation of the so-called “Tailoring Rule”, describing how stationary source regulation under the existing PSD program would be phased-in once GHGs are subject to regulation. Here are the highlights:

EPA still expects to promulgate the Tailoring Rule by April 2010.

The GHG permitting threshold will be “substantially higher than the 25,000-ton limit that EPA originally proposed.”

No permits will be required until 2011. Initially, only facilities otherwise subject to CAA permitting will be required to obtain permits. The smallest facilities will not be subject to GHG permitting before 2016.

You can talk all you want about global warming, but it seems to me as though it’s EPA that’s feeling the heat. EPA has clearly heard the threats of a Congressional resolution barring EPA regulation of GHGs under existing authority. The reaction from Congress is all the evidence one needs. Both Senators Rockefeller and Murkowski praised the letter. While neither indicated that the letter would be sufficient to stop them from pursuing Congressional action, it might be enough to peel off some fence-sitters who might otherwise have felt compelled to support the legislation.

What does EPA’s statement of intent mean for various law suits swirling around this issue?

I don’t see any impact on litigation against the Endangerment Finding; it will still proceed and it will still lose.

The likelihood of law suits from environmental groups alleging that EPA is shirking its responsibilities under the CAA has certainly increased. Moreover, while EPA has a lot of discretion, I could imagine courts saying to EPA:  “Nice try, but the CAA doesn’t give you the kind of flexibility you have asserted in the Tailoring Rule. Only Congress can provide that flexibility by amending the CAA.” In this respect, the situation is similar to litigation over the CAIR regulations, which pretty much everyone liked, but which were struck down because the approach EPA took in the CAIR rule wasn’t consistent with the CAA.

Finally, any kind of regulation by EPA will provide an additional defense to private nuisance litigation. As I have previously noted, one question raised by the nuisance law suits is whether EPA has regulated GHG in a manner sufficient to “displace” the common law of nuisance. In this respect, the sort of program described yesterday by Administrator Jackson may be the best possible outcome for the regulated community, because it will narrow EPA regulations while providing a ground to preclude nuisance litigation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The grand total is 16 separate challenges to EPA’s endangerment finding, according to Greenwire. I’m not one of those lawyers who regularly bash the legal profession. I still recall my law school professor, Henry Hansmann, stating that the role of lawyers is in fact to be transaction-cost minimizers, and I think that that is largely true. That being said, I am certainly wondering what all of this litigation is about.

The endangerment finding is basically a scientific determination. As I have previously noted, EPA discretion in this area is substantial and the likelihood that a court would reverse EPA’s scientific determination seems about as close to zero as possible. Apparently, some of the law suits do not attack the underlying scientific underpinnings of the determination, but instead attack EPA’s procedures for carrying it out or the expected regulatory and thus economic implications of the finding. If possible, these seem even less likely to succeed.

Finally, before we get to the merits of either of these arguments, there are substantial standing questions, given that the endangerment finding itself imposes no regulatory requirements on any of the plaintiffs.

It is more likely that these law suits are tactical in nature, filed as part of the broader battle to stop EPA from using existing Clean Air Act authority to regulate GHGs. I support that battle in that I agree that regulation under existing authority will be a nightmare. However, I think it’s a losing battle and I don’t see the litigation challenging the endangerment finding as likely to help in any case.

Hope springs eternal, I suppose.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Earlier this week, the Southeastern Legal Foundation filed a petition for review of the EPA Endangerment Finding with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. It’s not really surprising that someone filed suit, but the list of plaintiffs is interesting – though more for who is not on it than who is. There is not a single Fortune 500 company on the list of plaintiffs. Whether that speaks to the larger corporations doubting the merits of the challenge or simply making a strategic decision that it is not worth it to be associated with the litigation, I leave for them to say.

I will say that the likelihood that this challenge succeeds is vanishingly small. Ever since Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, courts have given EPA extraordinarily broad discretion when regulating on “the frontiers of scientific knowledge.” Whatever concerns dissenters may have about climate change science, I think it is pretty clear that EPA has a stronger record to support the Endangerment Finding than it had in Ethyl Corporation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I have never been a fan of specialized courts, but I have to admit that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s MEPA jurisprudence is strong evidence for the other side. It’s almost hard to describe how badly the SJC has mangled MEPA. The most recent example is yesterday’s decision in Town of Canton v. Commissioner of the Massachusetts Highway Department. (Requisite disclaimer – this firm represented the Town of Canton in the case.)

In Canton, the SJC ruled that a party bringing suit to challenge the adequacy of the Certificate issued by the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs an on EIR must do so within 30 days following issuance of the first permit issued to the project under review – even if the plaintiff doesn’t care about that permit. For example, in Canton, the case was dismissed because suit was not brought within 30 days of issuance of a sewer connection permit, even though Canton’s complaint was that the EIR did not adequately address traffic issues and the Highway Department had not yet acted on the necessary traffic approvals.

The basis for the decision is a plain language reading of the statute – 30 days of the first permit means 30 days. However, the Court’s policy logic is exactly backward. The SJC stated that it is necessary to adhere to the strict 30 day rule in order to make challenges to projects efficient and not unduly delay them. I fear that the development community will not be happy with the results of this case, however. The purpose of MEPA is consultative. Get all the information out there and make sure that the agency considers it before issuing approvals. The import of Canton, however, is to short-circuit the review process. The next time this fact pattern appears, plaintiffs will be forced to bring suit, without even giving the Highway Department a chance to get it right. How does encouraging litigation before it is known even to be necessary help citizen plaintiffs, developers, or agencies?

