Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

Yesterday, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management issued a notice of availability for the Environmental Assessment it prepared in connection with the issuance of leases for wind energy development off the coast of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. The EA includes a Finding of No Significant Impact, or FONSI. In other words, BOEM concluded that the issuance of leases does not require a full blown Environmental Impact Report. 

The EA also addresses the individual site assessment plans, or SAPs, that will have to be performed by each leaseholder. While BOEM retains the flexibility to determine whether the implementation of the SAPs is covered by the EA, there is certainly the suggestion that SAPs may be not require separate NEPA analysis.

The FONSI is of course not a full green light for wind development off the Mid-Atlantic coast. Once BOEM starts awarding leases, each lease-holder would ultimately have to prepare a Construction and Operations Plan, which would be subject to NEPA review and it would be quite surprising if individual wind projects were not obligated to prepare full EISs before proceeding to construction. 

Even so, establishing this process, and obviating the need for EISs prior to issuing leases and performing at least some SAPs, can only be helpful in getting siting of wind energy in this area off the ground.

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According to E&E News, Lisa Jackson said Friday that public pressure, not EPA regulation, will clean up fracking. 

Fracking fluids will get greener, water use will get down, all because the industry, quite frankly, will do it, must do it, and will feel the public pressure -- not the EPA pressure -- to do this in a responsible way.

Does she really mean it? Notwithstanding current pronouncements by the GOP Presidential candidates, neoclassical economics has a clear role for government regulation. If economic activity – such as fracking – imposes costs on society that are not internalized to the company doing the fracking, then regulation is appropriate. I think that fracking is of net benefit to society, but it certainly appears to impose at least some externalities that have not to date been internalized to the drilling companies. Thus, government regulation seems to be warranted – and logic tells us that those externalities will not be accounted for in the absence of regulation.

If Lisa Jackson believes that fracking’s externalities will be eliminated by public pressure, that would truly represent a sea change in the government’s view of how environmental problems should be solved. If public pressure is enough to clean fracking, then why wouldn’t public pressure be enough to clean toxics from utility air emissions?  What distinguishes fracking from all of EPA's regulatory programs? Why do we need EPA at all?

Perhaps the GOP candidates have it right.

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Just in case you are not sated with coverage about the Supreme Court argument in Sackett and the potential implications if EPA loses, I thought I would note that I did a brief (8 minutes) interview with LexBlog Network about the issues it presents. You can see it here. 

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Last Friday, noting a story about the extent to which concerns about sea level rise from climate change might affect development in East Boston, I wondered whether battles over whether and how to adapt to climate change might be moving from the realm of the hypothetical to the realm of the real. Climate Wire has now begun a series of stories on how cities are planning for climate change. This week, there have been stories about Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Hallandale Beach, Florida. 

The long-term picture in these cities is no prettier than that of East Boston. The specifics don’t matter so much as the scope, though there are some similarities. In Portsmouth, one concern is that the causeway leading to New Castle will be submerged. In New Hallandale, a recent analysis indicated that 893 miles of roads from Miami to Palm Beach will be under water at high tide if sea level rises by three feet. In Portsmouth, there is concern about what will happen to sewers containing combined storm and sewage flows – now that’s a pretty picture – while in Hallandale Beach, the concern is that encroaching salt water will impact current fresh water supplies. 

The real question is when to start planning, and how. How much planning should be focused on changing standards for new development and how much on protecting existing infrastructure? Of course, as an alternative, there’s always the approach of one of my favorites, Graham Parker, in his song Stick to the Plan.

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I am generally loath to speculate about what the Supreme Court will do based on oral argument, but the overwhelming reaction to the oral argument in Sackett v. EPA was that EPA is going to lose. What would a loss mean? In simplest terms, EPA would no longer be able to issue enforcement orders under the Clean Water Act without those orders being subject to judicial review. Such a decision would undeniably be significant. Everyone practicing in this area knows how coercive EPA enforcement orders can be. A person who thinks that he is not liable or that the order is inappropriate, and faced with having to violate the order and wait for EPA to bring an enforcement action to obtain judicial review, is truly between a rock and a hard place – or perhaps Scylla and Charybdis (I’m not sure which, but it’s not good, either way). The opportunity for preenforcement review would eliminate much of EPA’s coercive power.

The big question is whether a decision against EPA would be so broad as to make it clear that EPA’s order authority under other statutes, such as CERCLA, would be similarly affected. Here, speculation really is difficult, because the Supreme Court could invalidate EPA’s CWA authority several different ways, with differing impacts on other statutes. Readers who want to explore the issue in more depth than a blog post can review an article I did in the ABA Superfund and Natural Resource Damages Litigation Committee Newsletter.

As long as I am speculating, I’m going to go out on limb and predict that the Court’s decision will not be easily limited to the CWA. I think EPA’s order authority is in trouble across the board.

The next big question is when lower courts are going to actually start paying attention to what the Supreme Court says about environmental cases. I’m tired of this pattern. A series of cases are decided by lower courts, almost universally in EPA’s favor. Indeed, one of the striking things about Sackett is that the Supreme Court took the case without a circuit court split – EPA had won before every circuit court that had reached the question. The Supreme Court applies principles that are broadly accepted outside the environmental arena, but which for reasons unknown to everyone but the lower court judges have been thought inapplicable to environmental cases, and EPA loses. The next several years are spent with EPA, DOJ, and the lower courts merrily constructing some new edifice which allows EPA to continue to win – until the Supreme Court takes another case and says “No, we really meant it.”

There is a lesson here for lower courts, if they would but listen. Environmental cases are not sui generis. EPA does not necessarily win just because it is protecting the environment. General principles of corporate, administrative, and constitutional law apply. Under this framework, EPA will still win most of the time. That’s the nature of administrative law. Expert agencies receive a lot of deference from the courts in interpreting their organic statutes and applying their expertise. But they don’t win all the time, and they don’t win just because they are EPA.

Rant over. Let’s see what the Supremes actually do.

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A story in today’s Boston Globe makes clear that, at least in states where it is permissible to use the words “climate” and “change” in the same sentence, the battle over adaption may no longer be hypothetical. The neighborhood known as East Boston is one that might appropriately be described as having unfulfilled potential. Last month, at a Chamber of Commerce breakfast, Mayor Menino pledged to revive East Boston, specifically calling out five projects that have been on the drawing board for some time.

So what’s the problem? The problem is that East Boston is a waterfront community. Indeed, arguments have long been made that, with the cleanup of Boston Harbor and the revival of other areas of the waterfront, East Boston should not be left behind. In that sense, the waterfront is, of course, a benefit.

The question now is of course what happens to the waterfront in fifty years. Will it still be waterfront or will it be land under the ocean? Today’s Globe story includes a map developed for The Boston Harbor Association, which purports to show the potential impacts of rising sea levels on Boston’s waterfront communities. It’s not a pretty picture. (Well, actually, it is, but you know what I mean.) Some East Boston residents want the potential impacts of sea level rise addressed before significant projects are built in East Boston.

As we noted last fall, the Commonwealth, as part of its implementation of the Global Warming Solutions Act, is trying to address adaptation comprehensively. The Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs issued the Climate Change Adaption Report in September 2011 (It also has a pretty picture, shown here, on the impact of sea level rise.) However, while the Adaptation Report includes much discussion, none of its recommendations have been operationalized to date and a lot of work will have to be done before regulations or – dare I say – guidance is issued.

Thus, for some time, these issues are going to be addressed on an ad hoc basis in the context of individual projects. At a certain level, I understand the concern and I’m all in favor of reasonable foresight. On the other hand, is ad hoc decisionmaking a way to decide how close buildings can be built to the water, or whether they need to be built on stilts? The state MEPA office is going to face this issue with increasing frequency in the coming years. Since I don’t believe in preemptive rants, I’ll hold off until we see how MEPA actually starts to handle these types of projects. They do have a lot of discretionary authority.

This really is a stay-tuned situation. All I can say now is that those who put their heads in the sand are likely to drown.

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Last week, I noted that the D.C. Court of Appeals had found that the National Association of Home Builders did not have standing to challenge a determination by EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River are traditional navigable waters. On Friday, in National Association of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the NAHB lost yet another standing battle.

This time, the NAHB was challenging the Corps’ nationwide permit, NWP-46, allowing discharges of dredge and fill material into certain upland ditches. The District Court had found that the NAHB did have standing, but ruled against NAHB on the merits. The Court of Appeals didn’t even let them get that far, once more barring the courthouse doors.

Aside from the NAHB’s bad luck in losing in the court of appeals twice in one week, what’s news here? 

The news is that, once again, the Court has provided useful guidance regarding what regulated entities – or their trade groups – must allege to establish standing in these types of cases. The NAHB had asserted that NWP-46 imposes costs on its members because it is ambiguous and leaves members uncertain when they are in fact subject to CWA jurisdiction for filling ditches. Unfortunately for the NAHB, the Court concluded that the Corps has been asserting jurisdiction over upland ditches for years. Moreover, the Court pointed to an acknowledgement by the NAHB VP for Legal Affairs that the Corps had “consistently suggested that at least some upland ditches were subject to CWA jurisdiction.”

In short, the Court concluded that the NAHB’s injury was not traceable to the permit, but was instead traceable to the Corps’ underlying assertion of jurisdiction, which was not asserted for the first time in NWP-46. Indeed, as the Court noted, because the Corps had previously asserted jurisdiction over upland ditches, NWP-46 benefited NAHB members, by providing them a way to comply with the CWA that is less costly than the individual permit process.

As the two NAHB decisions make clear, a trade group asserting standing on behalf of its members – or those members suing on their own behalf – must address the traceability and redressability prongs of the standing requirement with particularity, and must establish both that the specific regulatory action being challenged is the direct cause of their injury and that vacating the agency action will redress that injury.

I’m sure that the third time will be a charm for the NAHB. 

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Those following stormwater issues know that EPA is overdue to promulgate a proposed rule for stormwater controls at post-construction sites. The rule has been extremely controversial, with groups such as the Associated General Contractors arguing that EPA has no authority to promulgate post-construction rules. EPA was originally scheduled to issue the proposed rule by September 30. When EPA couldn’t meet that deadline, it negotiated an extension until December 2 (while stating that the deadline for the final rule, November 19, 2012, would still be met). Well, it’s December 15, and no proposal has been issued.

E&E Daily has now reported that, in recent Congressional testimony, EPA Acting Assistant Administrator for Water Nancy Stoner (a law school classmate, I might add) has acknowledged the obvious and admitted that EPA is “behind schedule.” Stoner did not provide a new target for when the rule would be proposed. If I were a betting person, I’d be skeptical that there are any circumstances under which EPA could actually meet the November 19, 2012 deadline for promulgation of a final rule. 

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Developers have cheered in recent years as the Supreme Court has tightened its standing rules. In a decision issued on Friday in National Association of Home Builders v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may have hoist the developers on their own petard. 

After EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers issued a determination that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River constitute “traditional navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act, the National Association of Home Builders sued. The complaint appears to have attached declarations referring to individuals who own property along tributaries of the two reaches, and who asserted that they are have applied for permits under the CWA. None of this was enough for the Court, which made four important points:

·         The NAHB itself did not have organizational standing. The Court made clear that an organization does not have standing unless it has credibly asserted that the challenged action “’perceptibly impaired’ a non-abstract interest.”

·         NAHB’s effort to assert representational standing for its members generally failed, because it contained no assertions linking this site-specific TNW determination to any broader impacts that would affect developers away from the Santa Cruz River.

·         NAHB’s effort to assert standing on behalf of owners in the vicinity of the Santa Cruz River failed because none of the declarations filed with the complaint alleged any harm specifically tied to the issuance of the TNW determination.

·         NAHB did not have “procedural standing” to challenge the agencies’ failure to provide notice and an opportunity to comment before issuing the TNW determination. Quoting from the Supreme Court decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Appeals Court stated that “deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation – a procedural right in vacuo – is insufficient to create Article III standing.” As the Court further noted, allegations of procedural violations may be relevant in assessing the redressability issue, but they cannot loosen the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that they have suffered a substantive injury traceable to the procedural violation.

