Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

For several decades now, the United States has taken the position that communications and documents exchanged in Superfund matters between government lawyers representing the US EPA and government lawyers representing federal PRPs are privileged.  Specifically, the government has argued that both of these sets of government lawyers represent the same party -- the United States, which is a unitary government -- and thus their communications are protected as attorney-client communications.  That unitary government position was squarely rejected earlier this week in Menasha Corporation v. United States Department of Justice – yet another litigation arising from the Lower Fox River Superfund Site in Wisconsin. 

In that case, a private PRP pursued a Freedom of Information Act claim seeking documents relating to the terms of an earlier settlement. Relying upon its unitary government theory, the United States  asserted a claim of privilege with respect to documents and communications exchanged between DOJ lawyers representing EPA and other DOJ lawyers representing federal PRPs.  The court disagreed: “Because the United States has competing interests in this case, it (appropriately) has separate counsel from [two different sections at the Department of Justice] independently representing the interests of their respective client agencies in the same manner as other adverse parties. Communications between those adverse parties therefore waive the privilege as would communications between Plaintiffs Menasha and NMSC and any other PRP.” 

Central to the court’s holding is the rationale that in Superfund cases lawyers representing EPA and lawyers representing federal PRPs have adverse interests. Lawyers for EPA seek to maximize joint and several liability, whereas lawyers for federal PRPs, like lawyers representing private PRPs, seek to minimize liability. This rationale would seem to apply broadly in all Superfund matters to defeat most privilege claims involving communications and documents exchanged between DOJ lawyers representing EPA and federal PRPs.  It will be interesting to see if this decision changes the way DOJ attorneys interact in cases involving a federal PRP.

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Just in case you are not sated with coverage about the Supreme Court argument in Sackett and the potential implications if EPA loses, I thought I would note that I did a brief (8 minutes) interview with LexBlog Network about the issues it presents. You can see it here. 

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I am generally loath to speculate about what the Supreme Court will do based on oral argument, but the overwhelming reaction to the oral argument in Sackett v. EPA was that EPA is going to lose. What would a loss mean? In simplest terms, EPA would no longer be able to issue enforcement orders under the Clean Water Act without those orders being subject to judicial review. Such a decision would undeniably be significant. Everyone practicing in this area knows how coercive EPA enforcement orders can be. A person who thinks that he is not liable or that the order is inappropriate, and faced with having to violate the order and wait for EPA to bring an enforcement action to obtain judicial review, is truly between a rock and a hard place – or perhaps Scylla and Charybdis (I’m not sure which, but it’s not good, either way). The opportunity for preenforcement review would eliminate much of EPA’s coercive power.

The big question is whether a decision against EPA would be so broad as to make it clear that EPA’s order authority under other statutes, such as CERCLA, would be similarly affected. Here, speculation really is difficult, because the Supreme Court could invalidate EPA’s CWA authority several different ways, with differing impacts on other statutes. Readers who want to explore the issue in more depth than a blog post can review an article I did in the ABA Superfund and Natural Resource Damages Litigation Committee Newsletter.

As long as I am speculating, I’m going to go out on limb and predict that the Court’s decision will not be easily limited to the CWA. I think EPA’s order authority is in trouble across the board.

The next big question is when lower courts are going to actually start paying attention to what the Supreme Court says about environmental cases. I’m tired of this pattern. A series of cases are decided by lower courts, almost universally in EPA’s favor. Indeed, one of the striking things about Sackett is that the Supreme Court took the case without a circuit court split – EPA had won before every circuit court that had reached the question. The Supreme Court applies principles that are broadly accepted outside the environmental arena, but which for reasons unknown to everyone but the lower court judges have been thought inapplicable to environmental cases, and EPA loses. The next several years are spent with EPA, DOJ, and the lower courts merrily constructing some new edifice which allows EPA to continue to win – until the Supreme Court takes another case and says “No, we really meant it.”

There is a lesson here for lower courts, if they would but listen. Environmental cases are not sui generis. EPA does not necessarily win just because it is protecting the environment. General principles of corporate, administrative, and constitutional law apply. Under this framework, EPA will still win most of the time. That’s the nature of administrative law. Expert agencies receive a lot of deference from the courts in interpreting their organic statutes and applying their expertise. But they don’t win all the time, and they don’t win just because they are EPA.

Rant over. Let’s see what the Supremes actually do.

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The decision yesterday in United States v. Minnkota Power Cooperative serves as a useful reminder regarding how important the burden of proof is in review of agency decisions. The case started in 2006, as part of DOJ’s NSR enforcement initiative, when the United States and North Dakota brought suit against Minnkota’s Milton R. Young Station. The parties settled and a consent decree was entered. Apparently, the parties knew at the time of the settlement that there would be a dispute regarding what would constitute BACT for NO_x control and they thus agreed to defer the issue; the consent decree simply provided that the North Dakota Department of Health would determine BACT.

It took the DOH four years to do so, but, in November 2010, the DOH concluded that selective non-catalytic reduction, or SNCR, constitutes BACT for the MRY facility, which has unusual technology involving cyclone-fired boilers combusting North Dakota lignite, rather than bituminous or sub-bituminous coal. EPA wanted SCR identified as BACT and pursued dispute resolution under the consent decree to get it. 

Unfortunately for EPA, the decree provided that the determination by North Dakota would be binding unless EPA “demonstrates that it is not supported by the state administrative record and not reasonable in light of applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.” As the court noted, the consent decree language was not unique; it “mirrors the standard of review” for challenges to state BACT determinations even outside the consent decree context.

The crux of the case was whether cyclone fired boilers combusting North Dakota lignite were sufficiently like other coal-fired boilers that determinations for such boilers that SCRs constitute BACT should essentially be binding here. The North Dakota DOH compiled an extensive record demonstrating that such other coal-fired facilities are not sufficiently like the MRY facility, and the court deferred to DOH’s judgment, based on the record.

Perhaps the most telling evidence was that DOJ engaged an expert consultant, which issued an request for proposals to install SCR at the MRY facility. DOJ in fact obtained two proposals with performance guarantees. The availability of such guarantees is extremely probative of whether a technology constitutes BACT. However, DOJ’s consultant failed to provide in its RFP sufficient detail regarding the specific characteristics of the MRY facility – and when the companies responding to the RFP learned the details, they withdrew the guarantees, almost certainly leaving EPA and DOJ in a worse position than if they had never gone through the RFP process. One might also infer that the court thought that DOJ was trying to pull a fast one, which certainly did not help.

Yesterday’s Cape Wind decision, together with this case, even though involving totally different statutory and regulatory regimes, provide a useful joint reminder of the importance of building the record in administrative cases.

As to this case, would the outcome have been different if EPA had made the BACT decision? Would a decision to impose SCR as BACT have been upheld if the burden were on the person challenging that decision? We’ll never know, but I could see it happening. Burdens do matter.

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The PCB contamination in the Lower Fox River in Wisconsin continues to spawn novel Superfund decisions.  The latest is US v. NCR, in which Judge Greisbach of the Eastern District of Wisconsin reversed his initial ruling, made less than six months ago, that the United States could not establish successor liability under CERCLA against  Appleton Papers, which had bought assets from the alleged  polluting party – NCR Corp – and assumed NCR’s liabilities.  As Judge Greisbach explained in his earlier ruling, there can be no successor liability where the  seller of assets remains a viable CERCLA defendant, since the purpose of successor liability is to prevent “paper transactions” that deny the public access to a solvent party to respond to claims.  Whatever contract rights NCR might have against Appleton, the court initally held that they did not extend to the United States.

While the earlier decision seemed eminently reasonable, it posed a practical problem for the parties, since the PCB remedial work was essentially in the control of Appleton, which the Court ruled was not liable.  That practical problem then unleashed a flurry of creative advocacy by the United States – specifically an argument that the Court could issue orders requiring Appleton as a non-liable party to take steps to facilitate the remedial work.  The Court ultimately declined that invitation to be creative.  However, illustrating once again that hard cases make bad law, the Court did accept the government’s alternative invitation to reverse its earlier holding on successor liability.  To justify this reversal, the court could point to no supporting case law or policies in the doctrine of successor liability; the best the court could come up with was the weak argument that none of the successor liability cases expressly held that it was necessary that the seller of assets be insolvent or dissolved, even though all those cases involved circumstances in which the seller was in fact insolvent or no longer in existence.  To compound the confusion, the court went on to note that, in a private arbitration between Appleton and NCR to resolve their contract dispute, Appleton would be assigned 60% of all liability for the site.  According to the court, the fact that the arbitration assigned a majority of the liability to Appleton somehow justified allowing the government to pursue joint and several CERCLA liability against Appleton. 

Environmental law often pushes courts to put practicality ahead of sound legal principle, which begs the question whether the short-term result justifies the jurisprudential confusion.

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EPA may have had problems in court in recent years defending its regulations, but it has generally fared much better in its enforcement cases. Earlier this week, however, EPA suffered what will be, if it is affirmed, a devastating defeat in its PSD/NSR enforcement initiative. In United States v. EME Homer City Generation, Judge Terrence McVerry concluded that the government could get no relief against either the former owners of the facility or the current owners or operator. No penalties. No injunctive relief. No relief under state law. Nothing. Nada.

The facts here were typical of NSR enforcement cases. The facility, in Homer City, Pennsylvania, had implemented a number of projects from 1991 through 1996 which, EPA alleged, required PSD permits. No permits were sought. The owners at the time of the changes sold the plant in 1999. It was sold again in 2001 and is currently operated by one entity and owned by a group of LLCs. 

The court’s analysis was thorough, yet straightforward. According to the court, PSD requirements are one-time, pre-construction requirements. With respect to civil penalties, the United States acknowledged that the five-year statute of limitations precluded claims against the former owners. The court gave the claim against the current owners and operator short shrift. The court concluded that

The alleged PSD violations constitute singular, separate failures by the Former Owners to obtain pre-construction permits, rather than ongoing failures to comply with whatever hyupothetical conditions might have been imposed during the PSD permittingprocess. Thus, the United States was required to file suit to recover civil penalties for an alleged PSD program violation within five years of the construction project.

The big news from the decision is the court’s refusal to grant injunctive relief. While Judge McVerry described the statute as complex and ambiguous, he did not find the decision before him difficult. With respect to the current owners/operator, injunctive relief could not be imposed on them, because no remedy can be imposed without a liability finding. Because the failure to obtain PSD permits was solely attributable to the former owners, the current owners/operator are not liable for the violation. No liability; no injunction. 

The court found the question somewhat more difficult with respect to former owners. They would be liable for the original violation, if proved, and the five-year statute of limitations does not apply to injunctive relief. The court punted on whether it had authority to issue an injunction against former owners, resting its decision instead on the court’s broad discretion to grant or deny equitable relief. Describing injunctive relief as “a rare and extraordinary remedy,” the court concluded that it would be inappropriate to grant relief against former owners where, since they no longer own the facility, injunctive relief against the former owners is not necessary to prevent future violations by the former owners. 

Finally, the court concluded that the current owners/operator did not violate their Title V permit, because the permit does not include any requirement to meet BACT. The court flat-out rejected the idea that the Title V permit could somehow be found to “incorporate” BACT requirements that should have been included in the Title V permit because they should have been included in PSD permits, because the former owners should have applied for them. 

In short, the government was too late to bring claims against the former owners, and could not establish liability against the current owners. Thus, it could get no relief against anyone.

It is difficult to square this opinion with the general rule interpreting police power statutes broadly to effectuate their purposes, because this decision means that there will be some circumstances in which there is a violation with no remedy, even where the impacts of that violation are still being felt, or seen, or inhaled, today. However, the decision is careful and thoughtful and I wouldn’t automatically assume that it will be reversed on appeal. Not a good day for EPA.

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As some of our clients know all too well, I am spending much time these days defending citizen suits. As federal and state agency budgets get slashed, we’re only going to see more such suits, unless a Tea Party-controlled Congress amends the relevant statutes to cut back on citizen suit provisions. 