In fairness to this Court, while I think that they got the decision wrong, it is at least understandable given prior SJC MEPA jurisprudence. The problem is that the SJC began getting MEPA wrong in the Cummings and Enos cases, and they haven’t stopped since. The notion that parties challenging the adequacy of an EIR cannot sue the EEA Secretary – the person that approved the EIR – is just nuts. Put Enos and Cummings together with Canton and here’s the result, taking the agencies in play in the Canton case. 

1.         EEA approves an EIR

2.         DEP issues sewer connection permit

3.         Highway Department issues traffic approvals.

Where has the SJC left us? The citizen plaintiffs care about 1 and 3, and not 2, but suit is triggered when 2 happens, even though the plaintiffs don’t yet know whether the Highway Department will do the right thing or not.

Here’s another scenario likely to happen with some frequency. EEA secretary approves EIR. Citizen plaintiff believes that endangered species analysis was deficient. As is often the case, however, the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife takes some time to issue the needed permit. DEP, however, issues an unrelated permit. Once more, action by DEP triggers a need to sue, even though the plaintiff cares about the Secretary’s approval of the EIR and the DFW take permit, which hasn’t yet been issued – and may never be issued.

Which is going to come first, a legislative fix, the SJC revising the whole structure of MEPA jurisprudence, or hell freezing over?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On Wednesday, EPA released a proposal to reduce the primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for ground-level ozone from the 0.075 ppm standard set by the Bush administration in 2008 to a range of from 0.060-0.070 ppm. EPA also proposed to set a secondary standard intended to protect sensitive ecological areas, such as forests and parks.

As almost everyone knows, the 2008 standard was, to put it mildly, controversial from the start. The proposal today was based on recommendations made to EPA by its science advisors prior to the 2008 rulemaking. Following apparent intervention from the White House, then EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson set the primary standard above the scientific recommendation and declined to promulgate a secondary standard. Not surprisingly, a number of environmental organizations and public heath groups sued EPA over the failure to promulgate a new NAAQS consistent with the scientific recommendations.

Given that the Supreme Court already ruled, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, that EPA may not consider cost in setting NAAQS (and given the Bush EPA record before appellate courts), the 2008 standards always had “arbitrary and capricious” written all over them, so it’s no surprise that the Obama administration revisited the issue. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, unlike most of EPA’s rules, the projected benefits of this rule may not even exceed the costs.  According to EPA, the benefits of the rule would range from $13B to $100B, while the costs are projected to range from $19B to $90B.  Not much of a net benefit, it seems to me.  (I'm still waiting for Cass Sunstein to ride to the rescue of cost-benefit analysis in this administration.)

EPA expects to finalize the rule by August 31. Then the rubber really hits the road – when states have to revise SIPs in order to meet the new standards.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Shortly before the holidays, EPA Administrator Jackson issued an Order in response to a challenge to a combined Title V / PSD permit issued by the Kentucky Division for Air Quality to an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle, or IGCC, plant. The Order upheld the challenge, in part, on the ground that neither the permittee nor KDAQ had adequately justified why the BACT analysis for the facility did not include consideration of full-time use of natural gas notwithstanding that the plant is an IGCC facility. 

The Order may not be shocking in today’s environment – all meanings of that word intended – but the lengths to which the Order goes to avoid its own logical consequences shows just what a departure this decision is from established practice concerning BACT. BACT analyses have traditionally involved the proverbial “top-down” look at technologies that can be used to control emissions from a proposed facility. In other words, EPA takes the proposal as a given, and then asks what the best available control technology is for that facility. 

In EPA’s own words – from its New Source Review Workshop Manual (long the Bible for BACT analysis):

Historically, EPA has not considered the BACT requirement as a means to redefine the design of the source when considering available control alternatives. For example, applicants proposing to construct a coal-fired electric generator, have not been required by EPA as part of a BACT analysis to consider building a natural gas-fired electric turbine although the turbine may be inherently less polluting per unit product (in this case electricity).

Apt example, don’t you think? (In case you are wondering, EPA’s decision does not discuss or refer to this text from the NSR Manual.)

What was the basis for EPA’s decision here? Largely, it is that the IGCC facility will be designed to burn natural gas as well as syngas and the permittee specifically stated that it planned to combust natural gas during a 6-12 month startup period. On these facts, EPA concluded that the permittee and KDAQ had to do a better job explaining why full-time use of natural gas should be considered “to redefine the design of the source.”

As noted above, EPA went to great lengths to minimize the scope of the decision. It states that the Order:

should in no way be interpreted as EPA expressing a policy preference for construction of natural-gas fired facilities over IGCC facilities.

should not be interpreted to establish or imply an EPA position that PSD permitting authorities should conclude … that BACT for a proposed electricity generating unit is … natural gas.

does not conclude that it is not possible or permissible for the permit applicant … to develop a rationale which shows that firing exclusively with natural gas would “redefine the source.”

EPA does not intend to discourage applicants that propose to construct an IGCC facility from seeking to hedge the risk of investing in … IGCC technology by proposing … utilizing natural gas for some period….

