Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

Late last week, the CEQ issued its long-awaited draft Guidance on how to factor climate change into NEPA reviews. CEQ explicitly stated the draft is not effective at this time. CEQ will take comment for 90 days and “intends to expeditiously issue this Guidance in final form” after close of the comment period. Assuming CEQ does so, it will join several states, including California, New York, and Massachusetts, which already require that climate change be addressed in their state NEPA analogues.

The draft is very limited in scope at this point; CEQ may have decided that what is most important is simply the statement that climate change is real, it matters, and it therefore must be taken into account under NEPA. For example, CEQ proposes a threshold a 25,000 tpy of direct emissions CO₂e for NEPA applicability. The Guidance does not propose to apply this threshold to indirect emissions, “the analysis of which must be bounded by limits of feasibility.” Shocking recognition of what’s actually possible.

There are some tidbits that will nonetheless give pause to those who expect to be subject to this Guidance. First, the Guidance does discuss the need to consider the cumulative effects of GHG emissions. This is not surprising, given that NEPA already requires consideration of cumulative impacts outside the GHG context, but since all GHG impacts are cumulative, it is of particular importance here. Second, the Guidance also notes that project planners must consider the impact of climate change on projects, as well as the impact of projects on climate change. The example given in the Guidance is a plan for transportation infrastructure on a barrier island. The Guidance also suggests a longer-term time horizon than may have been used in the past. The example here is that of an industrial process drawing water from a source that relies on snow pack that is expected to decrease as a result of climate change.

As noted above, CEQ spends a lot of effort making the case that the Guidance is not a radical document. The phrase “rule of reason” is used no less than four times in the draft Guidance – and it feels like more. Nonetheless, I doubt opponents will be satisfied. I suspect that they – like the CEQ itself – believe that the fact of the document is more important than its immediate requirements.

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I have never been a fan of specialized courts, but I have to admit that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s MEPA jurisprudence is strong evidence for the other side. It’s almost hard to describe how badly the SJC has mangled MEPA. The most recent example is yesterday’s decision in Town of Canton v. Commissioner of the Massachusetts Highway Department. (Requisite disclaimer – this firm represented the Town of Canton in the case.)

In Canton, the SJC ruled that a party bringing suit to challenge the adequacy of the Certificate issued by the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs an on EIR must do so within 30 days following issuance of the first permit issued to the project under review – even if the plaintiff doesn’t care about that permit. For example, in Canton, the case was dismissed because suit was not brought within 30 days of issuance of a sewer connection permit, even though Canton’s complaint was that the EIR did not adequately address traffic issues and the Highway Department had not yet acted on the necessary traffic approvals.

The basis for the decision is a plain language reading of the statute – 30 days of the first permit means 30 days. However, the Court’s policy logic is exactly backward. The SJC stated that it is necessary to adhere to the strict 30 day rule in order to make challenges to projects efficient and not unduly delay them. I fear that the development community will not be happy with the results of this case, however. The purpose of MEPA is consultative. Get all the information out there and make sure that the agency considers it before issuing approvals. The import of Canton, however, is to short-circuit the review process. The next time this fact pattern appears, plaintiffs will be forced to bring suit, without even giving the Highway Department a chance to get it right. How does encouraging litigation before it is known even to be necessary help citizen plaintiffs, developers, or agencies?

In fairness to this Court, while I think that they got the decision wrong, it is at least understandable given prior SJC MEPA jurisprudence. The problem is that the SJC began getting MEPA wrong in the Cummings and Enos cases, and they haven’t stopped since. The notion that parties challenging the adequacy of an EIR cannot sue the EEA Secretary – the person that approved the EIR – is just nuts. Put Enos and Cummings together with Canton and here’s the result, taking the agencies in play in the Canton case. 

1.         EEA approves an EIR

2.         DEP issues sewer connection permit

3.         Highway Department issues traffic approvals.

Where has the SJC left us? The citizen plaintiffs care about 1 and 3, and not 2, but suit is triggered when 2 happens, even though the plaintiffs don’t yet know whether the Highway Department will do the right thing or not.