In a move that will facilitate citizen enforcement, EPA announced last week that it has yet again upgraded its Enforcement and Compliance History Online, or ECHO, data base. As Cynthia Giles, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Enforcement said:

EPA is committed to providing the public with easy to use tools that display facility compliance information and the actions EPA and the states are taking to address pollution problems in communities across the nation. EPA is proud to announce our latest effort under the President’s White House Regulatory Compliance Transparency Initiative and we will continue to take steps to make meaningful enforcement and compliance data available as part of an open, transparent government.

In other words, if we don’t have the resources to sue the polluters, we’ll at least try to make sure that NGOs do. 

It’s difficult to be against increased transparency – and I’m not. I will note, though, that ECHO is not perfect. I frequently see mistakes when I review information about our clients. I certainly would advise clients to review ECHO periodically to ensure that they know what information EPA is providing to the public about their compliance status.

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The public perception is that big, bad corporations can just spend as much money as necessary to win in court. Those of us in the trenches know that the reality differs. Indeed, at least with respect to actions brought by government environmental agencies, the most common defense experience is for the DOJ attorney to introduce him or herself by saying. “Good morning, your Honor, my name is ________. I represent the government, and I win.”

In a bench ruling earlier this month, in what are known as the “delta smelt” cases, Judge Oliver Wanger demonstrated – much to his own dissatisfaction, I may add – just how stacked the deck is in favor of the government. The issue in the case involved the terms of an injunction to protect the delta smelt and, specifically, where along the length of the Sacramento River, salt water intrusion has to be stopped. Not surprisingly, this question involves complex expert testimony. 

The government had two experts, Mr. Feyrer, for the Bureau of Reclamation, and Dr. Norris, for the Fish & Wildlife Service. To put it mildly, Judge Wanger was not happy with either expert. He described Dr. Norris’s testimony as “false”, “outrageous”, and “contradicted by her own testimony.” With respect to Mr. Feyrer, Judge Wanger referred to his “absolute incredibility, his absolute unreliability, and finally, the most significant finding, the Court finds him to be untrustworthy as a witness.”

Here’s the Judge's summary:

            The conclusion that the Court reaches is that this testimony particularly with the contradictions, with the revisionist and opportunistic opinions that are now offered totally impeaching, it’s self-impeaching and contradictory, both Mr. Feyrer and Dr. Norris. They lack credibility. They are the equivalent of bad faith.

            The Court finds agency bad faith here. There simply is no explanation. There is no justification. And again, the government wins.

***

            I’m not going to just junk the … standard and in a peak [pique?] of disappointment with the government’s because just your scientists can’t be honest and can’t be straight and can’t serve the public interest, that we’ll just throw the baby out with the bath water. That’s not going to happen. This species is in trouble. It still needs to be protected.

So, Judge Wanger, tell us what you really think. Elsewhere in the opinion, Judge Wanger described Dr. Norris as a “zealot.” I don’t think that that term will surprise anyone who has worked on environmental cases. We have all seen lawyers and experts who knew God was on their side and that they were therefore justified in engaging in the kinds of behaviors described by Judge Wanger. 

I am not involved in the delta smelt case and thus don’t know if Judge Wanger’s conclusions about the expert testimony are reasonable. I do know that, having reached the conclusions he did, it is admirable that he was still able to focus on the law and the facts and that he still left in place most of what the government wanted by way of an injunction.

If you’re on the defense side, just be prepared for that opening by the government.

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As I noted earlier this month, the Supreme Court denied GE’s certiorari petition seeking to challenge the constitutionality of EPA’s use of unilateral administrative orders issued under section 106 of CERCLA. It thus comes as something of a surprise that the Court today accepted a certiorari petition in Sackett v. EPA. The Sackets are appealing a decision by the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals holding that pre-enforcement review is not available to challenge unilateral administrative orders issued by EPA pursuant to section 319 of the Clean Water Act. Lest anyone think that this is simply the Court reining in that liberal 9^th Circuit, the 9^th Circuit decision followed the lead of all four other circuit courts that have already addressed the question.

So, not only did the Supreme Court grant cert. in a CWA case even though it denied cert. challenging a very similar provision under CERCLA, it did so without a circuit split to resolve.

CERCLA’s order provision does differ slightly from that of the CWA. CERCLA explicitly prohibits pre-enforcement review; the CWA does not. It seemed to me that, while I am firmly on the side of the challengers as to the practical import of unilateral orders, EPA’s legal authority remains fairly solid. As the Court of Appeals noted, even in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition, judicial review is prohibited as long as preclusion “is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.” Given the distinction between orders and civil enforcement, which is separately provided for in the CWA, and that the CWA does provide for judicial review of civil penalties imposed by EPA, a fair reading of the statute would seem to preclude pre-enforcement review of orders. This conclusion is buttressed by the purpose of the order provision, which is allow EPA to move quickly in particular cases, and the legislative history, which also seems to support preclusion.

The Court’s order granting cert. identified two questions – both the statutory interpretation question and the assertion that a ban on pre-enforcement review violates the due process clause. However, the constitutional claim is precisely what the Court refused to hear in the GE case. Obviously, that is not binding precedent, but why would the Court deny cert. to GE only to grant it three weeks later to the Sacketts?

Whatever the answer, there is a lot riding on this case. Notwithstanding the denial of cert. in the GE case, if the Supreme Court allows pre-enforcement review of orders under the CWA, it will have repercussions beyond the CWA. The CAA order provision would certainly be on shaky ground and, if the Court’s opinion were predicated on constitutional concerns rather than statutory interpretation, CERCLA’s order authority would seem to fail as well.

I should be telling my clients not to get their hopes up, but it's hard not to get one's hopes up.

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As much as I’ve always found EPA’s use of unilateral administrative orders under Section 106 of CERCLA to be offensive, I still expected EPA’s authority to withstand challenge. As I noted previously, not every law that is unfair is unconstitutional. At least for now, the issue has probably been laid to rest. Yesterday, the Supreme Court denied GE’s petition for certiorari seeking to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of its claim that EPA’s exercise of its unilateral order authority is unconstitutional. 

CERCLA has been constitutional for almost as long as Francisco Franco has been dead – and they’re both likely to remain that way.

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Thursday afternoon, EPA and the Tennessee Valley Authority announced one of the largest pollution reduction consent decrees in US history – resulting in between $3 to $5 billion of investment in air pollution controls, and retirement of almost one-third of TVA’s coal-fired generating units within the next few years.  Over the next decade, it will reduce TVA's total emissions of nitrogen oxides by 69% and sulfur dioxide by 67%.  Although the agreement provides a timely victory for EPA amid the current backlash against it in Congress, the settlement actually relates to a New Source Review (NSR) suit commenced by EPA during the Clinton Administration in 1999.  The consent decree resolves all alleged past preconstruction violations, as well as alleged violations of the New Source Performance Standards and Title V regulations.

The TVA operates 59 coal-fired boilers at 11 plants in Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee, and supplies power to around 9 million people in its service area that spans most of the southeastern US. The settlement involves all 11 plants, and includes an obligation to address 92% of TVA’s coal-fired system between 2011 and 2018 by either installing state of the art pollution controls like SCRs and FGD or repowering with renewable biomass. Another 18 coal-fired units, about 16% of TVA’s coal-fired generating system, totaling 2,700 MW of capacity, will be permanently retired – the largest retirement commitment seen under EPA’s Coal-Fired Power Plan initiative, which has settled 22 such NSR cases so far.  However, Greenwire reports that, even before today's announcement, TVA was already planning to retire about 1,000 MW of coal-fired capacity.

I found the option to repower the units with renewable biomass to be particularly interesting, especially given EPA’s current proposal to continue studying biomass emissions for three years before requiring Clean Air Act permits for greenhouse gas emissions from biomass sources.  In the agreement, “Renewable Biomass” is defined very broadly, with no time-frames or extensive restrictions. Instead, it includes, in part, organic matter that comes from forests or grasslands, as well as residues and byproducts from agriculture, forestry and paper industry. Under the agreement, the repowered units would be deemed “new” emission units, themselves subject to New Source Review and other permitting requirements.

The settlement also includes $10 million in penalties -- $8 million paid to EPA, $1 million paid to Tennessee and $500,000 each paid to Alabama and Kentucky -- as well as $350 million in environmental mitigation projects, including $240 million to be spent on TVA-run energy efficiency projects and $60 million to be divided among Alabama, Kentucky, North Carolina and Tennessee for the states to implement projects of their choosing, so long as they're within the categories specified in the consent decree.

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While EPA remains under attack by the GOP-majority House, that doesn’t mean that coal is off the hook. To the contrary, coal remains under attack itself. A number of recent stories demonstrate the multi-pronged effort by those who want to reduce or eliminate use of coal. For example, the Environmental Integrity Project and two Texas-based NGOs just filed suit against the Lower Colorado River Authority's Fayette Power Project, alleging violations of NSR/PSD requirements and exceedances of particulate limits in the plant’s permit. There is no doubt that there is a concerted effort by NGOs to make life difficult for coal. Thus, even if Congress succeeds in muzzling EPA to some extent, citizen suits will only proliferate, unless Congress also amends the CAA and other environmental statutes to eliminate citizen suit provisions.

Next up? A report that TransAlta Corp. has reached an agreement with the State of Washington to shut down Washington’s last coal-fired power plant. The agreement gives TransAlta until 2020 and 2025, respectively, to shut the two boilers at the plant. The story serves as a reminder that, even aside from NGOs, some states are looking to phase out coal-fired generation.

Let’s not forget that coal mining is under attack as well. Here too, notwithstanding Congressional efforts to protect coal mining, NGOs remain active. Daily Environment just reported that a federal judge issued a temporary restraining order against Highland Mining Co., ordering it to stop work on its 635-acre Reylas Surface Mine in Logan County, West Virginia. The suit alleges violations of NEPA and § 404 of the CWA.

Finally, we have the economic side of the issue. One factor coal has always had on its side – until recently – was its cost advantage over natural gas. With that cost difference eroded, simple economics may do what years of environmental enforcement couldn’t. Thus we have John Rowe of Excelon, which, of course, has almost no coal assets, asserting that EPA regulation will not kill coal, but only drive out old, inefficient plants. Heck, we even have the Wall Street Journal asking whether coal is “The Energy of the Past.”

Time will tell, but it is at least plain that the current GOP ascendancy has not solved all of coal’s problems.

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Last month, I noted that, in the absence of comprehensive climate legislation, U.S. carbon policy would be a mish-mash of several elements – including more NSR enforcement. In fact, Phillip Brooks, director of EPA’s Air Enforcement Division, had just told an ALI/ABA forum that EPA’s NSR enforcement initiative is alive and well and he predicted more closures of old coal plants as a result of EPA’s NSR enforcement. Earlier this month, proving that Brooks meant what he said, the United States sued Ameren Corporation, alleging NSR violations at Ameren’s Rush Island facility in Festus, Missouri. 

Apparently, I am not the only person who has noticed the connection between NSR enforcement and efforts to make life generally more difficult for coal plants. (Perhaps Mr. Brooks should not have been so explicit in his ALI/ABA remarks.) This week, Missouri Republican Senator Roy Blunt wrote to Lisa Jackson, criticizing the Ameren enforcement action and describing it as “another backdoor method used by the EPA to broadly penalize the use of coal in the United States.”

Blunt also criticized the “tsunami” of regulations by EPA that will increase the cost of coal-fired electricity generation. We had previously noted the Credit Suisse report which predicted the closure of more than 50 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity. Blunt referred to a study by the North Electric Reliability Corporation which made a similar prediction.

As my readers know, I dislike the NSR program and the enforcement initiative. I do think that many of these projects, often 15, 20, or 25  or more years ago, truly were thought routine, even if EPA may be able to persuade a court that they were not “Routine Maintenance” within the meaning of the regulations. The NSR program is certainly not a cost-effective way to regulate. However, NSR is part of the statute, EPA believes in it, and the case law is, from EPA’s perspective, at worst ambiguous and at best favorable. I expect that EPA would be pursuing many of these cases, even if climate change were not an issue and CO₂ not considered a problem. 