Methinks EPA doth protest too much. If I may say so, this is a freakin’ IGCC facility. Isn’t it obvious that one doesn’t plan or build an IGCC facility if one plans to burn natural gas? Don’t you think that EPA could have taken administrative notice of what IGCC technology is?

All of EPA’s protestations about the Order’s limits may be designed to mollify IGCC supporters, but what does its rationale mean for all of the existing facilities – coal and oil – that are already capable of firing on natural gas? Next time they are subject to NSR/PSD review, must they evaluate the possibility of switching completely to natural gas? As I’ve said here before, yikes!

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On Tuesday, District Judge Roger Titus issued an injunction against the construction of the Beech Ridge Energy wind project – 122 wind turbines along 23 miles of Appalachian ridgelines – unless the project can obtain an incidental take permit, or ITP, under the Endangered Species Act. Judge Titus concluded, after a four-day trial, that operation of the turbines would cause a “take” of the endangered Indiana Bat. 

I’m not going to get into the details of the decision, though it certainly does not seem crazy on its face. I am going to go on a rant that there has to be a better way.

Those of us who are old enough to have gotten interested in policy in the 1970s will recall TANSTAAFL – there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch. Appalachian ridgeline turbines kill Indiana Bats. Offshore wind turbines kill sea birds or spoil pristine views. Remember when everyone thought that hydroelectric power was the “clean” energy? Dams kill fish and alter ecosystems. Nuclear power creates long-lasting wastes. I probably don’t need to explain the costs of coal. TANSTAAFL.

Today, people look to solar, and geothermal, and tidal power. I don’t know about you, but while I’m open to persuasion, my default assumption is that geothermal and tidal power could bring changes to complex systems that we really don’t begin to understand. Maybe solar has no environmental costs, but I wouldn’t bet on it. TANSTAAFL.

In a world where everything has costs, we need to find a way to balance those costs to achieve societal objectives. Maybe the harm to the Indiana Bat would be so great that the Beech Ridge Energy project is not worth it. Maybe not. Either way, does anyone think that the ESA provides a mechanism to make that judgment? Of course not; it’s not designed to do so. It’s designed to protect the bats.

We really need an overarching statute that allows the government to assess the unavoidable trade-offs, because there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch, and decide which projects should move forward. Lest my environmentalist friends think that I want to be able to give developers a blank check, I can only say, no, no, no. I’m agnostic on the outcomes, but I’m quite certain that the approach I advocate would only make thorough (which is not to say slow) review under NEPA and related statutes more important. Decision-makers can’t balance the costs and benefits of different projects unless they have a thorough understanding of what those costs and benefits are.

TANSTAAFL.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Yesterday, EPA released its effluent guidelines for construction sites. The guidelines establish the first national standard containing numeric limitations on stormwater discharges. The final standard imposed is 280 nephelometric turbidity units. It will apply to all construction sites greater than 20 acres in size as of 18 months following the effective date of the regulations (which will be 60 days after Federal Register promulgation) and sites larger than 10 acres 4 years after the effective date.

As expected, EPA did not take NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance up on their suggestion that EPA impose post-construction controls. However, since EPA has already signaled that its long-term plan is to impose stormwater controls beyond the current universe of industry and construction sites, it seems at this point that broader stormwater regulation by EPA is more a question of when than whether.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Two more decisions were released last week concerning whether nuisance claims could be brought with respect to harm alleged to have resulted from private conduct contributing to climate change. First, in Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, the District Court dismissed nuisance claims. Second, in Comer v. Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a District Court dismissal of nuisance claims related to damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina.

Village of Kivalina first. In this case, an Inupiat Eskimo village claimed that global climate change traceable to the defendants has essentially made their village uninhabitable. Notably and, I think, shrewdly, they did not seek injunctive relief, but sought only damages related to the cost of relocating the village. The District Court concluded both that the law suit raised non-justiciable political questions and that the plaintiffs did not have standing, because their harm was not fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct.

The Fifth Circuit wasn’t buying either of these arguments in Comer v. Murphy Oil. To the Fifth Circuit, like the Second, in the American Electric Power case, the complexity of the underlying proof is not sufficient to render these types of cases non-justiciable. The cases involve tort claims; courts resolve tort claims – pretty much, end of story. I’ve got to say, from my lowly perch, that I think that the Second and Fifth Circuits got it right here. It’s easy to say that it would be better for Congress to deal with climate change than state legislatures or, as here, courts. However, that’s not that same as courts declining to exercise jurisdiction. I’d be surprised if the political question argument  has any real legs.

Standing is a different matter. I still think that both the traceability and redressability elements of standing are problematic. Plaintiffs in both Village of Kivalina and Comer v. Murphy Oil solved the redressability issue by seeking only damages, and not injunctive relief. Both the Second and Fifth Circuits noted that traceability, as a standing issue, necessitates only that the plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ conduct “contributes to” the plaintiffs’ injuries. This is not a stringent test. However, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I could imagine some courts looking askance at the types of allegations made in these complaints, even at a pleading stage.

