Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

To date, the only circuit courts that have reviewed public nuisance claims related to climate change, the Second Circuit, in American Electric Power, and the Fifth Circuit, in Comer v. Murphy Oil, have ruled that such suits can proceed. However, last week the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided to hear Comer v. Murphy Oil en banc, which certainly has to give the plaintiffs pause. While I am not fully versed in this issue, a quick glance at the web indicates that statistical analysis confirms one’s naïve assumption, i.e., that a full appellate court often decides to hear a case en banc because a majority thinks that the panel got it wrong.

As I noted when the original decision was issued, even under liberal standing rules, which suggest that the plaintiffs’ harm can be “traced” to the defendant as long as the defendant’s conduct “contributed” to the harm, it’s going to be very difficult for plaintiffs, particularly under the Supreme Court’s new pleading rules, to argue that, for example, Murphy Oil “contributed” to the harm caused by Katrina. If the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affirms the District Court dismissal in Murphy v. Comer, we could be headed back to the Supreme Court on climate change, since that would set up a conflict between the Second and Fifth Circuits.

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Two more decisions were released last week concerning whether nuisance claims could be brought with respect to harm alleged to have resulted from private conduct contributing to climate change. First, in Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, the District Court dismissed nuisance claims. Second, in Comer v. Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a District Court dismissal of nuisance claims related to damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina.

Village of Kivalina first. In this case, an Inupiat Eskimo village claimed that global climate change traceable to the defendants has essentially made their village uninhabitable. Notably and, I think, shrewdly, they did not seek injunctive relief, but sought only damages related to the cost of relocating the village. The District Court concluded both that the law suit raised non-justiciable political questions and that the plaintiffs did not have standing, because their harm was not fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct.

The Fifth Circuit wasn’t buying either of these arguments in Comer v. Murphy Oil. To the Fifth Circuit, like the Second, in the American Electric Power case, the complexity of the underlying proof is not sufficient to render these types of cases non-justiciable. The cases involve tort claims; courts resolve tort claims – pretty much, end of story. I’ve got to say, from my lowly perch, that I think that the Second and Fifth Circuits got it right here. It’s easy to say that it would be better for Congress to deal with climate change than state legislatures or, as here, courts. However, that’s not that same as courts declining to exercise jurisdiction. I’d be surprised if the political question argument  has any real legs.

Standing is a different matter. I still think that both the traceability and redressability elements of standing are problematic. Plaintiffs in both Village of Kivalina and Comer v. Murphy Oil solved the redressability issue by seeking only damages, and not injunctive relief. Both the Second and Fifth Circuits noted that traceability, as a standing issue, necessitates only that the plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ conduct “contributes to” the plaintiffs’ injuries. This is not a stringent test. However, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I could imagine some courts looking askance at the types of allegations made in these complaints, even at a pleading stage.

On balance, what these cases tell me is that some of these cases are actually likely to be litigated all the way through to trial. Notwithstanding the potentially huge recoveries, it seems here that the cost to the defendants of paying out anything more than nominal damages would be high, and the prospects of successful defense of these claims are still reasonably good. That’s a recipe for trial, as far as I can tell.

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After a number of stories indicating that the prospects for climate change legislation were dimming for 2009, the convergence of a number of factors suggests that legislation may still be possible.

Yesterday, Senator Boxer and Senator Kerry released a draft of climate change legislation. This doesn’t mean that Senate passage is imminent. The bill has not been formally introduced and, like the early drafts of the Waxman-Markey bill, leaves some sections blank. Senator Boxer apparently intends to issue a mark-up of the bill sometime in October. One note for the politically-minded readers of this blog – just don’t call the bill “cap-and-trade” legislation. Senator Kerry stated that he does not know what “cap-and-trade” means and denied that this is “cap-and-trade” legislation – notwithstanding that it would cap emissions of CO₂ and allow regulated entities the right to trade allowances to emit CO₂.

Meanwhile, EPA continues to work on climate change regulations. Last week, OMB apparently completed its review of EPA’s proposal to apply PSD rules to sources of CO₂ greater than 25,000 tons per year. EPA apparently intends to issue the rules some time this week. 

Opposition to climate change legislation among the regulated community appears to be splintering. In the past week, three members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce left the Chamber due to its intransigence on climate change. Perhaps even more tellingly, the Chamber yesterday issued a statement that it supports “strong federal” climate change legislation – though it still appears to oppose significant parts of the Waxman-Markey bill. The Chamber also stated that it prefers legislation to regulation by EPA. Finally, it is worth noting that the Chamber’s statement accused environmentalists of distorting its position, without addressing the withdrawal of three utility members.

The decision in Connecticut v. EPA allowing the public nuisance litigation against six generators to continue. If the threat of EPA regulation hasn’t been enough to tip the balance in favor of legislation, the threat of regulation by injunction may be enough to do so.

