Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

Environmental liability has always been a dish best served in as many slices as possible.  Hence, CERCLA jurisprudence in its first two decades was characterized by a judicial willingness to entertain ever more creative theories to extend environmental liability to new classes of parties, such as a developer who unknowingly moved contaminated soil (Tanglewood East) to a toll manufacturer who merely directed the production of a useful product with knowledge that there would be hazardous waste by-products (Aceto).  More recently, however, courts have shown far less appetite for expanding the traditional boundaries of environmental liability beyond owners, operators, arrangers and transporters.  Typical of this new trend is Hinds Investment, L.P. v. McLaughlin, decided yesterday.  In two short decisions, the Ninth Circuit held that the manufacturer of a dry cleaning machine could not be held liable under either CERCLA or RCRA merely for selling a machine that by design would generate waste PCE.

Similar to the rationale in Aceto, the plaintiff in Hinds Investments claimed that the manufacturer of  the dry cleaning equipment used at its shopping centers could be liable on the theory that those dry cleaning machines had been designed with the knowledge that they would generate waste PCE.  According to that plaintiff, the manufacturer of the machine was an “arranger” within the meaning of CERCLA and “contributed” to the past handling and disposal of a hazardous waste within the meaning of RCRA’s citizen suit provision.  On a motion to dismiss, the trial court rejected these claims.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed in its published decision, finding that the machine manufacturer did not have an active enough role in contributing to the use or disposal of the waste PCE to support a RCRA claim.  In an unpublished decision, the court ruled that no CERCLA claim would lie given that the machine manufacturer had not sold its equipment for the purpose of disposing waste PCE.  In the end, Hinds Investment illustrates just how dramatically the judicial climate has changed after Burlington Northern and Best Foods with courts being far less receptive today to the notion of expanding environmental liability to new classes of PRPs.

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In an interesting decision issued earlier this month, Judge Lewis Babcock of the District of Colorado ruled, in County of La Plata v. Brown Group Retail, that detection of contamination at levels exceeding state cleanup standards does not, by itself constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA. I think that Judge Babcock is correct, but I can’t help but feel that the decision might be different in the blue state of Massachusetts. I was particularly taken by Judge Babcock’s description of the nature and purpose of state regulatory standards:

Regulatory screening levels, action levels, and standards do not identify real or actual risks to human health. Rather, these regulations are designed to protect the public health by identifying the level of chemical exposure at which there is no threat of harm with a large margin of error. Exceedance of regulatory screening levels, action levels, or standards therefore does not demonstrate a real or actual risk to human health.

Tell it to MassDEP.

I think it’s wonderful that a federal judge has said that “regulatory … standards do not identify real or actual risks to human health.” He’s right, of course, and we often forget that when conservative assumption is piled on top of conservative assumption in the establishment of a standard, the standard may end up having only the most tenuous connection to any actual concern about human health.

I wish I could make equally kind statements about Judge Babcock’s handling of the CERCLA claims in the same case. Like many judges implementing the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, Judge Babcock shrugged off the defendant’s divisibility arguments, notwithstanding that the arguments the defendant made were well within the ambit of the types of considerations the Supreme Court said were relevant in Burlington Northern. I feel we are destined to continue the cycle of lower court decisions which simple-mindedly whack the defendant, followed every few years by a Supreme Court decision that says fairly simply: No, that’s not the way it’s supposed to be.

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When clients are threatened with citizen suits – and particularly when the threatened litigation involves a matter where EPA or a state regulatory agency is heavily involved, the clients always want to know why they can’t somehow get rid of the citizen suit, given that EPA is on the case. The answer is that they can – but only in limited circumstances.

The recent decision in Little Hocking Water Association v. DuPont confirmed this answer in the context of RCRA. The Little Hocking Water Association provides public water to certain communities in Ohio, directly across the Ohio River from a DuPont plant which uses , also known as PFOA or C8 – also known as the contaminant du jour. According to the complaint, the Little Hocking wells have among the highest concentrations of C8 of water supply wells anywhere and its customers have among the highest C8 blood levels anywhere. Little Hocking Water Association thus sued DuPont under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, claiming that DuPont’s release of C8 had created an “imminent and substantial endangerment."