On balance, what these cases tell me is that some of these cases are actually likely to be litigated all the way through to trial. Notwithstanding the potentially huge recoveries, it seems here that the cost to the defendants of paying out anything more than nominal damages would be high, and the prospects of successful defense of these claims are still reasonably good. That’s a recipe for trial, as far as I can tell.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On Monday, the Court of Appeals for the 2^nd Circuit finally issued a decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, reversing the District Court decision which had dismissed this public nuisance law suit against six large generating companies. The decision is notable in a number of different respects and may have far-reaching implications

·  Standing. Following Massachusetts v. EPA, it is not really surprising that the plaintiffs were able to establish that they have suffered injuries sufficient to provide standing. The more questionable point is redressability. The Court acknowledged that it must be “likely” that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. The Court’s response to this issue was that the plaintiffs need not demonstrate that a favorable decision will eliminate the injury, only that it will provide some measure of relief. Even so, could plaintiffs really prove that even elimination of all CO₂ emissions by the defendants would have any impact on climate change? I’m extremely skeptical. The Court did note that there is a “lowered bar for standing” at the pleading stage, so we may see more of this issue as the case proceeds.

·  Displacement. Connecticut v. American Electric Power, unlike the North Carolina v. TVA case decided in January, is basically premised on federal common law of public nuisance. However, federal common law only exists in the absence of legislation addressing the same issues and is subject to “displacement” by such legislation. Following Massachusetts v. EPA, there is no doubt that the CAA provides authority to regulate GHG. What, therefore, is the role of federal public nuisance claims at this point? The Court’s ruling here left defendants alive to argue this issue another day. The Court noted that EPA has not yet issued a final endangerment finding and certainly has not issued regulations limiting GHG emissions from stationary sources. Thus, the problem complained of by plaintiffs “has not been thoroughly addressed by the CAA.” In other words, if either Waxman-Markey passes or EPA moves forward with regulations on its own, defendants may have another crack at dismissing Connecticut v. American Electric Power. 

·  Nuisance Claims in Other Contexts. In tandem with North Carolina v. TVA, this case certainly puts new life into nuisance as a potentially important arrow in the quiver for environmental plaintiffs. As we noted in January, the TVA decision left room for nuisance claims even where National Ambient Air Quality Standards have been attained. This leaves substantial room for nuisance claims in a variety of contexts, as long as underlying legislation hasn’t specifically preempted such claims

·  Prospects for Federal Climate Change Legislation. We have already discussed the choice between regulation by EPA and comprehensive federal cap-and-trade legislation. Now it appears that this dilemma has three horns, not just two. Which would generators prefer? Waxman-Markey or judicial injunctions following nuisance litigation?

It’s a lot to consider.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On Tuesday, EPA announced its intention to issue new effluent guidelines for the Steam Electric Power Generating industry by sometime in 2012. The announcement follows an EPA study in 2008 which indicated that toxic metals, particularly those collected as part of flue gas desulfurization processes, can pose a problem in facility effluent. EPA’s announcement is not particularly surprising, given the ongoing study and given that EPA has not revised the guidelines since 1982. Indeed, notwithstanding EPA’s announcement, Environmental Integrity Project, Defenders of Wildlife and Sierra Club announced that they would still sue EPA over its failure to timely update the guidelines.

There are two reasons why this announcement is significant beyond just its implications for effluent discharges from these facilities. First, it’s hard to see EPA’s announcement – and the threat of NGO litigation – as anything other than another bullet aimed squarely at the coal industry. From climate change, to attacks on mountaintop removal, to the reaction to the TVA spill, to this effort to make the effluent guidelines more stringent, there is no doubt that coal is in the cross-hairs at the moment. If there are any doubters concerning this point, Duke Energy CEO Jim Rogers isn’t among them. He was quoted in this morning’s Energy & Environment Daily as saying that it is at least possible to envision a world in 2050 “where coal is not in the equation.”

The other reason why this announcement is significant is that it raises fairly squarely the question regarding the very structure of our current regulatory system.  It’s not really any more than happenstance and political convenience that we regulate different environmental media differently. In this context, it is noteworthy that EPA’s Science Advisory Board just recommended that EPA consider setting multi-pollutant standards under the Clean Air Act, rather than regulating each pollutant separately. Theoretically, that’s good as far as it goes, but it doesn’t really solve the problem of the balkanization of EPA’s different regulatory programs.  In the long run, EPA’s regulatory efforts would be much more cost-effective – and would probably garner much more public support – if they were rationally based on an overall assessment of risk, across pollutants and across media.

I’m not holding my breath.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Justice Potter Stewart famously said, with respect to obscenity, that “I know it when I see it.” I fear that the test for what constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA is no clearer than Justice Stewart’s subjective test regarding obscenity.

This week, in a decision that is good news for RCRA defendants, Judge Illlston, of the Northern District of California, ruled, in West Coast Home Builders v. Aventis Cropscience USA,  that risks posed by potential future vapor intrusion into buildings from a groundwater plume could not be “imminent and substantial” where no development has yet occurred on the property that is the subject of the litigation. The court was interpreting the Supreme Court’s statement in Meghrig v. KFC Western, to the effect that RCRA “implies that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later.”

Although Judge Illston’s interpretation of Meghrig seems right, other RCRA cases have been allowed to proceed, even though the relationship between the contamination and the exposure have often been equally attenuated. It seems that the court liked the simplicity of a black-letter rule that risks associated with conditions not yet in place can never be imminent.  I am not confident this case will provide much clarity, but even if it only establishes a bright line rule in one narrow corner of the "imminent and substantial endangerment" landscape, that's better than the prior morass.