The NABH decision appears plainly correct in light of Supreme Court standing jurisprudence. Moreover, it does not substantially narrow access to the courts. In fact, I think it provides a useful roadmap regarding the types of declarations that will be required to establish standing for developers. What it does make clear is that the courts are not simply discouraging environmental plaintiffs in their standing jurisprudence. Instead, the courts are discouraging each side equally – or at least requiring the same demonstrations from developers as well as environmentalists.

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Yesterday, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, or NERC, released its 2011 Long-Term Reliability Assessment. The NERC report identified environmental regulations as one “of the greatest risks” to reliability. Much of the focus of the concern was on EPA’s MACT rule for hazardous air pollutants and its 316(b) rule for cooling water intake structures. While expressing uncertainty about these not-yet finalized rules, the NERC report took an extremely cautious approach, largely assuming the worst in terms of the stringency and inflexibility of these rules.

Appropriate caution? Not according to EPA.

In a letter to NERC, EPA Deputy Administrator Bob Persciasepe accused NERC of simply ignoring what EPA has said regarding the provisions of those rules and how they will be implemented. For example, with respect to the 316(b) rule, NERC assumes that the rule will require closed cycle cooling, even though EPA has explicitly said it will not require closed cycle cooling on all units and the rule will allow the cost of controls and potential impacts on reliability to be considered in determining appropriate technology. 

As Persciasepe summarized:

NERC’s draft report describes an extreme outcome that arises from a scenario where the most stringent and costly rules imaginable took effect, and no one at the federal, state, or local level took any steps to ensure the continued reliability of the grid.

Fortunately, the EPA’s analysis and several external analyses show that, where the EPA’s actual rules are accurately characterized, there is no adverse impact on capacity reserves in any region of the country. If isolated, local reliability challenges were to emerge due to individual plant retirements, the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act provide flexibility mechanisms to ensure that sources can be brought into compliance over time while maintaining reliability.

In my most recent post on this subject, I noted that a comprehensive look at the reliability issue by FERC would be helpful. While I understand NERC’s approach to err on the side of caution, I agree with EPA that NERC overdid it here. Most of the old plants at risk of retirement are not going to have to install closed cycle cooling. I wouldn’t quite describe the NERC report as Chicken Little, but I don’t think the sky is falling. I’m still waiting for a more balanced and comprehensive review – and still skeptical that such a report would attain universal credibility, even if were to deserve it.

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As part of its efforts to control the impact of mountaintop removal mining, EPA has implemented a number of changes – both procedural and substantive – into how § 404 permit applications for such activities will be reviewed. None of these changes have gone through notice and comment rulemaking. As we previously noted, Judge Reggie Walton already expressed skepticism about EPA’s mountaintop removal guidance. Last week, in the latest decision in National Mining Association v. Jackson, Judge Walton shot down EPA’s “Enhanced Coordination Process”, or ECP, for reviews of section 404 permit applications.

Although EPA described the modifications as the types of procedural changes that are within agencies’ inherent authority, Judge Walton was having none of it. He concluded that EPA’s authority under the CWA is subject to certain unambiguous limitations. 

The statutory language explicitly establishes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, as the permitting authority, which strike the Court as an express limitation. … The statute is therefore not ambiguous…. Thus, if a responsibility involving the permitting process has not been delegated to the EPA by Congress, that function is vested in the Corps as the permitting authority.

Under the Multi—Criteria Resource Assessment, or MCIR [don’t ask me why it’s “MCIR” and not “MCRA”], EPA, not the Corps, initially applies § 404(b) guidelines, and EPA directs the Corps how to process mountaintop removal § 404 permit applications.  To Judge Walton, these changes exceed EPA’s statutory authority under the CWA.

Judge Walton also concluded that the ECP, including the MCIR violated EPA’s obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to comment on the change in rules that the ECP represents. For those of you who are not APA geeks, the APA exempts from the obligation to provide notice and comment “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” While the ECP sounds procedural – after all, the word “process” is in the label – Judge Walton concluded that the rules were substantive and required notice and comment under the APA. To Judge Walton,

The fact that the creation of the MCIR Assessment removed the task of applying the 404(b)(1) guidelines to pending permits from the Corps and bestowed it upon the EPA signifies a substantive, rather than a procedural, change to the permitting framework. … [I]t is apparent that the MCIR Assessment and the EC Process “effectively amend” the Section 404 permitting process by conferring additional reviewing authority on the EPA – authority that the statute reserves for the Corps. American Mining therefore compels a finding that the MCIR Assessment and the EC Process are legislative rules. 

Another day, another defeat for EPA. The APA lives.

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The abandonment of any discussion of climate change in Washington has not been followed in Massachusetts. Yesterday, Rick Sullivan, the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs, released the Massachusetts Climate Change Adaptation Report, providing the fruits of a lengthy process in Massachusetts to look at the impacts of climate change on five areas: Natural Resources and Habitat; Key Infrastructure; Human Health and Welfare; Local Economy and Government; and Coastal Zone and Oceans. 

Certainly, the summary of potential impacts in Massachusetts is not a pretty picture – speaking metaphorically, anyway; many of the pictures in the report actually are pretty cool. For those who want a quick idea, take a look at the 100-year flood in downtown Boston under the high emissions scenario, on page 20 of the Report.

The trick is in choosing adaptation strategies that are cost-effective in the face of some substantial uncertainties. To give them credit, the Report’s authors are aware of the difficulties. We’ll see what happens when regulators start to consider concrete implementation of particular strategies that may limit development in certain areas or impose additional costs or requirements.

While the Report is too long to summarize here, a few highlights are worth noting:

*  An emphasis on combining mitigation and adaptation – look for more requirements to use low impact development approaches and to meet LEED building standards

*  A recommendation to increase buffer zones – do we take land out of development because it may be needed for flood control in 50 years?

*  Assessment of ways “to discourage and avoid siting in current and future vulnerable areas.” How do we decide what constitutes a vulnerable area and over what time horizon? Do we forbid construction? Require extensive insurance and rely on the market to control investment?

*  Consideration of the development of guidance “to fully implement” existing requirements that new buildings for “non-water-dependent uses” under Chapter 91 “be designed and constructed to … incorporate projected sea level rise during the design life of buildings.” Given existing requirements to devote the ground floor of such buildings to “facilities of public accommodation”, perhaps we could simply require owners to devote the first floor to salt water swimming pools!

Levity aside, this is serious stuff. The projections are certainly scary. That doesn’t make the regulatory decisions easy, however. Decisions regarding time horizons, discount rates, and how much to rely on regulations versus market incentives will be difficult, but getting them right will be critical to ensure that appropriate adaptations are made without adapting ourselves out of all economic growth.

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Some of the world's most well-known apparel companies have come under criticism from Greenpeace for not sufficiently monitoring and limiting industrial wastewater discharges by suppliers.  In a new report called "Dirty Laundry", Greenpeace highlights the wastewater discharges from two major manufacturers in China that supply products to a range of major brands -- including Adidas, Bauer Hockey, Calvin Klein, Converse, Lacoste, Nike, Phillips-Van Heusen and Puma.  

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The fight about guidance and rules is in the news again. Yesterday, EPA finalized its guidance on Clean Water Act permitting with respect to mountaintop mining. As most of our readers know, EPA issued Interim Guidance in April 2010. In January 2011, in National Mining Association v. Jackson, Judge Reggie Walton, while denying plaintiff’s preliminary injunction, signaled that he thought that EPA’s Interim Guidance probably was a legislative rule that should have gone through notice and comment rule-making.

Judge Walton’s decision did not deter EPA, which finalized the guidance without significant changes. As the Legal Planet blog – a supporter of the guidance – noted, “the only differences between the interim guidance and this final one are cosmetic.” What are the nature of those cosmetic changes? They emphasize the flexible, non-binding nature of the guidance, hoping to fare better in the next round of judicial review than the agency did in defending the Interim Guidance. 

EPA reiterates that this guidance is guidance and not a rule. The CWA provisions and supporting regulations described in this document contain the legally and practically binding requirements. This guidance does not substitute for those provisions or regulations and is not itself a regulation. It does not impose legally or practically binding requirements on EPA, the Corps, or the regulated community, and may not apply to a particular situation depending on the circumstances. Any decisions regarding a particular permit will be based on the facts relevant to that permit and will be evaluated in accordance with the applicable statutes, regulations, and case law. Interested persons are always free to raise questions regarding the recommendations in this guidance in a particular situation. EPA will consider whether or not the recommendations or interpretations in this guidance are appropriate in each situation based on the statutes, regulations, and case law. The use of language such as “recommend,” “may,” “should,” and “can” is intended to describe agency policies and recommendations, while the use of mandatory terminology such as “must” and “required” refers to existing requirements under the CWA, its implementing regulations, and relevant case law.

The real trick about guidance is that it is not what EPA says in the document that matters; it is how EPA actually utilizes the guidance in practice. It is in some respects similar to the distinction between a facial constitutional challenge to a regulation and an “as applied” challenge. If EPA actually implements this document as a guide to its decision-making, then it is guidance. If EPA line staff implement it by rote, then it’s a rule. In other words, if it walks like a duck, it’s a duck, even if it does not talk like one.

Time will tell whether the courts believe EPA’s protestations that this really is just guidance. Time will also tell whether EPA implements this as guidance or implements it as a rule.

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As I noted earlier this month, the Supreme Court denied GE’s certiorari petition seeking to challenge the constitutionality of EPA’s use of unilateral administrative orders issued under section 106 of CERCLA. It thus comes as something of a surprise that the Court today accepted a certiorari petition in Sackett v. EPA. The Sackets are appealing a decision by the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals holding that pre-enforcement review is not available to challenge unilateral administrative orders issued by EPA pursuant to section 319 of the Clean Water Act. Lest anyone think that this is simply the Court reining in that liberal 9^th Circuit, the 9^th Circuit decision followed the lead of all four other circuit courts that have already addressed the question.

So, not only did the Supreme Court grant cert. in a CWA case even though it denied cert. challenging a very similar provision under CERCLA, it did so without a circuit split to resolve.

CERCLA’s order provision does differ slightly from that of the CWA. CERCLA explicitly prohibits pre-enforcement review; the CWA does not. It seemed to me that, while I am firmly on the side of the challengers as to the practical import of unilateral orders, EPA’s legal authority remains fairly solid. As the Court of Appeals noted, even in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition, judicial review is prohibited as long as preclusion “is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.” Given the distinction between orders and civil enforcement, which is separately provided for in the CWA, and that the CWA does provide for judicial review of civil penalties imposed by EPA, a fair reading of the statute would seem to preclude pre-enforcement review of orders. This conclusion is buttressed by the purpose of the order provision, which is allow EPA to move quickly in particular cases, and the legislative history, which also seems to support preclusion.

The Court’s order granting cert. identified two questions – both the statutory interpretation question and the assertion that a ban on pre-enforcement review violates the due process clause. However, the constitutional claim is precisely what the Court refused to hear in the GE case. Obviously, that is not binding precedent, but why would the Court deny cert. to GE only to grant it three weeks later to the Sacketts?

Whatever the answer, there is a lot riding on this case. Notwithstanding the denial of cert. in the GE case, if the Supreme Court allows pre-enforcement review of orders under the CWA, it will have repercussions beyond the CWA. The CAA order provision would certainly be on shaky ground and, if the Court’s opinion were predicated on constitutional concerns rather than statutory interpretation, CERCLA’s order authority would seem to fail as well.

I should be telling my clients not to get their hopes up, but it's hard not to get one's hopes up.

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While not ones to unnecessarily toot our own horns, the First Circuit’s decision in United States et al. v. Coalition for Buzzards Bay et al. is worth a read. We (specifically, Buzzards Bay Guardian Jonathan Ettinger, Amy Boyd, and I) have been representing the recently-renamed Buzzards Bay Coalition in this case for a number of years and yesterday’s decision represents both a victory for the Coalition and an important First Circuit precedent with respect to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 

In yesterday’s decision the First Circuit held that the Coast Guard failed to comply with NEPA when it promulgated a rule (the “2007 Rule”) which purported to expressly preempt certain provisions of the Massachusetts Oil Spill Prevention Act (MOSPA).