Section 7002 of RCRA contains provisions precluding such citizen suits if either EPA or a state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting” an action under RCRA to abate the endangerment. In the DuPont case, releases of C8 from the DuPont facility had been the subject of at least two administrative orders on consent entered into by DuPont and EPA. However, consent orders aren’t the same as “an action” under § 7002 or § 7003 of RCRA – and they thus do not preclude a citizen suit.

DuPont tried the next best argument – that EPA had primary jurisdiction over the regulation of C8 – and that the existence of EPA’s regulatory authority and the issuance of the consent orders meant that the courts should defer to EPA. DuPont’s argument was that a court could not fashion a remedy in the case without essentially establishing a new cleanup standard for C8 and that doing so is the job of EPA, not the courts.

The Court gave the primary jurisdiction argument short shrift. As the Court noted, using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in citizen suits would dramatically reduce the scope of such suits. Since Congress provided a citizen suit mechanism – and provided very specific, discrete, circumstances in which citizen suits are precluded – it doesn’t make sense to use primary jurisdiction to establish another defense, particularly where the defense would almost eliminate the remedy. 

The bottom line? If you don’t want to face a citizen suit (and you’re not in compliance), get yourself sued by EPA or your state regulatory agency. The mere existence of EPA or state regulation, even if requirements are embodied in a consent order, is not enough.

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Last week, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response announced release of its Community Engagement Implementation Plan. Who could be against community engagement? It’s as American as apple pie. It’s environmental justice. It’s community input into decisions that affect the community. It’s transparency and open decision-making.

Call me a curmudgeon, but I’m against it. Study after study shows that, in terms of the actual risks posed by Superfund sites, we devote too many of our environmental protection dollars to Superfund sites, when we should be focusing on air and water. Why do we keep doing this? Because the community demands it. As Peter Sandman has noted, perceptions of risk are driven only partly by the actual hazard posed. To a significant degree, those perceptions are more driven by outrage over the situation. In some circumstances, what Sandman calls outrage management makes sense, but I’m skeptical that EPA’s community engagement initiative is really about outrage management.

In any case, here’s the public policy question of the day. Does it really make sense to spend scarce environmental protection resources, not to reduce risk, but to reduce outrage?

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Environmentalists have been pushing for years to overturn the Bevill Amendment and get coal combustion residuals (CCR) regulated as a hazardous waste. The failure of an impoundment at the TVA facility in Kingston, Tennessee, in 2008 almost guaranteed that EPA would do something to regulate CCR. Like Hamlet, however, EPA seems to be having trouble making up its mind. Earlier this week, EPA announced two different potential regulatory approaches, one regulating CCR as a hazardous waste under RCRA Subtitle C and one regulating CCR as non-hazardous waste under Subtitle D of RCRA.

Entities with coal generating assets have two problems, broadly speaking, with regulating CCR as a hazardous waste. The first is just the sheer magnitude of the costs required to address existing surface impoundments and find alternatives to impoundments going forward. I realize that there are significant scientific questions regarding whether migration of contamination from existing impoundments in fact poses any significant risk. However, this question was answered at a political level once the Kingston impoundment failed. It’s difficult to see any regulatory regime going forward that doesn’t strictly regulate impoundments.

The second significant issue is beneficial reuse. A very substantial amount of CCR is safely and economically reused. Strict regulation of CCR as a hazardous waste would, to put it mildly, put a crimp in the CCR recycling market. EPA, at least based on its public pronouncements to date, appears to get it, though time will tell whether the program the agency ultimately implements will nonetheless create needless obstacles to recycling CCR.

Thus, if I had to guess – and to paraphrase the Bard – recycling of CCR is to be, disposal of CCR in surface impoundments is not to be.

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As I have previously noted, Cass Sunstein, now head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at OMB under Obama, has called the precautionary principle “deeply incoherent.” Why? Because, as Sunstein notes, “costly precautions inevitably create risks.”