A developer might reasonably respond to this decision by arguing that such a ruling means that the development will never happen, because no one will finance such a project without knowing that the potential vapor intrusion risk will be addressed. (And a court might respond by saying that that is a problem for Congress to solve, not the courts.)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Although not breaking any new ground, a decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court last week provides a helpful summary of the discretion typically given to MassDEP in making permitting decisions. In Healer v. Department of Environmental Protection, abutters to a proposed wastewater treatment facility in Falmouth sued MassDEP, claiming that the groundwater discharge from the leach field associated with the facility would damage drinking water supplies and nearby wetlands. The Court affirmed the MassDEP Commissioner’s rejection of the abutters’ challenge.

As the Court noted

the “applicable standard of review is “highly deferential to the agency” and requires the reviewing court to accord “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it…. We give deference to the decision of an agency interpreting its own regulations … [and] do not intrude lightly within the agency’s area of expertise, as long as the regulations are interpreted with reference to their purpose and to the purpose and design of the controlling statute.”

As if that were not enough of a nod towards agency deference, the Court also noted, in the context of the plaintiffs’’ challenge to the monitoring requirements imposed in the permit, that

The Legislature “has chosen to put into the hands of an expert administrative agency the decision making regarding complex issues of environmental … science…, and has allowed the agency considerable discretion in determining monitoring of applicable parameters in order to carry out its duty….

Finally, the Court made at least one statement about the plaintiffs’ affirmative case that is sure to be cited by MassDEP and permittees in future citizen suits. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that toxic household chemicals might cause environmental damage, the Court stated that the “regulations do not require the department to establish permit conditions based on the plaintiffs’ speculative concerns.”

So, what’s the upshot of Healer? It certainly confirms that, as a general matter, courts are not going to reverse agency decisions unless they seem really off-the-wall.  On the other hand, it remains true that MassDEP does not always win and my own jaded view is that courts remain willing to reverse MassDEP, even when deference would require that the court affirm the agency, if the agency decision somehow rubs the court the wrong way.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In an important decision yesterday, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the operator facility participating in the renewable portfolio standard program did not have standing to challenge a state decision authorizing other facilities to participate in the RPS program. The decision may have broad implications regarding when businesses may challenge the issuance of permits or other approvals to competitors in Massachusetts.

In Indeck Maine Energy v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, the plaintiffs operated biomass facilities which were authorized to sell renewable energy credits. When the Department of Energy Resources authorized two other biomass facilities to sell RPS credits, plaintiffs sued.

As the SJC noted up front, to establish standing, a plaintiff must “allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred.” At least in Massachusetts, an injury from business competition does not confer standing. However, prior cases held that this rule “does not apply … to competitors in a regulated industry.” The question is thus: What does it mean to be in a regulated industry?

After analyzing the purpose of the RPS statute and its prior cases on this issue, the court came to a relatively simple conclusion:

The question of standing in the context of competitive injury turns not simply on whether an industry is regulated, but rather on how that industry is regulative. The common threat present in the cases in which standing has been found is regulatory schemes that contemplated some form of protection of the competitive interests of the respective plaintiffs.

Accordingly, if an industry is regulated in such a way that it can be said that the protection of competitors is within the regulatory scheme’s area of concern, such a competitor alleging harm deriving from business competition would have standing to sue.

Applying the rule here, the SJC concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing, because the Legislature “did not seek to protect and thereby confer standing to sue on existing competitors, thereby creating a barrier to market entry.” In other words, a business does not have standing to challenge an approval issued to a competitor unless the very purpose of the regulatory scheme was to protect the competitive position of the plaintiff.

This decision has potentially significant impacts on other permitting regimes, such as those implemented by MassDEP.  Following Indeck, a business harmed by the issuance of an environmental permit issued to a competitor will not have standing to challenge the permit, because it is not the purpose of any of the environmental permitting regimes to create barriers to market entry.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Construction and development companies praying for an economic recovery next year have something else to worry about: pending new EPA regulations regarding stormwater discharges from construction activities – and claims from environmental groups that EPA’s proposal isn’t stringent enough.

EPA issued a proposal on November 28, 2008. That proposal is complex, but the aspect of it that has received the most attention is the requirement that certain construction sites greater than 30 acres meet numerical turbidity limits (specifically, 13 nephelometric turbidity units (NTUs), which I had to include in this post just because it sounds so cool). Developers have opposed the numeric limits; the National Association of Home Builders estimates that the cost to comply would be $15,000 to $45,000 per acre.

On the other hand, the NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have threatened to sue EPA if EPA does not revise the propose rule to include post-construction controls as part of the rule. EPA has stated that it is not planning to do so. It’s not obvious that NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have the better of this specific debate, but the argument regarding post-construction controls is similar to the ongoing discussion in Massachusetts and elsewhere regarding the need for ongoing stormwater controls at properties other than industrial facilities that are already regulated.

The issue is not going to go away.  EPA is under a deadline to issue the rule by December 1, 2009.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last Friday, in NRDC v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down parts of EPA’s Phase 2 rule for achieving compliance with the ozone NAAQS. The most important part of the ruling was the Court’s conclusion that EPA could not rely on compliance with the NO_x SIP Call to satisfy the requirement that sources in an ozone nonattainment area demonstrate achievement of reasonably available control technology, or RACT. The basis for the decision was the Court’s conclusion that the plain language of the relevant portions of the CAA did not allow use of a cap-and-trade program to substitute for the source-specific compliance requirements imposed by the statute.