By way of background, the MOSPA was enacted in response to a spill of approximately 98,000 gallons of oil into Buzzards Bay in April 2003. The federal government filed suit against the Commonwealth, asserting that the MOSPA was preempted by federal law. (The Coalition intervened as a defendant to support the Commonwealth in defending the MOSPA). Following a district court decision and an appeal to, and remand by, the First Circuit, and while the case was pending once again before the district court, the Coast Guard promulgated the 2007 Rule. 

The Coalition and others believe that the 2007 Rule provides less protection against oil spills than does the MOSPA – for example, the 2007 Rule requires tug escorts only for certain single-hulled vessels transporting oil through the Bay while the MOSPA requires such escorts for single- and double-hulled vessels. But in the course of the rulemaking the Coast Guard relied on a Categorical Exclusion (CE) to obviate the need for the preparation of an EA or EIS, and did not consider the impact of this lessened environmental protection.  The Commonwealth and The Coalition argued that in relying on a CE and failing to perform a NEPA analysis, the Coast Guard violated NEPA. The District Court found that the Coast Guard’s reliance on a CE was erroneous, but held that such error was harmless. 

The First Circuit agreed that the Coast Guard’s reliance on a CE was erroneous because the promulgation of the 2007 Rule was “likely to be highly controversial . . . in terms of public opinion”, and thus triggered an “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the use of a CE. The First Circuit then disagreed with the lower court’s finding that such error was harmless. 

The Court distinguished the case from prior cases finding harmless error, stating that

 the sockdolager is that the Coast Guard did not perform and environmental analysis at all. Indeed, it made no site-specific appraisal of the potential environmental effects of its proposed action. For ought that appears, it took no “hard look” at the situation. It gave the matter the barest of glances and . . . made no ‘reasoned finding.’ . . . the absence of any [substantial] analysis is antithetic to a finding of harmlessness.

Thus, the Court made clear that the harmless error rule is only applicable where there is evidence that some substantial environmental analysis has been undertaken by an agency. In this case the administrative record did not show that “the Coast Guard ever analyzed, or even adequately studied, the environmental impact of its proposed action.”

The Court also rejected the Coast Guard’s argument that failure of the Coalition and Commonwealth to object to its reliance on a CE during the notice-and-comment period resulted in a waiver of such objections, stating that

. . . nothing in Public Citizen shifts the burden of ensuring NEPA compliance from the agency that is proposing an action to those who wish to challenge that action. Indeed, the Public Citizen Court stressed that ‘the agency bears the primary responsibility to ensure that it complies with NEPA.’

In reaching its decision, the Court did not address the issue of preemption.  As a result of the decision, the First Circuit vacated a previously issued injunction of the MOSPA, and the 2007 Rule will now be remanded to the Coast Guard for proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

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I posted recently that EPA actually seems to be listening to comments from the regulated community and has changed course in some cases in response to those comments. The release by EPA and the Army Corps yesterday of their long-awaited revised guidance implementing the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision confirms that EPA is in listening mode. Although I am not normally a fan, this new version seems an appropriate use of guidance.

First, it is not a unilateral effort to expand agency jurisdiction. Instead, it responds to the Supreme Court Rapanos decision. Given the lack of a majority decision, Rapanos certainly left both regulators and the regulated community scratching their heads. Moreover, although one of my concerns about guidance is that it can ossify, that is not the case here. The new guidance replaces EPA’s prior Rapanos guidance, issued in 2008.  EPA is entitled to conclude that the prior guidance did not accurately reflect the limits of CWA jurisdiction after Rapanos.

Significantly, in response to substantial pre-issuance pressure to shelve the guidance and instead pursue notice and comment rulemaking, EPA and the Corps have agreed both to take comment on this guidance and to undertake formal rulemaking. Thus, the guidance will serve only to clarify EPA’s and the Corps’ current interpretation pending issuance of a rule.                                                         

On the merits, the guidance seems to be a reasonable interpretation of Rapanos. Everyone knows that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test is not a model of clarity – that’s why guidance is appropriate. Regulated industries benefit from greater clarity – even if more wetlands will be found to be jurisdictional – because uncertainty imposes its own costs. While the American Farm Bureau Federation has already complained about the new guidance, I think we need to distinguish between complaints about the guidance per se and complaints which really go to the scope of the CWA itself. 

If the guidance itself is too long for you, EPA has provided a useful summary. The summary of the summary? The following waters are protected by the Clean Water Act:

• Traditional navigable waters
• Interstate waters
• Wetlands adjacent to either traditional navigable waters or interstate waters
• Non-navigable tributaries to traditional navigable waters that are relatively permanent, meaning they contain water at least seasonally
• Wetlands that directly abut relatively permanent waters

In addition, the following waters are protected by the Clean Water Act if a fact-specific analysis determines they have a "significant nexus" to a traditional navigable water or interstate water:

• Tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters
• Wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters
• Waters that fall under the "other waters" category of the regulations. The guidance divides these waters into two categories, those that are physically proximate to other jurisdictional waters and those that are not, and discusses how each category should be evaluated.

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For those of you who thought that the sky was about to fall in EPA as part of the budget battle, I’m able to report that EPA survived sufficiently intact to continue to issue new rules. Today, EPA proposed a draft revised construction general permit, or CGP, for stormwater discharges from construction sites disturbing at least one acre (or less, if the project is part of a common development plan that is greater than one acre). The revised CGP would replace the current CGP which is set to expire on June 30. EPA has proposed to extend the current CGP through January 31, 2012, in order to give it time to promulgate the new CGP in final form. 

The revised CGP does make some changes. The most notable changes, summarized in EPA's Q&A on the proposal, are intended to incorporate into the CGP the provisions of EPA’s February 2010 effluent limitations guidelines rule, known as the C&D rule. These changes include new requirements concerning:

Sediment and erosion controls

Soil stabilization

Pollution prevention

Inspections

Stormwater pollution prevention plans (SWPPPs)

Buffer zones

The buffer zone requirement was included in the C&D rule, but EPA is now proposing to add significant flesh to the bones. Specifically, the rule would require a minimum fifty-foot buffer between the construction site and any waters of the United States which are located either on or immediately adjacent to the site. The rule would provide flexibility to allow the permittee to substitute additional sediment and erosion controls for some or all of the buffer, so long as the controls “achieve the equivalent sediment load reduction as an undisturbed naturally vegetated, 50-foot buffer.”

For my Massachusetts readers, the 50-foot buffer will seem very similar to the buffer zone already required under the MA Wetlands Protection Act regulations. The jurisdictional scope of the CGP will not be identical to Wetlands Act jurisdiction, but they should be fairly similar.

Comments on the proposed rule will be due 60 days following Federal Register publication.

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Sometimes I’m so timely I can’t stand it. This morning, I posted about the difficulty in challenging regulations under Massachusetts law. Later this morning, the SJC agreed. In Entergy v. DEP, the SJC upheld DEP’s authority to regulate cooling water intake structures under the state CWA. Funny how the SJC cited to the same language here as did Judge Sweeney in the Pepin case.

We will apply all rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the administration action and not declare it void unless its provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the legislative mandate.

Entergy argued that the statute and DEP’s regulations under it have always focused on discharges of pollutants, rather than intake of water. This was not persuasive to the SJC. The Court stated that

[T]he permitting regime for discharges does not foreclose the department from developing compatible methods of regulating water intakes…. Specific statutory authority to act in a particular respect does not bar consistent action under general statutory authority.

The Court’s bottom line? 

We will not substitute our judgment as to the need for a regulation, or the propriety of the means chosen to implement the statutory goals, for that of the agency, so long as the regulation is rationally related to those goals. [T]he purpose of conferring broad power on an expert agency is to permit discretion in determining the best approaches to a complex issue.”

I think that the SJC probably got this case right based on its own precedents. However, the Court’s last statement is almost breathtaking in its scope. Has there ever been a clearer or broader defense of the modern administrative state? With a statement like that, could one imagine the SJC ever concluding that the legislature delegated too much authority to the regulatory agencies? And yet, as conservatives sometimes note, it is the legislators, and not the agency personnel, who are elected and who are supposed to make the big picture decisions.

Jefferson would be turning over in his grave.

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Earlier this week, EPA announced its long-awaited revised proposal for a cooling water intake structure rule for existing facilities. Praise is much less interesting than criticism, and thus less conducive to entertaining blog posts, but I’m afraid EPA has left me no choice. Within the confines of what the Clean Water Act requires, EPA seems to have gotten this one pretty much right.

EPA has a useful summary of the rule here. I could certainly quarrel with aspects of the rule, but the basic structure makes sense. It applies to facilities that take at least 25% of their water from an adjacent waterbody and use more than 2MGD/day. Limits are imposed on total fish impingement, though facilities can meet an alternative standard by limiting approach velocity to 0.5 feet per second. EPA has gotten out of the command and control business, at least for existing units. Facilities that withdraw at least 125 MGD would have to perform studies leading to site-specific standards to address entrainment concerns.  Finally, new units that increase generating capacity would be have to used close-cycle cooling (or something equivalent).

One measure of EPA’s success here may be that environmental NGOs are already criticizing the proposal because, instead of setting immovable national standards, the rule would give too much discretion to state permitting authorities. 

It really is worth noting that the 316(b) proposal is only one of several in which EPA has listened to the concerns of industry and revised rules or proposed rules in response to those concerns. First, EPA revised its proposed Tailoring Rule to raise the jurisdictional thresholds to exclude additional smaller sources. Then, it revised the boiler rule in response to concerns that its original proposal really wasn’t feasible. Now, it has avoided a one size fits all rule for CWIS, allowing site-specific factors to come into play. 

Just so I don’t lose all my credibility with my clients, I must note that there remain areas in which EPA seems completely tone-deaf regarding reasonable regulatory reforms. The last bastion of soviet-style command and control known as the Superfund program certainly springs to mind. However, while I doubt EPA will get much credit for it, it is only fair to acknowledge that there does seem to be at least something of a pattern unfolding here. Whether this is really a change in EPA’s DNA or whether it is simply a response to current political realities, only time will tell. Whatever the cause, it’s certainly welcome.

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Last week, I discussed EPA’s efforts to “muddle through” on climate change in the absence of comprehensive legislation. This week, I think it’s the Clean Water Act’s turn. If there were any regulatory situation which required some serious muddling through at the moment, interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision almost is a match for the current climate mess. As most of my readers know, Rapanos was a 4-1-4 decision which left EPA, the Corps, developers and environmentalists fairly equally perplexed

Most stakeholders have assumed that Kennedy’s concurring opinion, requiring a “significant nexus” between wetlands and traditional navigable waters before those wetlands are subject to jurisdiction under the CWA, is the law of the land at this point. That is the approach adopted in the Rapanos Guidance issued by EPA and the Corps in 2007. 

A recent decision by the 4^th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Precon Development Corporation v. Army Corps of Engineers, illustrates just how muddled post-Rapanos interpretation has become. The decision in Precon – reversing the District Court – found that the Corps had not built a record sufficient to establish that the wetlands which Precon sought to develop were jurisdictional under the CWA. 

There were two technical issues in Precon. Precon lost what one might have thought would be the more significant issue – the Corps’ finding that, although only 4.8 acres were really at issue in this case, and Precon’s entire development includes 166 acres of wetlands, 448 acres of “similarly situated” wetlands would be examined for a substantial nexus to navigable waters. Precon ultimately won, however, because the Court concluded that the Corps’ record did not contain enough physical evidence to support its determination that a significant nexus exists between the 448 wetland acres and the downstream navigable water. 

The Court’s conclusion raised two issues of broad concern to stakeholders. First, the Court granted little deference to EPA’s conclusion on the significant nexus issue. The Corps argued that its conclusion that there was a significant nexus between the site wetlands and the downstream navigable waters was a factual conclusion. However, the Court concluded that the significant nexus determination was not factual. The Court stated that:

The question is instead whether the Corps’ findings were adequate to support the ultimate conclusion that a significant nexus exists. This legal determination is essentially now a matter of statutory construction, as Justice Kennedy established that a “significant nexus” is a statutory requirement for bringing wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries within the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters.”