I hope that Sunstein is as troubled as I am by the news, reported recently by Inside EPA, that Mathy Stanislaus, head of EPA’s Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, has said that implementing the precautionary principle is a key to EPA’s environmental justice efforts.

When Stanislaus says that “we can’t wait until we have all the conclusive interpretive science to make a decision,” I agree with him, but that’s not the precautionary principle, that’s just a willingness to regulate under uncertainty, which has been a bedrock of environmental law.

However, the precautionary principle is something different and much more insidious. It’s not “regulate in spite of uncertainty” – it’s “regulate because of uncertainty.” It seems to stem from an almost Luddite fear of new technology and, as Sunstein points out, a philosophical view that nature is good and man-made is bad.

Stanislaus is head of OSWER. Is he going to oppose use of new cleanup technologies based on nanotechnology, because the precautionary principle says that we don’t know that nanomaterials are safe?

Stanislaus wants to “operationalize the precautionary principle.” Be worried, be very worried.

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In an interesting decision issued a few weeks ago, a District Court in Georgia held that a property manager at a strip mall could not be held liable as an owner of a facility under CERCLA. However, the court held that the property manager could be liable as an operator of the facility. I don't think that the decision is correct, but if it is the law, then property managers would be wise to consider carefully what responsibilities they are willing to assume and what sort of indemnification agreements may be required with the actual property owners.

The case, Scarlett & Associates v. Briarcliff Center Partners, involved a strip mall which had as one of its tenants – surprise, surprise – a dry cleaning operation. The owner had almost no connection to the property. It had leased the entire strip mall. When the lessee ran into financial problems, its lender took over the property and engaged Faison & Associates to manage the property for it. Faison managed the property for approximately two years, until the bank sold the lease.

It seems obvious that Faison was not an owner of the property, since it neither owned nor leased the property, and the court agreed.

However, the court denied Faison’s motion for summary judgment on operator liability. Looking to the Bestfoods decision, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Faison "manage[d], direct[ed], or conduct[ed] operations specifically related to pollution….” The evidence cited by the court, however, is troubling, to say the least. In ruling against Faison, the court noted that Faison had informed the dry cleaner of certain EPA requirements and requested documentation that the dry cleaner was in compliance. There was also evidence that Faison “generally was responsible for managing and maintaining the shopping Center and performing all acts necessary to effect [the bank’s] compliance with all laws….”

I don’t think that that’s enough. In fact, the reverse seems to be the case. Don’t we want property managers to be taking steps to ensure that operating lessees comply with applicable regulations? If that can be evidence that the manager is an operator, the only result will be to cause property managers to be more hands off, which means less oversight, which means less compliance. The law has to be that property managers can take steps to ensure that lessees are in compliance without such steps being interpreted as “operation” of the facility by the manager.

Nonetheless, with this decision out there, if I were a property manager, I’d be very carefully reviewing my contracts both to ensure that I have minimized the likelihood that I will be considered an operator and to ensure that I have received proper indemnifications from the property owner.

Good luck.

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Justice Potter Stewart famously said, with respect to obscenity, that “I know it when I see it.” I fear that the test for what constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA is no clearer than Justice Stewart’s subjective test regarding obscenity.

This week, in a decision that is good news for RCRA defendants, Judge Illlston, of the Northern District of California, ruled, in West Coast Home Builders v. Aventis Cropscience USA,  that risks posed by potential future vapor intrusion into buildings from a groundwater plume could not be “imminent and substantial” where no development has yet occurred on the property that is the subject of the litigation. The court was interpreting the Supreme Court’s statement in Meghrig v. KFC Western, to the effect that RCRA “implies that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later.”

Although Judge Illston’s interpretation of Meghrig seems right, other RCRA cases have been allowed to proceed, even though the relationship between the contamination and the exposure have often been equally attenuated. It seems that the court liked the simplicity of a black-letter rule that risks associated with conditions not yet in place can never be imminent.  I am not confident this case will provide much clarity, but even if it only establishes a bright line rule in one narrow corner of the "imminent and substantial endangerment" landscape, that's better than the prior morass.