In this case, § 172(c)(1) of the CAA “requires that nonattainment areas achieve ‘such reductions in emissions from existing sources in the area’ as can be achieved by the adoption of RACT.” For the Court, this was simple and dispositive.

Thus, the RACT requirement calls for reductions in emissions from sources in the area; reductions from sources outside the nonattainment area do not satisfy the requirement.

In other words, a cap and trade program won’t do, if it allows sources to avoid explicit statutory requirements. There is nothing in the Act that precludes layering a cap-and-trade program on top of RACT requirements – but that would defeat the purpose of the cap-and-trade program, which is to allow emissions reductions to be made wherever they can be achieved most cost-effectively. To require minimum reductions at all facilities precludes such cost-effective decisions.

Frankly, while I’m a fan of cap-and-trade programs, the decision is neither unreasonable nor surprising, after the decision in North Carolina v. EPA striking down the parallel provision in the Clean Air Interstate Rule. As courts like to say (especially when Supreme Court confirmation hearings are under way), their job is not to make good policy; it is to interpret and enforce the law. If Congress wants to expand the role of cap-and-trade programs, it knows how to do so.

Of course, the elephant in the room is climate change legislation. If Congress does not enact a bill, North Carolina v. EPA and NRDC v. EPA circumscribe EPA’s discretion in implementing a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases under existing law.  I take the point made by Administrator Jackson and environmentalists that, if no one wants to regulate churches and schools, then EPA can probably figure out a way to do so.  However, exercise of such discretion is not the same as promulgating rules that will ensure that those facilities which are the subject of regulation have the flexibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the most cost-effective manner possible.  

Is anyone in Congress listening?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Earlier this week, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a decision of the Superior Court in Georgia that would have required Longleaf Energy Associates, developer of a coal-fired power plant, to perform a BACT analysis of CO₂ emissions control technologies in order to obtain an air quality permit for construction of the plant. The case is a reprise of the Deseret Power case regarding a coal-fired plant in Utah.

The court in Longleaf Energy concluded that CO₂ is not yet a regulated pollutant under the CAA, and thus that no BACT analysis is required. There were several bases for this conclusion:

The “Johnson Memo,” issued in response to Deseret Power, has not been withdrawn by EPA, though it is under reconsideration. Even EPA’s proposed endangerment finding for CO₂ noted that such a finding would not make CO₂ a regulated pollutant under the CAA.

As discussed in the Johnson Memo, neither the CAA nor any existing EPA regulations impose emissions limitations on CO₂.

Such a finding would “preempt” Congressional and EPA decision-making on the issue and impose standards in Georgia to which facilities outside of Georgia would not be subject.

The Longleaf Energy decision is a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the CAA – but it’s not the only plausible interpretation. I mention this in order to highlight a point I have made previously. As members of Congress and stakeholders consider the costs and benefits of federal climate change legislation, they have to consider the alternative. Most people, including me, have framed the question as a comparison of the legislative option with regulation by EPA under existing authority. This is largely correct, but misses two points. First, it’s going to take EPA some time to promulgate regulations. In the meantime, there will be more Deseret Power and Longleaf Energy decisions and there is no reason to be confident that such decisions will be consistent or even reconcilable. Second, even after EPA issues regulations, the Longleaf case gives me pause as to whether such regulations would be effective in creating any kind of uniform national interpretation of these issues.

There is just no question that, in the absence of federal legislation, the resulting patchwork of regulations and federal and state decisions concerning the regulation of CO₂ and other GHGs is going to be a big mess.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In an interesting case, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit this week vacated most of a preliminary injunction issued by a federal judge in Puerto Rico, because, the Court concluded, the lower court had wrongly, and without doing so explicitly, converted a PI hearing into a hearing on the merits.

In Sanchez v. Esso, a gasoline station operator brought RCRA citizen suit claims against Esso, which supplied gasoline to the station, and which actually was the owner of the USTs in which the gasoline was stored. Plaintiffs requested a PI requiring Esso both to assess and to remediate the contamination resulting from leaks in the tanks. After the District Court issued the PI, Esso sought interlocutory relief.  The Court of Appeals vacated most of the injunction.

As the Court of Appeals noted:

[w]hen a trial court ‘disposes of a case on the merits after a preliminary-injunction hearing … it is likely that one or more of the parties will not present their entire case….  Therefore, it is ordinarily improper to decide a case solely on such a basis. 

Reviewing the District Court proceedings, the Court of Appeals pointed to District Court’s statement that the Esso “appear[ed] to be in continuous violation” of the applicable regulations.  Moreover, following issuance of the injunction, Esso had asked the District Court to require the plaintiffs to post a bond.  The District Court denied the request on the ground that:

"'the grant of the preliminary injunction carried[d] no risk of monetary loss" for Esso in the face of the "documented" contamination resulting from Esso’s "violation of regulatory safeguards."

The District Court also made statements to the effect that the only issue going forward was the “extent” of Esso’s liability.

The Court of Appeals concluded that it was “inescapable” that the District Court pre-judged Esso’s ultimate liability.  Aside from the District Court’s conclusory statements about liability, the District Court also failed to address the traditional factors required for issuance of a PI.  This was “a clear error of law.”