Is EPA sad that its NSR enforcement has the collateral impact of making coal less economic so that small coal-fired plants retire early, thus reducing GHG emissions? I doubt it. Does the climate change issue increase EPA’s enthusiasm? Perhaps so. The question is whether this added motivation is relevant. EPA’s intent may not be relevant to the courts, but it certainly looks as though it is relevant to Congress.

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Earlier this week, the United States brought another NSR/PSD enforcement action, this time concerning the Homer City Plant, in Pennsylvania. The suit itself isn’t big news, though it’s helpful to have periodical reminders that the NSR enforcement initiative remains active at EPA and DOJ; it is a significant part of the government’s arsenal against traditional pollutants.

It’s also important to remember that, in the absence of comprehensive climate legislation, the NSR enforcement initiative has become part of the government’s climate strategy. The plant spokesman stated that the plant is “positioned quite well to succeed in whatever environment we might be looking at in the future." However, Randy Francisco, Pennsylvania representative for the Sierra Club's "Beyond Coal" campaign (and doesn’t the name say it all), had a different view: 

I don't think it's worth it to put the money into it to clean it up. This is one of the dirtiest plants in the country, and it really just needs to be put to bed.

Why do I describe this as a fine mess and how did we get here? To mix my comedic metaphors, we have met the enemy and he is us. It’s a mess, because the PSD/NSR program is a clunky, awkward, and vague program and, whatever the merits of the specific legal questions in the various suits, EPA can’t really deny that its interpretation of the program has not been a model of consistency. It’s a mess because it’s difficult to achieve programmatic results through enforcement. It’s a mess because using PSD enforcement to make coal more expensive so that coal plants will shut down and stop emitting GHGs is hardly an efficient way to regulate GHGs. 

Why are we the enemy? Simple. Because the environment would be cleaner and the economy stronger with comprehensive climate legislation combined with significant changes to the NSR/PSD program and we haven’t figured out a way to get there.

The result? No one’s happy (except, perhaps, some busy environmental lawyers and some politicians who can find opportunities for grandstanding). EPA and environmentalists aren’t happy, because we don’t have comprehensive climate legislation. Large emitters aren’t happy, because they are left with the collateral damage of PSD/NSR, a program that should be allowed to die a quiet death.

For those of us who live in the trenches of these battles, at least one detail in the complaint is worth noting.  The United States brought suit, not only against the current owner and operator of the Homer City plant, but also against New York State Electric and Gas Corporation and Pennsylvania Electric Co., both of which owned the plant prior to 1998. Why the emphasis? Because it’s more than six years ago and therefore outside the statute of limitations for the government’s penalty claims. Indeed, the government seeks penalties only from the current owner/operators. Nonetheless, it seeks injunctive relief against NYSEG and PENELEC, even though they’ve had no connection to the plant in more than 12 years. The complaint states that:

They can be ordered to fund and implement contracts with third-party vendors who design, fabricate, and install the air pollution control equipment at issue. They can also take various actions to mitigate their past illegal pollution such as purchasing air pollution credits known as “allowances.”

A fine mess we’ve gotten ourselves into.

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When EPA creates a web page solely addressing one stormwater settlement, you can safely assume that EPA thinks it is important and is trying to send a message. Thus, EPA’s announcement earlier this week of a settlement with Beazer Homes to resolve allegations that Beazer Homes violated federal stormwater requirements at construction sites in 21 – count ‘em, 21 – states should make everyone in the construction industry sit up and take notice.

The settlement requires Beazer Homes to pay a penalty of $925,000 (mostly to EPA, but some to each of the states). EPA estimated a price tag for the injunctive relief of almost $9,487,384. Basically, the consent decree simply requires Beazer Homes to comply with stormwater regulations, but EPA has imposed certain management requirements on Beazer Homes to ensure that compliance really will happen. Beazer Homes must develop an overall stormwater compliance program, designate a nationwide stormwater compliance manager, and also identify division-level compliance managers who must inspect every construction site within their jurisdiction at least quarterly to ensure that individual sites are in compliance. 

Stormwater is clearly one of EPA’s top priorities. The press release for the Beazer Homes settlement states so explicitly:

Keeping contaminated stormwater out of America’s waters is one of EPA’s national enforcement initiatives.

As concerns about nutrients increase, and EPA faces pressure from citizen groups regarding TMDLs for nutrients, we should only expect more such announcements. An ounce of prevention might be worth $9,487,384 of cure (not including a penalty).

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As the holiday approaches, I am particularly thankful that I am not counsel to the Washington State DOT in United States v. Washington State DOT, a case that continues to make me want to take EPA, DOJ, and United States District Judge Robert Bryan by the neck and ask them what the heck are they thinking. 

In July, I posted about Judge Bryan’s decision holding that the Washington DOT “arranged” for the disposal of hazardous substances by designing and operating a highway drainage system that deposited highway runoff containing hazardous substances into what became the Commencement Bay Superfund Site. As I noted then, the logic of that decision is that every Clean Water Act stormwater problem is now potentially a Superfund claim and every highway department – and every private developer with a parking lot – potentially faces not just stormwater enforcement, but a Superfund cost recovery suit. 

Last week, Judge Bryan issued another decision regarding the DOT’s potential arranger liability. Although his earlier decision held that Washington DOT had arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances through the design of its highway drainage systems, the court had not actually found the DOT liable under § 107(a)(3) of CERCLA. The DOT argued that, even if it arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances, the United States hasn’t “established a connection between the hazardous substances found at the [DOT] Property and the response costs incurred at the [Superfund site].” 

Judge Bryan wasn’t buying it. Instead, Judge Bryan concluded that, where plaintiff can establish contamination at defendant’s property that is at least similar to contamination at the Superfund site, and can establish a “plausible migration pathway by which the contaminant could have traveled from the defendant’s facility to the plaintiff’s site,” plaintiff has met its burden. The burden then shifts to the defendant to create a genuine issue of fact regarding causation.

Judge Bryan further concluded that it is up to the trial court to determine when to consider divisibility and apportionment defenses, and noted that “it would be consistent with the purposes of CERCLA to first fix liability and then determine any divisibility/apportionment defense based on causation.”

In other words, design a stormwater drainage system that directs contamination towards an area that needs a cleanup, and you are in Superfund litigation up to your neck until the final verdict is rendered.

Thanks, but no thanks.

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One of the first lessons I learned as a summer associate, more years ago than I care to remember, is that the probability of a successful estoppel claim against the government is approximately the same as the probability that there is a Santa Claus. After the recent decision from the District of New Jersey in FMC Corporation v. American Cyanamid, the probability of a successful estoppel claim may still be low, but it isn’t zero. 

FMC involves claims concerning the Higgins Farm Superfund Site, in Franklin, New Jersey. According to the decision, FMC contacted the State of New Jersey in 2001 in order to obtain information concerning the scope of its potential liability. One of the questions involved natural resource damages. New Jersey determined that it would not assess NRD for the site and that conclusion was communicated by telephone to FMC in late 2002. As settlement negotiations continued, in 2003, New Jersey actually provided to FMC a copy of the memorandum that had been prepared documenting that no NRD would be assessed. 

The reason for the determination apparently was a NJDEP policy that, where no off-site groundwater contamination existed, no NRD would be assessed. However, that policy changed later in 2003, after a change in administration at NJDEP. Ultimately, in 2006, NJDEP filed suit against FMC seeking natural resource damages. In responding to FMC’s motion to dismiss, NJDEP made the argument most of us would expect:

the doctrine of waiver should not be applied under these circumstances [because] a government agency may change policies for the benefit for the public without creating rights in parties who claim to have relied on the old policy.

The Court wasn’t buying it. While acknowledging that “the application of waiver or estoppel principles to government actions is to be most strictly limited,” the Court concluded that New Jersey had expressly waived its right to recover NRD. It was significant to the Court that NJDEP did not qualify the waiver in any way. Given the absence of qualifying language, the Court concluded that to allow NJDEP to bring NRD claims after such an unqualified waiver “would serve to completely alter the calculus of the litigation and undermine settlement negotiations that parties engage in with the State.”

The biggest lesson of FMC will probably be for government attorneys – make sure you qualify your waivers. Nonetheless, it does suggest that, at least in the right case, the government will be held to its promises. 

Merry Christmas, FMC.

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In a crisply written opinion by Judge Posner, the 7^th Circuit Court of Appeals just reversed a district court judgment against Cinergy in the NSR case involving Cinergy’s power plant in Wabash, Indiana, and directed that judgment enter for Cinergy. It is not obvious that the case will have wide applicability, but it is certainly worth noting.

The first key issue in Cinergy was whether proposed new projects would be subject to NSR review if they were expected to result in an increase in annual emissions or only if they would result in an increase in the hourly emissions rate. In an earlier ruling, the 7^th Circuit decided that annual emissions, rather than the hourly rate, was the appropriate test provided for in the statute and regulations.

However, when the case came to trial, a twist occurred. The jury only found violations with respect to four projects. All of those projects occurred between 1989 and 1992 – and during that time, Indiana’s SIP stated that the applicable test was whether a project would result in an hourly emissions rate increase. Even more complicated, EPA had approved the SIP, even though it also told Indiana that the SIP had to be changed. Indiana had apparently changed its rules prior to 1989, but failed to submit a SIP modification until 1994. The Court ruled that EPA must be held to the SIP that it approved and that was in effect at the time of the projects.

The Clean Air Act does not authorize the imposition of sanctions for conduct that complies with a State Implementation Plan that EPA has approved. The EPA approved Indiana’s plan with exceptions that did not include [the improper test.]

Calling EPA’s approval of the SIP a “blunder,” the Court said that EPA must live with it.

It’s not obvious that this decision will have much relevance outside cases in Indiana involving projects implemented during the time Indiana’s SIP contained the wrong test. However, it is a lesson that the details do matter – in particular, the details of the relevant SIP.

The second aspect of the case is also a lesson in the nitty-gritty of litigation – and may have broader applicability. With respect to NOx emissions [it is not clear why the NOx allegations were not controlled by the prior part of the decision], EPA relied on two experts to testify that the projects would result in increases in annual emissions. However, both experts relied on a formula used for baseload power plants. Unfortunately for EPA, the Wabash facility is a cycling plant, not a baseload plant. The model used by EPA's experts assumes that an increase in capacity would result in a proportionate increase in output. However, that assumption is not valid for a cycling plant. The Court thus ruled that the experts’ opinions should not have been admitted; without them, EPA had no evidence of increased emissions and judgment had to enter for Cinergy.

This aspect of the case provides a cautionary lesson for the government (though I wouldn’t start dancing in the street if I were defending one of these cases). I think that there has been a sense that, if the government wins the legal battle on the issue of annual emissions v. hourly emissions rate and wins the routine maintenance argument, then the defendants are sunk. This case is a reminder that the facts still matter and that the government has to prove its case based on evidence regarding the specific projects being challenged.

What a notion.

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If environmental lawyers have been wondering when they’re going to get their share of economic stimulus, it’s time to stop wondering. Last week, Cynthia Giles, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, announced that her office would be focusing on higher impact cases.  Giles also noted that, by the end of this month, EPA would have more than 200 criminal investigators.

If it weren’t for one statement by Giles, I don’t think that this would be news. Enforcement numbers always fluctuate. Environmental and watchdog groups always criticize EPA and state agencies when the numbers go down, and EPA and state agencies always respond to that criticism.

What caught my eye, however, was this. According to the Daily Environment Report, Giles said that the best measure of the effectiveness of EPA’s enforcement efforts is

how many people are charged and how many people are convicted, and on those scores I think we're doing pretty well.

Sorry. I don’t buy it. If everyone’s complying, then no one gets charged and no one gets convicted. I’m not naïve. Not everyone does comply and vigorous enforcement is necessary to ensure that compliance does happen. In fact, most of my clients are large corporations who comply with environmental laws and they often appreciate vigorous enforcement, because it helps ensure a level playing field. 

At the same time, however, it’s important to recognize that enforcement numbers don’t particularly correlate with the level of compliance. Nor are they a good measure of whether environmental agencies are doing their job well. Instead, enforcement numbers are mostly just red meat to advocacy groups who either want scalps, want to pressure agencies to do more, or both.

Giles’s remarks may be good news for environmental lawyers, but that doesn’t mean that more enforcement is the best use of government resources to increase environmental protection.

