State of the Environment: Pangloss Edition

I know that despair is always more fashionable than optimism, but it is sometimes useful to remember that not everything is going to hell in a hand basket. Yesterday, EPA issued a press release announcing publication of its latest report on trends in air quality. The report, titled “Our Nation’s Air: Status and Trends Through 2008”, makes clear that, overall, air quality has gotten significantly better, particularly since 1990.

What I find most notable is that reductions in NOx largely occurred after 2002, whereas reductions in other pollutants, such as PM and SO2, have occurred since 1990. Notice anything about these dates? After 1990, the acid rain trading program came into effect. With respect to NOx, the report itself acknowledges that the improvements resulted from implementation of the NOx SIP call and EPA’s NOx Budget Trading Program. 

What do you know? Trading programs work. Anyone in Congress pondering climate legislation paying attention?

Multiple Pollutant Legislation Makes a Reappearance

Harking back to legislative efforts of a few years ago, Representative John McHugh (R-NY) yesterday introduced legislation that would require significant reductions in emissions of SO2 and NOx, and mercury from power plants. The highlights of the bill include the following:

  • No later than two years from enactment, EPA must promulgate regulations requiring that powerplants:
    • reduce SO2 emissions by 75% over the Phase II levels contained in the current CAA acid rain program
    • reduce NOx emissions by 75% over 1997 levels
  • Even aside from the above-described reductions, on the later of 5 years from enactment or 30 years from initial operation, powerplants must meet applicable new source performance standards, or NSPS
  • Mercury emissions from coal-fired powerplants will be restricted to 0.6 pounds per trillion Btu. These limits will go into effect:
    • As of the date of operation, for facilities beginning operations after December 31, 2010
    • As of January 1, 2013, for facilities existing as of December 31, 2010

There is no provision for a cap-and-trade program with respect to mercury. The bill would impose a penalty of $10,000 per ounce on facilities that exceed the mercury limit.

Representative McHugh has said that he hopes to attach the legislation to the climate change bill. I haven’t seen any discussion yet regarding the bill’s prospects, but the fact that it was introduced by a Republican, albeit one from New York, suggests that something like this is at least possible. 

To me, the requirement that existing facilities attain NSPS may be the most interesting part of the bill. While the regulated community is diverse, I think that, given sufficient time to meet NSPS, at least some fraction of owners of existing facilities would be willing to do so, if – and it’s a big if – Congress would in return make changes to the NSR/PSD rules so that facility owners would not have to engage in a difficult, expensive, and uncertain NSR review for every conceivable facility modification. Freedom from NSR review in return for compliance with NSPS by a reasonable date certain? That would be an interesting trade-off.

SO2 Allowance Prices Drop: Is There a Lesson Here?

The results of EPA’s annual auction of sulfur dioxide (SO2) allowances under the acid rain program provide empirical support for a proposition that the regulated community repeatedly advances – certainty is critical to the success of complex regulatory regimes. Prices for 2009 allowances fell from last year’s average of $380/ton to $70/ton, or more than 80%. Prices in the 7 year advance auction fell even more dramatically, from $136/ton in 2008 to $6.65/ton, or more than 95%.

The short explanation for the crash in prices? Uncertainty over the fate of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule. Although there may be a number of other factors in play, the consensus seems to be that CAIR is the primary culprit. Having a rule issued, challenged, struck down, vacated, and then temporarily reinstated does not provide much of a basis for rational investment planning by corporations that might need allowances.

The number and identity of the bidders are also interesting. Two bidders purchased more than 98% of the spot auction allowances. One bidder – JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation – purchased essentially 100% of the 7 year allowances. (Though you will all be comforted to know that “Bates College Environmental Econ” was able to purchase 2 allowances in both the spot and 7 year auctions.) Of course, most of the allowances are allocated to existing emitters; fewer than 3% of allowances are auctioned. Nonetheless, this seems like remarkably little interest.

Is there a lesson here for a CO2 cap and trade program? Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good might be one candidate. Another would simply be not to tinker too much. The importance of cost certainty in corporate planning may be obvious, but that does not mean that it doesn’t bear repeating in times such as these.