GHG Nuisance Claims? Yes? No? Maybe?

Two more decisions were released last week concerning whether nuisance claims could be brought with respect to harm alleged to have resulted from private conduct contributing to climate change. First, in Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, the District Court dismissed nuisance claims. Second, in Comer v. Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a District Court dismissal of nuisance claims related to damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina.

Village of Kivalina first. In this case, an Inupiat Eskimo village claimed that global climate change traceable to the defendants has essentially made their village uninhabitable. Notably and, I think, shrewdly, they did not seek injunctive relief, but sought only damages related to the cost of relocating the village. The District Court concluded both that the law suit raised non-justiciable political questions and that the plaintiffs did not have standing, because their harm was not fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct.

The Fifth Circuit wasn’t buying either of these arguments in Comer v. Murphy Oil. To the Fifth Circuit, like the Second, in the American Electric Power case, the complexity of the underlying proof is not sufficient to render these types of cases non-justiciable. The cases involve tort claims; courts resolve tort claims – pretty much, end of story. I’ve got to say, from my lowly perch, that I think that the Second and Fifth Circuits got it right here. It’s easy to say that it would be better for Congress to deal with climate change than state legislatures or, as here, courts. However, that’s not that same as courts declining to exercise jurisdiction. I’d be surprised if the political question argument  has any real legs.

Standing is a different matter. I still think that both the traceability and redressability elements of standing are problematic. Plaintiffs in both Village of Kivalina and Comer v. Murphy Oil solved the redressability issue by seeking only damages, and not injunctive relief. Both the Second and Fifth Circuits noted that traceability, as a standing issue, necessitates only that the plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ conduct “contributes to” the plaintiffs’ injuries. This is not a stringent test. However, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I could imagine some courts looking askance at the types of allegations made in these complaints, even at a pleading stage.

On balance, what these cases tell me is that some of these cases are actually likely to be litigated all the way through to trial. Notwithstanding the potentially huge recoveries, it seems here that the cost to the defendants of paying out anything more than nominal damages would be high, and the prospects of successful defense of these claims are still reasonably good. That’s a recipe for trial, as far as I can tell.

Massachusetts Limits The Standing of Businesses to Challenge Permits Issued to Competitors

In an important decision yesterday, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the operator facility participating in the renewable portfolio standard program did not have standing to challenge a state decision authorizing other facilities to participate in the RPS program. The decision may have broad implications regarding when businesses may challenge the issuance of permits or other approvals to competitors in Massachusetts.

In Indeck Maine Energy v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, the plaintiffs operated biomass facilities which were authorized to sell renewable energy credits. When the Department of Energy Resources authorized two other biomass facilities to sell RPS credits, plaintiffs sued.

As the SJC noted up front, to establish standing, a plaintiff must “allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred.” At least in Massachusetts, an injury from business competition does not confer standing. However, prior cases held that this rule “does not apply … to competitors in a regulated industry.” The question is thus: What does it mean to be in a regulated industry?

After analyzing the purpose of the RPS statute and its prior cases on this issue, the court came to a relatively simple conclusion:

The question of standing in the context of competitive injury turns not simply on whether an industry is regulated, but rather on how that industry is regulative. The common threat present in the cases in which standing has been found is regulatory schemes that contemplated some form of protection of the competitive interests of the respective plaintiffs.

Accordingly, if an industry is regulated in such a way that it can be said that the protection of competitors is within the regulatory scheme’s area of concern, such a competitor alleging harm deriving from business competition would have standing to sue.

Applying the rule here, the SJC concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing, because the Legislature “did not seek to protect and thereby confer standing to sue on existing competitors, thereby creating a barrier to market entry.” In other words, a business does not have standing to challenge an approval issued to a competitor unless the very purpose of the regulatory scheme was to protect the competitive position of the plaintiff.

This decision has potentially significant impacts on other permitting regimes, such as those implemented by MassDEP.  Following Indeck, a business harmed by the issuance of an environmental permit issued to a competitor will not have standing to challenge the permit, because it is not the purpose of any of the environmental permitting regimes to create barriers to market entry.