A developer might reasonably respond to this decision by arguing that such a ruling means that the development will never happen, because no one will finance such a project without knowing that the potential vapor intrusion risk will be addressed. (And a court might respond by saying that that is a problem for Congress to solve, not the courts.)

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In an interesting case, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit this week vacated most of a preliminary injunction issued by a federal judge in Puerto Rico, because, the Court concluded, the lower court had wrongly, and without doing so explicitly, converted a PI hearing into a hearing on the merits.

In Sanchez v. Esso, a gasoline station operator brought RCRA citizen suit claims against Esso, which supplied gasoline to the station, and which actually was the owner of the USTs in which the gasoline was stored. Plaintiffs requested a PI requiring Esso both to assess and to remediate the contamination resulting from leaks in the tanks. After the District Court issued the PI, Esso sought interlocutory relief.  The Court of Appeals vacated most of the injunction.

As the Court of Appeals noted:

[w]hen a trial court ‘disposes of a case on the merits after a preliminary-injunction hearing … it is likely that one or more of the parties will not present their entire case….  Therefore, it is ordinarily improper to decide a case solely on such a basis. 

Reviewing the District Court proceedings, the Court of Appeals pointed to District Court’s statement that the Esso “appear[ed] to be in continuous violation” of the applicable regulations.  Moreover, following issuance of the injunction, Esso had asked the District Court to require the plaintiffs to post a bond.  The District Court denied the request on the ground that:

"'the grant of the preliminary injunction carried[d] no risk of monetary loss" for Esso in the face of the "documented" contamination resulting from Esso’s "violation of regulatory safeguards."

The District Court also made statements to the effect that the only issue going forward was the “extent” of Esso’s liability.

The Court of Appeals concluded that it was “inescapable” that the District Court pre-judged Esso’s ultimate liability.  Aside from the District Court’s conclusory statements about liability, the District Court also failed to address the traditional factors required for issuance of a PI.  This was “a clear error of law.”

It is unclear what impact this case will have. However, RCRA, like most environmental statutes, has an element of strict liability.  The strict liability nature of these statutes often makes it too easy for courts – and perhaps regulators at times? – simply to assume that a defendant is liable, without worrying about the sometimes messy process of discovery and the taking of evidence.  Sanchez v. Esso thus serves as a welcome reminder that even in a world of strict liability, a defendant remains entitled to his day in court.

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As some of my clients know all too well, I’ve been spending a lot of time on some Superfund matters recently. Although I can’t remember a period when I didn’t have at least one moderately active Superfund case, significant immersion in complex remedial decision-making and negotiations provides an unwelcome reminder just how flawed CERCLA is. Almost 20 years after the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act ushered in wide-spread acceptance of the use of market mechanisms to achieve environmental protection goals and the state of Massachusetts successfully privatized its state Superfund program, the federal Superfund program, like some obscure former Russian republic which remains devoted to Stalinism, is one of the last bastions of pure command and control regulation.

Can anyone tell me why the remedy selection process takes years and costs millions of dollars – before any cleanup has occurred or risk reduction been achieved? Can anyone tell me why, after the remedy has been selected, EPA has to spend millions of dollars – charged back to the PRPs, of course – to oversee the cleanup? Oversight costs can easily exceed 10% of cleanup costs, while oversight during the remedial design and feasibility study process sometimes seem to be barely less than the cost of actually performing the RI/FS.

While there are certainly a multiplicity of causes, there are two factors which greatly contribute to the problem. One was, coincidentally, highlighted in a post today by my friend Rob Stavins. As Rob noted, unlike the acid rain program, which was new at the time, the Superfund bureaucracy is well entrenched and there are a number of actors with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 

The second issue relates to the genesis of the Superfund program, as well as its continuing raison d’être. Whenever EPA has ranked relative risks from different environmental hazards, Superfund sites come in at the bottom. However, if you think back to Superfund’s origins, what comes to mind? Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums – and some concerned near-by residents who rallied around a cause to ensure that the problem would be addressed. As renowned risk communications expert Dr. Peter Sandman has noted, there is not necessarily a significant correlation between actual risk levels and public outrage, and it’s not possible to decrease outrage simply by providing accurate information about risks.