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When clients are threatened with citizen suits – and particularly when the threatened litigation involves a matter where EPA or a state regulatory agency is heavily involved, the clients always want to know why they can’t somehow get rid of the citizen suit, given that EPA is on the case. The answer is that they can – but only in limited circumstances.

The recent decision in Little Hocking Water Association v. DuPont confirmed this answer in the context of RCRA. The Little Hocking Water Association provides public water to certain communities in Ohio, directly across the Ohio River from a DuPont plant which uses , also known as PFOA or C8 – also known as the contaminant du jour. According to the complaint, the Little Hocking wells have among the highest concentrations of C8 of water supply wells anywhere and its customers have among the highest C8 blood levels anywhere. Little Hocking Water Association thus sued DuPont under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, claiming that DuPont’s release of C8 had created an “imminent and substantial endangerment."

Section 7002 of RCRA contains provisions precluding such citizen suits if either EPA or a state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting” an action under RCRA to abate the endangerment. In the DuPont case, releases of C8 from the DuPont facility had been the subject of at least two administrative orders on consent entered into by DuPont and EPA. However, consent orders aren’t the same as “an action” under § 7002 or § 7003 of RCRA – and they thus do not preclude a citizen suit.

DuPont tried the next best argument – that EPA had primary jurisdiction over the regulation of C8 – and that the existence of EPA’s regulatory authority and the issuance of the consent orders meant that the courts should defer to EPA. DuPont’s argument was that a court could not fashion a remedy in the case without essentially establishing a new cleanup standard for C8 and that doing so is the job of EPA, not the courts.

The Court gave the primary jurisdiction argument short shrift. As the Court noted, using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in citizen suits would dramatically reduce the scope of such suits. Since Congress provided a citizen suit mechanism – and provided very specific, discrete, circumstances in which citizen suits are precluded – it doesn’t make sense to use primary jurisdiction to establish another defense, particularly where the defense would almost eliminate the remedy. 

The bottom line? If you don’t want to face a citizen suit (and you’re not in compliance), get yourself sued by EPA or your state regulatory agency. The mere existence of EPA or state regulation, even if requirements are embodied in a consent order, is not enough.

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EPA shows no signs of slowing down in its efforts to use the Clean Air Act’s PSD/NSR provisions as an enforcement club. The latest target in EPA’s crosshairs is the Detroit Edison Monroe Power Plant. Late last month, DOJ filed a complaint alleging violations of PSD/NSR requirements in connection with a project to replace the high temperature reheater and the economizer at Monroe Unit 2. Aside from the broad sign that EPA remains committed to these cases, the most recent action is notable for at least two reasons:

The suit names both Detroit Edison, which owns the plant, and DTE Energy, Detroit Edison’s parent. The complaint alleges that DTE Energy “employees make decisions involving construction and environmental matters at the plant” and that it “must approve major capital expenditures at” Monroe. Naming the parent is consistent with actions EPA has taken with respect to some of this firm’s clients; Parent companies would be wise to pay attention to this trend.

The project that is the subject of the complaint took place this year; we’re not talking about EPA reaching back to projects completed in the 1980s or 1990s. The complaint alleges that DTE provided one day’s notice before commencing the project. I’m not involved in the case, so I don’t know the details, but it’s hard to imagine that there isn’t some relevant background here. Either Detroit Edison and DTE, relying on some of the more favorable PSD/NSR decisions, decided just to pay their money and take their chances, or someone at EPA or the State of Michigan led the plant astray. Time will tell.

There has been no doubt for some time that EPA is going to continue to seek reductions in conventional pollutant emissions through these types of enforcement actions. This action is also a good reminder, however, of the type of action we have to look forward to, assuming that the Tailoring Rule is upheld. If there is no Congressional action, the PSD/NSR program is going to be EPA’s only leverage to get GHG reductions.

I can’t wait.

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My apologies if this post is a mash note to Judge Wilkinson. Sometimes a decision is written with such clarity and simplicity that you have to sit up and take notice. Such is the case with yesterday’s decision in North Carolina v. TVA, reversing the District Court decision imposing an injunction against four TVA plants that would have required installation of additional controls for NO_x and SO₂ , notwithstanding the absence of any allegation that the plants were violating their permits under the Clean Air Act. My apologies also to my friends in the environmental community and the Massachusetts AG’s office, who supported the District Court decision, but I have a hard time seeing this decision as anything other than the death knell for this kind of public nuisance litigation.

My only complaint with the opinion is that second paragraph of the decision is such a cogent summary that it’s not obvious to me that the decision needed to go on for another 30 pages. That paragraph states:

This ruling was flawed for several reasons. If allowed to stand, the injunction would encourage courts to use vague public nuisance standards to scuttle the nation’s carefully created system for accommodating the need for energy production and the need for clean air. The result would be a balkanization of clean air regulations and a confused patchwork of standards, to the detriment of industry and the environment alike. Moreover, the injunction improperly applied home state law extraterritorially, in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court’s decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Finally, even if it could be assumed that the North Carolina district court did apply Alabama and Tennessee law, it is difficult to understand how an activity expressly permitted and extensively regulated by both federal and state government could somehow constitute a public nuisance. For these reasons, the judgment must be reversed.

While I will thus leave the bulk of the opinion to readers particularly interested in the subject, one other paragraph stands out for me. After discussing the contours of public nuisance litigation, Judge Wilkinson noted that:

while public nuisance law doubtless encompasses environmental concerns, it does so at such a level of generality as to provide almost no standard of application. If we are to regulate smokestack emissions by the same principles we use to regulate prostitution, obstacles in highways, and bullfights, see Keeton, supra, at 643-45, we will be hard pressed to derive any manageable criteria. As Justice Blackmun commented, "one searches in vain . . . for anything resembling a principle in the common law of nuisance."

There’s no question in my mind that this decision is the end of public nuisance litigation as a viable cause of action for traditional pollutants, where those pollutants are comprehensively regulated under a federal statute. Moreover, it certainly provides a roadmap for dismissal of public nuisance claims concerning GHG emissions. As I noted last year in discussion Connecticut v. AEP, even though the 2^nd Circuit allowed GHG nuisance claims to proceed, part of its argument was that there is no comprehensive federal regulatory scheme with respect to GHG. Its argument clearly suggested that, once such regulations are in place, public nuisance defendants might have better luck. The promulgation of the Tailoring Rule now means that public nuisance defendants can point to North Carolina v. EPA and say that the federal rules have displaced the common law of nuisance. I think that they will probably win that argument. They certainly should.

Thank you Judge Wilkinson.

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Last week, in City of Pittsfield v. EPA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a petition by the City of Pittsfield seeking review of an NPDES permit issued by EPA. The case makes no new law and, by itself, is not particularly remarkable.  Cases on NPDES permit appeals have held for some time that a permittee appealing an NPDES permit must set forth in detail in its petition basically every conceivable claim or argument that they might want to assert. Pretty much no detail is too small. The City of Pittsfield failed to do this, instead relying on their prior comments on the draft permit. Not good enough, said the Court. 

For some reason, reading the decision brought to mind another recent appellate decision, General Electric v. Jackson, in which the D.C. Circuit laid to rest arguments that EPA’s unilateral order authority under § 106 of CERCLA is unconstitutional. As I noted in commenting on that decision, it too was unremarkable by itself and fully consistent with prior case law on the subject.

What do these two cases have in common? To me, they are evidence that, while the government can over-reach and does lose some cases, the deck remains stacked overwhelmingly in the government’s favor. The power of the government as regulator is awesome to behold. Looking at the GE case first, does anyone really deny that EPA’s § 106 order authority is extremely coercive? Looking at the Pittsfield case, doesn’t it seem odd that a party appealing a permit has to identify with particularity every single nit that they might want to pick with the permit? Even after the Supreme Court’s recent decisions tightening pleading standards, the pleading burden on a permit appellant remains much more substantial than on any other type of litigant.

Why should this be so? Why is it that the government doesn’t lose when it’s wrong, but only when it’s crazy wrong? 

Just askin’.

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Sometimes, the practice of environmental law just takes my breath away. A decision issued earlier last month in United States v. Washington DOT was about as stunning as it gets. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Robert Bryan held that the Washington State Department of Transportation had “arranged” for the disposal of hazardous substances within the meaning of CERCLA by designing state highways with stormwater collection and drainage structures, where those drainage structures ultimately deposited stormwater containing hazardous substances into Commencement Bay -- now, a Superfund site -- in Tacoma, Washington.  

I’m sorry, but if that doesn’t make you sit up and take notice, then you’re just too jaded. Under this logic, isn’t everyone who constructs a parking lot potentially liable for the hazardous substances that run off in stormwater sheet flow? 

For those who aren’t aware, phosphorus, the stormwater contaminant du jour, is a listed hazardous substance under Superfund. Maybe EPA doesn’t need to bother with new stormwater regulatory programs. Instead, it can just issue notices of responsibility to everyone whose discharge of phosphorus has contributed to contamination of a river or lake.

The Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment regarding whether the discharges of contaminated stormwater were federally permitted releases. Since the Washington DOT had an NPDES permit, it argued that it was not liable under § 107(j) of CERCLA. However, as the Court noted, even if the DOT might otherwise have a defense, if any of the releases occurred before the permit issued – almost certain, except in the case of newer roads – or if any discharges violated the permit, then the Washington DOT would still be liable and would have the burden of establishing a divisibility defense. 

If one were a conspiracy theorist, one might wonder if EPA were using this case to gently encourage the regulated community to support its recent efforts to expand its stormwater regulatory program. Certainly, few members of the regulated community would rather defend Superfund litigation than comply with a stormwater permit.

You can’t make this stuff up. 

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Last year, I analogized PRP efforts to have CERCLA’s unilateral administrative order provisions declared unconstitutional to Chevy Chase’s repeated announcements during the first year of Saturday Night Live that Francisco Franco was still dead. Eventually, that joke wore out. With yesterday’s decision by the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in General Electric v. Jackson, upholding EPA’s UAO authority, these legal challenges may be similarly about to wear out. 

The analysis in GE v. Jackson is pretty straightforward. EPA may not obtain fines or treble damages if a PRP defies a UAO unless the agency goes to court and the court concludes that the PRP is in fact liable under CERCLA and that none of the statutory defenses apply. Because PRPs thus have a “pre-deprivation” remedy, there is no due process violation. At a formal level, that’s hard to dispute. The formal pre-deprivation remedy and the absence of a circuit split make it unlikely that the Supreme Court will have any interest in hearing this case.

GE’s most cogent argument, to me, is that, as a practical matter, the deck is so heavily stacked in EPA’s favor that it really is very difficult for PRPs to take advantage of the due process rights that CERCLA provides. The Court gave this argument short shrift, noting that, out of 1,638 recent UAOs, PRPs had refused to comply with 75, or 4.6%. However, we do not know the details underlying these data. Many of these 75 non-complying PRPs could simply be deadbeats, rather than viable PRPs who considered themselves not liable or had reason to believe that EPA’s remedy was arbitrary and capricious. 

There are limits to the use of anecdotal evidence, but does anyone who has a lot of CERCLA experience really deny that the coercion faced by PRPs is extreme? This is why liberal friends of mine who consider themselves environmentalists, but who aren’t lawyers and don’t know how CERCLA works, are often shocked when I describe some of these cases – in an unbiased way, of course – and ask how CERCLA can be constitutional.

My own sense is that the D.C. Circuit decision is probably right as a matter of constitutional law. Not every law that is unfair is unconstitutional. I certainly think that CERCLA’s UAO provisions are unfair. I also think that they are bad law, masquerading as “polluter pays” provisions. However, to the extent one can really even speak about Congressional intent given the haphazard way CERCLA was drafted, Section 106, as interpreted in GE v. Jackson, is pretty clearly what Congress intended and, for now, it’s the law. 

Francisco Franco is still dead, and so are constitutional challenges to EPA's UAO authority under CERCLA.