Whether these developments will be enough to push climate change legislation over the threshold remains to be seen. Certainly, they improve its prospects.

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On Monday, the Court of Appeals for the 2^nd Circuit finally issued a decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, reversing the District Court decision which had dismissed this public nuisance law suit against six large generating companies. The decision is notable in a number of different respects and may have far-reaching implications

·  Standing. Following Massachusetts v. EPA, it is not really surprising that the plaintiffs were able to establish that they have suffered injuries sufficient to provide standing. The more questionable point is redressability. The Court acknowledged that it must be “likely” that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. The Court’s response to this issue was that the plaintiffs need not demonstrate that a favorable decision will eliminate the injury, only that it will provide some measure of relief. Even so, could plaintiffs really prove that even elimination of all CO₂ emissions by the defendants would have any impact on climate change? I’m extremely skeptical. The Court did note that there is a “lowered bar for standing” at the pleading stage, so we may see more of this issue as the case proceeds.

·  Displacement. Connecticut v. American Electric Power, unlike the North Carolina v. TVA case decided in January, is basically premised on federal common law of public nuisance. However, federal common law only exists in the absence of legislation addressing the same issues and is subject to “displacement” by such legislation. Following Massachusetts v. EPA, there is no doubt that the CAA provides authority to regulate GHG. What, therefore, is the role of federal public nuisance claims at this point? The Court’s ruling here left defendants alive to argue this issue another day. The Court noted that EPA has not yet issued a final endangerment finding and certainly has not issued regulations limiting GHG emissions from stationary sources. Thus, the problem complained of by plaintiffs “has not been thoroughly addressed by the CAA.” In other words, if either Waxman-Markey passes or EPA moves forward with regulations on its own, defendants may have another crack at dismissing Connecticut v. American Electric Power. 

·  Nuisance Claims in Other Contexts. In tandem with North Carolina v. TVA, this case certainly puts new life into nuisance as a potentially important arrow in the quiver for environmental plaintiffs. As we noted in January, the TVA decision left room for nuisance claims even where National Ambient Air Quality Standards have been attained. This leaves substantial room for nuisance claims in a variety of contexts, as long as underlying legislation hasn’t specifically preempted such claims

·  Prospects for Federal Climate Change Legislation. We have already discussed the choice between regulation by EPA and comprehensive federal cap-and-trade legislation. Now it appears that this dilemma has three horns, not just two. Which would generators prefer? Waxman-Markey or judicial injunctions following nuisance litigation?

It’s a lot to consider.

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In a decision that could have significant impact on states’ efforts to limit cross-border pollution, Judge Lacy Thornburg of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina issued an affirmative injunction against the TVA this week, requiring it to install pollution control equipment at its facilities located nearest to North Carolina and imposing specific emissions limits from those facilities. The basis for the injunction was a finding, after trial, that the facilities created a public nuisance as a result of the air pollution transported from those facilities to North Carolina.

The decision is notable for a number of the findings and holdings.

• Generally speaking, compliance with regulations does not preclude a finding that air emissions constitute a nuisance. (The Court applied the nuisance law of the states in which the plants were located.)
• Ozone and PM_2.5 can create adverse health impacts at concentrations below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). This suggests that facilities contributing to concentrations of air pollutants can be subject to an injunction requiring the facility to decrease emissions, even if the area is in attainment of the NAAQS.
• The Court looked to survey data indicating that Blue Ridge Parkway visitors would pay $328 in annual taxes in order to improve visibility. As many readers will know, this kind of survey research is extremely controversial and may lead to some extraordinary damages findings.
• The Court declined to impose an injunction against TVA facilities that were not proximate to North Carolina, essentially on the ground their impacts on North Carolina were de minimis. The court found that those plants against which an injunction was entered contributed to somewhere between 5% and 10% of ambient contaminant concentrations. The other plants contributed less 0.1% of ambient concentrations.
• The Court imposed a stringent schedule by when pollution control equipment must be installed. The Court gave the TVA 27 months to install scrubbers and 21 months to install SCRs. This time frame was substantially shorter than that proposed by the TVA.

The one piece of good news for generating plants was the court’s causation analysis with regard to more distant plants. That analysis, if followed, suggests it would be extremely hard for a public nuisance plaintiff to prevail in a global warming case, since the causative contribution of any facility or even group of facilities to the global warming problem is almost certain to be even more attenuated than for those TVA plants distant from North Carolina.

The decision undoubtedly gives downwind states a substantial hammer against upwind sources of contamination (and could be applied to water pollution cases as well as air pollution). Indeed, in the current set of Congressional negotiations, industrial interests could conceivably be tempted to accept more stringent emissions limits in return for preemption of state nuisance laws. It will be interesting to see how this plays out in Congress.

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