Here’s another scenario likely to happen with some frequency. EEA secretary approves EIR. Citizen plaintiff believes that endangered species analysis was deficient. As is often the case, however, the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife takes some time to issue the needed permit. DEP, however, issues an unrelated permit. Once more, action by DEP triggers a need to sue, even though the plaintiff cares about the Secretary’s approval of the EIR and the DFW take permit, which hasn’t yet been issued – and may never be issued.

Which is going to come first, a legislative fix, the SJC revising the whole structure of MEPA jurisprudence, or hell freezing over?

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Earlier this week, Energy & Environmental Affairs Secretary Ian Bowles announced the release of the nation’s first ocean management plan. The plan is similar, but not identical to, the draft plan issued last July. Here are the highlights

A Prohibited Area off the coast of the Cape Cod National Seashore, where most uses will be – you guessed it – prohibited

Multi-Use Areas, constituting approximately two-thirds of the planning area, where uses will be permitted if they comply with stringent standards for protecting marine resources

Renewable Energy Areas, where commercial- and community-scale wind projects have been found to be appropriate.

One significant element of the final plan, and one highlighted in Secretary Bowles’s press release, is that, where projects are proposed in areas including sensitive marine resources, it will be presumed that an alternative project outside the resource area would be less environmentally damaging. Project proponents would have to meet a balancing test, demonstrating that the project has public benefits which outweigh the detriment to the resource.

It’s going to take some time to digest the entire plan. However, most of the nation outside Houston has accepted the concept of zoning on land for almost 100 years – and land-based zoning affects private property. It’s difficult to argue with the concept that the Commonwealth should plan for resources – state waters – that it does own. In addition, having a defined framework for reviewing proposals to utilize state waters should help remove some of the uncertainty associated with the current ad hoc review that necessarily occurs in the absence of a plan. 

Deerin Babb-Brott – time to take a well-earned vacation!

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Laura Rome of Epsilon has helpfully reminded me that the maturity of a regulatory program is also relevant to whether an agency should proceed by guidance or regulation.  With newer programs that remain in flux, the flexibility inherent in guidance – and the easier amendment process for guidance – counsels in favor of guidance rather than regulation.

Laura’s comment also reminded me that, a few years ago, NAIOP was sufficiently concerned about MassDEP’s use of guidance as an end-run around the formality of the regulatory process that it submitted to MassDEP suggested “Guidance on Guidance.”  The overarching principles contained in the NAIOP proposal are helpful reminders regarding the uses and limitations of guidance documents.

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There are not too many areas of environmental law where practice intersects frequently with academic theory. One such area is whether agencies should use notice and comment rule-making any time they want to set forth policy or whether they should instead be permitted to use flexible guidance documents. The real issue from the practitioner’s point of view is the extent to which use of guidance permits street level bureaucracy a degree of unfettered discretion that is truly scary. Like Judge Roy Bean, these bureaucrats are the law West of the Pecos – or at least outside agency headquarters. The flip side of the debate is the notion that modern environmental law is simply too complicated to specify all rules through notice and comment rule-making. Agencies need, as a practical matter, the flexibility to operate through informal guidance.

The debate is illustrated by two D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions. First, in Appalachian Power v. EPA, issued in 2001, the Court struck down EPA use of a guidance document. The Court nicely summarized the issue:

The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the commands in the regulations. One guidance document may yield another and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and more detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law is made, without notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. … The agency may also think there is another advantage--immunizing its lawmaking from judicial review.

The Court dismissed EPA’s contention that the document was not binding, and said this in response to EPA’s reference to its boilerplate statement that the guidance created no rights: 

“[R]ights” may not be created but “obligations” certainly are…. The entire Guidance, from beginning to end – except the last paragraph – reads like a ukase.

Haven't all our clients felt what it is like to be under agency ukase?

Unfortunately for those who liked the outcome in Appalachian Power, it seems to have been the high-water mark for those wanting to circumscribe agency use of guidance. More recently, the D.C. Circuit refused to review EPA guidance as though it were a rule. In Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, responding to an Appalachian Power-type challenge, the Court concluded that EPA had not treated the guidance at issue as binding and noted that, in response to Appalachian Power, EPA had edited the guidance to make it look less binding. The Cement Kiln plaintiffs thought this was evidence of subterfuge; the Court did not buy it. The Court did acknowledge that an agency assertion that guidance is non-binding “will not make it so where there is evidence —or practice – to the contrary."

