Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

I’ve been waiting to write this headline ever since the SJC took this case. Today, the SJC issued its long-awaited decision in Moot v. Department of Environmental Protection. For those of you who pay attention to where the waters ebbeth and floweth – or at least where they ebbed and flowed in 1641 – you know that this is the second time that Moot has been before the SJC.

After the SJC struck down MassDEP regulations which provided that landlocked tidelands did not need a license under Chapter 91, as the Commonwealth’s waterways statute is now known, the Legislature took a shot at fixing what would have been a major problem by passing new legislation specifically excluding landlocked tidelands from the need to obtain a license. 

Moot challenged the legislation, arguing that it completely relinquished all of the Commonwealth’s rights in private tidelands, without making the findings necessary to justify such a relinquishment. The SJC did not agree. The Court concluded that the Commonwealth has preserved its rights in landlocked tidelands, and noted that projects subject to MEPA must address project impacts on the Commonwealth’s tideland rights. In essence, the Court concluded that the oversight provided by MEPA was sufficient to demonstrate that the Commonwealth could and would still enforce its rights in landlocked tidelands. Since those rights are still protected, the Court concluded, the Legislature had authority to exclude landlocked tidelands from the need to obtain a license under Chapter 91. 

This is clearly the right result. The only question in my mind is the gymnastics that the Court had to go through to get there. The Court may have concluded that the Commonwealth has not relinquished all of its rights in landlocked tidelands, but does anyone think that the MEPA process will ever result in developers being required to make changes to their projects to protect those rights? I sure hope not. Certainly, the first developer forced to do anything different as a result of that process is not going to be a happy camper. It would have been cleaner for the SJC to acknowledge that the Legislature was effectively relinquishing the public’s rights in landlocked tidelands and to affirm that act. Nonetheless, this decision pretty much did what was needed and a large number of landowners – not just the developers defending this case – are breathing a lot easier this afternoon.

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Earlier this week, Energy & Environmental Affairs Secretary Ian Bowles announced the release of the nation’s first ocean management plan. The plan is similar, but not identical to, the draft plan issued last July. Here are the highlights

A Prohibited Area off the coast of the Cape Cod National Seashore, where most uses will be – you guessed it – prohibited

Multi-Use Areas, constituting approximately two-thirds of the planning area, where uses will be permitted if they comply with stringent standards for protecting marine resources

Renewable Energy Areas, where commercial- and community-scale wind projects have been found to be appropriate.

One significant element of the final plan, and one highlighted in Secretary Bowles’s press release, is that, where projects are proposed in areas including sensitive marine resources, it will be presumed that an alternative project outside the resource area would be less environmentally damaging. Project proponents would have to meet a balancing test, demonstrating that the project has public benefits which outweigh the detriment to the resource.

It’s going to take some time to digest the entire plan. However, most of the nation outside Houston has accepted the concept of zoning on land for almost 100 years – and land-based zoning affects private property. It’s difficult to argue with the concept that the Commonwealth should plan for resources – state waters – that it does own. In addition, having a defined framework for reviewing proposals to utilize state waters should help remove some of the uncertainty associated with the current ad hoc review that necessarily occurs in the absence of a plan. 

Deerin Babb-Brott – time to take a well-earned vacation!

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Public and private developers spend a lot of time talking about NIMBY, or Not In My Backyard. With the increasing number of coastal development projects, ranging from wind farms to LNG facilities to plans for casinos, we should perhaps be talking about another acronym: NIMO, or Not In My Ocean. Yesterday, a decision from the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Weaver's Cove LNG v. Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council gave some hope that NIMO will not mean that states can simply squelch development of ocean resources.

Weaver’s Cove, as originally proposed in 2003, was to be an LNG terminal  located up the Taunton River, in Fall River, Massachusetts. To address safety and related concerns, the proposal has been moved off-shore.

The only element of the project that is subject to the jurisdiction of Rhode Island authorities is dredging that would be necessary in Rhode Island waters. That dredging requires a federal consistency determination by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council, or CRMC. In addition, Rhode Island state law requires that the CRMC provide a license to the project, known as an Assent. Here, the CRMC refused to provide either the federal consistency determination or the state law Assent. Weaver’s Cove LNG sued, won in the District Court, and won again yesterday at the Court of Appeals.

The facts of the case are complicated and the Court limited the decision as far as it could to the case-specific facts. Nonetheless, there are two points to be gleaned from the decision that may be of broader import

The Coastal Zone Management Act contains a provision, specifically intended to prevent states from frustrating the purposes of the CZMA, which provides that, if a state fails to act on a consistency request within six months, the state’s concurrence is “conclusively presumed.” Here, Rhode Island argued that the clock hadn’t begun to run, because Weavers’ Cove hadn’t provided all of the information necessary for CRMC to make a consistency finding. The Court didn’t buy it. Again, the facts here won’t translate to other cases, but what will transfer is the Court’s refusal simply to accept Rhode Island’s request that the Court defer to a state agency’s interpretation of its own law. Calling the CRMC’s interpretation of Rhode Island law “untenable” and “clearly erroneous,” the Court rejected it and held that, because of the CRMC’s failure to act, consistency would indeed be “conclusively presumed.”

Perhaps even more significantly, the Court concluded that the Rhode Island law which would require that the CRMC issue an Assent before the project could move forward is preempted by the Natural Gas Act (NGA). While the Court did not find that the NGA explicitly preempted Rhode Island law or that it occupied the field, it did conclude that, in this case, state law conflicted with the NGA. 