Well, this is certainly a nice question of administrative law. The significant nexus issue may now be the ultimate legal question. Nonetheless, I would guess that most wetlands scientists and hydrologists would say that this is largely a factual question. Even if the agency is applying its judgment to answer that question, it’s the type of judgment that requires technical expertise – expertise to which courts have traditionally deferred.

The second of the Court’s important pronouncements was that it would not give the EPA/Corps Rapanos Guidance deference under Chevron. Why not?

Because – although it could – the Corps has not adopted an interpretation of “navigable waters” that incorporates this concept through notice-and-comment rulemaking, but instead has interpreted the term only in a non-binding guidance document.”

Isn’t it timely, then, that EPA and the Corps sent a draft new Rapanos guidance to OMB in December, and GOP leadership in the House is proposing language in a continuing resolution that would preclude EPA from using any funds “to implement, administer, or enforce a change to a rule or guidance document pertaining to the definition of waters under the jurisdiction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1251).” Perhaps EPA and the Corps should take half a loaf. Why not agree to shelve the guidance and instead proceed with notice-and-comment rulemaking to clarify Rapanos? At least then the Courts might grant EPA and the Corps more deference in implementation.  It’s already been almost five years since Rapanos was issued. EPA and the Corps can hardly argue that it’s necessary to go the guidance route because they don’t have the time to proceed through the full regulatory process.

Enough muddling through. Take the time to do it right and issue regulations. Then, maybe the muddle will abate. (Can one abate a muddle?)

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As readers of this blog know, the question of guidance v. regulation is one near and dear to my heart. I generally disfavor guidance, because I think it offers none of the protections of the regulatory process and almost none of the flexibility that guidance is supposed to provide. Two issues are of particular concern. First, guidance is not supposed to announce new rules – only clarifying interpretation of existing rules. However, we all know what a slippery slope that can be. Second, notwithstanding the purported flexibility of guidance, how often do regulators on the street – those actually using the guidance, rather than those writing it – treat guidance exactly like regulations and expect the regulated community to follow it to the letter?

The problem was brought to the forefront again recently by the decision in National Mining Association v. Jackson, in which Judge Reggie Walton in the District Court for the District of Columbia stated that EPA’s mountaintop mining guidance likely exceeded EPA’s authority. Although Judge Walton denied plaintiffs’ request for an injunction because they had not demonstrated irreparable harm, he made clear that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits. Addressing the core issues I noted above, he stated that the EPA mountaintop mining guidance

Qualified as final agency action because, despite the representation that it is an interim document, it is nonetheless being applied in a binding manner and has been implemented in its current version even though the EPA continues to receive comments about it. Therefore,… it appears that the EPA is treating the Guidance as binding.

Judge Walton went on to conclude that the various documents at issue constitute “legislative rules because they seemingly have altered the permitting procedures under the Clean Water Act by changing the codified administrative review process.” He also found that the documents exceeded EPA’s authority, because they ignored “EPA’s limited role in the issuance of Section 404 permits.”

Relatively hard on the heels of the National Mining Association decision, Daily Environment Report this week covered efforts by industry groups to prevent EPA from issuing guidance interpreting the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision regarding the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.” I’m sorry, but does anyone think that such “guidance” would not be treated in practice as having the finality of regulation? If, under such guidance, certain types of situations are considered to be “waters of the United States,” does anyone doubt that such situations will be subject to CWA permitting requirements 100% of the time? 

Agencies officials generally make two arguments in favor of guidance. One is simply to ask for recognition of the practical reality that getting formal notice and comment rulemaking accomplished is very difficult and often impractical in the modern world. The second is that guidance provides flexibility. However, if the regulators want the rest of us to recognize the practical realities involved in promulgating regulations, then they must recognize the practical reality that guidance almost always immediately ossifies and that those implementing it treat it as gospel. There is often little in it for the regulated community.

Until Rand Paul succeeds in dismantling the modern administrative state, the debate will continue.

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I don’t normally blog about cases in which I’m involved, but since this one made the front page of the Boston Globe, I suppose it’s sufficiently newsworthy. Yesterday, EPA announced that a settlement had been reached among EPA, MassDEP, our client GenOn Kendall, and the Charles River Watershed Association and the Conservation Law Foundation concerning the NPDES permit for Kendall Station. As a result of the settlement, when all the equipment needed to implement it has been installed, both the water intake and discharge and the thermal load will be reduced by over 95%.

How will this be accomplished? Installation of certain new equipment at Kendall Station and a new steam pipe across the Charles River will allow facility to sell more steam to Boston and avoid putting excess heat into the River. As a result, not only will the impacts on the River be reduced, there will be collateral air emissions benefits, as Kendall’s clean gas displaces fuel oil as a source of steam in Boston.

Credit in the first instance has to go to our client, GenOn, for thinking creatively about how to respond to the problem posed by the very restrictive conditions imposed in its 2006 NPDES renewal. GenOn firmly believed that it had strong technical arguments with which to dispute the permit terms. Rather than focusing on those arguments, however, GenOn instead worked to figure out a solution that will allow the plant to remain economic, while addressing the concerns of the regulators.

Credit also goes to EPA Region I and MassDEP, both of which responded enthusiastically and constructively to GenOn’s proposal. Notwithstanding the win-win nature of the solution, the negotiations were complicated and the permit is extremely complex. However, the agencies kept their eyes on the prize.

Finally, credit also goes to the Charles River Watershed Association and the Conservation Law Foundation. Both of them had appealed the original permit, arguing that it was not sufficiently stringent (well, they are environmental NGOs). They could have tried to play bad cop to the agencies’ good cop. After all, it may take until 2016 until all the new equipment is in place and operational. CRWA and CLF could have used this delay to extort more from GenOn. In fact, while GenOn was pleased to contribute $250,000 to a fish restocking effort in the Charles River that CRWA will help implement, CLF and CRWA cooperated fully in the final settlement.

One aspect of the settlement is particularly worth noting. As discussed, the settlement works because Kendall Station is in an urban location and has a market for additional steam. Many commentators have discussed the important role of combined heat and power in helping achieve the nation’s environmental goals. Not everything is going to be solar and wind. Clean gas facilities that can sell steam will be a major contributor over the coming decades. Often, environmental justice concerns are raised with respect to urban power plants. There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch. If we want CHP, then we have to put the power where there’s a market for the steam.

However, that full rant can wait for another day. Right now, as Peter Shelley of CLF said in the Globe, “this solution is the type of thing that makes you feel good.”

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In Cool Hand Luke, Paul Newman is sentenced to two years on a chain gang for cutting the heads off of municipal parking meters.  The Mingo Logan Coal Company wants to cut the top off of 3.5 square miles of West Virginia mountaintop. This week, EPA gave the company's Spruce No. 1 Mine proposal the death penalty, using its authority under § 404(c) of the Clean Water Act to veto a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers in 2007. As EPA noted in its press release, this is only the 13^th time in 38 years that EPA has utilized § 404(c) to veto a permit.

EPA’s decision resulted in howls of protest, not just from the mine’s owner, but also from the two Senators from West Virginia. Joe Manchin, who famously campaigned with an advertisement in which he shot a purported copy of cap-and-trade legislation, described EPA’s decision as a “shocking display of overreach.” 

EPA’s characterization was slightly different. The agency summarized the mine’s impacts as follows:

Burying more than 35,000 feet (more than 6 miles) of high-quality streams under mining waste, which will eliminate all fish, invertebrates, salamanders, and other wildlife that live in them;

Polluting downstream waters as a result of burying these streams, which will lead to unhealthy levels of salinity and toxic levels of selenium;

Causing downstream watershed degradation that will kill aquatic wildlife, impact birdlife, reduce habitat value, and increase susceptibility to toxic algal blooms;

Inadequately mitigating for the mine’s environmental impacts to high-quality streams , by using mining ditches, for example, to offset the functions provided by these natural streams; and

Failure to consider cumulative watershed degradation resulting from past, present, and future mining in the area.

While I’m sure that the owner will dispute some of EPA’s characterization, my money’s on EPA, overreach or not. The impacts of mountaintop mining are substantial and I don’t see a court rejecting EPA’s conclusion that they are, in this case, “unacceptable.”

To bring the situation back to Cool Hand Luke, what EPA and the mining companies have here is a failure to communicate, and EPA is the one in the Strother Martin role, wielding a very painful veto hammer.

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When EPA creates a web page solely addressing one stormwater settlement, you can safely assume that EPA thinks it is important and is trying to send a message. Thus, EPA’s announcement earlier this week of a settlement with Beazer Homes to resolve allegations that Beazer Homes violated federal stormwater requirements at construction sites in 21 – count ‘em, 21 – states should make everyone in the construction industry sit up and take notice.

The settlement requires Beazer Homes to pay a penalty of $925,000 (mostly to EPA, but some to each of the states). EPA estimated a price tag for the injunctive relief of almost $9,487,384. Basically, the consent decree simply requires Beazer Homes to comply with stormwater regulations, but EPA has imposed certain management requirements on Beazer Homes to ensure that compliance really will happen. Beazer Homes must develop an overall stormwater compliance program, designate a nationwide stormwater compliance manager, and also identify division-level compliance managers who must inspect every construction site within their jurisdiction at least quarterly to ensure that individual sites are in compliance. 

Stormwater is clearly one of EPA’s top priorities. The press release for the Beazer Homes settlement states so explicitly:

Keeping contaminated stormwater out of America’s waters is one of EPA’s national enforcement initiatives.

As concerns about nutrients increase, and EPA faces pressure from citizen groups regarding TMDLs for nutrients, we should only expect more such announcements. An ounce of prevention might be worth $9,487,384 of cure (not including a penalty).

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An adjudicatory hearing decision issued by MassDEP in September just came to my attention. The decision in the case, In the Matter of Town of Plymouth, is worth reading for those of you interested in the emerging issues related to concerns over nutrients and how nutrient discharges will be regulated in groundwater or surface water discharge permits.

What caught me eye about the decision, however, wasn’t its substance, but was instead its procedural history. The Town of Plymouth first obtained a permit for the groundwater discharge from its municipal wastewater treatment plant in 2000. The Eel River Watershed Association appealed that permit. (For my out-of-state readers, such permits are appealed administratively in Massachusetts.) Dispositive motions were filed in 2003 – but were never acted on. 

Although the Recommended Final Decision by the hearing officer (which was adopted by the MassDEP Commissioner) doesn’t provide the entire history, one assumes that Plymouth timely filed a renewal application before the permit’s 2005 expiration date. It took MassDEP until 2008 to issue a permit renewal – at which time the dispositive motions in the appeal of the 2000 permit were still pending. 

Not surprisingly, the Town of Plymouth and MassDEP filed motions to dismiss the appeal of the 2000 permit as moot, once the new permit was in effect. Equally unsurprisingly, those motions were granted. To give MassDEP its due, it has worked hard in recent years to shorten the time needed to resolve adjudicatory appeals. It is noteworthy that MassDEP issued the decision dismissing the appeal of the 2008 permit within two years. Nonetheless, it is sort of chilling that the resolution of a permit appeal can extend beyond the life of the permit being challenged.

Justice delayed is…, oh, never mind.

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Almost all – 46 – states have delegated programs under the Clean Water Act. One criterion that EPA must determine has been satisfied before approving delegation is that the state has the ability to "abate violations of the permit … including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement."

EPA’s regulations provide that this criterion will be met if :

State law allows an opportunity for judicial review that is the same as that available to obtain judicial review in federal court of a federally-issued NPDES permit. A State will not meet this standard if it narrowly restricts the class of persons who may challenge the approval or denial of permits….

With respect to citizen suits, this language seems fairly clear. As long as the state does not impose heightened standing requirements, the same opportunity for judicial review exists.

When EPA approved delegation of the NPDES program to Alaska, notwithstanding that Alaska has a version of the so-called “English Rule,” which requires that losing parties pay fees to the winners, various citizen groups challenged the delegation, on the ground that the Alaska fee shifting provision means that, as a practical matter, Alaska restricts access to the courts in ways not permitted under the CWA. Last week, in Akiak Native Community v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the delegation. 