In short, the public is outraged by hazardous waste sites and does not trust PRPs to clean them properly. All of those EPA oversight costs are, in large part, intended not to decrease risk, but to lower outrage.  Outrage is understandable in some circumstances, and efforts to reduce it are laudable, but is it really an appropriate use of scarce environmental protection resources to spend the money that gets poured into Superfund sites?

There has to be a better way. Indeed, there is a better way. It’s called a privatized system in which PRPs have to meet well-defined cleanup standards, but are allowed to do so on their own, in whatever manner is most cost-effective, subject to audits by regulators. Privatized programs such as the one in Massachusetts are not perfect. However, their flaws – which largely stem from a failure to fully support privatization -- pale in comparison to the waste that is the federal program under CERCLA.

In other contexts, I’ve called on the Obama administration to embrace regulatory reform. Why not start with Superfund? Notwithstanding Rob Stavins’ point about the difficulty of overturning an entrenched status quo, if the states could do it, why not the federal government?

Besides, I have an entrenched personal reason for seeking Superfund reform. This stuff drives me nuts.

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Although it appeared initially as though Congress might be the first to move towards greater regulation of coal ash following the TVA spill, EPA has seized the initiative. Yesterday, Administrator Jackson announced a two-pronged initiative. First, EPA has issued information requests to facilities maintaining coal ash impoundments in order to gather information necessary to support new regulations. Second, she confirmed that EPA will indeed then promulgate regulations designed to prevent future spills.

In response to the Administrator’s announcement, Nick Rahall, Chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee withdrew his own coal ash regulation bill, H.R. 493, from mark-up.

EPA has not yet tipped its hand regarding the likely nature of such regulations, including whether coal ash would be handled as hazardous waste under RCRA or whether it would instead be handled as a solid waste.  Facilities operating coal-fired power plants have likely resigned themselves to increased regulation of coal ash, but could be expected to fight tooth and nail against efforts to regulate ash as a hazardous waste.  Such regulation would greatly increase management/disposal costs and would preclude many current reuses of coal ash.

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Attorneys who have litigated citizen suits under RCRA have often wondered if there is any possible risk that would not qualify as an “imminent and substantial endangerment,” thus subjecting the person who “contributed” to such endangerment to liability under RCRA.

In Scotchtown Holdings v. Town of Goshen, the District Court for the Southern District of New York earlier this month established at least some outer parameters for this seemingly boundless phrase. In Scotchtown Holdings, the owner of land allegedly contaminated by the defendant’s use of sodium chloride – also known as salt to the uninitiated – caused groundwater contamination that precluded development of the plaintiff’s property for residential use.

The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that, because the property had not already been developed – and because the contamination meant that it would not be developed – there was no imminent and substantial endangerment.

It may be that this decision is obvious and unremarkable. It is certainly distinguishable from cases where at least a potential future exposure exists if no cleanup were to occur and current land uses remain unchanged.  In Scotchtown Holdings, no exposure would occur unless land use were to change.  Nonetheless, for those of us who thought that the presence of contamination almost meant that an imminent and substantial endangerment existed, QED, the decision is a breath of fresh air.

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The magnitude of the recent release of coal ash from the TVA dam is hard to fathom, though the pictures certainly give some sense of its magnitude. Now, as regulators and Congress attempt to get their collective arms around the import of the release, some of the regulatory implications of the release are starting to emerge. According to a report in yesterday’s Greenwire, Congressional hearings this week may include a discussion regarding whether coal ash should continue to be exempt from regulation as a hazardous waste under RCRA

The exemption of coal ash is critical to coal-fired power plants. According to the article, 130 million tons of fly ash were generated last year, 42 percent of which were beneficially reused. Moreover, there are approximately 600 landfills and containment ponds holding fly ash. Having helped a coal-fired power plant defend a law suit involving an on-site ash landfill some years ago, I can tell you from personal experience that placing fly ash within the ambit of RCRA hazardous waste rules would be a major headache for coal-fired power plants – and a major new weapon in the armory of those who want to shut down coal plants any way possible.