It is unclear what impact this case will have. However, RCRA, like most environmental statutes, has an element of strict liability.  The strict liability nature of these statutes often makes it too easy for courts – and perhaps regulators at times? – simply to assume that a defendant is liable, without worrying about the sometimes messy process of discovery and the taking of evidence.  Sanchez v. Esso thus serves as a welcome reminder that even in a world of strict liability, a defendant remains entitled to his day in court.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last week, Judge Larry McKinney issued an order requiring to shut down three coal-fired generating units at its Wabash Station facility by no later than September 30, 2009. The decision actually struck me as a thoughtful analysis of injunctive relief issues in a situation where a violation of NSR regulations had already been proven. Although the decision has gotten most press for the order shutting down the units, it covers a number of issues important to injunctive relief situations, and there are some nuggets which are potentially useful to generators; it is not a one-sided decision. Here are some highlights:

The shut-down order – although significant, is not as earth-shattering as it seems. Cinergy gave the judge little choice by testifying that it would not be economic to install pollution controls on the units, given their age and size. The fight was thus about when, not whether, the units would be shut down. The judge was clearly annoyed that, following the liability finding, Cinergy had seemingly taken no action to plan for a shut-down. The judge, in response to reliability concerns, did allow the units to operate through the summer of 2009.

Irreparable harm discussion – a few noteworthy aspects here

The court relied on modeling which demonstrated that Wabash emissions contributed to PM_2.5 levels downwind

The court noted that contributions of “just a few tenths of a ug“ can be significant when an area is on the border between compliance and noncompliance.

Like the court in the TVA injunctive relief case we posted about earlier this year, the court specifically noted that adverse health affects can occur at levels below the NAAQS

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that acid deposition and mercury emissions from Wabash had caused irreparable harm, concluding “that Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient nexus between the relevant excess emissions and the negative … effects. 

In a win for generators, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ position that BACT for NO_x emissions in 1989 was SCR technology. This is an important issue, because EPA and the states will sometimes try to take the position that unproven technologies are nonetheless BACT. The decision squarely rejects that argument.

Surrender of SO₂ allowances. The court required Cinergy to surrender SO₂ allowances equal to the excess emissions from the May 2008 jury verdict to the time the units are shut-down. However, it is important to note that the Plaintiffs had requested that the court order Cinergy to install BACT on larger units at the Station that had not violated NSR rules. The court rejected that argument, noting that the Plaintiffs’ proposal “does not bear an equitable relationship to the degree and kind of harm it is intended to remedy …. Imposition of such a remedy is punitive in nature.”

In sum, although the decision is important, it is not surprising in context. Indeed, the finding on BACT, which was favorable to Cinergy, may have the most precedential significance.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

 As we mentioned yesterday, the discussion draft of the Waxman-Markey “American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009” which was released on Tuesday is notable both for what it includes and the significant portions it leaves to be decided at a later date. 

In summary, the bill contains four titles:

1) a “clean energy” title, which promotes renewable energy through a portfolio standard of 6% in 2012 rising to 25% by 2025, additional funding for carbon capture and sequestration, a low-carbon transportation fuel standard, and authorization for federal agencies to enter into long-term contracts with renewable energy providers;

2) an “energy efficiency” title, which calls for a nationwide building efficiency code, and directs EPA to set emission standards for locomotives, marine vessels and non-road sources;

3) a “global warming” title, which specifies that greenhouse gases are not to be treated as criteria pollutants or regulated in new source review under the Clean Air Act (the authorities currently viewed to be EPA’s best tools in regulating greenhouse gases), lays out up to 83% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels by 2050 and creates the framework for a cap-and-trade auction system to be overseen in part by FERC, but does not specify how allowances would be allocated or auctioned, nor how auction proceeds would be spent, other than giving a portion to preventing international deforestation; and

4) a “transitioning” title which establishes a new council within NOAA to prepare an adaptation plan and fund, but does not provide details on where the funds come from, and lays out various programs creating release valves to be triggered by increasing prices, but again withholds critical details, such as how the programs will provide assistance to consumers.

After the jump, we provide more detail about Title 3, the Global Warming section.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Empire Strikes Back? Revenge on the NIMBYs? Whatever you want to call it, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce now has a great new web site, called Project No Project, which lists energy projects which have been stalled by local opposition.  The site lists project by state and by type, and explains the status of the project, who the opponents are, and what its prospects seem to be.

It is good to see the Chamber join the digital age and adopt some of the methods of those on the other side of these battles.

Of course, one person’s NIMBY is another’s abomination.  As this story was reported in ClimateWire on Monday, Glenn Wattley, CEO of the Alliance to Preserve Nantucket Sound – the leading opponent of the Cape Wind project – disputed the notion that the group’s opposition to Cape Wind resulted from the NIMBY phenomenon.  Isn’t it amazing that project opponents almost always acknowledge that NIMBYism exists, but always deny that their opposition to the project they are fighting is motivated by NIMBYism?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Greenwire reported yesterday that EPA plans to issue its endangerment finding on emissions of greenhouses gases, in response to Massachusetts v. EPA, by the end of April. Greenwire also released EPA’s internal presentation regarding its recommendation to the Administrator.