I actually wish that the Court had gone further than it did. As noted above, I think that, in the absence of different standing requirements, there is a comparable “opportunity” for judicial review. Instead, the Court’s decision was more limited, holding only that, as a result of certain limits on Alaska’s application of the fee-shifting rule, the plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish that EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Indeed, the Court noted that EPA could potentially reverse the delegation if it later finds in practice that Alaska courts are applying the fee-shifting provisions in ways that discourage citizen plaintiffs.

I just want to know – what’s so bad about fee-shifting?

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As Superfund practitioners know, federal NPL sites are generally settled on the basis that the PRPs will first attain interim cleanup levels, though final cleanup levels are not determined until EPA is actually ready to issue its certification of completion of the remedy. Moreover, EPA insists that, should any ARARs change during the course of the cleanup, whatever standards are in effect at the time of site closure will be applied.

We saw the impact of this on the ground in 2001, when EPA revised the Safe Drinking Water Act maximum contaminant level, or MCL, for arsenic from 50 ppb to 10 ppb. The new MCL became an ARAR for Superfund, and the expected date to attain cleanup standards suddenly got pushed back at a number of Superfund sites.

Even at the time, it was not clear that 10 ppb was the last word. EPA’s proposed rule had provided for a 5 ppb standard, but EPA eased off in response to public comment; small water suppliers can have great difficulty in attaining a 5 ppb standard. 

Earlier this year, EPA announced the availability of a new toxicological review of arsenic. That review suggested greater cancer risks from arsenic. Yesterday, EPA’s Science Advisory Board issued a report generally supportive of the new toxicological review. If the result is a further tightening of the MCL, more stringent cleanups, through the ARARs process, will follow ineluctably. 

I don’t normally post about developments this far from concrete regulatory changes. However, given the way the Superfund cleanup process works, PRPs negotiating cleanups of sites with arsenic groundwater contamination have to begin to factor this issue into their strategy now, because it’s not too early to starting thinking about cleanup cost estimates for alternative - meaning lower - arsenic MCLs.

Having put you on notice, I now have to tell one war story; if you don’t feel the need for a war story, you can stop reading here. In 1991, I was involved in negotiating the settlement for the cleanup of the Coakley Landfill Site, in southern New Hampshire. The federal government was a PRP. In Coakley, the government made a substantial (seven figure) contribution to the settlement. However, because the private PRPs had argued in negotiations with EPA that there was no need to treat groundwater – notwithstanding that the ROD remedy selected by EPA required groundwater treatment – the federal government as PRP insisted on getting a refund of the share of its payment attributable to the groundwater remedy, should EPA finally certify completion of the remedy without there ever having been an active groundwater treatment system in operation.

A few years later, the PRPs indeed persuaded EPA to eliminate active groundwater treatment. At the time, the expected date for certification of completion was 2007. In 2001, EPA changed the arsenic MCL from 50 ppb to 10 ppb. I don’t need to tell you that there is an arsenic issue at the Coakley Site. Now, the expected date for certification of completion is 2021. If, before then, EPA were to further lower the arsenic MCL, who knows what will happen to the expected date for certification of completion? The private PRPs may never have to reimburse the federal government!

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When clients are threatened with citizen suits – and particularly when the threatened litigation involves a matter where EPA or a state regulatory agency is heavily involved, the clients always want to know why they can’t somehow get rid of the citizen suit, given that EPA is on the case. The answer is that they can – but only in limited circumstances.

The recent decision in Little Hocking Water Association v. DuPont confirmed this answer in the context of RCRA. The Little Hocking Water Association provides public water to certain communities in Ohio, directly across the Ohio River from a DuPont plant which uses , also known as PFOA or C8 – also known as the contaminant du jour. According to the complaint, the Little Hocking wells have among the highest concentrations of C8 of water supply wells anywhere and its customers have among the highest C8 blood levels anywhere. Little Hocking Water Association thus sued DuPont under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, claiming that DuPont’s release of C8 had created an “imminent and substantial endangerment."

Section 7002 of RCRA contains provisions precluding such citizen suits if either EPA or a state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting” an action under RCRA to abate the endangerment. In the DuPont case, releases of C8 from the DuPont facility had been the subject of at least two administrative orders on consent entered into by DuPont and EPA. However, consent orders aren’t the same as “an action” under § 7002 or § 7003 of RCRA – and they thus do not preclude a citizen suit.

DuPont tried the next best argument – that EPA had primary jurisdiction over the regulation of C8 – and that the existence of EPA’s regulatory authority and the issuance of the consent orders meant that the courts should defer to EPA. DuPont’s argument was that a court could not fashion a remedy in the case without essentially establishing a new cleanup standard for C8 and that doing so is the job of EPA, not the courts.

The Court gave the primary jurisdiction argument short shrift. As the Court noted, using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in citizen suits would dramatically reduce the scope of such suits. Since Congress provided a citizen suit mechanism – and provided very specific, discrete, circumstances in which citizen suits are precluded – it doesn’t make sense to use primary jurisdiction to establish another defense, particularly where the defense would almost eliminate the remedy. 

The bottom line? If you don’t want to face a citizen suit (and you’re not in compliance), get yourself sued by EPA or your state regulatory agency. The mere existence of EPA or state regulation, even if requirements are embodied in a consent order, is not enough.

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Sometimes, the headline writes the story. EPA’s TMDL program under the Clean Water Act has been the subject of so much litigation since its inception that EPA has a web page devoted to the status of litigation on the establishment of TMDLs.

Bringing things close to home, the Conservation Law Foundation and the Coalition for Buzzards Bay filed suit late last month, challenging implementation by MassDEP and EPA of the TMDL program for certain embayments on Cape Cod and Nantucket. (Full disclosure time – this firm represents the CBB on unrelated matters.)

The law suit claims that MassDEP erred in determining the waste load allocation, or WLA, in establishing the TMDLs for the embayments, because it failed to identify septic systems, stormwater systems, and wastewater treatment systems as point sources. (Since we also represent wastewater treatment system operators – though none that are the subject of these TMDLs – I think that, like Joe Friday, this is going to be a “Just the facts, ma’am,” post.)

With respect to stormwater systems, MassDEP determined that systems located less than 200 feet from the embayments were point sources, but that those farther away were not. The basis for this determination, according to the complaint, was that the more proximate systems in fact discharge to surface waters, whereas the more distant ones discharge to groundwater, so that there is no point source discharge to surface water. 

The complaint does not identify the basis for MassDEP’s conclusion that septic systems are not point sources, but presumably it is also based on a conclusion that the systems discharge to groundwater and thus are not point sources of surface water pollution.  

Without commenting on the merits – just the facts, ma’am – I will note that a determination that septic systems and stormwater drainage systems that discharge initially to groundwater are point sources under the CWA would have dramatic consequences for the regulation of nutrient pollution under the CWA. In situations where there are industrial sources of these pollutants, those industrial sources might be quite pleased to have someone else bear share of the burden of reductions necessary to meet the TMDL. Given the brouhaha over how state agencies would cope with permitting hundreds or thousands of new stationary sources under EPA’s Clean Air Act PSD program for GHGs, however, I cannot imagine that MassDEP – or other state environmental agencies – would eagerly assume the responsibility for permitting septic systems.

Why do I foresee more litigation in the TMDL program’s future?

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As many of you know, the Commonwealth's tidelands licensing statute, Chapter 91, is one of my favorites, for no other reason than that it gives me the opportunity to talk about where the "waters ebbeth and floweth."  Deriving from the Colonial Ordinances of 1641 and 1647, Chapter 91 is about as arcane as it gets – which, of course, lawyers are supposed to like. 

The short version is that the Commonwealth holds the fee interest in “Commonwealth Tidelands” – those below the low water line. While the Commonwealth can license private use of Commonwealth Tidelands, only the legislature, acting explicitly, can give up those rights. Private Tidelands, the land between high and low water, are owned by the upland owner, but are subject to public rights in “fishing, fowling, and navigation” – another reason why I love Chapter 91.

In a decision handed down today, the Massachusetts SJC made crystal-clear that nothing short of an explicit legislative act is sufficient to eliminate the public’s ownership rights in tidelands. In Arno v. Commonwealth, the “owner” of land in Nantucket that was filled in the 19^th Century sued the Commonwealth, essentially seeking a declaration that he was the fee owner of the land. His argument was that a prior owner had registered the land in 1922, and the Attorney General, in commenting at the time, did not object to registration or assert that the Commonwealth still owned the land. To the SJC, what the AG did – or intended to do – in 1922 was irrelevant. 

Neither the Land Court nor the Attorney General had the authority to divest the public of its rights in Arno’s parcel…. Only an act of or an express delegation by the Legislature could extinguish the public’s rights.

The decision is probably not a surprise following the SJC’s original Moot decision, but is nonetheless a lesson to those who would claim ownership in tidelands. If the waters ebbeth and floweth – or if they ever did – only the legislature can give them away.

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Late July saw some movement on the cooling water intake structure (CWIS) front. 

On Friday, July 23, in ConocoPhillips, et al. v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit granted EPA’s motion for a voluntary remand of the existing-facilities portion of its Phase III regulation. The Phase III rule, promulgated in 2006, addressed CWIS at existing small power plants and other facilities in certain industries, including the pulp and paper, chemical, primary metals and petroleum and coal products industries, as well as new oil and gas extraction facilities. The Phase III rule did not set a “best technology available” (BTA) standard for existing facilities, and instead continued the current practice of “best professional judgment,” case-by-case determinations of BTA. Not surprisingly, the rule was challenged by a number of entities.

Last year, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, the agency had requested that the portion of the regulation dealing with existing facilities be remanded so that the agency could reevaluate it in conjunction with its proceedings on remand of the 2004 Phase II rule, which addressed CWIS at large, existing, power plants. In Entergy the Supreme Court held that EPA could, but was not required, to employ cost-benefit analysis when determining the BTA and has discretion to consider to what degree costs and benefits should be weighed in making such a determination. The Fifth Circuit’s recent ruling now clears the way for EPA to combine Phase II and Phase III into a single rulemaking covering all existing CWIS facilities. (At the same time that it remanded the Phase III rule as it relates to existing facilities, the court deferred to the agency and upheld the rule as it applies to new offshore oil and gas facilities).

This decision dovetails with the agency’s announcement two days earlier that it would be sending to the OMB for approval a proposed survey that would help the agency determine the benefits of the proposed regulatory options for CWIS. Data collected during the survey, which will be of approximately 2000 households, will be used to calculate willingness to pay for the reduction of fish losses at CWIS. Comments on the proposal must be submitted by September 20, 2010.   

So, it looks like some progress is being made towards a determination of what constitutes BTA for CWIS at existing facilities, but how long it will take for it to be made is unclear. Obviously, it seems that the agency’s previously announced intentions, as reported in the BNA Daily Environment Report, to issue a proposed rule in the middle of this year were a bit optimistic.

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Last week, in City of Pittsfield v. EPA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a petition by the City of Pittsfield seeking review of an NPDES permit issued by EPA. The case makes no new law and, by itself, is not particularly remarkable.  Cases on NPDES permit appeals have held for some time that a permittee appealing an NPDES permit must set forth in detail in its petition basically every conceivable claim or argument that they might want to assert. Pretty much no detail is too small. The City of Pittsfield failed to do this, instead relying on their prior comments on the draft permit. Not good enough, said the Court. 

For some reason, reading the decision brought to mind another recent appellate decision, General Electric v. Jackson, in which the D.C. Circuit laid to rest arguments that EPA’s unilateral order authority under § 106 of CERCLA is unconstitutional. As I noted in commenting on that decision, it too was unremarkable by itself and fully consistent with prior case law on the subject.

What do these two cases have in common? To me, they are evidence that, while the government can over-reach and does lose some cases, the deck remains stacked overwhelmingly in the government’s favor. The power of the government as regulator is awesome to behold. Looking at the GE case first, does anyone really deny that EPA’s § 106 order authority is extremely coercive? Looking at the Pittsfield case, doesn’t it seem odd that a party appealing a permit has to identify with particularity every single nit that they might want to pick with the permit? Even after the Supreme Court’s recent decisions tightening pleading standards, the pleading burden on a permit appellant remains much more substantial than on any other type of litigant.