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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is set to publish a Final Rule creating an optional, alternative set of generator requirements for hazardous waste generated or accumulated in laboratories at “eligible academic entities”: (1) colleges and universities; (2) non-profit research institutes owned or affiliated with a college or university; or (3) teaching hospitals owned or affiliated with a college or university. 

The Rule will append a new subpart, Subpart K, to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste generator regulatory requirements of 40 CFR 262. Eligible academic entities may choose to have their laboratories subject to Subpart K in lieu of existing generator requirements. Notable provisions of Subpart K, include the following:

(1) Rather than requiring a hazardous waste determination at the time of generation, Subpart K allows eligible academic entities to make hazardous waste determinations when the waste is removed from the laboratory or within four days of arriving at an on-site central accumulation area (CAA) or on-site interim status or permitted treated, storage, or disposal facility (TSDF).

(2) Eligible academic entities will need to create Laboratory Management Plans (LMPs), a portion of which will be enforceable by EPA, describing how the entity will label containers and manage “unwanted materials” prior to hazardous waste determinations.

(3) Once every twelve (12) months, each laboratory will have thirty (30) days to clean-out any hazardous waste that consists of unused or commercial chemical products and will not have to count such waste towards the entity’s generator status. 

Eligible entities that have developed successful programs consistent with the existing generator regulations may choose not to become subject to the increased burden of Subpart K. I believe, however, that the Rule will be a welcome option for entities that have had a difficult time managing large numbers of laboratories (and students) generating small amounts of hazardous wastes that vary in type by semester.   

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Two recent federal decisions may aid regulators and activists seeking to hold companies liable under the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act (RCRA) for historical soil or groundwater contamination that could migrate as vapor and contaminate indoor air.

On July 28, 2008, in United States v. Apex Oil Company, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois found the owner of a petroleum pipeline strictly liable under RCRA for pipeline leaks that contaminated soil and groundwater decades prior, and granted injunctive relief requiring the owner to abate the contamination. In Apex Oil, the Department of Justice filed suit under § 7003(a) of RCRA, which enables the federal government to force remedial actions when contamination may present an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."  The Court found that vapors emanating from petroleum hydrocarbon contamination in soils could present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health under RCRA because residents could suffer adverse health effects when exposed to the vapors or be harmed by fires or explosions caused by the vapors. Of significance, the court noted that an “endangerment” need not be quantifiable, definite, or pose an emergency situation for it to be substantial and thus actionable under RCRA. An appeal of the Apex Oil decision is pending in the Seventh Circuit.

On June 12, 2008, in Grace Christian Fellowship v. KJG Investments, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin allowed, in part, rebuttal testimony supporting a RCRA claim that vapors from soil contaminated by a gasoline leak at an adjacent gas station were entering the basement of a church and threatening the health and safety of the occupants. The Grace court has yet to issue a final decision as to whether the gas station is actually liable under RCRA or required to remediate the underlying contamination. 

Both decisions could provide support for regulators and activists arguing that vapor intrusion meets RCRA’s standards for imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. The Apex Oil decision also indicates that the underlying contamination need not be recent for RCRA standards to be satisfied. As liability under RCRA is strict, these cases highlight the importance of assessing whether a potential vapor intrusion condition exists on already-contaminated property or property that is the subject of a real estate transaction. 

Locally, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) recently promulgated regulations and standards under the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP), governing the mitigation of potential indoor contamination caused by vapor intrusion. These state regulatory developments only underscore the fact that potential vapor intrusion issues must be addressed. Property owners will ignore these issues at their financial and legal peril.