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When the Burlington Northern decision was first announced, I concluded that “never has the Supreme Court done so much by doing so little.” On May 5, Judge John Mendez, of he Eastern District of California, proved me at least half right. In United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, joint and several liability was imposed on the defendants in 2002. The 2002 decision stated that “given the nature of pollution at the site, it would be difficult to identify distinct harms.” The court did not analyze whether there was a reasonable basis for apportionment of liability. 

Following the Burlington Northern decision, the defendants moved for reconsideration, arguing that Burlington Northern constituted an intervening change in the law. Defendants argued that “the Supreme Court clearly meant to send a signal to other courts that they must begin evaluating apportionment in a different way.” I think that the defendants in Iron Mountain were right.  Unfortunately, that’s not the standard for a motion for reconsideration.   If Iron Mountain were being decided for the first time today, the defendants might get a better result, but that doesn't mean that they win their motion for reconsideration.

What the Supreme Court really said in Burlington Northern isn’t that the law was wrong; it is that District Courts weren’t applying the law correctly. District court judges had their collective judicial thumbs firmly on the side of the government. The Supreme Court simply told the lower courts to take those thumbs off the scales. I hope that this decision will not encourage lower courts to keep the thumbs on the scales.

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Last year, I noted that EPA had made its ECHO data base more user-friendly, creating a web-based map of enforcement actions. Last week, EPA took the effort a step further, at least with respect to Clean Water Act enforcement action. EPA’s Clean Water Act Annual Noncompliance Report, or ANCR, is available on the web in an interactive format that allows interested citizens to see where the noncompliance and enforcement action is taking place. 

As some of my clients are unfortunately aware, I’ve been seeing a lot of enforcement action recently, at both the federal and state level. It’s not clear long the agencies can maintain a vigorous enforcement posture in the face of repeated budget cuts. I still think that efforts such as providing interactive access to EPA’s ANCR is going to facilitate citizen suits, ensuring the private enforcement is available even if the agencies ease up.

Whether that's a good result is of course a separate question.

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Last week, Judge Thomas Varlan handed the power plant sector a major win in the NSR enforcement arena, ruling that economizer and superheater replacement projects in 1988 at the TVA Bull Run plant were routine maintenance not subject to NSR/PSD regulations. Judge Varlan ruled for the TVA notwithstanding that: 

The projects cost millions of dollars (but less than $10M each)

They extended the life of the plant by 20 years

The costs were identified as capital, not maintenance, expenses

The projects were more extensive than other economizer/superheater projects that had previously been implemented at the Bull Run facility

Why did the Court rule for the TVA?

Although expensive, the projects’ costs were consistent with a wide range of maintenance projects conducted at Bull Run during the time frame

These projects were routine in the industry, even if not commonly performed more than once at individual facilities

Life extension, while a result of the projects, was not their primary purpose

If this decision is upheld on appeal, it will significantly weaken EPA and citizen NSR/PSD enforcement efforts in the power plant sector – at least in the Sixth Circuit, where there are a lot of coal-fired power plants.

Whether the decision is right or wrong – and neither reversal nor affirmance by the Sixth Circuit would surprise me – I’d like to take this opportunity to get on my soapbox about the NSR program as a whole. Why are we fighting about whether projects implemented 22 years ago were routine maintenance? Wouldn’t it make more sense to rely on trading programs that are proven to work cost-effectively to reduce emissions than to try to figure out whether replacement of a superheater provides sufficient leverage to require a power plant to install a scrubber or SCR?

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Last week, Judge John Darrah handed the government a defeat in a PSD/NSR enforcement action, when he ruled that the requirement to obtain permits under the PSD program prior to making major modifications was solely a pre-construction obligation and did not constitute a continuing violation. 

United States v. Midwest Generation was one of the recent wave of government PSD/NSR actions, filed last summer. The problem with the government’s case was that Midwest Generation had purchased the six facilities at issue in the case from Commonwealth Edison in 1999 and all of the alleged changes but one were made prior to the purchase.

Although the court thoroughly reviewed the case law – and found it generally supportive of its conclusion – its major focus was on a plain reading of the statutory language (and we know how much this Supreme Court likes plain readings). The relevant statute provision provides that:

No major emitting facility … may be constructed in any area to which this part applies unless … a Permit has been issued…. 

To Judge Darrah,

the plain meaning of the statute’s introductory language … thus prohibits the construction of a “major emitting facility’ unless [the statutory requirements] are met…. On its face, nothing in § 7475 prohibits the subsequent operation of such a facility without a permit. (Emphasis in original.)

There are other counts in the government’s complaint, including claims of operating permit violations. However, the decision on the NSR/PSD claims is quite significant. The case does not simply dismiss, as some other decisions have done, penalty claims. This is not a statute of limitations decision (though the Judge did also follow most other cases in dismissing, on statute of limitations grounds, the penalty claims with respect to the one alleged modification that occurred after Midwest Generation bought the facilities). As Judge Darrah made clear, the government is not entitled to “any relief on those claims – injunctive or otherwise.” (Emphasis in original.)

Score one of generators – particularly merchant generators who bought facilities after modifications had already been made.

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The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued interpretive guidance yesterday which requires publicly traded companies to consider the impacts of climate change – both the physical damage it could cause, as well as the economic impacts of domestic and international greenhouse gas emissions-reduction rules – and disclose those risks to investors. As we noted when discussing the potential for this announcement in October, the disclosure requirements are likely to affect companies in a wide range of industries. 

In its press release announcing this decision, the SEC said that this interpretive guidance neither creates new legal requirements nor modifies existing ones; rather, SEC guidance is intended to provide consistency among issuers in their disclosure to shareholders of bottom-line risks and consequences. The guidance will cover:

• Risk Factors
• Description of the Business
• Legal Proceedings
• Management’s Discussion and Analysis

The interpretive release will be published in the Federal Register and posted on the SEC’s website. The press release summarizes the key points as these:

• Impact of Legislation and Regulation: When considering potential disclosure obligations, companies should determine whether the impact of existing laws and regulations regarding climate change is material. In some cases, companies should also evaluate the potential impact of pending legislation and regulation related to environmental issues and climate change.
• Impact of International Accords: Companies should consider, and disclose if material, the risks related to or effects upon their business of international accords and treaties relating to climate change.
• Indirect Consequences of Regulation or Business Trends: Legal, technological, political and scientific developments regarding climate change may create both new opportunities and new risks for companies. For example, a company may face decreased demand for goods that produce significant greenhouse gas emissions, or increased demand for goods that result in lower emissions than competing products. Companies should consider the actual or potential indirect consequences they may face due to climate change-related regulatory or business trends.
• Physical Impacts of Climate Change: Companies should also evaluate for disclosure purposes the actual and potential material impact of environmental matters on their business. It is not entirely clear what the SEC means by this, although one example might be agricultural risks associate with altered climate trends that appear to have reduced or increased annual rainfall in particular locales.

When the interpretive release is available, we will provide you with full information. It is likely that pressure from shareholder groups on this issue will continue (here, for instance, is CERES' statement), given that cap-and-trade legislation appears bogged down in Congress and that the prospects for EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act are unclear.

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EPA announced yesterday that it had reached a settlement with Duke Energy to address allegations of New Source Review violations at Duke’s Gallagher coal-fired generating plant in New Albany, Indiana. A jury had already found Duke liable for certain NSR violations at the plant. The settlement obviates the need for a remedy trial, which had been scheduled for early 2010.

The settlement requires Duke Energy to repower Units 1 and 3 at Gallagher with natural gas or shut them down and to install emission controls at Units 2 and 4. Duke will also pay a $1.75 million penalty and spend $6.25 million on various mitigation projects. 

The settlement is not that surprising, particularly given the prior liability findings. It nonetheless serves as a useful reminder that EPA continues to focus on coal plants and that it is going to use all the tools at its disposal to reduce coal plant emissions. Although the press release does not mention global warming, these settlements are another way for EPA to attack the climate change problem under existing authority, even in advance of rules regulating GHGs under the PSD program.

BTW, if it seems as though I am inundating you with posts today, the blog will be on vacation until January 4, so I wanted to get some last posts done. Happy holidays to all.

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EPA has published its annual Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results FY 2009. It always makes interesting reading. This year, EPA has added something new: a web-based map showing the location of all enforcement actions, with links to summaries of the specific actions taken. It’s actually a little tricky to navigate. I had to find an area of interest and zoom in far enough for the dots to be replaced by flags to be able to click on particular sites and obtain the detailed information.

I can see NGOs making a lot of use of this map, and I therefore recommend that regulated entities spend some time with it as well. Forewarned is forearmed. 

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On the be careful what you wish for front, Massachusetts Energy and Environment Secretary Ian Bowles announced yesterday an effort to examine “options for changes in administrative structures and programs to meet environmental goals in light of budget challenges.” The announcement identifies three separate areas of investigation:

Public-Private Partnerships – This makes a lot of sense, but, based on the announcement, seems to be too narrowly focused. The announcement indicates that the review will focus on management of properties owned by the Department of Conservation and Recreation. However, we shouldn’t just be looking at whether to let Disney sponsor the Freedom Trail. For example, I am on the board of the Corporate Wetlands Restoration Partnership, a public-private partnership that leverages private money to assist publicly funded wetlands restoration projects. Surely, there are other, similar opportunities to enlist the private sector in in financing EEA programs.

New Regulatory Models – Here is where the rubber meets the road for most of us attorneys and our clients. The announcement mentions MassDEP’s very successful privatization of our state Superfund program, Chapter 21E, and asks whether there are other opportunities for similar innovations. Some thoughts:

Greater use of general permits.

Other opportunities to privatize, such as inspections and audit functions. Naysayers will raise concerns about the independence of third-party inspections, but it’s a false dichotomy to contrast a world of perfect inspections by DEP with a system of private inspections. Audits and inspections would occur with much greater regularity if regulated facilities were required to pay a third party to audit their facilities every year.  Wouldn't that be a good thing?

Greater consistency in agency decision-making. I don’t think that EEA or DEP realize the costs imposed by their failed efforts to rein in street level bureaucrats who have their own ideas as to what good policy is.

Spend less time writing new guidance and let qualified professionals exercise their professional judgment without wasting precious agency time questioning whether a regulated entity used the proper font in its latest submittal (sorry, rhetorical excess alert).

Reorganization/Consolidation of State Agencies

Secretary Bowles, Commissioner Burt, and others involved should be commended for undertaking this effort. It would be great if the current budget crisis could be turned into a real opportunity for reform. As I’ve said on other occasions, this should be a Nixon-in-China moment for regulatory reform. 

Carpe diem.

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Late last week, Elliott Gilberg, Acting Director of EPA’s Office of Site Remediation Enforcement (OSRE) issued an Interim Policy on Managing the Duration of Remedial Design/Remedial Action Negotiations. Members of the regulated community may not be surprised by the contents of the memo, but they certainly will not be pleased. In brief, the memorandum fundamentally makes two points:

EPA wants to shorten the duration of RD/RA negotiation

EPA is going to use the heavy hammer of unilateral administrative orders, or UAOs, to keep PRPs’ feet to the fire and ensure that negotiations move quickly.

PRPs will likely agree that shortening the duration of negotiations would be a good outcome in the abstract – but achieving it by greater use of UAOs? I don’t think so.

I can only wonder if EPA has even considered the impact of the Burlington Northern decision here. Is this a perverse reaction from EPA? A metaphorical throwing down the gauntlet to PRPs? It certainly feels that way.

I have a different suggestion, if EPA truly wants to shorten negotiations. First, acknowledge Burlington Northern and compromise on the merits in those great majority of cases where there are legitimate divisibility arguments. Second, stop acting like the last bastion of command and control regulation. Set cleanup standards and then, to the maximum extent permitted by existing law, let PRPs clean up to those standards, without micromanaging every detail of the cleanup process.

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In a story from today’s Daily Environment Report, Cynthia Giles, the new Assistant Administrator for Enforcement at EPA, stated that she was looking increase the number of criminal investigators at EPA, noting that

Criminal enforcement is a very important part of our arsenal in achieving compliance and has a powerful deterrent effect. It's important to us that we're out there and that we pursue the criminal cases.