Why should this be so? Why is it that the government doesn’t lose when it’s wrong, but only when it’s crazy wrong? 

Just askin’.

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Sometimes, the practice of environmental law just takes my breath away. A decision issued earlier last month in United States v. Washington DOT was about as stunning as it gets. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Robert Bryan held that the Washington State Department of Transportation had “arranged” for the disposal of hazardous substances within the meaning of CERCLA by designing state highways with stormwater collection and drainage structures, where those drainage structures ultimately deposited stormwater containing hazardous substances into Commencement Bay -- now, a Superfund site -- in Tacoma, Washington.  

I’m sorry, but if that doesn’t make you sit up and take notice, then you’re just too jaded. Under this logic, isn’t everyone who constructs a parking lot potentially liable for the hazardous substances that run off in stormwater sheet flow? 

For those who aren’t aware, phosphorus, the stormwater contaminant du jour, is a listed hazardous substance under Superfund. Maybe EPA doesn’t need to bother with new stormwater regulatory programs. Instead, it can just issue notices of responsibility to everyone whose discharge of phosphorus has contributed to contamination of a river or lake.

The Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment regarding whether the discharges of contaminated stormwater were federally permitted releases. Since the Washington DOT had an NPDES permit, it argued that it was not liable under § 107(j) of CERCLA. However, as the Court noted, even if the DOT might otherwise have a defense, if any of the releases occurred before the permit issued – almost certain, except in the case of newer roads – or if any discharges violated the permit, then the Washington DOT would still be liable and would have the burden of establishing a divisibility defense. 

If one were a conspiracy theorist, one might wonder if EPA were using this case to gently encourage the regulated community to support its recent efforts to expand its stormwater regulatory program. Certainly, few members of the regulated community would rather defend Superfund litigation than comply with a stormwater permit.

You can’t make this stuff up. 

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Two seemingly unrelated reports last week serve as a reminder that coal remains very much under siege. First, Earthjustice, on behalf of a number of environmental organizations, filed a petition with EPA under § 111 of the Clean Air Act requesting that EPA identify coal mines as an emissions source and, consequently, establish new source performance standards for coal mine emissions of methane and several other categories of pollutants. 

Second, as Daily Environment reported, the Army Corps of Engineers suspended use of Nationwide Permit 21 for the six states in the Appalachian region, covering Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. The decision means that, at least for now, mountaintop removal mining operations in these states will have to apply for and obtain individual Clean Water Act permits, rather than relying on the Nationwide permit.

Other significant regulatory actions affecting the long-term economics of coal include EPA’s decision to tighten regulation of coal combustion residuals, whether through identification of CCR as a hazardous waste or through regulation under RCRA subtitle D – with the current betting being on listing of CCR as a hazardous waste, and EPA’s Tailoring Rule, which will focus initial regulation of GHG emissions on large stationary sources, the most obvious of which are large coal-fired power plants.

All of these actions are nominally independent, but if anyone thinks that at least the NGOs such as the Center for Biological Diversity and Earthjustice don’t see these as related actions the cumulative goal of which is to end use of coal, they’re just not paying attention. Does Lisa Jackson feel the same way? I doubt she’ll ever tell us, but I think I know the answer.

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Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided, 8-0, in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, that a Florida law which allows the State DEP to fill in submerged land (owned, under Florida law, by the State), and then to cut off the littoral owners’ rights to accretion of the beach front without paying compensation, was not a taking requiring compensation under the 5^th Amendment. The decision was fairly easy, even for the property rights wing of the court, because it concluded that Florida law had always provided for such a result, so that the action by the DEP did not change the private owners’ preexisting rights.

However, the decision masks both continuing deep divisions on the Court concerning Takings Clause issues and confusion, if not incoherence, in the Justices' thinking.  As I noted when the Court took the case, the Court in Lucas distinguished state regulatory action limiting owners’ use of the property from “restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” I think it's a specious distinction. We used to regulate by common law of nuisance. Now we regulate by statute and regulation. Why should the common law be treated differently by the Supreme Court for Takings Clause purposes than statutes or regulations? 

In yesterday’s decision, four members of the Court answered this question. It turns out, according to Justices Scalia, Alioto, Roberts, and Thomas, that judicial changes to the common law may also subject the government to a regulatory takings claim. The reason? It is that, according to Justice Scalia, “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had no power to ‘change’ the common law.” News to me. I hadn’t realized that there was a halcyon day when the common law was fixed and perfect. Thus, it turns out, common law restrictions on property avoid the taking label only if they existed as of the time of the Constitution.

Justices Kennedy, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment (Stevens did not participate), but stated that it was premature to try to determine when judicial decisions might provide grounds for a takings claim. Justice Kennedy did emphasize that the plain language of the Takings Clause does not address what are now known as regulatory takings: 

The Framers most likely viewed this Clause as applying only to physical appropriation pursuant to the power of eminent domain.

Of course, Justice Kennedy is right on this score – a point somehow ignored by Justice Scalia in his originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. 

I normally represent private property owners and there are certainly times when, it appears to me, the government tries to achieve what might be noble objectives on the backs of private owners, simply because it doesn’t want to bear the cost.  Nonetheless, I think that this issue isn’t that complicated and the proper resolution would eliminate most takings claims. If a private use of land unreasonably imposes costs on neighbors or the public, then that use can be restricted, either by courts or by regulatory agencies, without payment of compensation. That type of regulation simply isn’t a taking. And, yes, the definition of “unreasonable” may change over time. That’s life in the big city – or the beachfront. Get over it.

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Last week, EPA released its Clean Watersheds Needs Survey 2008 Report to Congress. I have three immediate reactions to the Report. The first is that there are a lot of needs out there. The Report’s bottom line is that there is currently an expected shortfall of $298 billion over the next 20 years for clean water infrastructure. As Congress turns from short-term stimulus spending to long-term concerns about the deficit, it’s difficult to see Congress being eager to hear National Association of Clean Water Agencies Executive Director Ken Kirk say that

the federal government must become a long-term partner in developing a sustainable funding mechanism to address the growing infrastructure funding gap.

My second reaction is that I’m skeptical of these numbers. I don’t doubt the big picture funding gap, but it’s clear in a quick review that different states report these numbers differently. For example, as readers of this blog know, both EPA and Massachusetts DEP are making big pushes to increase stormwater regulation in Massachusetts. However, the Report states that, while Massachusetts has almost an overall $8 billion shortfall, its stormwater needs are only $41 million. The Report further states that Massachusetts needs literally zero money for stormwater conveyance infrastructure and only $22 million for treatment systems. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, apparently needs $6 billion for stormwater infrastructure. 

As much as I love my adopted state, I’m doubtful that Massachusetts is that far ahead of Pennsylvania. I sure hope that, before spending decisions are made, someone takes a closer look at these numbers.

My third reaction is one of fear, particularly on the stormwater front. Nationally, the overall shortfall associated with stormwater is nearly $43 billion. We’ve already seen in Massachusetts efforts to push stormwater compliance costs onto private landowners. With that sort of shortfall, the pressure to do so can only increase, particularly as local governments are starved for revenue. 

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EPA is proceeding with its plan to establish a new program to regulate stormwater discharges from new development and redevelopment, with a target date for a final rule by November 2012. The next step: the reissuance of draft mandatory questionnaires that, once finalized, will be sent to various stakeholders, including approximately 738,000 owners and developers of residential, industrial and commercial sites. According to EPA, the “target population for the Owner/Developer Questionnaires is all development establishments in the United States,” as defined by 8 NAICS codes (see Part A.4 of EPA’s Supporting Statement for further information on whether your business would be covered).

The questionnaires request detailed information about real estate improvements during the last five years as well as the financial characteristics of development companies and their projects. There are two versions of the Owner/Developer questionnaire, but only the longer version -- which will be sent to “selected recipients” -- seems to address the types of stormwater controls actually used, or the cost of those controls, in any detail. Thus, while the longer questionnaire will present an additional burden for its recipients, it will also allow developers to report key information for the regulated community, including the cost-effectiveness and context of stormwater controls (e.g. soil types, urban vs. rural settings). 

Among other stakeholder groups, EPA will also send questionnaires to owners and operators of municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) and to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authorities. That means that one party that apparently won’t have to fill out a questionnaire is the Massachusetts DEP, which, along with 4 other states and the District of Columbia, does not have NPDES permitting authority. Particularly in light of MA DEP’s own recent stormwater proposal, EPA might consider asking all state environmental authorities about the scope of their current and planned regulatory efforts with respect to stormwater, so as to better coordinate state and federal programs. 

We’re pleased that EPA is making an effort to base its regulatory proposal on good information. Nevertheless, developers should watch the rulemaking process carefully between now and 2012. The 30 day public comment period on the draft questionnaires ends June 9, 2010.

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EPA Region 1 continues to roll out new programs on the stormwater front, and this week’s development is particularly important for private property owners in the Charles River watershed. The agency released proposed amendments to the Residual Designation for the Charles River (“RDA”) and a Draft General Permit for Residually Designated Discharges. While the proposed permit only affects the Massachusetts communities of Milford, Bellingham, and Franklin, EPA has stated that it may expand the General Permit to include other Charles River communities in the future, so property owners along the entire length of the Charles River should be paying attention.

The full set of materials can be found on the EPA’s website, but here are a few highlights: 

2-acre threshold: “Designated Discharges” covered by the permit consist of two or more acres of privately-owned impervious surfaces. (Many publicly-owned properties located in the Charles River basin will be subject to the Massachusetts North Coastal Small MS4 General Permit, released in draft by EPA Region 1 earlier this year.)

Aggregation: As those of you following stormwater issues in Massachusetts are aware, the first draft of the RDA was linked to the proposed state stormwater regulations, which included an “aggregation rule” with a number of onerous consequences. The amended RDA and the draft General permit are no longer connected to the stalled state regulations, but they still include the concept of requiring a single permit for contiguous but separately owned properties that share stormwater controls. Fortunately, unlike the state proposal, each co-permittee will only be responsible for ensuring compliance for “all terms and conditions of this permit applicable to the activities that it controls or has the right to control.”

Permit requirements: The draft permit includes a series of stormwater control requirements including a 65% phosphorus load reduction target (derived from the Lower Charles River TMDL) that permittees can implement on-site through structural or non-structural controls or through a “Certified Municipal Phosphorus Program.”

Comments are due June 30. We expect EPA to take a lot less time to finalize these documents than MassDEP has taken to finalize its own stormwater program.  

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Last week, EPA proposed to veto a permit for the No. 1 Spruce Mine in West Virginia. Yesterday, EPA went much farther, announcing new guidance – effective immediately – which will impose numeric water quality based effluent limits, or WQBELs, on effluent from surface mining projects. EPA has at least tentatively concluded that high conductivity resulting from discharges of mountaintop fill has adversely affected streams downstream of surface mining operations.

The guidance is fairly straightforward – and for those to whom is it not sufficiently simple, EPA has provided a six-page summary version. Basically, EPA has concluded that permits for mountaintop mining must contain WQBELs that will ensure that in-stream conductivity levels do not exceed 500 microsiemens per centimeter (500 uS/cm). If modeling suggests that mining activities will result in any level above 300 uS/cm, “EPA should work with the permitting authority to ensure that the permit includes conditions that protect against conductivity levels exceeding 500 uS/cm.”

If you’re wondering what those levels mean and how big an impact the requirement to impose WQBELs will have, E&E Daily reported that EPA Administrator Jackson stated last evening that there are "no or very few valley fills that are going to meet this standard."

Though the guidance is effective immediately, EPA is characterizing it as a proposal and will take comment until December 1, 2010.