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In a recent decision, the 7^th Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed that neither CERCLA nor RCRA provide convenient ways for the buyer of a building containing asbestos to finance the abatement of that asbestos. In Sycamore Industrial Park Associates v. Ericsson, the seller of the building replaced the old heating equipment shortly prior to sale, but left the old system, including piping, in place. The buyer sought to make the seller pay for the asbestos abatement on the ground that the seller has disposed of the old equipment by abandoning it in place when it installed the new system. The 7^th Circuit didn’t buy it.

The Court acknowledged that there might be a close question as to whether the asbestos constituted a solid or hazardous waste or RCRA and CERCLA. However, the Court concluded that it need not answer the question, because the seller had not “disposed” of the material. The Court concluded that, where all of the asbestos was either inside the building or inside a pipe chase, there “is no real threat that asbestos ‘or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters….” 

The Court did indicate that the intent of the seller may be relevant; it gave the example that a person looking to avoid liability for a toxic retaining pond, could not sell the entire property, including the pond, as a means of avoiding such liability. It described this situation as the “malicious motive case.” Absent such a malicious motive, however, sale of property including toxic or hazardous material does not put a person into the category of potentially responsible parties.

Similar to its analysis of the “disposal” question, the Court also concluded that there was no release or threat of release that would subject a person to CERCLA liability. “We reaffirm that when there is no emission into the outside environment,… there is no release or threatened release, and thus there can be no liability under CERCLA. 

The Court reached the same conclusion under RCRA. First, utilizing the same analysis as under CERCLA, it found that there had been no disposal by the seller. It also rejected the allegation that the seller had handled or stored the asbestos, concluding that “RCRA requires active involvement in handling or storing of materials for liability.”

In short, if the asbestos isn’t walking out the door, it may be a problem inside a building, but CERCLA and RCRA won’t help the building owner pay to fix that problem.

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On October 7, 2008, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a new final rule (the “Rule”) that exempts certain recycled hazardous secondary materials from RCRA’s “cradle to the grave” regulatory system.

Hazardous waste is regulated under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). A hazardous secondary material can only be classified as a hazardous waste if it is first determined to be a solid waste as defined in Section 261.2 of the RCRA regulations. Previously, Section 261.2 classified some hazardous secondary materials, but not others, as solid wastes even when recycled. As complying with RCRA can be expensive and burdensome, Section 261.2 likely deterred many companies from recycling hazardous secondary materials deemed to be solid waste.  

The new Rule now explicitly excludes from the definition of solid waste three categories of hazardous secondary materials that are “legitimately” recycled. First, the Rule excludes hazardous secondary materials that are generated and reclaimed under the control of the generator (i.e., generated and reclaimed on-site, by the same company, or under “tolling” agreements). Second, the Rule excludes materials that are transferred by a generator to a reclamation facility (or an intermediate facility prior to recycling at a reclamation facility), provided that certain conditions are met. Finally, the Rule provides a procedure for applying for a case-by-case “non-waste determination” when the hazardous secondary material is legitimately recycled in a continuous industrial process or indistinguishable in all relevant aspects from a product or intermediate. The new exclusions and non-waste determination are, however, not available for materials that are: (1) considered inherently waste-like; (2) used in a manner constituting disposal; or (3) burned for energy recovery.       

For a hazardous secondary material to be “legitimately” recycled under the new exclusions or a non-waste determination, the following factors must be met: (1) the material must provide a useful contribution to the recycling process; and (2) the recycling process must make a valuable new intermediate or final product. Two additional factors must be considered, but are not mandatory: (3) whether the recycled material is managed as a valuable commodity; and (4) whether the recycled product contains toxic constituents at significantly greater levels than a non-recycled product made from virgin materials. EPA has long assessed the legitimacy of recycling activities under RCRA based on substantially these same four factors. See 53 FR 522. This Rule merely codifies the factors with minor adjustments.

Overall, the Rule is a helpful example of deregulation that should facilitate recycling without sacrificing environmental protection. The facilities most likely to benefit from the rule will include manufacturers that generate or already recycle hazardous secondary materials.  The most common types of recyclable materials that would be affected by the rule are metal-bearing secondary materials and solvents.

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