The immediate context for this post is efforts by the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, or MEPA, office to take a second look at its greenhouse gas (GHG) policy in light of the legislative passage of the Global Warming Solutions Act. The work group (of which I am a member) reviewing this issue has been considering whether it is better to leave aspects of the policy as guidance or whether to put them in regulation.

As you can probably tell from the start of this post, my gut reaction is always to make the agency put its rules into notice and comment regulation. I’ve had too many experiences of street level bureaucrats who take advantage of the “flexibility” of agency guidance documents to become their own version of Roy Bean.

However, my friend Sam Mygatt, whose judgment I trust, has strongly endorsed the approach of leaving many of these issues to guidance. After puzzling over this for some time – How could Sam be right and I be wrong? – I realized what the answer is:

The size of the bureaucracy matters. 

The rules -- or guidance -- at issue here are promulgated by the MEPA office.  This is also the agency Sam deals with most frequently (he did run it at one time, after all). The MEPA office has a handful of reviewers. The consultants, such as Sam, who have large MEPA practices deal with the MEPA reviewers repeatedly. They are able to build relationships of confidence and trust; it is very difficult for these reviewers to see Sam as the devil, merely looking to desecrate the environment to benefit his client. 

Larger bureaucracies are different. Street level bureaucrats have inherently more autonomy in larger bureaucracies. Moreover, while we may all get to know some staffers at DEP or EPA, it is impossible to build the same type of relationships as is possible with the MEPA office.

At a casual empirical level, this distinction seems to have substantial force. For smaller bureaucracies, stick with guidance; with larger bureaucracies, make them issues rules.

Your take?

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In December, I posted about the decision in Canton v. Paiewonsky, in which Judge Fabricant held that a party seeking to challenge the certificate of the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs approving an Environmental Impact Report must do so within 30 days of issuance of the first permit for a project – even if the plaintiff’s concerns about the project are totally unrelated to that permit and the plaintiff would not be harmed by issuance of the permit. As before, I’ll provide the disclaimer that this firm represents the plaintiff in the Canton case.

That acknowledgment aside, it is difficult to read today’s Appeals Court opinion in Hertz v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs as saying anything other than that Judge Fabricant got it wrong. Hertz is technically not even a decision about MEPA. The plaintiffs in Hertz challenged an amendment to a municipal harbor plan. The Appeals Court ruled that they did not have standing, notwithstanding that they abutted the property that was the subject of the amendment to the plan, because they did not suffer a particularized harm that was protected by the municipal harbor plan process.

What is most interesting about the decision in Hertz is that, even though it is not a MEPA case, the Court’s analysis focused on the Supreme Judicial Court decision in Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs – which is a MEPA decision and which is the case on which the Town of Canton relied for the argument its suit was timely. Reading the opinion in Hertz together with Enos, the conclusion seems clear that, had Canton sued to challenge the adequacy of the EIR upon issuance of the first permit issued to the project, Canton’s inability to allege that the issuance of the permit would cause it to suffer particularized harm would have meant that the suit would have been dismissed for lack of standing. That being the case, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run on issuance of the first permit; the statute of limitations has to begin to run on issuance of the permit about which the plaintiff is complaining, because only then has the plaintiff suffered a harm sufficient to provide it with standing to sue.

We’ll see what the SJC does with the appeal in Canton, but it still seems here that the better reading of the MEPA statute is that the statute of limitations for a suit challenging a certificate on an EIR must begin to run when the permit that is the subject of the plaintiff’s concern is issued, rather than when the first permit is issued, regardless of whether the plaintiff has any concerns about that first permit.

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It looks as though Massachusetts is going to at least try to avoid having lengthy environmental reviews create obstacles to spending its share of the federal stimulus package. A draft report prepared by the Commonwealth’s Permitting Task Force makes several recommendations which, if implemented, would indeed help to ensure that the money can get out the door and the shovels in the ground. Highlights include:

·                     Allowing projects to proceed, at their own risk, during permit appeals.

·                     Providing that appeals related to any stimulus projects would be heard in the permit session of the Land Court.