There’s no doubt that, in a simplistic way, she is correct. Generally speaking, as the plausible threat of enforcement increases, the amount of noncompliance will be expected to decrease. However, for criminal enforcement to be a truly useful enforcement tool, EPA has to communicate clearly and unambiguously what conduct constitutes a criminal violation of environmental laws and what does not. Where language is ambiguous and interpretations shift, criminal enforcement only works as the roughest kind of hammer. It may decrease noncompliance, but it will also decrease productive, compliant, economic activity, because the risk posed by uncertainty will not be worth the reward.

Anecdotal evidence is always dangerous, but from where I sit, the risk that EPA will fail to wield its bludgeon with due care is substantial.

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In another sign that the NSR program is alive and well under the Obama administration, the United States (together with the State of Illinois, filed suit Thursday against Midwest Generation, alleging violations of NSR requirements at six coal-fired power plants. Although the action is not too surprising, given that the Bush EPA had issued a notice of violation to Midwest Generation in 2007, it remains noteworthy. Each new prosecution serves to remind generators that failure to comply with NSR rules can lead to significant costs.

Of course, that in terrorem effect on other generators is precisely what the administration and environmental groups want. Unfortunately, for those of us who believe that the NSR program is an incredibly wasteful way to reduce air pollution, such litigation only detracts from efforts to make air pollution control regulations more cost-effective.

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As we have reported, EPA and MADEP have both been taking steps over the past year to broaden the scope of their stormwater programs beyond existing regulation under the rules concerning stormwater discharges associated with industrial or construction activity. EPA has proposed using residual designation authority in Maine and Massachusetts and the MADEP proposed sweeping rules governing existing private facilities.

In the regulated community, there has been substantial concern that these efforts have focused too narrowly on private properties, with the MADEP proposed rules, for example, potentially requiring costly retrofits on many properties without consideration of whether there might be more cost-effective ways to control stormwater pollution, such as through increased focus on MS4s.

Based on this week’s news, EPA may have heard these complaints.

On Wednesday, EPA Region I announced enforcement actions against municipalities for violations of MS4 requirements. EPA proposed to fine nine communities in Massachusetts and New Hampshire; EPA also issued orders requiring that the municipalities take certain actions to come into compliance with the MS4 requirements.  Given the current economic climate and the erosion in municipal budgets, the willingness to impose penalties demonstrates EPA’s seriousness in enforcing the MS4 requirements.

So why does the private sector need to remain worried? One word in the first sentence of EPA’s press release says it all: “integrated.”  Wednesday’s enforcement announcement was part of “a new integrated effort” to enforce stormwater requirements.  While this notice was focused on illegal connections to storm sewers, is there any doubt that this is also part of a broader “integrated” effort to attack stormwater pollution more generally?  Now, when EPA and MADEP come calling on the private sector, the agencies can respond to complaints about unequal focus by noting that they have already made municipalities take their medicine; now it’s time for the private sector to do so as well.

Spoonful of sugar, anyone?

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EPA announced today that it had reached yet another six-figure penalty settlement in an anti-idling case.  This time, the penalty was $650,000. This is one of the larger penalties EPA has obtained in this area.  There appear to be several reasons for the magnitude of the penalty.  First, the defendant, Paul Revere Transportation, LLC, was apparently a recidivist.  It has been the subject of an anti-idling enforcement action in 2003.  Second, Paul Revere refused to settle, making EPA go to trial to prove liability.  Finally, at the trial, EPA established a substantial number of idling violations.  Facing a separate trial regarding the penalty, Paul Revere quickly negotiated a settlement on the penalty amount.

EPA Region I has now targeted bus companies, transit companies, rental car companies, and waste haulers. Truly, any company which operates a large fleet of vehicles is at risk for an anti-idling enforcement action if it does not have a written company idling policy.  Moreover, a paper policy is not enough; companies must take care to ensure a top-down emphasis on compliance with its anti-idling policy.  Letting drivers start trucks before going inside to drink their coffee will not pass muster.

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I assume that environmental agencies’ focus on the annual dollar total of enforcement fines and penalties drives my clients as crazy as it does me. After all, the correlation between such figures and any environmental outcomes is pretty limited. Indeed, less enforcement may mean more compliance rather than more undetected violations.

It thus comes as at least limited good news from Inside EPA that EPA is looking at ways to measure the impact of enforcement efforts other than by measuring the amount of fines and penalties. Instead, as indicated by a presentation made last month by EPA’s Office of Compliance, EPA is going to try to measure the environmental benefits of its enforcement efforts.

(Of course, it’s more than a little depressing that the motivation for this change is the expected decrease in the dollar value of settlements in FY 2009 from the Bush administration’s FY 2008 numbers. God forbid that the Obama administration should recover fewer environmental enforcement dollars than the Bush EPA!)

While congratulations will be due to EPA for whatever strides they make in this area, it is only the tip of the iceberg. The problem of identifying the benefits of environmental programs extends far beyond the enforcement arena; it is endemic to the entire gamut of environmental regulatory programs, state and federal. 

EPA occasionally generates very gross overall numbers demonstrating that the benefits of some program outweigh the costs. However, such figures provide no real assistance in determining whether some other approach to regulating a particular air contaminant would have been more cost-effective or, more fundamentally, whether allocating resources to other contaminants or even other media would be a better place to spend environmental protection dollars. As I noted in one of my Superfund rants, a small town in New Hampshire can legitimately ask whether it could save more lives by devoting resources to public safety improvements than to cleaning up a Superfund site.  The fault is not that of EPA alone or that of state environmental agencies.  It’s very easy for Congress, under pressure from some apparent crisis, to create a regulatory program that explicitly or implicitly forbids considerations of cost-effectiveness or cost benefit analysis.

To hark back to a different rant of mine, on the subject of regulatory reform, is it too much to ask of the Obama administration that it make efforts to increase the cost-effectiveness of our regulatory programs?  If Obama is serious about bipartisanship, this might be one way to achieve it. 

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While some of my colleagues are laboring in the climate change vineyards (and we should have posts soon summarizing the House bill), I thought I would note another interesting enforcement decision issued this week.  United States v. Oliver is, in some respects, a run of the mill decision.  A mom-and-pop medical waste incinerator (the adjective is the court’s not mine; it does give one pause) failed for several years to comply with EPA regulations governing such facilities.  EPA sought and obtained a permanent injunction ceasing facility operations until the defendants can demonstrate to the satisfaction of EPA and the court that it can comply with the applicable regulations.

The interesting part of the decision relates to the Court’s imposition of a penalty.  EPA took the position that the Court should presume that the maximum penalty should be imposed, citing Pound v. Airosol and United States v. B & W Inv. Properties. Doing so in this case would have generated a penalty of $220,080,000 before any mitigation were considered. That EPA itself only sought a penalty of $445,000 demonstrates the absurdity of even starting with the maximum penalty. The court, noting that the defendant had two employees and was poorly capitalized, stated that the size of the business argued for a penalty “far smaller” than what the government sought.

The court also considered, as a separate factor, the impact of the penalty on business operations. While previously noting that the defendants showed no real likelihood of being able to come into compliance, the court nonetheless noted that imposition of a large penalty would pretty much make it impossible for the defendants to operate in compliance with applicable regulations, and therefore concluded “that the penalty should be dramatically lower than the amount sought by the United States.”  The court imposed a $75,000 penalty.

I’m not sure I’d read too much into this decision, but it does give defendants a basis for arguing that courts should not start with the maximum statutory amount in determining an appropriate penalty.  It also puts the defendant’s ability to pay front and center in the penalty calculus.

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Last week, Judge Larry McKinney issued an order requiring to shut down three coal-fired generating units at its Wabash Station facility by no later than September 30, 2009. The decision actually struck me as a thoughtful analysis of injunctive relief issues in a situation where a violation of NSR regulations had already been proven. Although the decision has gotten most press for the order shutting down the units, it covers a number of issues important to injunctive relief situations, and there are some nuggets which are potentially useful to generators; it is not a one-sided decision. Here are some highlights:

The shut-down order – although significant, is not as earth-shattering as it seems. Cinergy gave the judge little choice by testifying that it would not be economic to install pollution controls on the units, given their age and size. The fight was thus about when, not whether, the units would be shut down. The judge was clearly annoyed that, following the liability finding, Cinergy had seemingly taken no action to plan for a shut-down. The judge, in response to reliability concerns, did allow the units to operate through the summer of 2009.

Irreparable harm discussion – a few noteworthy aspects here

The court relied on modeling which demonstrated that Wabash emissions contributed to PM_2.5 levels downwind

The court noted that contributions of “just a few tenths of a ug“ can be significant when an area is on the border between compliance and noncompliance.

Like the court in the TVA injunctive relief case we posted about earlier this year, the court specifically noted that adverse health affects can occur at levels below the NAAQS

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that acid deposition and mercury emissions from Wabash had caused irreparable harm, concluding “that Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient nexus between the relevant excess emissions and the negative … effects. 

In a win for generators, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ position that BACT for NO_x emissions in 1989 was SCR technology. This is an important issue, because EPA and the states will sometimes try to take the position that unproven technologies are nonetheless BACT. The decision squarely rejects that argument.

Surrender of SO₂ allowances. The court required Cinergy to surrender SO₂ allowances equal to the excess emissions from the May 2008 jury verdict to the time the units are shut-down. However, it is important to note that the Plaintiffs had requested that the court order Cinergy to install BACT on larger units at the Station that had not violated NSR rules. The court rejected that argument, noting that the Plaintiffs’ proposal “does not bear an equitable relationship to the degree and kind of harm it is intended to remedy …. Imposition of such a remedy is punitive in nature.”

In sum, although the decision is important, it is not surprising in context. Indeed, the finding on BACT, which was favorable to Cinergy, may have the most precedential significance.

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Earlier this week, the jury reached a verdict in the Cinergy – now Duke Energy – NSR retrial. The short version is simple:

Condensor retubine – no need to go through NSR

Pulverizor replacement – requires NSR

I don’t know all of the details of the case.  For example, I don’t know if the pulverizer capacity was expanded when they were replaced.  If any readers know the details and want to share them, I’d be grateful.

The decision does call to mind a previous post, in which I suggested that environmentalists might trade elimination of the NSR program for a requirement that all existing facilities comply with NSPS by a date certain. If instead of the current NSR program, the CAA had been amended in 1977 to give existing facilities until 2002 – 25 years – to be as clean as new facilities, there would have been howls of outrage at the time from the environmental community, but today we would be in a much better place.  Although the same howls would be heard today, shouldn’t it be possible to reach a deal, particularly given the pressure old facilities will be under as a result of a cap-and-trade program, that would eliminate NSR in return for a date certain by which existing facilities have to be clean as new?  It might be 15 years later than if the deal had been struck in 1977, but that doesn’t mean it would be a bad idea now.

BTW, for a cogent economic analysis of this issue, take a look at my friend Rob Stavins' post from a few weeks ago.  I'm tempted to say great minds thing alike, but perhaps I'll just go with a great mind thinks alike.

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One more note on the Burlington Northern decision.  A client of mine has already noted that one impact of the decision will be to result in more litigation over divisibility, which will be good for private lawyers (ouch!).  She’s right, as my clients always are, but she shouldn’t be.

Litigation should only increase if EPA does not adjust its settlement demands. If EPA responds appropriately, and makes demands which reflect a fair resolution of a divisible liability, then there shouldn’t necessarily be more litigation than there is today.  However, if EPA continues to negotiate with PRPs as though liability is always joint and several, then there will certainly be more litigation – and EPA will start to lose some more cases.  

Anyone care to bet which response by EPA is more likely?

If EPA adjusts its settlement demands downward in response to the decision – or if we start to see litigation in which courts find liability to be divisible – then EPA’s ability to fund Superfund cleanups will be under even more pressure.  This could provide some additional momentum behind the current Congressional effort to reinstitute the Superfund tax.

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Those of us who have practiced in the Superfund arena for some time know that the government, in those rare cases where it has been forced to litigate, has used the same oral argument in every case: “Good morning, your honor. My name is ______. I represent the government in this action and we win.” Today, the Supreme Court made clear that that the government now needs a new oral argument template.