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Last week, I noted that Gina McCarthy, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, suggested that, in the short run, the most significant pressure on inefficient energy sources would come, not from climate change legislation or from EPA GHG regulations, but instead from all of the conventional pollutant regulations that EPA expects to promulgate that will make use of coal much more expensive. While Gina was referring to a variety of air regulations, such as CAIR, MACT rules, and SIP revisions following a more stringent PM standard, even Gina may have been too narrowly focused. Today, EPA announced that it was proposing to veto a mountaintop mining permit issued to the Spruce No. 1 Surface Mine, in West Virginia.

The proposed veto was based on a number of interrelated concerns, including impacts on water quality and fish and wildlife, an inadequate mitigation plan, and the cumulative impacts of Spruce No. 1 and other mining operations in the aptly named Coal River basin. The cumulative impact issue must, by itself, terrify mine owners.

I’m sure that EPA made this decision (rightly or wrongly) on the merits under the Clean Water Act. Nonetheless, does anyone think that Gina McCarthy - and Administrator Jackson - are not aware of the broader picture? Even if they were not, the environmental organizations that are looking to end use of coal certainly are. When one piles CAIR and mercury and increasingly stringent particular standards on top of limitations on mountaintop mining, the phrase that occurs to me is indeed “cumulative impact.” However, it’s the cumulative impact of all of these regulations and regulatory decisions on those using – or financing – coal plants that set me thinking. Perhaps that’s why a separate story in today’s GreenWire was headlined “Coal: Outlook grim for new power plants”

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Those of us who advise clients regarding compliance with environmental regulations have often been in the awkward position of agreeing with clients that the agency position is, shall we say, misguided, yet at the same time advising against legal challenge, because the judicial review deck is stacked so heavily in favor of the agency. (In another time or place, one might ask why this is so.)

Nevertheless, occasionally, the agency loses and, when it does, that loss can be instructive. Yesterday, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that MassDEP may not impose conditions on registrations under the Water Management Act without first promulgating regulations to guide its discretion in imposing such conditions.

Under the WMA, withdrawals existing as of the date of Act were grandfathered and persons with such withdrawals are allowed to maintain them by registering the withdrawal with MassDEP. Such registrations must be renewed periodically, but MassDEP may not reduce the size of the withdrawal. (New or increased withdrawals, on the other hand, require a permit and are subject to more stringent regulation.)

In the last round of registration renewals, MassDEP began imposing conditions on the registrations in order to increase water conservation. However, while the statute authorizes MassDEP to impose conditions on permits, similar language does not exist with respect to registrations. 

The SJC spent some time discussing MassDEP’s authority to promulgate regulations that would impose conservation requirements on registrants, but made clear that the plain language of the statute did not seem to authorize MassDEP to impose conditions on registrants absent regulations.

What’s the lesson here? With respect to the WMA, it’s “no shortcuts.” If MassDEP wants to impose conservation requirements on registrants, it must do so pursuant to validly promulgated regulations. What’s the broader lesson? Challenging the agency may be an uphill battle, but legislative language does matter and, where the language is clear, the courts will – at least sometimes – enforce it.

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Earlier this week, Energy & Environmental Affairs Secretary Ian Bowles announced the release of the nation’s first ocean management plan. The plan is similar, but not identical to, the draft plan issued last July. Here are the highlights

A Prohibited Area off the coast of the Cape Cod National Seashore, where most uses will be – you guessed it – prohibited

Multi-Use Areas, constituting approximately two-thirds of the planning area, where uses will be permitted if they comply with stringent standards for protecting marine resources

Renewable Energy Areas, where commercial- and community-scale wind projects have been found to be appropriate.

One significant element of the final plan, and one highlighted in Secretary Bowles’s press release, is that, where projects are proposed in areas including sensitive marine resources, it will be presumed that an alternative project outside the resource area would be less environmentally damaging. Project proponents would have to meet a balancing test, demonstrating that the project has public benefits which outweigh the detriment to the resource.

It’s going to take some time to digest the entire plan. However, most of the nation outside Houston has accepted the concept of zoning on land for almost 100 years – and land-based zoning affects private property. It’s difficult to argue with the concept that the Commonwealth should plan for resources – state waters – that it does own. In addition, having a defined framework for reviewing proposals to utilize state waters should help remove some of the uncertainty associated with the current ad hoc review that necessarily occurs in the absence of a plan. 

Deerin Babb-Brott – time to take a well-earned vacation!

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Yesterday, EPA released its effluent guidelines for construction sites. The guidelines establish the first national standard containing numeric limitations on stormwater discharges. The final standard imposed is 280 nephelometric turbidity units. It will apply to all construction sites greater than 20 acres in size as of 18 months following the effective date of the regulations (which will be 60 days after Federal Register promulgation) and sites larger than 10 acres 4 years after the effective date.

As expected, EPA did not take NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance up on their suggestion that EPA impose post-construction controls. However, since EPA has already signaled that its long-term plan is to impose stormwater controls beyond the current universe of industry and construction sites, it seems at this point that broader stormwater regulation by EPA is more a question of when than whether.

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Public and private developers spend a lot of time talking about NIMBY, or Not In My Backyard. With the increasing number of coastal development projects, ranging from wind farms to LNG facilities to plans for casinos, we should perhaps be talking about another acronym: NIMO, or Not In My Ocean. Yesterday, a decision from the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Weaver's Cove LNG v. Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council gave some hope that NIMO will not mean that states can simply squelch development of ocean resources.

Weaver’s Cove, as originally proposed in 2003, was to be an LNG terminal  located up the Taunton River, in Fall River, Massachusetts. To address safety and related concerns, the proposal has been moved off-shore.

The only element of the project that is subject to the jurisdiction of Rhode Island authorities is dredging that would be necessary in Rhode Island waters. That dredging requires a federal consistency determination by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council, or CRMC. In addition, Rhode Island state law requires that the CRMC provide a license to the project, known as an Assent. Here, the CRMC refused to provide either the federal consistency determination or the state law Assent. Weaver’s Cove LNG sued, won in the District Court, and won again yesterday at the Court of Appeals.

The facts of the case are complicated and the Court limited the decision as far as it could to the case-specific facts. Nonetheless, there are two points to be gleaned from the decision that may be of broader import

The Coastal Zone Management Act contains a provision, specifically intended to prevent states from frustrating the purposes of the CZMA, which provides that, if a state fails to act on a consistency request within six months, the state’s concurrence is “conclusively presumed.” Here, Rhode Island argued that the clock hadn’t begun to run, because Weavers’ Cove hadn’t provided all of the information necessary for CRMC to make a consistency finding. The Court didn’t buy it. Again, the facts here won’t translate to other cases, but what will transfer is the Court’s refusal simply to accept Rhode Island’s request that the Court defer to a state agency’s interpretation of its own law. Calling the CRMC’s interpretation of Rhode Island law “untenable” and “clearly erroneous,” the Court rejected it and held that, because of the CRMC’s failure to act, consistency would indeed be “conclusively presumed.”

Perhaps even more significantly, the Court concluded that the Rhode Island law which would require that the CRMC issue an Assent before the project could move forward is preempted by the Natural Gas Act (NGA). While the Court did not find that the NGA explicitly preempted Rhode Island law or that it occupied the field, it did conclude that, in this case, state law conflicted with the NGA. 

Notwithstanding the Court’s efforts to limit its preemption holding, I think it will provide grist for preemption arguments in other cases, as will its reluctance to defer to state agency interpretation of state law, where such deference might create obstacles to the accomplishment of federal objectives.

It’s too much to say that this decision represents the end of NIMO. However, it’s also difficult to see this as totally abstracted from an awareness by the Court of the delays experienced by the Cape Wind project. We’ve got to figure out a way to get to an answer more quickly. The answer my be “no” to some projects, but it shouldn’t take six years to get an answer.

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On Tuesday, EPA announced its intention to issue new effluent guidelines for the Steam Electric Power Generating industry by sometime in 2012. The announcement follows an EPA study in 2008 which indicated that toxic metals, particularly those collected as part of flue gas desulfurization processes, can pose a problem in facility effluent. EPA’s announcement is not particularly surprising, given the ongoing study and given that EPA has not revised the guidelines since 1982. Indeed, notwithstanding EPA’s announcement, Environmental Integrity Project, Defenders of Wildlife and Sierra Club announced that they would still sue EPA over its failure to timely update the guidelines.

There are two reasons why this announcement is significant beyond just its implications for effluent discharges from these facilities. First, it’s hard to see EPA’s announcement – and the threat of NGO litigation – as anything other than another bullet aimed squarely at the coal industry. From climate change, to attacks on mountaintop removal, to the reaction to the TVA spill, to this effort to make the effluent guidelines more stringent, there is no doubt that coal is in the cross-hairs at the moment. If there are any doubters concerning this point, Duke Energy CEO Jim Rogers isn’t among them. He was quoted in this morning’s Energy & Environment Daily as saying that it is at least possible to envision a world in 2050 “where coal is not in the equation.”

The other reason why this announcement is significant is that it raises fairly squarely the question regarding the very structure of our current regulatory system.  It’s not really any more than happenstance and political convenience that we regulate different environmental media differently. In this context, it is noteworthy that EPA’s Science Advisory Board just recommended that EPA consider setting multi-pollutant standards under the Clean Air Act, rather than regulating each pollutant separately. Theoretically, that’s good as far as it goes, but it doesn’t really solve the problem of the balkanization of EPA’s different regulatory programs.  In the long run, EPA’s regulatory efforts would be much more cost-effective – and would probably garner much more public support – if they were rationally based on an overall assessment of risk, across pollutants and across media.

I’m not holding my breath.

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Although not breaking any new ground, a decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court last week provides a helpful summary of the discretion typically given to MassDEP in making permitting decisions. In Healer v. Department of Environmental Protection, abutters to a proposed wastewater treatment facility in Falmouth sued MassDEP, claiming that the groundwater discharge from the leach field associated with the facility would damage drinking water supplies and nearby wetlands. The Court affirmed the MassDEP Commissioner’s rejection of the abutters’ challenge.

As the Court noted

the “applicable standard of review is “highly deferential to the agency” and requires the reviewing court to accord “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it…. We give deference to the decision of an agency interpreting its own regulations … [and] do not intrude lightly within the agency’s area of expertise, as long as the regulations are interpreted with reference to their purpose and to the purpose and design of the controlling statute.”

As if that were not enough of a nod towards agency deference, the Court also noted, in the context of the plaintiffs’’ challenge to the monitoring requirements imposed in the permit, that

The Legislature “has chosen to put into the hands of an expert administrative agency the decision making regarding complex issues of environmental … science…, and has allowed the agency considerable discretion in determining monitoring of applicable parameters in order to carry out its duty….

Finally, the Court made at least one statement about the plaintiffs’ affirmative case that is sure to be cited by MassDEP and permittees in future citizen suits. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that toxic household chemicals might cause environmental damage, the Court stated that the “regulations do not require the department to establish permit conditions based on the plaintiffs’ speculative concerns.”

So, what’s the upshot of Healer? It certainly confirms that, as a general matter, courts are not going to reverse agency decisions unless they seem really off-the-wall.  On the other hand, it remains true that MassDEP does not always win and my own jaded view is that courts remain willing to reverse MassDEP, even when deference would require that the court affirm the agency, if the agency decision somehow rubs the court the wrong way.

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Construction and development companies praying for an economic recovery next year have something else to worry about: pending new EPA regulations regarding stormwater discharges from construction activities – and claims from environmental groups that EPA’s proposal isn’t stringent enough.

EPA issued a proposal on November 28, 2008. That proposal is complex, but the aspect of it that has received the most attention is the requirement that certain construction sites greater than 30 acres meet numerical turbidity limits (specifically, 13 nephelometric turbidity units (NTUs), which I had to include in this post just because it sounds so cool). Developers have opposed the numeric limits; the National Association of Home Builders estimates that the cost to comply would be $15,000 to $45,000 per acre.

On the other hand, the NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have threatened to sue EPA if EPA does not revise the propose rule to include post-construction controls as part of the rule. EPA has stated that it is not planning to do so. It’s not obvious that NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have the better of this specific debate, but the argument regarding post-construction controls is similar to the ongoing discussion in Massachusetts and elsewhere regarding the need for ongoing stormwater controls at properties other than industrial facilities that are already regulated.