Although EPA’s anticipated decision is not a surprise, it is still noteworthy. Among the highlights:

• The finding will conclude that greenhouse gas emissions endanger public health (the proposed endangerment finding that the Bush administration EPA had prepared, but then withdrew, was limited to public welfare issues.
• The finding will apparently note that there are environmental justice implications associated with climate change. This is particularly interesting, given that there is also concern that there are equity issues associated with the likely responses to climate change – Warren Buffett this week described a cap-and-trade plan has as a “regressive tax.”
• EPA’s preferred option at this point is to base the endangerment finding on identifying the entire group of GHG as the “air pollutants” that cause the endangerment. One specific rationale is that doing so will facilitate flexibility in setting standards for these pollutants. In other words, if GHG are grouped together, EPA will be able to propose a regulatory program that will allow netting and offsets among the different GHGs. 

Other than the nod to regulatory flexibility provided by grouping GHGs, EPA has not tipped its hand regarding the nature of any regulatory regime for GHGs, let alone when it might be able to propose and finalize such regulations. Doing so remains a gargantuan task. 

Moreover, while EPA is clearly committed to addressing this issue, if one believes the statements of Congressional committee chairs to the effect that climate change legislation will get done promptly, there is a certain logic to waiting for such direct legislative authority. On the other hand, fear of what EPA may do remains part of the calculus on Capital Hill, so EPA may decide to move forward aggressively with regulatory development under current Clean Air Act authority simply in order to keep pressure on Congress. 

It’s going to be a busy – and interesting – year.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link

In December, I posted about the decision in Canton v. Paiewonsky, in which Judge Fabricant held that a party seeking to challenge the certificate of the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs approving an Environmental Impact Report must do so within 30 days of issuance of the first permit for a project – even if the plaintiff’s concerns about the project are totally unrelated to that permit and the plaintiff would not be harmed by issuance of the permit. As before, I’ll provide the disclaimer that this firm represents the plaintiff in the Canton case.

That acknowledgment aside, it is difficult to read today’s Appeals Court opinion in Hertz v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs as saying anything other than that Judge Fabricant got it wrong. Hertz is technically not even a decision about MEPA. The plaintiffs in Hertz challenged an amendment to a municipal harbor plan. The Appeals Court ruled that they did not have standing, notwithstanding that they abutted the property that was the subject of the amendment to the plan, because they did not suffer a particularized harm that was protected by the municipal harbor plan process.

What is most interesting about the decision in Hertz is that, even though it is not a MEPA case, the Court’s analysis focused on the Supreme Judicial Court decision in Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs – which is a MEPA decision and which is the case on which the Town of Canton relied for the argument its suit was timely. Reading the opinion in Hertz together with Enos, the conclusion seems clear that, had Canton sued to challenge the adequacy of the EIR upon issuance of the first permit issued to the project, Canton’s inability to allege that the issuance of the permit would cause it to suffer particularized harm would have meant that the suit would have been dismissed for lack of standing. That being the case, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run on issuance of the first permit; the statute of limitations has to begin to run on issuance of the permit about which the plaintiff is complaining, because only then has the plaintiff suffered a harm sufficient to provide it with standing to sue.

We’ll see what the SJC does with the appeal in Canton, but it still seems here that the better reading of the MEPA statute is that the statute of limitations for a suit challenging a certificate on an EIR must begin to run when the permit that is the subject of the plaintiff’s concern is issued, rather than when the first permit is issued, regardless of whether the plaintiff has any concerns about that first permit.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

We posted recently about the revival of EPA’s NSR enforcement program. Now, yet another shoe has dropped. The Center for Biological Diversity has announced the creation of the Climate Law Institute, the purpose of which is to use citizen law suits under existing laws to advance regulations intended to address climate change. The press release states that the Institute has $17 million in funding with which to pursue its mission.  

While that mission will focus on climate change, as its name implies, it will not be limited to litigation under the Clean Air Act. It was the CBD which led the litigation resulting in the listing of the Polar Bear under the Endangered Species Act.  The Institute indicates that, in addition to the Clean Air Act, the ESA, NEPA, and the Clean Water Act may all be utilized as part of its overall litigation strategy.  

Among other specific targets identified in the press release, the Institute states that it aims to prevent the construction of any new coal-fired power plants and to phase out existing coal plants as quickly as possible.

Unless EPA moves very quickly across a number of fronts – which may well happen – it looks as though we’re going to see a lot of climate-related litigation in the near future.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Attorneys who have litigated citizen suits under RCRA have often wondered if there is any possible risk that would not qualify as an “imminent and substantial endangerment,” thus subjecting the person who “contributed” to such endangerment to liability under RCRA.

In Scotchtown Holdings v. Town of Goshen, the District Court for the Southern District of New York earlier this month established at least some outer parameters for this seemingly boundless phrase. In Scotchtown Holdings, the owner of land allegedly contaminated by the defendant’s use of sodium chloride – also known as salt to the uninitiated – caused groundwater contamination that precluded development of the plaintiff’s property for residential use.

The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that, because the property had not already been developed – and because the contamination meant that it would not be developed – there was no imminent and substantial endangerment.

It may be that this decision is obvious and unremarkable. It is certainly distinguishable from cases where at least a potential future exposure exists if no cleanup were to occur and current land uses remain unchanged.  In Scotchtown Holdings, no exposure would occur unless land use were to change.  Nonetheless, for those of us who thought that the presence of contamination almost meant that an imminent and substantial endangerment existed, QED, the decision is a breath of fresh air.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link