Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

My apologies if this post is a mash note to Judge Wilkinson. Sometimes a decision is written with such clarity and simplicity that you have to sit up and take notice. Such is the case with yesterday’s decision in North Carolina v. TVA, reversing the District Court decision imposing an injunction against four TVA plants that would have required installation of additional controls for NO_x and SO₂ , notwithstanding the absence of any allegation that the plants were violating their permits under the Clean Air Act. My apologies also to my friends in the environmental community and the Massachusetts AG’s office, who supported the District Court decision, but I have a hard time seeing this decision as anything other than the death knell for this kind of public nuisance litigation.

My only complaint with the opinion is that second paragraph of the decision is such a cogent summary that it’s not obvious to me that the decision needed to go on for another 30 pages. That paragraph states:

This ruling was flawed for several reasons. If allowed to stand, the injunction would encourage courts to use vague public nuisance standards to scuttle the nation’s carefully created system for accommodating the need for energy production and the need for clean air. The result would be a balkanization of clean air regulations and a confused patchwork of standards, to the detriment of industry and the environment alike. Moreover, the injunction improperly applied home state law extraterritorially, in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court’s decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Finally, even if it could be assumed that the North Carolina district court did apply Alabama and Tennessee law, it is difficult to understand how an activity expressly permitted and extensively regulated by both federal and state government could somehow constitute a public nuisance. For these reasons, the judgment must be reversed.

While I will thus leave the bulk of the opinion to readers particularly interested in the subject, one other paragraph stands out for me. After discussing the contours of public nuisance litigation, Judge Wilkinson noted that:

while public nuisance law doubtless encompasses environmental concerns, it does so at such a level of generality as to provide almost no standard of application. If we are to regulate smokestack emissions by the same principles we use to regulate prostitution, obstacles in highways, and bullfights, see Keeton, supra, at 643-45, we will be hard pressed to derive any manageable criteria. As Justice Blackmun commented, "one searches in vain . . . for anything resembling a principle in the common law of nuisance."

There’s no question in my mind that this decision is the end of public nuisance litigation as a viable cause of action for traditional pollutants, where those pollutants are comprehensively regulated under a federal statute. Moreover, it certainly provides a roadmap for dismissal of public nuisance claims concerning GHG emissions. As I noted last year in discussion Connecticut v. AEP, even though the 2^nd Circuit allowed GHG nuisance claims to proceed, part of its argument was that there is no comprehensive federal regulatory scheme with respect to GHG. Its argument clearly suggested that, once such regulations are in place, public nuisance defendants might have better luck. The promulgation of the Tailoring Rule now means that public nuisance defendants can point to North Carolina v. EPA and say that the federal rules have displaced the common law of nuisance. I think that they will probably win that argument. They certainly should.

Thank you Judge Wilkinson.

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On July 6, 2010, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) released a proposed rule, dubbed the “Transport Rule”, which would replace the Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”). As you likely recall, in 2008 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in North Carolina v. EPA, found that CAIR had a number of fatal flaws and remanded it to the Agency. (Due to its environmental benefits, the Court agreed to leave CAIR in effect while EPA worked on addressing its concerns).  

EPA has clearly attempted to address the problems identified in North Carolina v. EPA. Most significantly, while the Transport Rule still contains a trading component, trading is limited and the Rule ultimately requires that each state provide the reductions required to mitigate that state’s contribution to the interstate air transport problem. At 1,300 pages, the Rule is too long even to summarize here. For a quick summary, take a look at our Client Alert. You might also want to take a look at EPA’s helpful Fact Sheet and presentation summary for slightly more detail.

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Last Friday, in NRDC v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down parts of EPA’s Phase 2 rule for achieving compliance with the ozone NAAQS. The most important part of the ruling was the Court’s conclusion that EPA could not rely on compliance with the NO_x SIP Call to satisfy the requirement that sources in an ozone nonattainment area demonstrate achievement of reasonably available control technology, or RACT. The basis for the decision was the Court’s conclusion that the plain language of the relevant portions of the CAA did not allow use of a cap-and-trade program to substitute for the source-specific compliance requirements imposed by the statute.

In this case, § 172(c)(1) of the CAA “requires that nonattainment areas achieve ‘such reductions in emissions from existing sources in the area’ as can be achieved by the adoption of RACT.” For the Court, this was simple and dispositive.

Thus, the RACT requirement calls for reductions in emissions from sources in the area; reductions from sources outside the nonattainment area do not satisfy the requirement.

In other words, a cap and trade program won’t do, if it allows sources to avoid explicit statutory requirements. There is nothing in the Act that precludes layering a cap-and-trade program on top of RACT requirements – but that would defeat the purpose of the cap-and-trade program, which is to allow emissions reductions to be made wherever they can be achieved most cost-effectively. To require minimum reductions at all facilities precludes such cost-effective decisions.

Frankly, while I’m a fan of cap-and-trade programs, the decision is neither unreasonable nor surprising, after the decision in North Carolina v. EPA striking down the parallel provision in the Clean Air Interstate Rule. As courts like to say (especially when Supreme Court confirmation hearings are under way), their job is not to make good policy; it is to interpret and enforce the law. If Congress wants to expand the role of cap-and-trade programs, it knows how to do so.

Of course, the elephant in the room is climate change legislation. If Congress does not enact a bill, North Carolina v. EPA and NRDC v. EPA circumscribe EPA’s discretion in implementing a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases under existing law.  I take the point made by Administrator Jackson and environmentalists that, if no one wants to regulate churches and schools, then EPA can probably figure out a way to do so.  However, exercise of such discretion is not the same as promulgating rules that will ensure that those facilities which are the subject of regulation have the flexibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the most cost-effective manner possible.  

Is anyone in Congress listening?

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