Law and the Environment : Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Foley Hoag Law Firm : Boston, Washington D.C.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided, 8-0, in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, that a Florida law which allows the State DEP to fill in submerged land (owned, under Florida law, by the State), and then to cut off the littoral owners’ rights to accretion of the beach front without paying compensation, was not a taking requiring compensation under the 5^th Amendment. The decision was fairly easy, even for the property rights wing of the court, because it concluded that Florida law had always provided for such a result, so that the action by the DEP did not change the private owners’ preexisting rights.

However, the decision masks both continuing deep divisions on the Court concerning Takings Clause issues and confusion, if not incoherence, in the Justices' thinking.  As I noted when the Court took the case, the Court in Lucas distinguished state regulatory action limiting owners’ use of the property from “restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” I think it's a specious distinction. We used to regulate by common law of nuisance. Now we regulate by statute and regulation. Why should the common law be treated differently by the Supreme Court for Takings Clause purposes than statutes or regulations? 

In yesterday’s decision, four members of the Court answered this question. It turns out, according to Justices Scalia, Alioto, Roberts, and Thomas, that judicial changes to the common law may also subject the government to a regulatory takings claim. The reason? It is that, according to Justice Scalia, “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had no power to ‘change’ the common law.” News to me. I hadn’t realized that there was a halcyon day when the common law was fixed and perfect. Thus, it turns out, common law restrictions on property avoid the taking label only if they existed as of the time of the Constitution.

Justices Kennedy, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment (Stevens did not participate), but stated that it was premature to try to determine when judicial decisions might provide grounds for a takings claim. Justice Kennedy did emphasize that the plain language of the Takings Clause does not address what are now known as regulatory takings: 

The Framers most likely viewed this Clause as applying only to physical appropriation pursuant to the power of eminent domain.

Of course, Justice Kennedy is right on this score – a point somehow ignored by Justice Scalia in his originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. 

I normally represent private property owners and there are certainly times when, it appears to me, the government tries to achieve what might be noble objectives on the backs of private owners, simply because it doesn’t want to bear the cost.  Nonetheless, I think that this issue isn’t that complicated and the proper resolution would eliminate most takings claims. If a private use of land unreasonably imposes costs on neighbors or the public, then that use can be restricted, either by courts or by regulatory agencies, without payment of compensation. That type of regulation simply isn’t a taking. And, yes, the definition of “unreasonable” may change over time. That’s life in the big city – or the beachfront. Get over it.

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In 1992, in South Carolina Coastal Council v. Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a state statute or regulation that denies a property owner all economic use of her property requires payment of just compensation under the Takings Clause. The Court distinguished statutes and regulations from restrictions inherent in background principles of the common law of nuisance – the latter types of restrictions do not require just compensation.

The Supreme Court announced earlier this week that in the fall 2009 term it will hear another, similar, property rights case. The Court will hear an appeal of a decision by the Florida Supreme Court holding that a beach erosion control statute did not unconstitutionally deprive landowners of their property rights without just compensation. 

The facts in Stop the Beach Replenishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection are somewhat obscure and relate specifically to the consequences of beach replenishment in Florida. However, it again does raise the question of how the Supreme Court treats statutes. Prior to the 1960s, governments pretty much regulated nuisances pursuant to common law police power. Apparently, exercise of such power has the constitutional blessing of the Supreme Court.

On the other hand – to note the obvious – since the 1960s, across the gamut of environmental police power issues, use of statute and regulation has overtaken reliance on the common law. For some reason, however, constitutional jurisprudence has not caught up with reality on the ground. The whole idea of the common law is that it is flexible and changes over time. Is there any doubt that, had there not been an explosion of environmental statutes and regulations, there would have been an explosion in the development of the common law of nuisance? It seems near certain that courts would have identified numerous additional uses of property over the past 40 years that would now be considered nuisances.

Why should the same regulatory outcome require compensation if taken pursuant to statute or regulations, but not if it occurs as a result of judge-made common law?   

(In the interests of full disclosure, the broad question of how courts treat statutes, as opposed to the otherwise developing common law, was raised by my then-Professor Guido Calabresi in his 1982 book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes.  Judge Calabresi, your student has not forgotten.)

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