In Burlington Northern v. United States, the Supreme Court issued two important decisions in one. First, the Court held that a defendant must actually intend its waste to be disposed of before it can be found liable as an arranger under § 107(a)(3) of CERCLA. The facts were these. Shell Oil sold pesticides to Brown & Bryant, Inc., which operated a chemical distribution business. As part of the transfer of pesticides from Shell to B&B, some pesticides were released on the property. There was evidence that Shell knew that releases were a regular part of the transfer process. Both the District Court and Appeals Court concluded that Shell’s knowledge that releases occurred was enough to establish arranger liability.

Noting that CERCLA does not define the term “arrange[e] for”, the Court looked the phrase’s ordinary meaning. Doing so, the Court concluded that liability may attach only where the defendant “takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.” The government argued that, because the defendant knew that disposal was the inevitable result of its sale of product to the site owner, the defendant had “intended” disposal to occur. The Court rejected this argument. The Court was very clear: The defendant “must have entered into the sale of [the product] with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed during the transfer process.”

The direct holding with respect to Shell will be important in a number of cases and is helpful in setting a fairly bright line on arranger liability. Even beyond the immediate holding, however, I wonder what, if anything, this case means for what is known as transshipment liability. Under section 107(a)(3), a person is liable as an arranger if they

arranged for disposal or treatment … of hazardous substance owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party…

It has always seemed to me that the plain reading of § 107(a)(3) is that the defendant must have “arranged” for the disposal of the hazardous substances at the site where disposal occurred. In those not uncommon situations where the site operator transshipped the waste – without the generator’s knowledge or consent – the generator should not be liable under CERCLA at the transshipment site, because it did not intend for any disposal at the transshipment site. Given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on what the generator intended, I think that, in the right case, a transshipment generator defendant would stand a pretty good chance of winning, if he or she were willing to litigate the case all the way up to the Supreme Court. 

I hope someone will and I hope I’m right. 

The second holding in Burlington Northern may be of even more practical significance. In it, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the District Court’s original divisibility finding with respect to the Burlington Northern Railroad. The District Court used a simple formula based on percentage of the site owned by Burlington Northern and the percentage of time that Burlington Northern leased the land as compared to the total duration of site operations. What’s most significant is that the Court did not even require any significant analysis to uphold the District Court; Justice Stevens’ opinion merely stated that there was evidence that contribution from the railroad parcel to the overall contribution was limited, so that, “[w]ith these background facts in mind, we are persuaded that it was reasonable for the court to use the size of the leased parcel and the duration of the lease as the starting point for its analysis.”

This seems obvious, but is probably a game changer in government Superfund litigation. The overwhelming tenor of lower court opinions has been that the defendant’s burden in a divisibility argument is almost overwhelming and that the burden will be satisfied in the rarest of cases and only upon almost perfect evidence of divisibility. The Supreme Court has made clear that that is simply not the case. Superfund cases are no different than other cases and there is no unstated higher burden of proof. 

Thus, while a district court judge might still be affirmed if he or she concludes that the defendant did not meet its burden of proving divisibility, the real import of the decision is that now district court judges need not fear that they will be automatically reversed if they do conclude that the harm is divisible. Given the standard stated in Burlington Northern, it might go too far to say that most cases will be divisible, but divisibility findings should not be at all rare – and that’s definitely news.

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As some of my clients know all too well, I’ve been spending a lot of time on some Superfund matters recently. Although I can’t remember a period when I didn’t have at least one moderately active Superfund case, significant immersion in complex remedial decision-making and negotiations provides an unwelcome reminder just how flawed CERCLA is. Almost 20 years after the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act ushered in wide-spread acceptance of the use of market mechanisms to achieve environmental protection goals and the state of Massachusetts successfully privatized its state Superfund program, the federal Superfund program, like some obscure former Russian republic which remains devoted to Stalinism, is one of the last bastions of pure command and control regulation.

Can anyone tell me why the remedy selection process takes years and costs millions of dollars – before any cleanup has occurred or risk reduction been achieved? Can anyone tell me why, after the remedy has been selected, EPA has to spend millions of dollars – charged back to the PRPs, of course – to oversee the cleanup? Oversight costs can easily exceed 10% of cleanup costs, while oversight during the remedial design and feasibility study process sometimes seem to be barely less than the cost of actually performing the RI/FS.

While there are certainly a multiplicity of causes, there are two factors which greatly contribute to the problem. One was, coincidentally, highlighted in a post today by my friend Rob Stavins. As Rob noted, unlike the acid rain program, which was new at the time, the Superfund bureaucracy is well entrenched and there are a number of actors with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 

The second issue relates to the genesis of the Superfund program, as well as its continuing raison d’être. Whenever EPA has ranked relative risks from different environmental hazards, Superfund sites come in at the bottom. However, if you think back to Superfund’s origins, what comes to mind? Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums – and some concerned near-by residents who rallied around a cause to ensure that the problem would be addressed. As renowned risk communications expert Dr. Peter Sandman has noted, there is not necessarily a significant correlation between actual risk levels and public outrage, and it’s not possible to decrease outrage simply by providing accurate information about risks.

In short, the public is outraged by hazardous waste sites and does not trust PRPs to clean them properly. All of those EPA oversight costs are, in large part, intended not to decrease risk, but to lower outrage.  Outrage is understandable in some circumstances, and efforts to reduce it are laudable, but is it really an appropriate use of scarce environmental protection resources to spend the money that gets poured into Superfund sites?

There has to be a better way. Indeed, there is a better way. It’s called a privatized system in which PRPs have to meet well-defined cleanup standards, but are allowed to do so on their own, in whatever manner is most cost-effective, subject to audits by regulators. Privatized programs such as the one in Massachusetts are not perfect. However, their flaws – which largely stem from a failure to fully support privatization -- pale in comparison to the waste that is the federal program under CERCLA.

In other contexts, I’ve called on the Obama administration to embrace regulatory reform. Why not start with Superfund? Notwithstanding Rob Stavins’ point about the difficulty of overturning an entrenched status quo, if the states could do it, why not the federal government?

Besides, I have an entrenched personal reason for seeking Superfund reform. This stuff drives me nuts.

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We posted recently about the revival of EPA’s NSR enforcement program. Now, yet another shoe has dropped. The Center for Biological Diversity has announced the creation of the Climate Law Institute, the purpose of which is to use citizen law suits under existing laws to advance regulations intended to address climate change. The press release states that the Institute has $17 million in funding with which to pursue its mission.  

While that mission will focus on climate change, as its name implies, it will not be limited to litigation under the Clean Air Act. It was the CBD which led the litigation resulting in the listing of the Polar Bear under the Endangered Species Act.  The Institute indicates that, in addition to the Clean Air Act, the ESA, NEPA, and the Clean Water Act may all be utilized as part of its overall litigation strategy.  

Among other specific targets identified in the press release, the Institute states that it aims to prevent the construction of any new coal-fired power plants and to phase out existing coal plants as quickly as possible.

Unless EPA moves very quickly across a number of fronts – which may well happen – it looks as though we’re going to see a lot of climate-related litigation in the near future.

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In addition to our post yesterday and the items highlighted in the New York Times Green.Inc blog on the difficulties facing new and existing coal-fired power plants this week, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Justice have launched what they call a new national crackdown targeting coal-fired plants that violate the Clean Air Act.

As the first piece of this campaign, the agencies filed suit on Wednesday against a Kansas power plant for PSD violations dating back to 1994, and following a notice of violation issued to the plant owners in January 2004.   

EPA and DOJ  had been criticized for not pursuing new cases against power plants during the Bush administration, but it looks as though efforts to take on the coal industry are ramping up again.

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The EPA and DOJ announced yesterday that Kentucky Utilities (KU), a coal-fired electric utility, has agreed to spend approximately $135 million on pollution controls to resolve violations of the Clean Air Act New Source Review program.  KU will also pay a $1.4 million civil penalty plus $3 million in implementing supplemental environmental projects, or SEPs.  Finally, KU will also surrender over 50,000 SO₂ allowances shortly after entry of the consent decree, and annually surrender any excess NOx allowances resulting from the installation of pollution control equipment.   

The consent decree, which covers one of the three coal-fired electric generating units at the E.W. Brown plant in Mercer County, Kentucky, requires KU to meet the most stringent limit for nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions ever imposed in a federal settlement with a coal-fired power plant.  According to the EPA's fact sheet, the new pollution control equipment will reduced combined emissions of SO₂ and NOx by more than 31,000 tons per year to just 10% of the 2007 emission levels.  KU has also agreed to install controls to reduce particulate matter emissions by approximately 1,000 tons per year.

Notably, one of the SEPs provides for KU to contribute $1.8 million towards a $7 million carbon capture and sequestration pilot project led by the University of Kentucky.

This Consent Decree is the sixteenth judicial settlement in the series of cases begun in 1999 against 32 plants in 10 states to bring the power plant industry into full compliance with the NSR and PSD requirements of the Clean Air Act.  It shows that although these cases have been around for a while, the EPA and DOJ are still focused on enforcement for NSR violations.

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Readers of a certain age will recall Chevy Chase’s Weekend Update segment during the first year of Saturday Night Live, when, for a number of shows, he would report that Francisco Franco was still dead. (And isn’t it great that there is actually a Wikipedia article on the subject of Franco still being dead!).

This segment was brought to mind by the report of this week’s decision out of the District Court for the District of Columbia, in the case of General Electric v. Jackson, affirming that EPA’s authority to issue unilateral administrative orders under § 106 of CERCLA had survived an as applied constitutional challenge brought by General Electric. Clients have been asking their lawyers whether CERCLA could possibly be constitutional ever since it was passed more than 28 years ago. Today, with this decision, I can report that CERCLA is still constitutional.

The same court had rejected a facial challenge to CERCLA’s constitutionality in 2005. In the recent decision, the court concluded that EPA’s “pattern and practice” in implementing § 106 also survived challenge. GE had raised two concerns. The first is that, under the decision in Ex Parte Young, EPA’s coercion of PRPs through its use of § 106 deprives PRPs of their due process rights. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the availability of the sufficient cause defense and the ultimate availability of judicial review meant that EPA’s issuance of § 106 orders is not unconstitutionally coercive.

Second, GE argued that EPA’s process for issuing § 106 orders deprives PRPs of a constitutionally protected property interest and that, in order to do so, EPA must provide more process, in particular a neutral decision-maker, prior to issuing orders. Here, while the court found that issuance of § 106 orders does deprive PRPs of a property interest, the balance of harms weighs in EPA’s favor and imposition of greater pre-issuance process would impose substantial costs on EPA without providing significant benefit to PRPs.

Francisco Franco is still dead. CERCLA is still constitutional. Plus ca change, plus c’est la même chose.

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In a decision that could have significant impact on states’ efforts to limit cross-border pollution, Judge Lacy Thornburg of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina issued an affirmative injunction against the TVA this week, requiring it to install pollution control equipment at its facilities located nearest to North Carolina and imposing specific emissions limits from those facilities. The basis for the injunction was a finding, after trial, that the facilities created a public nuisance as a result of the air pollution transported from those facilities to North Carolina.

The decision is notable for a number of the findings and holdings.

• Generally speaking, compliance with regulations does not preclude a finding that air emissions constitute a nuisance. (The Court applied the nuisance law of the states in which the plants were located.)
• Ozone and PM_2.5 can create adverse health impacts at concentrations below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). This suggests that facilities contributing to concentrations of air pollutants can be subject to an injunction requiring the facility to decrease emissions, even if the area is in attainment of the NAAQS.
• The Court looked to survey data indicating that Blue Ridge Parkway visitors would pay $328 in annual taxes in order to improve visibility. As many readers will know, this kind of survey research is extremely controversial and may lead to some extraordinary damages findings.
• The Court declined to impose an injunction against TVA facilities that were not proximate to North Carolina, essentially on the ground their impacts on North Carolina were de minimis. The court found that those plants against which an injunction was entered contributed to somewhere between 5% and 10% of ambient contaminant concentrations. The other plants contributed less 0.1% of ambient concentrations.
• The Court imposed a stringent schedule by when pollution control equipment must be installed. The Court gave the TVA 27 months to install scrubbers and 21 months to install SCRs. This time frame was substantially shorter than that proposed by the TVA.