Notwithstanding the Court’s efforts to limit its preemption holding, I think it will provide grist for preemption arguments in other cases, as will its reluctance to defer to state agency interpretation of state law, where such deference might create obstacles to the accomplishment of federal objectives.

It’s too much to say that this decision represents the end of NIMO. However, it’s also difficult to see this as totally abstracted from an awareness by the Court of the delays experienced by the Cape Wind project. We’ve got to figure out a way to get to an answer more quickly. The answer my be “no” to some projects, but it shouldn’t take six years to get an answer.

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In 1992, in South Carolina Coastal Council v. Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a state statute or regulation that denies a property owner all economic use of her property requires payment of just compensation under the Takings Clause. The Court distinguished statutes and regulations from restrictions inherent in background principles of the common law of nuisance – the latter types of restrictions do not require just compensation.

The Supreme Court announced earlier this week that in the fall 2009 term it will hear another, similar, property rights case. The Court will hear an appeal of a decision by the Florida Supreme Court holding that a beach erosion control statute did not unconstitutionally deprive landowners of their property rights without just compensation. 

The facts in Stop the Beach Replenishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection are somewhat obscure and relate specifically to the consequences of beach replenishment in Florida. However, it again does raise the question of how the Supreme Court treats statutes. Prior to the 1960s, governments pretty much regulated nuisances pursuant to common law police power. Apparently, exercise of such power has the constitutional blessing of the Supreme Court.

On the other hand – to note the obvious – since the 1960s, across the gamut of environmental police power issues, use of statute and regulation has overtaken reliance on the common law. For some reason, however, constitutional jurisprudence has not caught up with reality on the ground. The whole idea of the common law is that it is flexible and changes over time. Is there any doubt that, had there not been an explosion of environmental statutes and regulations, there would have been an explosion in the development of the common law of nuisance? It seems near certain that courts would have identified numerous additional uses of property over the past 40 years that would now be considered nuisances.

Why should the same regulatory outcome require compensation if taken pursuant to statute or regulations, but not if it occurs as a result of judge-made common law?   

(In the interests of full disclosure, the broad question of how courts treat statutes, as opposed to the otherwise developing common law, was raised by my then-Professor Guido Calabresi in his 1982 book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes.  Judge Calabresi, your student has not forgotten.)

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I know it’s hard to believe, but some of you may not have realized that today is World Oceans Day. In connection with World Oceans Day, Senator Jay Rockefeller has written a letter to the White House in support of the concept of “ocean zoning.” Senator Rockefeller will also be holding hearings on the issue tomorrow. Among those testifying will be Deerin Babb-Brott, who is the Assistant Secretary in the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs and is in charge of Massachusetts’ first in the nation ocean zoning effort.

The Massachusetts effort is based on the Oceans Act of 2008, which called for development of a comprehensive ocean management plan. In other words, ocean zoning. Since enactment of the Act, EOEEA has been working on developing the required plan, with assistance from the Ocean Advisory Commission, which was created by the Act to help guide EOEEA’s development of the plan. The plan has yet to issue and, based on recent documents from EOEEA, it may be some time before the final plan sees the light of day.

Notwithstanding the complexities of the issue – or perhaps because of them – Senator Rockefeller apparently believes that federal ocean zoning would be appropriate. He may be right. Issues such as renewable energy and deepwater aquaculture may be of local concern, but do we really want a patchwork of local laws and regulations dictating policy on issues of broad national concern?  If we go that route, it won’t be very long before there is a yet more complicated set of exemptions and preemptions.

I’m sure that Deerin will not be advocating federal preemption of local ocean zoning efforts, but there is a part of me that hopes that Deerin’s testimony is so effective that he talks himself out of a job.

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In December, I posted about the decision in Canton v. Paiewonsky, in which Judge Fabricant held that a party seeking to challenge the certificate of the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs approving an Environmental Impact Report must do so within 30 days of issuance of the first permit for a project – even if the plaintiff’s concerns about the project are totally unrelated to that permit and the plaintiff would not be harmed by issuance of the permit. As before, I’ll provide the disclaimer that this firm represents the plaintiff in the Canton case.

That acknowledgment aside, it is difficult to read today’s Appeals Court opinion in Hertz v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs as saying anything other than that Judge Fabricant got it wrong. Hertz is technically not even a decision about MEPA. The plaintiffs in Hertz challenged an amendment to a municipal harbor plan. The Appeals Court ruled that they did not have standing, notwithstanding that they abutted the property that was the subject of the amendment to the plan, because they did not suffer a particularized harm that was protected by the municipal harbor plan process.

What is most interesting about the decision in Hertz is that, even though it is not a MEPA case, the Court’s analysis focused on the Supreme Judicial Court decision in Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs – which is a MEPA decision and which is the case on which the Town of Canton relied for the argument its suit was timely. Reading the opinion in Hertz together with Enos, the conclusion seems clear that, had Canton sued to challenge the adequacy of the EIR upon issuance of the first permit issued to the project, Canton’s inability to allege that the issuance of the permit would cause it to suffer particularized harm would have meant that the suit would have been dismissed for lack of standing. That being the case, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run on issuance of the first permit; the statute of limitations has to begin to run on issuance of the permit about which the plaintiff is complaining, because only then has the plaintiff suffered a harm sufficient to provide it with standing to sue.

We’ll see what the SJC does with the appeal in Canton, but it still seems here that the better reading of the MEPA statute is that the statute of limitations for a suit challenging a certificate on an EIR must begin to run when the permit that is the subject of the plaintiff’s concern is issued, rather than when the first permit is issued, regardless of whether the plaintiff has any concerns about that first permit.

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