The issue is not going to go away.  EPA is under a deadline to issue the rule by December 1, 2009.

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This week, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs announced release of the draft Ocean Management Plan, developed pursuant to the Oceans Act of 2008. The draft Plan has gotten most press for its identification of specific areas for off-shore wind energy development – as well as its prohibition of wind farms in other areas, including the area of the proposed Buzzards Bay wind farm. EOEEA Secretary Ian Bowles was quoted as saying that Buzzards Bay is too crowded and sensitive for the development of large-scale wind farms.

The Plan is about much more than wind farms, however. It really is zoning brought off-shore. There are areas where certain uses are prohibited, areas in which uses are encouraged, and other areas that will be subject to performance standards to determine whether specific uses should be allowed. Where uses are at least conceptually allowed, there will be provisions to protect sensitive areas, including a provision that requires proponents of uses in such areas to “avoid, or demonstrate that there is no less damaging practicable alternative, or demonstrate that data does not accurately characterize the resource or use.”

The Plan is important for several reasons:

The breadth of its application

The effort to integrate ocean planning with the Commonwealth’s climate change agenda

Its potential precedential effect on other states and nascent federal ocean zoning efforts

Public hearings on the Plan will be held in September, though they have not yet been scheduled. Even in advance of the hearings, comments on the Plan can be submitted here. The schedule calls for the final Plan to be issued by December 31, 2009.

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As we previously noted, last fall Massachusetts proposed sweeping new regulations designed to reduce phosphorus discharges in stormwater. In response to a very large number of comments, MassDEP is taking a second look at the regulations, though the bookies in Las Vegas are laying odds against there being any significant changes made when the regulations reappear.

Now Maryland is also getting into the act, although it is taking a slightly different approach. Under a statute enacted in 2007, developers in Maryland must incorporate the concept of “environmental site design” into their plans. ESD means

using small-scale stormwater management practices, nonstructural techniques, and better site planning to mimic natural hydrologic runoff characteristics and minimize the impact of land development on water resources.

The Maryland statute will be enforced by counties and municipalities. Therefore, the Maryland Department of the Environment has released a Model Stormwater Management Ordinance for use by local governments in implementing the statute.

As one of the contentious issues in the Massachusetts debate has been when redevelopment would subject a property to the requirements of the regulations, it is notable that the Maryland ordinance defines redevelopment as

any construction, alteration, or improvement performed on sites where existing land use is commercial, industrial, institutional, or multifamily residential and existing site impervious area exceeds 40 percent. [Emphasis added.]

To that, I can only say, uh-oh.

One final note on stormwater – Oregon just enacted legislation limiting the phosphorus content of certain soaps.  This is not significant in its own right. However, in Massachusetts, many of the comments from developers and industrial interests noted that the types of stormwater controls proposed by MassDEP may not be the most cost-effective way to reduce nutrient loading to water bodies, and specifically suggested that programs targeted at consumers using products containing nutrients might be a better way to attack the problem in the first instance.

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I know it’s hard to believe, but some of you may not have realized that today is World Oceans Day. In connection with World Oceans Day, Senator Jay Rockefeller has written a letter to the White House in support of the concept of “ocean zoning.” Senator Rockefeller will also be holding hearings on the issue tomorrow. Among those testifying will be Deerin Babb-Brott, who is the Assistant Secretary in the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs and is in charge of Massachusetts’ first in the nation ocean zoning effort.

The Massachusetts effort is based on the Oceans Act of 2008, which called for development of a comprehensive ocean management plan. In other words, ocean zoning. Since enactment of the Act, EOEEA has been working on developing the required plan, with assistance from the Ocean Advisory Commission, which was created by the Act to help guide EOEEA’s development of the plan. The plan has yet to issue and, based on recent documents from EOEEA, it may be some time before the final plan sees the light of day.

Notwithstanding the complexities of the issue – or perhaps because of them – Senator Rockefeller apparently believes that federal ocean zoning would be appropriate. He may be right. Issues such as renewable energy and deepwater aquaculture may be of local concern, but do we really want a patchwork of local laws and regulations dictating policy on issues of broad national concern?  If we go that route, it won’t be very long before there is a yet more complicated set of exemptions and preemptions.

I’m sure that Deerin will not be advocating federal preemption of local ocean zoning efforts, but there is a part of me that hopes that Deerin’s testimony is so effective that he talks himself out of a job.

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Particularly this week, one needs to make a conscious effort to remember that it is not “all climate, all the time” on the environmental front. While climate change is obviously the President’s top priority at the moment, the administration did take the time this week to send letters to congressional leaders voicing the its support for amendments to the Clean Water Act to eliminate uncertainty concerning the Act’s scope following the Supreme Court decision in Rapanos. 

While the administration has not provided suggested statutory revisions, the letters state that: “It is essential that the Clean Water Act provide broad protection of the nation's waters, consistent with full congressional authority under the Constitution.” This suggests that the administration might look kindly on the simple fix proposed under the Clean Water Restoration Act, , S. 787, which would basically just substitute “waters of the United States” for “navigable waters of the United States” wherever it appears in the Act.

There is no doubt that such legislation would reduce uncertainty regarding the scope of the CWA, which is unambiguously a good thing.  Whether there is a way to reduce uncertainty without expanding the scope of the Act’s jurisdiction to the full scope permitted under the Constitution, and whether such an expansion would be wise policy, are questions that neither the administration nor congressional Democrats appear to be asking at this point.

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In an statement this week likely to send chills down the spine of developers, EPA Administrator Jackson called on Congress to provide a clearer definition of wetlands subject to permitting authority under the Clean Water Act. As most readers know, the 2006 Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States narrowed the scope of regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands. Unfortunately, the absence of a majority decision in Rapanos means that, at this point, no one knows quite how much narrower. I think that most observers at least triangulate around Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which stated that waters or wetlands with a “significant nexus” to waters that are navigable in fact should be subject to regulation. However, uncertainty abounds.

Uncertainty imposes significant costs on regulated entities (not to mention EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers). Therefore, a statutory fix that simply eliminated uncertainty would probably be welcomed by the regulated community. Of course, the devil is in the details. If the uncertainty is eliminated by subjecting any land that is ever wet to the CWA, such legislation would probably not be welcomed by developers.  Jackson’s statement that “I believe that the country benefits from something broader rather than narrower” is not likely to assuage developers’ concerns.

Time will tell whether compromise is possible in order to eliminate uncertainty that benefits no one.

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As many readers of this blog will have already learned, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Entergy v. Riverkeeper yesterday. The Court reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and held that EPA was within its authority to consider cost-benefit analysis in setting standards for cooling water intake structures under § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act.

I’m definitely getting on my soapbox here, but this should not be news and it should not be controversial – though I certainly realize that it is. If current conditions tell us anything, it is that resources are not infinite. The irony here is that it is environmentalists who tend to make this point most frequently. Unfortunately, they don’t like to acknowledge that, because resources are not infinite, cost-benefit decisions get made implicitly, even when EPA does not utilize cost-benefit analysis in its regulations.

When I was just a poor Superfund lawyer, I attended a public meeting in Somersworth, New Hampshire, as local residents tried in vain to persuade EPA that they could save more lives by installing traffic signals and hiring public safety personnel than by spending millions of dollars cleaning up an old landfill to the nth degree. The simple truth is that when we force regulated industries to incur costs without regard to the associated benefits, other spending gets displaced. It may be better to have power plant owners spend money on closed cycle cooling than on worker health benefits or, God forbid, payments to shareholders, but let’s make the decision honestly and not ignore the trade-offs.

I still don’t understand why the debate can’t be about how fairly to define costs and benefits. There are serious issues here, but there’s certainly no free lunch. I posted recently about my disappointment regarding early indications that the Obama administration will not be a friend to common sense regulatory reform. The same issues arise here. The Obama administration, because of its undoubted credibility, could advance the cause of cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. I fear it is not going to happen.

For the same reason, it’s quite possible that the Riverkeeper decision may be much ado about nothing. Riverkeeper holds that EPA may consider costs and benefits, but does not require it. Environmentalists are already clamoring for EPA to rewrite the 316(b) rules and I wouldn’t be surprised if the agency does so.

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This week, the practice of mountaintop removal – chopping the tops off mountains in order extract the coal – received two blows: one from EPA and one from Congress. First, EPA offices Region 3 and Region 4 announced that they plans to assess the Central Appalachia Mining's Big Branch project in Pike County, Ky., and the Highland Mining Company's Reylas mine in Logan County, W.Va., before permits are issued for those projects. 

Although the broad brush is important here, so are some of the details. First, both letters raise concerns about the cumulative impacts of multiple mountaintop removal projects. Second, the Region 3 letter raises the possibility that EPA might use its authority under section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act to prohibit issuance of the required permit, noting that the “extensive cumulative and other impacts give this proposed project high potential” for action under § 404(c).  

The second blow was the introduction in Congress of legislation that would prohibit mountaintop removal. Of course, introduction doesn’t guarantee passage, but it does seem notable that one of the two sponsors is Lamar Alexander, both a Republican and a Senator from a coal mining state. Senator Alexander’s support suggests that a tipping point may have been reached on this issue.

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Demonstrating that the recent announcement of new stormwater controls for the Charles River in Massachusetts were not an aberration, EPA, joining with the Maine DEP, announced last Friday that it will be imposing new stormwater regulations for discharges into Long Creek, which ultimately flows into Casco Bay.

Responding to petitions from the Conservation Law Foundation, EPA has exercised its Residual Designation Authority under its NPDES permitting regulations.

The new designation can be found on EPA’s website. Notably, the new program will apply to impervious surfaces larger than one acre. This is a smaller area than is currently proposed for the Charles River. EPA estimates that regulating impervious surfaces one acre and up will place 90% of all impervious area in the Long Creek watershed under NPDES jurisdiction.

Owners of properties in other degraded watersheds, you may be next on the list.

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Although some of you may think that the regulatory agencies are now all climate change all the time, Massachusetts DEP has demonstrated that there is still life in some more traditional aspects of environmental regulation. MassDEP has just proposed sweeping new stormwater regulations that would go far beyond the traditional EPA model of regulating construction sites and stormwater discharges from industrial facilities.

DEP’s proposal is far too detailed for a blog post. For those interested in this issue, take a look at the client alert we issued, which hits the big issues. One big-picture item to note: There certainly seems to be something of a competition brewing between EPA and DEP regarding regulations of stormwater. 

Anyone who has at least 5 – and perhaps at least 2 – acres of impervious surface should certainly consider commenting on the regulations when they are formally issued for public comment.

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On September 22, EPA issued a new Stormwater Multi-Sector General Permit (MSGP) to cover 4,100 facilities with discharges associated with an industrial activity. The permit replaces the MSGP that was issued in 2000 and expired in October 2005. The expired permit continued to be valid for facilities that were covered by the permit at the time it expired.

The new permit applies to states not authorized to implement EPA’s NPDES program, including Massachusetts and New Hampshire. It will be effective as of September 29, 2008.

Although EPA claims of regulatory reform sometimes ring hollow, the new MSGP truly does seem to be an improvement over the prior MSGP for industrial facilities. One significant improvement is that permit now separates technical requirements for effluent limitations from the requirement to prepare and implement stormwater pollution prevention plans (SWPPP). Importantly, EPA has clarified that a SWPPP is not an effluent limitation. Therefore, industrial facilities may amend SWPPP without EPA approval. More important, because the SWPPP is not an effluent limitation, noncompliance with the SWPPP will not subject a permittee to claims that he/she has violated an effluent limitation (though noncompliance with a SWPPP may be a violation of a record-keeping requirement).

EPA has also significantly streamlined its filing and compliance systems. First, notice of intent to be covered by the MSGP may be made electronically, through a new “eNOI” system. Second, EPA has created a “Water Locator” tool, which will enable facilities to obtained certain relevant information, such as applicable total maximum daily loads, or TMDLs, on-line. Facilities will also be able to provide required monitoring data on-line.

In short, while the new permit may not eliminate any substantive complaints that industrial facilities may have with EPA’s stormwater program, it should reduce transaction costs associated with compliance.

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