Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

Yesterday, EPA released its effluent guidelines for construction sites. The guidelines establish the first national standard containing numeric limitations on stormwater discharges. The final standard imposed is 280 nephelometric turbidity units. It will apply to all construction sites greater than 20 acres in size as of 18 months following the effective date of the regulations (which will be 60 days after Federal Register promulgation) and sites larger than 10 acres 4 years after the effective date.

As expected, EPA did not take NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance up on their suggestion that EPA impose post-construction controls. However, since EPA has already signaled that its long-term plan is to impose stormwater controls beyond the current universe of industry and construction sites, it seems at this point that broader stormwater regulation by EPA is more a question of when than whether.

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Although not breaking any new ground, a decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court last week provides a helpful summary of the discretion typically given to MassDEP in making permitting decisions. In Healer v. Department of Environmental Protection, abutters to a proposed wastewater treatment facility in Falmouth sued MassDEP, claiming that the groundwater discharge from the leach field associated with the facility would damage drinking water supplies and nearby wetlands. The Court affirmed the MassDEP Commissioner’s rejection of the abutters’ challenge.

As the Court noted

the “applicable standard of review is “highly deferential to the agency” and requires the reviewing court to accord “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it…. We give deference to the decision of an agency interpreting its own regulations … [and] do not intrude lightly within the agency’s area of expertise, as long as the regulations are interpreted with reference to their purpose and to the purpose and design of the controlling statute.”

As if that were not enough of a nod towards agency deference, the Court also noted, in the context of the plaintiffs’’ challenge to the monitoring requirements imposed in the permit, that

The Legislature “has chosen to put into the hands of an expert administrative agency the decision making regarding complex issues of environmental … science…, and has allowed the agency considerable discretion in determining monitoring of applicable parameters in order to carry out its duty….

Finally, the Court made at least one statement about the plaintiffs’ affirmative case that is sure to be cited by MassDEP and permittees in future citizen suits. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that toxic household chemicals might cause environmental damage, the Court stated that the “regulations do not require the department to establish permit conditions based on the plaintiffs’ speculative concerns.”

So, what’s the upshot of Healer? It certainly confirms that, as a general matter, courts are not going to reverse agency decisions unless they seem really off-the-wall.  On the other hand, it remains true that MassDEP does not always win and my own jaded view is that courts remain willing to reverse MassDEP, even when deference would require that the court affirm the agency, if the agency decision somehow rubs the court the wrong way.

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In an statement this week likely to send chills down the spine of developers, EPA Administrator Jackson called on Congress to provide a clearer definition of wetlands subject to permitting authority under the Clean Water Act. As most readers know, the 2006 Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States narrowed the scope of regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands. Unfortunately, the absence of a majority decision in Rapanos means that, at this point, no one knows quite how much narrower. I think that most observers at least triangulate around Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which stated that waters or wetlands with a “significant nexus” to waters that are navigable in fact should be subject to regulation. However, uncertainty abounds.

Uncertainty imposes significant costs on regulated entities (not to mention EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers). Therefore, a statutory fix that simply eliminated uncertainty would probably be welcomed by the regulated community. Of course, the devil is in the details. If the uncertainty is eliminated by subjecting any land that is ever wet to the CWA, such legislation would probably not be welcomed by developers.  Jackson’s statement that “I believe that the country benefits from something broader rather than narrower” is not likely to assuage developers’ concerns.

Time will tell whether compromise is possible in order to eliminate uncertainty that benefits no one.

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Developers and others who appear before local boards know what an uphill battle it is to challenge decisions of those boards. After all, there’s a reason for the existence of the phrase “You can’t fight City Hall.” Of course, it’s never a good idea to fight City Hall unless you absolutely have to do so, but a recent decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court gives some hope to those forced into that position by a board taking an extreme position.

In Pollard v. Conservation Commission of Norfolk, the local conservation commission, acting under its local wetlands bylaw, rejected a request for an order of conditions – a permit, to those of you outside Massachusetts – on the ground that the developer had not met its burden of demonstrating that the proposed work would not adversely affect a resource area. The developer had submitted a report by a consultant, in which the consultant opined that the project would not adversely affect the resource area and would comply with the bylaw.

The only evidence in the record before the commission was the report from the developer’s consultant. The commission took no other evidence. Instead, the commission simply concluded that the expert’s report was not credible. Since the developer had the burden of demonstrating compliance with the bylaw, the commission concluded that this was a sufficient ground on which to reject the permit application. 

The Appeals Court concluded otherwise.

While noting that the commission was not required to credit the developer’s expert, even though uncontradicted, the Appeals Court concluded that the commission was required to provide a basis for its rejection of the expert, noting that “evidence of a party having the burden of proof may not be disbelieved without an explicit and objectively adequate reason.” Since the commission had made no effort, either in its decision or in court, to explain its rejection of the expert opinion, the Court had no way to determine whether the commission “decision was arrived at with fairness and without predisposition.”

Developers cannot necessarily take this decision to the bank. As long as local boards provide some reasoned basis for their decision, a successful challenge will remain a long shot. However, where a local board truly ignores available evidence, there is some hope that courts will ensure that reason prevails.

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