The one piece of good news for generating plants was the court’s causation analysis with regard to more distant plants. That analysis, if followed, suggests it would be extremely hard for a public nuisance plaintiff to prevail in a global warming case, since the causative contribution of any facility or even group of facilities to the global warming problem is almost certain to be even more attenuated than for those TVA plants distant from North Carolina.

The decision undoubtedly gives downwind states a substantial hammer against upwind sources of contamination (and could be applied to water pollution cases as well as air pollution). Indeed, in the current set of Congressional negotiations, industrial interests could conceivably be tempted to accept more stringent emissions limits in return for preemption of state nuisance laws. It will be interesting to see how this plays out in Congress.

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While many economists are worried about the possibility of deflation in the current economic crisis, EPA still is concerned about inflation – specifically inflation in the amount of statutory civil penalties under statutes enforced by EPA. In a Federal Register notice dated December 11, 2008, EPA announced increases in its civil penalties. 

Some of the increases are not trivial. It is of course true that EPA rarely obtains, or even seeks, the maximum permissible penalty, but the maximum does set the boundary for negotiations with the agency. 

All joking aside, EPA has a statutory obligation under the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 to review penalty amounts at least every four years and to adjust the penalties based on the provisions of the DCIA. Nonetheless, in the current situation, EPA’s sense of timing is impeccable.

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Last week, I posted about the Pollard decision, which made clear that local boards to not have unlimited discretion to ignore evidence provided by project proponents. This week, the shoe is on the other foot, so to speak. In Macero v. MacDonald, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed a decision in favor of a project opponent, on essentially the same analysis as that in Pollard.

In Macero, the developer sought a variance from state and local septic system regulations. The developer provided some information from a professional. However, the local Board of Health did not, apparently, formally review that information, and its decision did not include specific findings that the standards for the variance had been met. As the Appeals Court stated, “the authority of the board is broad…. However, competent judicial review … is … rendered difficult if not impossible by the lack of specific findings and rationale for the agency decision.”

The lesson here? Even if the board is on your side, make sure that they take the time to dot all their i’s and cross all their t’s.

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Developers and others who appear before local boards know what an uphill battle it is to challenge decisions of those boards. After all, there’s a reason for the existence of the phrase “You can’t fight City Hall.” Of course, it’s never a good idea to fight City Hall unless you absolutely have to do so, but a recent decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court gives some hope to those forced into that position by a board taking an extreme position.

In Pollard v. Conservation Commission of Norfolk, the local conservation commission, acting under its local wetlands bylaw, rejected a request for an order of conditions – a permit, to those of you outside Massachusetts – on the ground that the developer had not met its burden of demonstrating that the proposed work would not adversely affect a resource area. The developer had submitted a report by a consultant, in which the consultant opined that the project would not adversely affect the resource area and would comply with the bylaw.

The only evidence in the record before the commission was the report from the developer’s consultant. The commission took no other evidence. Instead, the commission simply concluded that the expert’s report was not credible. Since the developer had the burden of demonstrating compliance with the bylaw, the commission concluded that this was a sufficient ground on which to reject the permit application. 

The Appeals Court concluded otherwise.

While noting that the commission was not required to credit the developer’s expert, even though uncontradicted, the Appeals Court concluded that the commission was required to provide a basis for its rejection of the expert, noting that “evidence of a party having the burden of proof may not be disbelieved without an explicit and objectively adequate reason.” Since the commission had made no effort, either in its decision or in court, to explain its rejection of the expert opinion, the Court had no way to determine whether the commission “decision was arrived at with fairness and without predisposition.”

Developers cannot necessarily take this decision to the bank. As long as local boards provide some reasoned basis for their decision, a successful challenge will remain a long shot. However, where a local board truly ignores available evidence, there is some hope that courts will ensure that reason prevails.

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Hopefully, since I like to think the readers of this blog are largely law-abiding, this post will not be relevant to very many of you, but it seemed newsworthy nonetheless. On December 10, EPA announced a new web site dedicated to helping to locate and bring to justice fugitives from environmental crimes. The new web site includes profiles of 25 men wanted for a variety of environmental claims.

The web site is largely self-explanatory, but I did want to note two items. First, in a transparent bid to limit my liability, I will note, as does EPA on the web site, that it is a bad idea to try to apprehend any of these individuals yourself. Second, as a Red Sox fan, I need to emphasize that the David Ortiz who was recently apprehended is definitely not our own Big Papi. Sorry, Yankees fans.

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On the better late than never front, I finally got around to reviewing the still relatively recent decision in United States v. Cinergy Corp. regarding the scope of injunctive relief available with respect to violations of the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review, or NSR, provisions. Although the decision was issued in mid-October, its significance is great enough to mention here.

As most readers here will know, the Cinergy case is one of the remaining NSR enforcement cases originally brought by the Clinton administration. The defendants had previously been found liable for NSR violations at the Wabash River power plant. The recent decision involved the defendants’ efforts to preclude the government from seeking retroactive injunctive relief, i.e., not penalties, and not prospective relief to prevent future violations, but injunctive relief intended to remedy, mitigate, or offset the prior violations.

The relevant statutory language, from § 113 of the CAA, provides that a court may “restrain” violations, impose penalties, and, critically, “award any other appropriate relief.” The court in Cinergy held that this broad language authorizes injunctive relief focused on past harm, rather than just restraint of future violations.

It is one thing to order restoration of an illegally filled wetland. In that context, such a remedy is understandable and its scope necessarily somewhat limited. In the case of air pollution, however, once the emissions have occurred, it is obviously impossible to identify the location of that pollution or the scope of the remedy appropriate for such past harm. In other words, demonstrating an appropriate nexus between the harm and the remedy will often be difficult, if not impossible. 

One obvious possible form of relief would be to calculate the excess emissions resulting from the non-compliance and require the defendant to overcontrol in the future until it has offset those excess emissions. Whether the court will order such an offset or any other form of remedial injunction is not yet known, because the court concluded that it needed to have an evidentiary hearing regarding what relief it should in fact order. However, the mere possibility that such relief may be available certainly provides the government with a significant hammer to use during settlement negotiations in pending or future NSR enforcement cases. 

One issue of concern is whether such relief might be ordered against a current owner of a facility even if the original NSR violation was caused by a prior owner. In that case, the prior owner is not capable of offsetting the historical excess emissions, but the current owner would have a strong equitable argument that a remedial injunction should not be imposed against it.

As always, some of these questions are obviously going to have to wait for future judicial decisions.

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Can a party found liable of violating the Clean Air Act's New Source Review provisions be required to reduce future pollution more to mitigate emissions caused by past violations?  According to a recent U.S. District Court decision, maybe.

In U.S. v. Cinergy Corp., S.D. Ind., No. 99-1693, decided October 14, 2008, the first court to rule on whether retroactive, as opposed to prospective relief, is available under Section 113 of the Clean Air Act found that the court does have the authority to grant such relief.  Although the court stopped short of ordering this relief (procedurally, this opinion was a denial of the defendants' summary judgment motion), the court held in sweeping language that nothing in the Clean Air Act limits the full range of equitable relief that courts can order.

This recent ruling relies heavily on a 1946 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946), in which the Supreme Court held that when a court's equitable jurisdiction is invoked by a statute, "all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction," unless the law by "clear and valid legislative command" or "necessary and inescapable inference" has restricted the court's equitable powers.

In Cinergy Corp., the district court said its equitable powers were invoked by the phrasing of Section 113 of the Clean Air Act which gives a court, "jurisdiction to restrain [a] violation [of the Clean Air Act], to require compliance, assess [a] civil penalty, to collect any fees owed the United States... and to award any other appropriate relief."   Applying this rule, the court determined that it would have the authority to require the three defendants to take appropriate actions that remedy, mitigate and offset harms to the public and the environment caused by their proven violations of the Clean Air Act.

In this particular enforcement suit, three companies -- Cinergy Corp. (now part of Duke Energy Corp.), PSI Energy Corp., and the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. -- were found liable in May of long-term violations of the New Source Review requirements in their operation of a power plant in West Terre Haute, Indiana. The US requested in their filings that the court impose specific measures to reduce pollution beyond what is required for prospective compliance, in order to make up for the nearly two decades of illegal pollution caused by the plant. 

A trial on remedies is expected to begin in February, 2009.

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As those of us who have practiced in the Superfund arena for some time know, in the early years of Superfund litigation, such litigation was, from the defendant’s perspective, brutish and short, if not nasty and mean. The DOJ attorney would, in essence, march into court, state “I am from the government; I win,” and the case would be over.

In recent years, that approach has not proven quite so uniformly successful. The key case in the defendants’ arsenal is United States v. Bestfoods. In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court looked to traditional common law principles regarding corporate law to assess the potential liability of a parent corporation under CERCLA. The Court concluded that a parent corporation could not be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the traditional test for piercing the corporate veil could be met.

In a recent decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also looked to common law principles in assessing liability under CERCLA. Once more, reference to the common law spared the defendant – at least temporarily – from the Superfund gallows. In United States v. Capital Tax Corporation, the defendant had purchased tax certificates from Cook County with respect to certain contaminated property. After it found a buyer for the property, Capital Tax then actually obtained tax deeds to the property. Capital Tax had no written agreement with the buyer and did not transfer the tax deeds to the buyer, because the buyer never made full payment of the purchase price. 

Eventually, EPA issued an administrative order to Capital Tax requiring it to clean up the property. When Capital Tax refused to do so, EPA performed the cleanup and sued Capital Tax, seeking recovery of response costs and penalties for failure to comply with the order. Capital Tax defended the case, arguing that, although it did hold legal title to the property, it did so only as security for the balance of the purchase price. In other words, Capital Tax asserted that it was entitled to the security interest defense under § 101 of CERCLA.

The Court found for Capital Tax, but took a slightly different approach. The Court concluded that Capital Tax should have an opportunity to establish that it is not the current owner of the property because, under the doctrine of equitable conversation, the true owner was the party to whom Capital Tax intended to sell the property. 

Ultimately, the facts of the case are complicated, obscure, and not necessarily transferable to other cases. What is transferable is the Court’s insistence that state common law rules about ownership are important in determining whether a party is an owner under CERCLA. As the Court stated,

The understanding that state law governs property and the expectations built around that understanding strongly suggest that the federal standard should be rooted in an adoption of state property law. … To invent out of whole cloth a distinctly federal law of property would be inappropriate, if not impossible.

The lesson from Capital Tax is thus a simple one, even if its application may be complicated in specific cases. CERCLA does not mean that the government always wins. It does not mean that common law is irrelevant. If a party’s status is the determining issue for Superfund liability, then the party should carefully consider what applicable state common law says about that status. The government may still win most of the time, but the defendants now have at least a few arrows in their quiver.

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EPA’s enforcement efforts under the New Source Review, or NSR, program have had more twists and turns during the past ten years than it is possible to catalogue, at least in a blog post short enough to avoid crashing the server. In brief, EPA began under the Clinton administration an ambitious effort to bring NSR cases against numerous power plants. Those efforts have had substantial, though not perfect, success in court. Settlements with some targets have also yielded hundreds of million dollars in agreed-to upgrades in plant emission controls.

The Bush administration, of course, sought to amend the NSR regulations in ways that were inconsistent, at least going forward, with the pending enforcement actions. The Administration nonetheless continued to prosecute the cases that had already been brought, though at least for a time it decided that it would only bring new cases if they were consistent with its new NSR regulations. Still with me?

A settlement recently reached by EPA with St. Marys Cement, demonstrates that EPA’s NSR enforcement efforts still have some life. The settlement is the first by EPA with a company in the cement industry. All of the prior settlements were either with power plants or refineries. In the settlement, St. Marys agreed to pay $800,000 in civil penalties and to implement emission control projects. While the consent decree does not state the expected cost of the emission controls, these projects often cost in the millions or tens of millions of dollars.

There is no reason to think that the St. Marys settlement is a one-off by EPA. Other facilities in the cement industry should be assessing their potential NSR exposure, and any facility, whether power plant, refinery, cement kiln, or other major source, should assess the NSR rules in making decisions regarding facility maintenance or upgrades. 

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