·                     Exempting stimulus projects from federal review. This echoes a suggestion previously made by Governor Schwarzenegger and by at least one Republican Senator. The Senate has already rejected it. As described in the Task Force report, the exemption would be limited to projects where the only basis for federal review is federal funding. There would be no general exemption from federal permitting requirements. Unlike Governor Schwarzenegger, the Task Force is not recommending that MEPA, the state environmental review statute, be waived for stimulus projects.

·                     Efforts to bring the Massachusetts Historic Commission to the table – MHC declined to participate in the Permitting Task Force

·                     Creation of permits by rule for certain types of projects in order to avoid delays resulting from individual permit applications/reviews

Time will tell whether the Commonwealth adopts any or all of these recommendations. This is only a draft report at this point. Time will also tell regarding the stimulus effort itself and efforts in Congress to smooth out the environmental review process. 

In any case, these common-sense recommendations could only help

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A recent Superior Court decision may significantly affect how appeals are conducted in MEPA cases. In Canton v. Paiewonsky, Judge Fabricant ruled that Canton’s challenge to the MEPA certificate for the Westwood Station project was filed too late, because it was not filed within 30 days of the issuance of the first permit issued to the project, even though the first permit had nothing to do with the basis for Canton’s challenge to the MEPA certificate.

First, a bit of disclosure: this firm represents the Town of Canton in this case. Nonetheless, I truly believe that, unless I were representing Westwood Station, I would think that this decision is plainly wrong and will have several adverse consequences, even if we had no connection to the case.

The basis for the decision is the language in the MEPA statute, which provides that an action to challenge a MEPA certificate “shall commence no later than thirty days following the first issuance of a permit or grant of financial assistance by an agency.” The court concluded that this language is plain on its face – end of inquiry.

Canton made two arguments.  The Court gave them both short shrift. Canton noted that the first permit, a beneficial use determination, or BUD, by MassDEP, was not the subject of public notice, so the limitations period almost certainly would run before any member of the public were aware that it had even started. The court’s solution was simple, if totally unrealistic and impractical – “properly timed public records requests.”

Canton’s second argument was that it had no basis to sue on issuance of the BUD, because it had no concerns about the BUD, which was irrelevant to Canton’s claims that the MEPA certificate was flawed. In other words, Canton suffered no injury from issuance of the BUD, so it had no standing to sue. Canton’s concerns were largely about traffic issues. The Court largely ignored the case law cited by Canton, on the ground that those cases did not address the statute of limitations issue explicitly.

Interestingly, the Highway Department did not join in Westwood Station’s motion to dismiss, perhaps because the Department realized that, outside the four corners of this case, the decision does no one any good. First, with respect to the notice issue, resource-constrained state permitting agencies will certainly have to respond to many more public records requests. As a practical matter, even with more requests, it will be impossible for interested parties to know about all the approvals issued to development projects.

Even developers, aside from Westwood Station, will not benefit from this decision, because the result will be to force potential challengers into court early, increasing transaction costs and potentially making amicable resolution of development challenges more difficult. The court’s willingness to ignore the real ripeness issue will require project proponents to bring suit on issuance of the first approval, even if negotiations are still proceeding on the approval that really matters.

Sometimes a plain reading is not quite as plain as a judge thinks it is.

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In October 2007, the Massachusetts MEPA office issued its Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) Policy, requiring certain limited categories of projects subject to MEPA to assess the GHG impacts of those projects and include mitigation of those impacts in the environmental impact review. In short, projects with obvious traffic or air emissions impacts were subject to the policy.

On August 8, 2008, Governor Patrick signed the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2008. Among other provisions, the Act provided specific statutory authority for the MEPA GHG Policy and provided that greenhouse gas emissions should be addressed in any state permits.

As a result of this change, the MEPA office has revised the MEPA GHG Policy to require that any project that will require an Environmental Impact Report must comply with the GHG Policy. This revision to the jurisdiction of the policy will be applicable to any project proponent who files an Environmental Notification Form after the February 2, 2009 MEPA filing deadline. The Secretary has retained discretion to require compliance with the GHG Policy for any Notice of Project Change filed after the February 2, 2009 filing deadline. For your convenience, the MEPA office has provided a summary of the changes to the policy.

Let the fun begin.

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